Mercenaries and Paid Men

The Mercenary Identity
in the Middle Ages

Edited by John France

BRILL

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History of Warfare

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The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages

Proceedings of a Conference held at University
of Wales, Swansea, 7th–9th July 2005

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LEIDEN • BOSTON
2008

To all those who suffered in the London bombings of 7 July 2005

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MERCENARIES AND PAID MEN. THE MERCENARY IDENTITY IN THE MIDDLE AGES[1]

INTRODUCTION

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Mercenaries have never had a good press. At best they have been largely forgotten. The great war between Greece and the Persian Empire is imprinted in our minds as a struggle of freedom against Asiatic despotism, but it is often forgotten that huge numbers of Greeks fought against Alexander the Great (336–23) as paid men in the ranks of the Persian army. In the twentieth century mercenaries meddling in African wars were regarded with disdain, while even now we look with suspicion upon the private-enterprise soldiers serving the coalition in Iraq. This is all the odder in that they may lay claim to be one of the oldest professions known to mankind. In the second millennium the kings of Assyria and Babylon employed Amorite nomads, while the Pharaohs bought the services of Nubians and Philistines, and all this long before money was invented. Such dislike and distrust was especially marked in the Middle Ages when the very term *mercenarius* was for long a term of abuse. In classical Latin the word simply meant a hireling of any sort, but this was given a particular connotation by its use in a famous passage in the Gospel of St John in which Christ contrasts himself, the Good Shepherd with the 'hireling…whose own the sheep are not' who flees at the first sign of trouble 'because he is an hireling, and careth not for the sheep.'[2] This dislike had very clear consequences. After the conquest of England in 1066, a penance for killing was imposed on the entire Norman army, but it was markedly more severe for those who served William for pay than for those who were his subjects serving from obligation to their ruler.[3] This distinction between duty and the desire for gain may strike us as highly artificial. Virtually all men who fought hoped to gain, and in this case the greater men who were subjects of William stood to gain far more than those who hired themselves for pay. However, this distinction was a very important one in medieval

thinking and still forms the basis of modern perceptions of who was a mercenary and who was not.

One aspect of the poor press which mercenaries have received is that they are seen as the most brutal and degraded of soldiers. Cruelty, in particular is often seen as their defining characteristic. In 1179 the Third Lateran Council condemned mercenaries and all who employed them, calling even for a crusade against these destroyers of churches who killed the poor and the innocent without any distinction of sex or status.[4] But this was hardly a special quality of mercenaries. The nobles and knights of medieval Europe tended to justify their privileged position in terms of their sense of social responsibility, and, in particular, the duty to defend the weak and helpless. By the end of the twelfth century, David Crouch (15–32) suggests, this was a central plank of the newly emerging exclusiveness of the aristocrats to whom the knights were being assimilated. But this quality was observed at least as much in the breach as in the performance. A vital part of medieval warfare was the destruction of the economic capacity of the enemy, and if this involved, as it often did, bullying peasants and much worse, then so be it. Geoffroy de Vigeois, a Limousin abbot who was more familiar than most with the ravages of mercenaries, records that the great noble Aimar, Viscount of Limoges and his friends, massacred 2000 of both sexes in a day in a drive against their enemies towards Brive.[5] In 1188 William Marshal, the very paradigm of twelfth-century chivalry, advised his king, Henry II of England (1154–89), to deceive the French by pretending to disband his army in order to mount a terrible raid, a *chevauchée*, into their lands, burning, looting and destroying.[6] Mercenaries were often the instruments of this kind of violence, but their employers were the nobility who were well aware of their methods.

Similarly, fickleness is often seen as another characteristic of the mercenary soldier. In 1183 Henry the Young King, rebelled against his father, Henry II, and seized the city of Limoges where he found numerous allies amongst the discontented nobility of the Limousin. At the same time he gathered a substantial force of mercenaries, but he was afraid that his father would hire them away from him by paying more. Indeed, Henry II, as John Hosler (33–42) has shown, was a formidable and frequent hirer of mercenaries.[7] But switching sides was a commonplace of war and far from limited to paid men. When Philip of France (1180–1223) attacked Normandy in 1204, the infidelity of the local nobility to their ruler, King John (1199–1216), became a major factor in the collapse of the duchy.[8] By contrast, in 1102 Robert

of Bellême's castle of Bridgnorth surrendered to Henry I (1100–35) at the instance of the local inhabitants, angering the mercenaries in the garrison who felt their reputation had been sullied, compromising their chances of future employment. Henry, impressed by this, permitted them to go freely.[9] This may have been an exceptional instance, and Henry I's generosity was certainly unusual, but in general mercenaries seem to have given good value. King John of England was certainly convinced of their value. He demanded that his bailiffs in Normandy should guard all the booty of his mercenary leader, Lupescar, and later required that the Seneschal of Gascony should assist 'our beloved and faithful Lupescar' in all ways.[10] Indeed, John's preference for such men has made a considerable contribution to the bad press mercenaries have received. They were excoriated in *Magna Carta* as foreigners and the barons demanded that their expulsion from the realm be written into the document as a vital part of their agreement with John.[11] The paradox of French-speaking barons who ruled English people condemning other Frenchmen as foreigners is remarkable. It is all the more paradoxical in the case of Robert of Béthune, who John had appointed as Constable of his army, because this man was from a notable Flemish family, and in his own right Lord of Béthune and advocate of St Vaast of Arras.[12] However, the memory of the condemnations has stuck in the memory of English-speaking peoples for whom *Magna Carta* is a sacred text. Kelly Devries (43–60) is surely right to scorn nation as a criterion for identifying mercenaries.

In fact, *Magna Carta* is only one of the very particular circumstances which have contributed to the poor regard in which medieval mercenaries are held. The condemnation of 1179 seems to be truly remarkable. But in fact it did not merely single them out as perpetrators of horror because their employers, the nobility, were also condemned. Yet the decree of 1179 arose from the fact that Southern France was plagued by a terrible series of wars. The Plantagenet, Henry II, as duke of Aquitaine, had laid claim to the county of Toulouse as early as 1156, but this was rejected by the counts of Toulouse. There followed what has been called 'The Forty Years War', really a series of conflicts, which dragged on until 1196. Inevitably, the kings of France took an interest in this dispute, and usually supported the counts of Toulouse. This conflict, therefore, became enmeshed in the wider Angevin-Capetian rivalry which in the 1180s would severely affect the Berry, where Bourges was an important French royal centre.[13] Moreover, the barons of Aquitaine did not enjoy the stern rule of their Angevin masters,

and there were eight serious rebellions against Henry II and Richard in the period 1168–93.[14] Furthermore, the kings of Aragon wanted to assert their claim to Provence, the lands east of the Rhône, and other parts of the south, against the counts of Toulouse. This resulted in a series of wars embroiling Provence, the Auvergne and the Languedoc which smouldered on in parallel with the Angevin-Capetian conflicts, particularly after 1166. It is hardly surprising that the kings of Aragon and the Angevins were commonly allies across this period.[15] In fact a huge area of central and Southern France suffered from acute political fragmentation, and the absence of any dominant power created conditions which mercenaries and others could exploit to the full. Rather similar conditions prevailed in late medieval Italy. The collapse of the Empire in the thirteenth century, and the severe problems in such successor-states as Naples, here discussed by Guido Guerri dall'Oro (61–88), created the same kind of political fragmentation which could be exploited by mercenary leaders, foreign in the case of Hawkwood, local in the case of the Da Varano lords of Camerino considered here by John Law (89–104), to their own advantage.[16] The notorious ill-fame of such *condottiere* bands is well-deserved. Leaders like Sir John Hawkwood changed sides at will, blackmailed cities and pillaged the countryside with unprecedented intensity, and all this has been brilliantly exposed by modern writers.[17] It is worth noting, however, that only a minority of such predators were foreign, and that it was the complex and bitter rivalries of small Italian states which provided mercenaries with their opportunities.

In less extreme circumstances, mercenary troops were a normal element in armies across the Middle Ages, hardly exciting comment. The articles in this volume speak clearly for the ubiquity of the mercenary in Europe at this time and for the wide variety of functions which they discharged. Much medieval warfare consisted in the building of fortifications and the conduct of sieges. This is the subject of Nicolas Prouteau's paper (105–118) which examines the role of mercenaries in the warfare of the Middle East in the age of the crusades. The fact that men worked across the religious divide in such capacities indicates how complex relations were between the crusaders and their Muslim foes. If this is largely unknown territory, it has to be said also that naval warfare in the Middle Ages has not been very fully explored. John Pryor (119–42) has written extensively on this subject and here traces the careers of soldiers of fortune in the naval service of Charles of Anjou, King of Sicily (1265–85).

It is often supposed that mercenaries only became common components in armies from about AD 1000. Richer of Rheims provides an account of the battle of Conquerueil in 992 in which he refers to the Angevin army as consisting of Fulk of Anjou's vassals and his *conducticiis*.[18] This is commonly cited as one of the earliest references to mercenary soldiers in medieval Europe. Richard Abels (143–66) broadly agrees with this time-scale, in that he connects the appearance of mercenaries in the late tenth century, at least in England, with the rise of a money economy which resulted in both the hire of such troops and direct payment being made to those who served out of obligation to a ruler. Bernard Bachrach (167–92), however, contends that in Roman and Merovingian times 'there were groups of fighting men, perhaps we may call them companies, as well as individual fighting men, who were free to offer their services for hire and who were contracted to perform military duties for various types of remuneration'. Equally, Charles Bowlus (193–206) looks to an earlier date because he characterises the Magyars as mercenaries, who entered the service of various German factions, most notably in 954 when they served the rebels against Otto I, his son Liudolf of Swabia and son-in-law Conrad of Franconia, in the campaign which ultimately led to Otto's great victory at the Lech in 955.[19]

Thus, for the early medieval period this volume presents us with a major problem: when did mercenaries first appear? On closer examination we can see here also the elements of the discussion on mercenary identity, for many soldiers in these early armies were paid. As Abels says, 'In this paper I will draw a distinction between, on the one hand, mercenaries, that is, soldiers who lacked political or social ties to those who employed them, and, on the other, salaried household men and paid expeditionary soldiers whose duty to serve arose, at least in part, from the demands of lordship.' This, of course, is the pragmatic definition of a mercenary which is implicit in the medieval distinction, already referred to, between those who fought only or primarily for pay, and those who fought for other reasons. In this volume it is also explicitly used by Ifor Rowlands (207–230), who distinguishes between those who serve for money and those who have a particular relationship, personal or tenurial, with his commander. This pragmatic view commands widespread acceptance, but the difficulty lies in our sources and their limitations. Were the *antrustiones*, the armed followers of the great who were so important in Bachrach's period, mercenaries in this sense, and when, if ever, did a purely cash relationship transform

into something else? Were the Magyars mercenaries or allies? It is just
this range of problems which Stephen Morillo (243–60) has set out to
examine in a wide-ranging article which aims to create a consistent,
cross-cultural typology or set of definitions of the varieties of paid and
unpaid military service. The basis of the typology is a distribution field
with two axes: one running from politically determined terms of service
to economically determined ones; the second measuring the degree to
which military personnel are embedded in the society they serve. This
is one of the few papers here to step outside the purely European
sphere, and it provides us with a matrix against which to examine the
problem on an international scale, but inevitably we still have to deal
with the limitations of our sources.

   The problem for the period before c. AD 1000 is scarcity of con-
temporary comment, and this continues to a degree, but thereafter
impenetrability becomes a major element in the discussion. The term
mercenarius is actually a very rare one in our sources. Geoffroy de Brueil
de Vigeois was a monk of St Martial at Limoges who later became
abbot of Vigeois (1170–84), to the south-east of Limoges in the modern
department of Corrèze. He came into close contact with mercenaries
and was appalled by the destruction they wrought. But when he uses
the blunt term *mercenarios* it is applied to churchmen corrupted by rich
living. Immediately afterwards he lists the soldiers who afflicted the
Aquitaine as '*Primo Basculi, postmodum Teuthonici Flandrenses et, ut rustice
loquar, Brabansons, Hannuyers, Asperes, Pailer, Navar, Turlau, Vales, Roma,
Cotarel, Catalans, Aragones*'.[20] The decree of Third Lateran of 1179 gives
a comparable list '*Brabantionibus et Aragonensibus, Navariis, Bascolis, Coterellis
et Triaverdinis*', while another source much interested in the sufferings of
the south at this time calls the same people '*Ruthariorum. Arragonensium,
Basculorum, Brabancionum et aliorum conducticiorum*'.[21]

   Some of these names are regional designations for the places such
soldiers came from, while others are generic terms. Brabançons (men
of Brabant) found in all these lists, is much the commonest term used
by twelfth-century chroniclers. *Aragonensibus, Navariis, Bascolis* and *Han-
nuyers* are, respectively, those from Aragon, Catalonia, the Basque lands
and Hainaut. It is very evident that these are all divided or otherwise
troubled lands. There are also, however, places mentioned in these lists
which are very uncommon. *Turlau* could refer to Le Puy-Turlau (Péri-
gord) or Turlau near the town of Curemonte (Corrèze) but these seem
unlikely, while *Vales, Roma* are obscure. *Asperes* poses difficulties. Geoffroy
de Vigeois includes them in a list of people from the Netherlands, but

goes on to mention Aragonese and others in the same breath. Asperen, in what is now Holland, is a possible place of origin, but so is Vallée d'Aspe (Pyrénées Atlantiques, région du Béarn). Alternatively this may be a generic term derived from the Latin *asper*, meaning rough (which perhaps could be rendered in English as 'ruffians') or an allusion to the *asperiolus*, a coin. Obvious generic terms are *Rutharii*, derived from *Rupta* or *Ruta*, meaning men of the companies, analogous to *routiers*, *conducticii* and *coterelles*, and all could perhaps be rendered as gangsters or cut-throats in English. *Palearii* is another generic term connected with *paleare* meaning a stack of straw, and could be rendered as rough-sleepers. Geoffroy de Vigeois explicitly tells us that he reserves this term for a particular group of men from very diverse origins sent to the Limousin by Philip of France. *Triaverdinis*, used in the list given by Canon 27, is a very rare word which Ducange thinks may be connected with *Trialemello* meaning thrice-armoured. All these are clearly pejorative terms, and one wonders why the simple mercenary is avoided. Perhaps Geoffroy de Vigeois provides a clue—that it had ecclesiastical overtones.

But there was certainly another very important reason for avoiding the blunt term mercenary. By the twelfth century it is apparent that most men serving as soldiers were paid. At the very top of society great magnates served kings of their superiors because they had an obligation to do so, arising from personal or tenurial relationships. Their relationship with the commander was essentially political, but lesser men needed funding because military service was costly. Many of these were gentle persons, and they could not be called mercenaries. And there is no shortage of evidence of paid fighting men. Eljas Oksanen (261–74) has studied the treaties between the Count of Flanders and the English kings in the twelfth century. They provide for a pension to the counts in return for an obligation to raise *equites* for English service on demand. Although we do not know that any of these were ever implemented, Oksanen concludes that the availability of such troops was a useful basis for soldering a political relationship between the two lands. But it is difficult to call the actual soldiers mercenaries. A cavalryman needs a long training to be useful. Moreover, the daily pay of cavalrymen was substantial, but not so high as to provide easily for the rapid purchase of horse, armour and equipment, so it is a reasonable inference that these mounted soldiers were drawn from knightly families who provided the equipment. The term *stipendiarii* is frequently used in twelfth century documents to describe soldiers in Europe and elsewhere, and it seems to be another euphemism, avoiding the blunter *mercenarii*. In the Latin

Kingdom of Jerusalem it is used particularly frequently, and normally it is interpreted as meaning holders of money-fiefs. However, Alan Murray (275–86) suggests that these cash-grants would have been an entirely appropriate way to pay hired men, though he leaves open the question as to whether we should regard them as mercenaries. Similarly, Ifor Rowlands (207–30) has examined the royal records of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and concluded that, at a much humbler level, the paid troops recorded in them and raised from the royal lands were not mercenaries in that their service arose from obligation as well as simple payment. Similarly, the urban militias England and Germany, as David Bachrach shows (231–42), might be paid for their services, but they were not mercenary in any sense. The English served under the direction of the monarchy, while the Germans were entirely the instruments of their cities.

Laura Napran's paper (287–300) examines the chronicle of Gilbert of Mons, Chancellor of the Count of Hainaut who was very familiar with mercenaries and paid men and regarded the former as necessary to the effective military endeavours of the counts of Hainaut. His chronicle provides evidence of the social standing and costs of mercenaries, while an analysis of vocabulary demonstrates a perceptual difference between professional mercenaries and nobles who received payment as expenses. While the use of paid men was regarded as a sign of power, a 'paid' lord was considered by Gilbert to be degraded.[22] David Crouch (15–32) has reached much the same conclusion by a rather different route. His paper asks what difference was there between Mercadier, Richard's great mercenary leader, and the young William Marshal and why was William so hostile to his contemporary and fellow-servant of the crown? Both served for money and reward. The answer, Crouch suggests, lies in the fact that at this very time aristocracy was becoming defined and, thereby, exclusive. 'The generation of William Marshal was the one in which social class took a step towards becoming self-consciously hierarchical.' All this tends to reinforce the notion that payment was a sensitive subject in medieval armies and that its form and perhaps, frequency had considerable impact on perceptions of status.

A much larger body of contemporary source material has survived from the later Middle Ages than from the period before. Moreover, the language is much more explicit, and, in the case of royal records, much more informative and detailed. Adrian Bell (301–316) has explored this by taking the muster rolls of two English expeditionary armies to France in 1387 and 1388 and comparing them with other material to reconstruct

the careers of men as soldiers and mercenaries fighting in Italy. Including no less than six who served in these campaigns are also found on the strength of the notorious 'White Company' in Italy. Bell shows that the ability to fight in the latest style was a profitable commodity, and we know from the example of Hawkwood that there were fortunes to be made in Italy. Spencer Smith (317–30) has reaffirmed this, revealing in his investigation of the archaeology of the manor house of Tatsfield, Surrey how well its one time owner, Owain Lawgoch, a mercenary of Welsh princely descent, had done. But fighting in other lands did more than merely profit proficient (and lucky) soldiers. It also spread new fighting techniques and methods. The incessant wars in France spilled over into Spain as both sides sought Hispanic allies. This brought mercenary soldiers into Spanish affairs in large numbers, with the result that, as Carlos Andrés González Paz (331–44) remarks, 'The fourteenth-century Spanish Civil War cannot be understood without the analysis of the role that the English (and Welsh) or French mercenaries troops played in this armed confrontation. Those mercenary troops, supporting both Pedro I of Castile and his stepbrother Enrique of Trastamara, introduced into the Iberian Peninsula a new way of waging war, which was rather different from the old standards of the chivalry.'

Sven Ekdahl (345–62) has explored another dimension of the mercenary experience in the later Middle Ages, their use by the Teutonic Order during the 'Great War' with Poland-Lithuania, 1409–11, whose best known event was the battle of Tannenberg on 15 July 1410. As well as being interesting in itself, a passage in his article throws up the very question—is there a pure mercenary? During the battle of Tannenberg, Luppold von Köckritz, a knight from Meissen, died attempting to kill the Polish king. He was a close friend of the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Ulrich von Jungingen. In a letter, Luppold recorded that many aristocratic friends would fight the Lithuanians, who were perceived as pagans, on behalf of the Order, but would demand payment in the case of war against the Christian Poles. This raises the issue of identity again, for it suggests that those who fought for money could also be moved by ideological consideration. It is also raised by the two contributions to this volume which reach into what is generally called the early modern period.

Muríosa Prendergast (363–82) discusses the role of Scottish mercenaries in Irish affairs. In a military sense these troops brough a more systematic and effective style of war to Ireland where, hitherto, relative poverty had meant that fighting mainly consisted of raids. At first these

mercenaries seem to have been recruited on a limited basis and they
became assimilated to Irish political structures. But in the second half of
the sixteenth century the supply of Scottish mercenaries became highly
political because it gave the opportunity for the Scottish magnates pro-
viding them to become powers in their own right in Ireland. Thus the
cash nexus with the Irish employers proved less important for these men
than the political relationship with their lords. The effect of this demand
for mercenary service brought political intervention and new political
structures, destabilizing Gaelic Ireland. In the seventeenth century, as
Ciarán Óg O'Reilly (383–93) shows, Ireland exported mercenaries who
served in a vast number of armies in continental Europe. But though
we tend to refer to such men, including the famous 'Wild Geese', as
mercenaries, in reality they would only serve Catholic powers, in whose
causes they were prepared, literally, to fight unto death. But is it proper
to call somebody who is ideologically motivated a mercenary?

The papers in this volume reveal how common mercenaries were
in Europe and even elsewhere in the Middle Ages. They also point
to their impact on the conduct of war. English-speaking people, in
particular, tend to regard foreigner and mercenary as synonymous
because of *Magna Carta*. But this was clearly a nonsense because the
conflicts between the kings of England and France had something of the
character of a civil war between members of an international French
aristocracy. The Hundred Years War is often seen as having promoted
a sense of nationality on both sides of the channel, but Jean le Bel was
a Hainaulter serving Edward III (1326–77) who saw nothing remark-
able in this or in Edward's claim to rule what we call France. Perhaps
more importantly these papers address the question of what kind of
people mercenaries were. The veiled language reveals how sensitive
the subject of payment for military activity was for a very long time.
The key to understanding the mercenary in the period after AD 1000,
and perhaps even before, is to grasp how important war was to the
European upper class. It was a means of enforcing and extending their
power and defending it from their rivals. The moral justification of their
economic, social and political dominance was their role as the defend-
ers of church and society. Although aristocrats claimed a monopoly of
war, they could not fulfil this function on their own, and they recruited
privileged followers, the *chevaliers* or knights, who were their bully-boys
and enforcers. Some of these held land of their patrons, while others
were paid men who might aspire to such status. Both groups conceived
of themselves as the honourable followers of the great. They lived with

them in and around castles, fought with much the same equipment and enjoyed a common lifestyle. There seem always to have been plenty of aspirants to this way of life who could be recruited at need, as the Treaty of Dover and its successor agreements suggest. Thus, when a great man went to war he was supported by his core followers, many of them related, augmented by rather similar people hired for the occasion. But such honourable men could not be called mercenaries. And war on any scale demanded many more troops and of different kinds.

Although the kingdoms of Medieval Europe reserved the right to call all men to arms in times of invasion, arming the general population was not something which the elites encouraged. We do not know precisely how infantry were recruited, but as the money economy of Europe became ever more vigorous, from the end of the tenth century, we hear more and more of paid men, and they represented a major element in almost all armies by the mid-twelfth century. We may wonder that anyone wanted the life of a soldier, but peasants dragged out an existence which was, in the famous phrase, 'nasty, brutish and short', and there were always chancers in village communities. It can be no accident that regional designations like 'Brabanter' suggest that such people came from troubled frontier areas where disturbance must have increased the numbers of willing recruits. We do not know how 'regular' such soldiers were. All armies had short lives, so we can only assume these people went back to their villages and the rustic way of life between campaigns. If anybody was a pure mercenary, serving only for pay and available to anyone with the means, it was these *routiers*, and this undoubtedly lies behind the disdain in which they were held. But they were not called mercenaries, because that meant 'hireling' and would have been a powerful reminder that almost all soldiers, of whatever status, were paid.

Thus, there were very strong social and cultural reasons for a framework of language which hides much reality from us. Roger of Sicily, of the Hauteville family who conquered South Italy in the eleventh century, was happy to tell his family historian to recollect that once he lived as a brigand.[23] But in the twelfth century the European nobility were rather more fussy, as David Crouch says, about how it presented itself and anxious to stand aloof from others. Hence care was taken to distance the 'proper soldiers', the aristocrats and their dependents, from others who fought. Somewhere in that grey and uncertain gap a man became a mercenary, but quite where the change took place is uncertain. In a world where a landed knight might serve both as a vassal

and as a paid man, this is hardly surprising. By the later middle ages, however, armies had become much more professional and records are much more plentiful. As a result the mercenary appears as a distinct and identifiable figure. But at this very time other ideological forces appear as motivating forces. John Hawkwood was an entrepreneur of war, but he often represented the interests of the English government in Italy. The indentured soldiers raised by the English captains in the 'Hundred Years War' resemble very closely the contracted companies of mercenaries who devastated fourteenth-century Italy, and they often ignored official orders and campaigned for themselves in just the same brutal way. Yet they were different, and ultimately responsive to an ideology of what we call nationalism. And as Europe divided over religion in the sixteenth century Protestantism and Catholicism exercised powerful influences over even the most self-serving of soldiers.

What this conference served to show was the complexity of the military profession in Medieval Europe. The exigencies of a limited agricultural economy prohibited the creation of regular armies. Short-term armies were made up of many different kinds of people enjoying complicated relationships with their commanders. We may talk of the army of this king or that, but most soldiers probably saw themselves as being the men of a whole host of lesser captains and lords. The greater army was a composite of retinues and hirelings, and though the overall commander's money held the whole thing together like a cement, it was less a monolith than a network of complicated relationships. In these circumstances we might do well to regard mercenary as a term of art, a paradigm to which some approximated more than others, but which, in itself, had little contemporary reality.

NOTES

[1] The papers in this volume were given at a Conference, 'Mercenaries and Paid Men. The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages' held at Swansea University, 7th–9th July 2005. On behalf of the participants, the editor would like to thank the British Academy, the James Callaghan Centre for the Study of Conflict, the School of Humanities and the History Department at Swansea for their generous support.

[2] Iohannes 10.12–14; English of the King James Bible.

[3] H.E.J. Cowdrey, 'Bishop Ermenford of Sion and the penitential ordinance following the battle of Hastings', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 20 (1969), 225–42.

[4] C.J. Hefele, *Histoire des Conciles* ed. H. Leclerq, 9 vols (Hildesheim: Olms Verlag, 1973) 5.2, 1106–08.

[5] Geoffroy de Vigeois, *Chronica* in P. Labbe, *Novae Bibliothecae manuscriptorum et librorum rerum Aquitanicarum* 2 vols (Paris: Cramoisy, 1657), 2. 323.

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[8] F.M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy 1189–1204: Studies in the History of the Angevin Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1913).

[9] Ordericus Vitalis, *Historia Aecclesiastica* ed. M. Chibnall 6 vols (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969–80), 6.28.

[10] T. Duffus Hardy (ed.), *Rotuli Litterarum Patentium in Turri Londoniensi asservati* (London: Record Commission, 1853), 24, 30, translation by T. Duffus Hardy (ed.), *A Description of the Patent Rolls* (London: Public Records, 1835), 52. I owe this reference to my colleague, Ifor Rowlands.

[11] On those to be expelled, see N. Vincent, 'Who's Who in Magna Carta Clause 50?', in M. Aurell (ed.), *Le médiéviste et la monographie familiale, sources, méthodes et problématiques* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 235–61.

[12] His position is remarked on by M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience* (New Haven: Yale, 1996), 152–3. On Robert's career see E. Warlop, *The Flemish Nobility before 1300* (Kortrijk: Desmet-Huysman, 1976), 668–9. I am grateful to my colleague, Ifor Rowlands, for information and references on Robert.

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[14] A. Debord, *La Société laïque dans les pays de la Charente, X^e–XIIe siècles* (Paris: Picard, 1984), 382–402.

[15] C. Higounet, 'La rivalité des maisons de Toulouse et de Barcelone pour la prépondérance médiévale', in C.E. Perrin (ed.), *Mélanges d'histoire du moyen âge dédiés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1951), 313–22.

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[17] On the Italian experience see in particular M. Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (London: Bodley Head, 1974); Caferro, *Hawkwood*.

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[19] On the Lech campaign see especially C. Bowlus, *The Battle of Lechfeld and its Aftermath, August 955. The End of Migrations in the Latin West* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

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[21] Anonymous of Laon, *Chronicon Universale Anonymi Laudunesnsis (1154–1219)*, ed. A. Cartellieri and W. Stechele (Leipzig & Paris, 1929), 37.

[22] Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut* tr. L. Napran (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2005).

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WILLIAM MARSHAL AND THE MERCENARIAT

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The *History of William Marshal*, which records his life and many of its hero's opinions, is a marvellous window on the Angevin court in the later years of the twelfth century. Although it was not composed till the mid 1220s, and its author was a young man who knew little of the 1180s and 1190s, we know from its author himself that he had good sources for what was being done and said in the Marshal household in those years. His principal source was the Marshal himself, who told his children and followers many anecdotes of those days, but also we have the preserved recollections and memoirs of at least two of his principal household knights in the 1180s and 1190s, the bannerets John of Earley, his sometime ward, and John Marshal of Hockering, his nephew. So the *History* is not just an invaluable—if occasionally unreliable—source for the history of early Angevin England and Normandy, it is also a very reliable guide to the attitudes of the upper end of the aristocracy of the late twelfth century.[1]

Not surprisingly therefore the *History* has a lot to say about mercenaries; not surprising, because the subject of the mercenary and mercenary violence is one that is very much evident in other sources for the late twelfth century. Taken all in all, we can say that William Marshal and the men of his circle were not in their day particular fans of mercenaries, and they especially did not like their captains. What I want to deal with here is what was the precise nature of the Marshal's distaste for the *routier*, and particularly the *routier* captain. The view I want to test is that the condemnation of the mercenary in the late twelfth century took a new turn. No one was ever a fan of the medieval mercenary, by which I mean strictly the short-term contracted soldier, and specifically the *routier*, that is, a member of a *rutta*, a party of soldiers and their commander contracted in companies for specific campaigns. For it is, strictly speaking the *routier* that late twelfth-century sources condemn. The change in the vocabulary of condemnation in the Marshal's generation is, I will suggest, something which tells us of

broader developments in society than simple distaste for the *routier* and his conscienceless violence.

The *History* goes into detail on three of the mercenary captains of the age. It considers the activities of Sancho de Savannac in 1183, Mercadier in 1197–8 and Lupescar in 1202. Its author's opinions are invariably negative. Sancho was employed with a company of his Basques to assist the Young King's operations in the Limousin in the early summer of 1183. Henry's death in June left Sancho owed money for his services. To make sure he was paid he seized William Marshal by the bridle and held him captive until he gave his personal pledge that Sancho would be paid a hundred marks. The account describes Sancho as *riches rotiers*, and his concerns as being entirely monetary. It's highlighted when the author describes Sancho as talking of the Young King to the Marshal as '*your* lord'; for clearly, in the author's view, Sancho had to be a stranger to that sort of affective link between lord and man.[2] The Young King was Sancho's employer, but the Marshal's friend and father.

Mercadier is given much the same off-hand treatment by the Marshal biography. In 1198 he is described as being sent by King Richard to scout out the size of King Philip Augustus's army advancing on Gisors, along with a local knight, Hugh de Corny. The two men are opposed to each other as contrasts. The author describes Mercadier as the opposite of Sir Hugh, who was a 'wise and valiant knight', for where Hugh gets the moves of the French army right and gives a correct assessment of its size, Mercadier panics. The king believes Hugh, because he knew him to be 'a shrewd, wise and worthy man'—which assumes that Mercadier was none of these things.[3] This is a not uncommon romance tactic, opposing the characterisation of a man you disapprove of to one that you do—hence brave Lancelot was opposed to fell Mordred, and uncourtly Kay to courtly Gawain; psychotic Raoul to restrained Bernier. The intention here is to oppose a knight who was, as they said in those days, *preudomme*, a mature collected knight, to a soldier who was anything but.

So it is almost a surprise to find the biography some lines later describing Mercadier being commissioned to lead a *chevauchée* through the Beauvaisis (a reference back to the 1197 campaign). You would hardly think that the king would trust him if he really had that poor an opinion of Mercadier. But Mercadier was there to strike terror, according to the *History*, and being nasty was clearly a quality with which the author was prepared to credit him, for he was in that cam-

paign a 'cruel neighbour (*felon veisin*)' to the city of Beauvais.[4] The passage deliberately underplays Mercadier's part in that campaign, for it pictures King Richard as leading the attack on the Beauvaisis, when in fact it was Mercadier and Count John who took Bishop Philip of Beauvais captive and seized the castle of Milly-sur-Thérain in that memorable castle action. King Richard was in fact in Rouen at the time, and although Marshal certainly was valiant in the assault on the castle he was not in command of the siege. The author had no intention of crediting Mercadier with any worthy military achievement, if he could get away with it.

Finally, the Marshal biography deals with the part that John's mercenary captain, Lupescar, played in the final campaigns in Normandy in 1202–3. Lupescar commanded a great company of *rotiers* in those last months of the Anglo-Norman realm. And as far as the *History* was concerned, it was Lupescar who was principally responsible for its demise. He gives quite an excursus on the subject:

> But you should know first of all why it was that the king could not win the hearts of his men and draw them to him. Why? By my faith, he allowed Lupescar to treat them so harshly that he seized whatever he came across in the land, as if the land were at war. But that was nothing; for if he dishonoured the men's wives and daughters, not twopennyworth was paid in compensation.[5]

This singling out of Lupescar and his troops for censure is certainly intriguing. It is intriguing because of how closely Marshal and Lupescar were actually associated with the defence of Normandy. As it seems from the combined evidence of his absence from John's court and a passage in William le Breton's *Philippidos*, John ordered William Marshal and Lupescar in September 1203 to lead a large expedition from Rouen up the Seine to the frontier to relieve Château Gaillard, but the expedition was however decisively repulsed by William des Barres. The author of the biography chose either to ignore this incident, or his sources threw a veil across it; either way, it deliberately edited out the close association of Marshal and Lupescar.[6] One explanation would be that the Marshal perhaps blamed Lupescar for this humiliation, as a way of drawing the blame off from himself, and his circle adopted a view of the man as a principal reason why the greater humiliation of John's expulsion from Normandy occurred. The culpability of Lupescar was by no means a view unique to the Marshal and his men: a petition of the Norman barons addressed to John two months after the defeat of the Château Gaillard relief column roundly condemned Lupescar's

behaviour in the duchy. But maybe this was because he was by then a useful scapegoat for the developing disaster.

A composite view of mercenary captains emerges from the Marshal biography. It goes like this. They are only interested in money; they are incompetent soldiers useful only for the more sordid aspects of warfare; they are dishonest, and oppressive if given power; but in particular they stand outside the network of relationships between king-duke, magnates and knights. They were not necessarily loyal either, despite owing their living to fulfilling short-term military contracts efficiently. We find this slander outside the Marshal biography, but deriving from the same generation. Geoffrey of Vigeois in 1183 reflected on the sup-posed fears of the Young King in the Limousin that the mercenaries he was employing might go over to his father, if he offered them more money.[7] But perhaps the key thing they do not share with their betters is the professed respect of a nobleman for the defenceless in society. The author echoes here the fulminations of Pope Alexander III in 1179 against Brabançon, Arragonese, Navarrese and Basque mercenaries and their employers, who wage war on Christian folk 'in the manner of pagans'.[8] So, these men are neither *chivalers* or *serjanz*: they are only *rotiers* and no ethics apparently bind them, so much so that they are on the edge of Christian society. The Marshal biographer's view on this is not unique. In 1194, Marshal's former colleague in the Young King's circle, the poet Bertran de Born, came out with a parallel view:

> I have as much affection for the Basque routiers (*companha*) as for greedy prostitutes. Sacks of sterling pennies and Capetian moutons offend me when they are the product of fraud. A household knight (*maisnadier*) who shows himself greedy ought to be hung, along with the magnate (*ric ome*) who sells his services. No man ought to pursue Lady Greed, who sells her favours for money.[9]

Again, the mercenary, the *routier*, is characterised as working only for money and as standing outside the prevailing morality of the knight. Fighting should not be done for money, but for something else, and greed—whatever Gordon Gekko said—is not good. Bertran had attacked Alfonso II of Aragon ten years earlier for becoming no more than a hired warrior (*soudadiers logaditz*) by selling his services.[10]

All of this righteous posturing can, of course, look a little hypocritical in view of what we know about the crass materialism of late twelfth-century military society. What difference after all was there between Mercadier and the young William Marshal? We know a lot about the

Marshal's life and motivations, and at first sight his life as a retained, landless knight bears some resemblances to that of the *routier*. William Marshal had entered into employment as a household knight in 1166 and had hopped from household to household as opportunities presented themselves. As a landless member of a *mesnie* he expected at the least his horses and equipment to be found for him, food and board, and fine cloth for robes to be granted to him at regular intervals. At certain times in his life we know he negotiated regular money fees from his employers, not least the handsome charge on the rents of St-Omer which he was given by Count Philip of Flanders for entering his household late in 1182. We know also that he expected money payments for riding in the tourneying household of the Young King Henry.

The amounts of cash expended on the tournament field were quite remarkable. In 1179 on one particularly special occasion the Young King rode with more than two hundred knights, fifteen of whom were senior knights, or bannerets, with their own retinues. Not only did he pay his own retained knights, he also paid twenty shillings a day to the knights in his bannerets' retinues, thus relieving them of the expense. Each day this enormous tourneying company rode together it cost Henry over two hundred pounds, and he undertook to pay each knight the same sum from the moment they left their homes to join him. To give an idea of what was being offered daily, two hundred pounds was the annual income of a moderately wealthy baron, or the amount the county of Worcester owed the king every year. William Marshal's biographer commented: 'It was a source of wonder where this wealth was to be found,' as well indeed he might. Of course some of it was raised from the king's own captures and ransoms. But the biographer was also aware that much of it was raised on credit at the towns at which Henry was staying, and that he left a trail of debt bonds behind him wherever he went.[11]

Now here is a situation at first sight not too obviously different from that of the captains contracted by the Young King in wartime to recruit companies in his service. And not just the circumstances were comparable, so were the attitudes behind them. Thanks to Nicholas Vincent we know that the Marshal was never satisfied with what he got from his professed lords. What makes this different from greed? Professor Vincent recovered a letter of summons by Henry II to the Marshal for the 1188 campaign in which the king had some ironic things to say about the way the Marshal had annoyed the king by never being

satisfied with the size of the rewards in land that the king had offered him.[12] How, then, could William Marshal piously look down on the likes of Mercadier and Lupescar? How were they other than him? You could easily argue that the profit motive was just as evident in his own conduct and that the seductions of Lady Greed were not something he was proof against.

It seems to have been a criticism of which the Marshal was himself aware. This is clear at the point where money in his career was most evident, on the tourney field. The point of tourneying for such a knight as he was in the 1160s and 1170s was to make money by taking ransoms. For the Marshal, the ransoms were usually the horse of the man he had taken or thrown down. Time and again in the *History*, the Marshal is depicted as ostentatiously handing on the odd ransom to demonstrate that he still preferred Lady Largesse over Lady Greed. But that did not alter the fact that he was particularly keen that ransoms be paid. On two occasions he relentlessly pursued fellow tourneyers in *ad hoc* courts of honour held by princes in the post-tournament dinners, so as to get what he saw was his due. He was meticulous in recording what was owed him. We know that on one occasion he went into a partnership with a Flemish knight, Roger de Jouy, to pool profits from ransoms in an entire tourneying year in the mid 1170s, from one particular Pentecost to the following Ash Wednesday. He commissioned and kept a parchment roll as record of the 103 captures the pair had jointly made.[13] Finally—and this was really clever—he made sure that everyone knew that the ransoms he required would not be exorbitant. In a tournament at Anet on the Norman border in June 1179, the Marshal was solicited by a group of fifteen trapped French knights to take their surrender, which they did because he was known to charge less than his rivals in the matter of ransoms. The knights who had trapped the Frenchmen were outraged at his opportunism, as well they might be.[14] But the Marshal knew the sense in the commercial concept of the loss leader.

Yet still the Marshal *did* feel superior to warriors who contracted to fight for cash. Of course, the similarities between his and their behaviour are only similarities if we look at their behaviour a little simplistically. The fact was that the Marshal belonged to a social group which had developed a self-conscious set of ethical ideals, and the group's attitudes were complex ones, caught as they were between the ideals they professed and the practical exigencies of daily life and survival. This social group was made up of those magnates and their knightly

followers who regarded themselves as noble, and so were constrained to practice conduct which was consequently recognised as noble. Such conduct in the Marshal's generation was summed up succinctly in the *Song of Aspremont* around 1190 in the following sketch of a self-evidently noble gentleman:

> To the proud he was indomitable and remorseless, but he behaved with humility and consideration to lesser folk. He was not greedy for possessions and was generous to important and humble people alike. In body he was well-proportioned and an object of admiration.[15]

The object of this little sketch was in fact a Saracen, an admirable emir called Gorhan. And the fact that a Saracen could be regarded as noble in such a way, while the likes of supposed Christians like Lupescar and Mercadier, might not be, can only be significant in illustrating the contempt in which the Marshal and his fellows regarded them. The two qualities which made Gorhan noble—lack of greed and socially responsible behaviour—were those very qualities that the Marshal's biographer said that Sancho, Mercadier and Lupescar lacked.

It is worthwhile looking at those particular qualities through contemporary literature. The contrast between Greed and Largesse is strongly evident in contemporary literature. As the Marshal's biography made clear, its author set a lot of store by Largesse. It is, in fact, one of the more fascinating noble qualities of the twelfth century, fascinating because it was so very evidently an obsession of the time and as a noble virtue its roots were tangled. When the biographer made a thing about Largesse he was not necessarily being self-interested, praising a quality as noble from which he hoped to profit, as the Marshal had profited in his day from his lords. The author in fact made Largesse the principal noble virtue, indeed he said that Nobility (*gentilesce*) was raised in the household of Largesse. For that reason we must conclude that Largesse was a defining moral quality, a symptom of a 'good heart'.[16] I would go further and say that there was an element in the praise of Largesse which grew out of the early twelfth-century tracts on the *contemptus mundi*, tracts which had penetrated the consciousness of the educated laity. This was the sort of sentiment that Stephen de Rouen, monk of Bec-Hellouin, thought that he detected in Waleran II, count of Meulan and Worcester, when he retired into a monastery in 1166. He expounded on the count's understanding of generosity in this way:

> Wealth melts away, honour is trodden down, and the world's glory is one day remembered, the next forgotten, and once forgotten is gone for ever.

> Count Waleran himself saw that he would be earth, worms and dust:
> he dreaded eternal punishment and he strove to enter heaven. He gave
> away, dispersed and thought little of his belongings, and he took the easy
> yoke of Christ upon his body with a pious heart.[17]

Stephen linked together liberality and indifference to possessions. He
made it into a religious frame of mind, a dualistic one that prioritised
spiritual concerns over the material. It was I think for this reason that
Chrétien de Troyes said that Largesse was the queen of the virtues
and that, of itself, Largesse made a man a *prodome*, a wise and mature
man of affairs.[18]

   Chrétien's contemporary, Alan of Lille, drew out a further moral
understanding of Largesse. He explained in more detail what sort of
nobility lay in the concept of Largesse. It was not just a simple matter
of giving away what he had: *Largitas* in a man caused him to set no store
on greed or gifts, and to have nothing but contempt for bribes, and so
be the very antithesis of the routier.[19] So for all these twelfth-century
writers, writing just as noble conduct was on the verge of reaching
codification, Largesse was an elevating moral and religious quality. As
early as 1118 we find a clerk of the count of Anjou itemising the virtues
to which his master aspired, and these included the emulation of the
patience and generosity (*largitas*) of the patriarch Job, regarded as one
of the patrons of all ascetics.[20] And it was for this reason that Count
Henry the Liberal's epitaph proclaimed on his part, '*Largus eram, multis
dederam*' (I was generous; to many I gave).[21] Largesse was the symptom
of a Christ-like mind which set little store by material things, which
rejected the sin of greed and the corruption that flowed from it. This
was why Chrétien regarded it as the defining feature of a *preudomme*:
Largesse was true nobility.[22] Raoul de Houdenc said much the same
in the next generation. He taught that *Larguece* was in fact one of the
two key qualities in noble conduct, the other being courtliness. Raoul
argued that when true knights exhibit Largesse, they were showing above
all the courage to do without material possessions. It is no surprise
therefore to find that Raoul considered that Largesse arose not out of
Prowess, but out of Hardihood (*Hardement*), because as he interpreted
their significance, both derived from a commendable contempt for the
things of the world, the same contempt recommended to noblemen by
Stephen de Rouen in the late 1160s.[23]

   Now it might be true that ideal and reality did not quite match in
the noble man's devotion to Largesse. We have already seen that the

Marshal's generosity had more than a tinge of the pragmatic about it. The Marshal biography itself is saturated with materialistic expectations, it is in fact obsessed with money. Contemporaries were well aware of this sort of moral double standard and slackness. Around 1200 Alexander Neckam mocked the hypocrisy of the magnates of his day and the paltry rewards they offered their harassed and exploited followers: 'Miserliness' he said 'enforced away from the public gaze. Generosity which never gets beyond giving absolute necessities'.[24] But that sort of lip service is neither here nor there. The point is that Largesse was identified in late twelfth-century lay mind as a noble quality, while Greed was identified as ignoble. Those men who openly practised acquisitiveness were not playing the noble game. They were outsiders to the socially dominant class.

The other quality on which the mercenary captains were attacked was their lack of social responsibility. They did not bear down the proud and protect the humble, quite the opposite in fact. Yet this was an even more well-established noble quality. The moral justification for the privilege of the nobleman was always at the forefront of the twelfth-century mind as it approached the verge of the codification of noble conduct. In fact it almost amounts to a sub-code in its own right. In my recent book, *The Birth of Nobility*, I called it the 'Davidic ethic', for the reason that it ultimately derived from the praise psalms attributed to King David.[25] It was an ideal consciously drawn by clerics from Biblical tradition, and it had been drawn from it many centuries before the age of William Marshal. The earliest writer who cites it was the one known as the Pseudo-Cyprian, author of a tract called the 'Twelve Abuses current in the World'. The Pseudo-Cyprian was an early writer on kingship and law, working apparently in eighth-century Ireland, and it was he who first used the ethic to be a reproach to a 'wicked king'. It was from him that Archbishop Hincmar of Reims drew the matter of his lecture to the lay powers of his province in 881, instructing them on their duty under God:

> No consideration....should cause them to stray from righteousness. They should be impartial judges between neighbours. They should protect and assist orphans and widows and other poor folk, and they should hold the Church and its servants in respectful deference, as far as they are capable. By constant effort and repression they should restrain those who, in their arrogance and violence, seek to undermine the common peace of the people by theft and brigandage.

The obligations involved in the ethic can therefore be reduced to some-
thing brief and simple. Rightful authority was based on protection for
the weak and helpless, especially the Church; respect for widows and
orphans; and opposition to the cruel and unjust.

The message was repeated on into the sub-Carolingian generations.
When Witgar of Compiègne composed a eulogy for Count Arnulf I
of Flanders in the 950s, he praised him as 'the assiduous restorer of
God's churches, the pious support of the fatherless, dependents and
widows, the merciful source of aid to all in need who turn to him'.[26]
When an anonymous cleric of Jumièges composed a lament for William
Longsword, count of Rouen (murdered in 942, as it happened, by the
pious and merciful Count Arnulf) he bewailed a man who was: 'maker
and lover of peace; comforter and defender of the poor; maintainer
of widows and orphans'. This for a man who had been born overseas
as the son of a pagan Viking jarl.[27] Two or three generations after
this, the programme for the Peace of God movement in France was
in part the fulfilment of those very ethical requirements: the protection
of the poor and the defenceless.[28] And the Peace movement is in itself
some evidence that the ethic had deeply penetrated lay consciousness
by 1000, for it was that ethic that was being appealed to by the peace
legislators.[29]

As early as the end of the eleventh century the scope of the Davidic
ethic had broadened out to embrace all warriors of good will. The
romance epic, the *Couronnement de Louis* in the 1130s, contains the advice
to all lords that they should maintain orphans and widows, serve the
Church and be considerate to their knights.[30] By the last quarter of
the twelfth century, in the Marshal's generation and possibly even in
his hearing, Stephen de Fougères preached that ideally: 'a knight must
draw his sword to do justice and to defend those who cannot implead
others for themselves: he should suppress violence and theft', and also,
of course, defend the Church. In the same decade Alan of Lille consid-
ered that for all knights who were pious it was necessary (amongst other
things) to defend widows, console the unhappy, support the needy, feed
the destitute and befriend orphans. It is no surprise, therefore, to find
that William Marshal in his day ostentatiously respected the ethic. In
the retreat from the city of Le Mans in 1189 he found time to direct
his squires to assist an old lady retrieve her goods from her house in
the burning city, and hauled out her smoking mattress personally.[31]

It is difficult to imagine Mercadier or Lupescar helping an old lady
save her mattress, though it is not impossible. But the fact is that con-

temporaries attacked them for not sharing the Davidic ethic which justified aristocratic power. When they plundered and raped for their employers, they did so without conscience and offered no compensation. I suppose that when William Marshal laid waste the lands of his lords' enemies he must have done so with a compromised conscience. But he could argue that at least he respected an ideal which the mercenary captain simply did not acknowledge.

The third and final line of attack against the *routier* was simply that he had no part in the community of interlinked loyalties that helped define noble society. Mercenaries had no lords. They did not share in the expectations of loyal service laid on household knights. The sentiment was expanded on in proverbial style in the 1170s by Jordan Fantosme:

> He who acts falsely towards his rightful lord or does any wrong which causes him annoyance can be sure of getting his merited punishment; and he who serves him loyally is greatly to be esteemed.[32]

The reason why such a stern ethic of loyalty should be so central a component of medieval noble conduct may be perhaps self-evident, but it needs examination, simply because there were times when noblemen did not adhere to it. Alan of Lille in the 1180s gave a good, if idealised, definition of the faithful warrior, a man who avoided deceit and fraud, kept pacts of friendship and was true to his real friends, while avoiding fairweather flatterers, 'the footmen of Fortune'.[33] Alan pinpointed the characteristics that brought loyalty to the fore as a noble virtue. It encouraged men to keep to agreements that they had made, to avoid known fraudsters and to stand by their friends.

The question of loyal service is nowhere more prominent than in the biography of that loyal servant, William Marshal (*c*. 1146–1219). William occupied a truly Anglo-French world, living and fighting during his long life in a great arena: from southeast Ireland, through Wales, England, Normandy, Picardy and Paris, south to Poitou and Burgundy, and venturing as far as Jerusalem. William did not hold an acre of land until he was over forty, and until then he existed on food, board, and salaries from his employers. His reputation for loyal service was literally his bread and butter. He had enemies, and when they wanted to undermine him, they did so by attacking his loyalty. One of his chief tasks as the leader of the Young King Henry's military household in the 1170s and early 1180s was to stay by his lord's side in tournaments, and prevent him being captured. Marshal's enemies

alleged he was often not to be found there, but instead he rode off on his account after ransoms. After one such adventure the king himself is depicted as rebuking William:

> I really think it's about time you came back, Marshal. Any man who leaves his lord in such a situation behaves very badly. You saw fit to do that just now, and I am not the one to teach you in these matters, but this much I do wish to tax you with, that you did not behave in a rightful manner when you left me at such a time. It was not right, indeed it was wrong.

William turned the rebuke with a courtly excuse, that he was wrong to go, but on the other hand he had not thought that his young master had ambitions to be quite so forward in the field as to put himself in danger, but now he saw that Henry was going to rival his royal ancestors in valour, he would take more care.[34]

Later in life, William Marshal was again accused of disloyalty, and again sought to justify himself. In 1205 he had crossed to France in the aftermath of the French conquest of Normandy to attempt to negotiate a peace settlement between King John and King Philip. The negotiations failed, but during them Marshal made an act of homage to King Philip for his Norman lands, so as to keep them from confiscation. When he returned to the English court, he found that King John was very angry, and had taken his pragmatism as treachery. The Marshal protested vociferously that the instructions King John had given him before he left had allowed him the latitude to save his French lands. The king for his part utterly denied it. Marshal continued to stonewall:

> Sire, I was never disloyal (*fals*). There is no *prodome* in this land of yours against whom, if he wished to prove and establish that my intent was to do you wrong I would not defend myself in combat. I have never committed treason or any evil deed that would make me hide my head in shame, nor will I as long as I live.[35]

Marshal was in the end driven to demand that anyone who wished to maintain the charges of disloyalty against him should fight a duel. No-one was willing to do this, given William Marshal's military reputation, and so the charge lapsed. However such charges rankled with the next generation of the Marshal family. After the old Marshal was dead, his biographer was careful to note that King Philip of France, on hearing the news, had remarked in condolence to Richard Marshal, his younger son, that William Marshal had been the most loyal man (*li plus leials*) he had ever met.[36]

The importance of a reputation for loyalty in noble conduct is amply demonstrated by the Marshal biography, as is also its fragility. There are many other contemporary medieval agonisings over what was or was not good faith. How far did the ethic of loyalty bind a man? The Marshal shows some examples. There are others in the *Roman de Thèbes*, a work of the 1150s or early 1160s, where we are given a household debate between two knights about loyalty between lord and man. One knight, Alys, says that a man owes his lord military aid and all other assistance he can give in pursuit of his interests, and in return the lord 'has to look after my interests as if they were his own'. But the debate here goes a further step, and considers what should be done if the lord did not honour his obligations. Alys responds sharply: 'Do you think I would keep faith with someone who did not keep faith with me? To the Devil with a man who trifles with me, who will not keep to his promises'.[37] Again, there is a balance between pragmatism and idealism, but the balance was always towards the ideal.

So the point of this argument is in the end simple. There were many reasons to resent and despise mercenaries, but for the aristocrat who was conscious of his nobility, the principal one was that the mercenariat stood outside the confines of what was considered noble behaviour, and did not share the ethical ideals that united and was beginning to define a noble class. It was on those headings that it was attacked. You could equally well point to another target of aristocratic disdain which employed just the same method of attack. This was the urban elite which was resented for its wealth and for its social ambitions. An example of how it was treated can be found in the well known 1180s tract of Andrew the Chaplain on love between social levels projected a society which was divided into a hierarchy of social conditions (which he also called *ordines*). Andrew saw them as ranked in ascending levels (*gradus*) and as being exclusive, for they had boundaries (*metae*, *fines*) which should not be crossed. The boundary that did not include the urban elite was the sense of nobility (*nobilitas*). It was the conscious property of the two highest of the orders he described, and it was greedily envied by the urban classes. It constrained the knight and the count to be polite, but always to be aware of the social gulf between themselves and the rest. Nobility was rooted both in birth and upbringing, and although Andrew reluctantly conceded that nobility of manners could be possessed or acquired by those outside the aristocracy, to the knight and count they were innate and natural. Andrew also admitted that the

prince, who was above all the orders of society, could confer nobility on a man of great probity (or as the vernacular had it, a *preudomme*), whatever his class. The late twelfth century—as we have seen from the treatment of the urban elite as well as the mercenariat—had become preoccupied with focussing nobility on the elite levels, and thus denying it to lower levels. Merchants were rich and could afford all the trappings and luxuries that materially defined the higher aristocrat, and the fact that they could do so troubled the boundary of noble class.

The lines of attack against the urban wealthy naturally focussed on their adoration of Lady Greed, as they had with the mercenariat. An anonymous French social polemic written around the time of the *History of William Marshal* puts it this way:

> Townsmen nowadays are chiefly occupied in having a good time; they make their belly and jewelled cups their god…do anything for them and you'll find yourself billed for it![38]

An earlier didactic example: James de Vitry and Jean de Joinville both repeat a story which originated in Andrew the Chaplain's generation. In Champagne in the 1170s there was a particularly wealthy merchant called Artaud of Nogent, a close associate of Count Henry the Liberal (1152–1181), the husband of Andrew's patron. Artaud built a grand castle and was an important member of the count's council, and acted and dressed in every way like a magnate. But, according to the story, he was brutally cut down to size when the count was petitioned by a poor knight for help to pay the dowries of two daughters. Artaud in his meanness spoke up too loudly against the petition, and the count retaliated against his presumption by granting Artaud and his goods to the poor knight, on the grounds that Artaud was his 'villein' to dispose of as he wished.[39] The story's later popularity tells us how useful it was in reinforcing the limits of nobility, but also how insecure those limits actually were when confronted by wealth that could buy the material attributes of aristocracy. As for London and its elite, Matthew Paris put into Henry III's mouth a nasty put-down of their pretensions: 'those London peasants (*rustici*) who call themselves barons sicken me with their wealth'.[40] The message was clear. There was nothing wrong with wealth, provided you knew how to use it, a nobleman could overcome the temptations of wealth, but a merchant could not.

The key point I am making is that the criticisms of mercenaries which reach us from the 1180s and 1190s were a new thing. They were a symptom of more dissatisfaction with mercenaries than just disap-

proval of their disruptive effect on society. Mercenaries—but particularly mercenary captains—were one of those groups within that particular generation who had to be stigmatised as non-noble, because in their wealth and influence with princes they were a challenge to the emerging concept of the noble knight. They could not therefore be admitted to be *preudomme*, they had to attacked for the qualities they displayed that distanced them from what was definitively noble: qualities of loyalty, freedom from greed, and respect for the defenceless.

As a control factor to what I am talking about here, it is worth noting that the attacks on mercenaries in the last quarter of the twelfth century are something rather different from attacks on them earlier in the same century. An analysis of the plentiful rhetoric used against them in King Stephen's reign in England betrays different themes. Although Stephen hired considerable numbers of soldiers for his campaigns in 1136 and 1137, these hirings produced no comment. It is likely that he was doing no more really than Henry I had done before him, engaging troops individually on short term contracts. It's not even known if these troops were outsiders to the Anglo-Norman realm. Similarly, his agents in Normandy hired numerous mercenary knights, in this case from France, but again no comment. The first hostility is manifested in Normandy towards the Flemish mercenary army that Stephen contracted for in 1137 with his former associate William, once count of Ypres. What was new? The difference seems to have been that this was a band of genuine *routiers*, a *rutta* or company serving under an influential contractor with his own political agenda. They were less answerable to the king, and they were deeply resented by the Norman aristocracy, and their presence caused Stephen's army of summer 1137 to collapse as many of the Normans walked out. The only explanation offered is racial antagonism of Normans to Flemings. The same reason is given for the antagonism towards Robert of Gloucester's lavish recruitment of companies of Welsh professional warriors under their kings: notably Morgan of Glamorgan and Madog of Powys.

Contemporaries in the 1140s despised the Flemings as devious, conscienceless looters, and their captain, William of Ypres as 'an evil man who feared neither God nor men.' The Welsh were likewise seen as semi-human barbarians. Both were condemned as wolves and amoral predators, slaughterers of priests and the innocent, torturers and rapists. This is, of course, the sort of attack that continues to be made against *routiers* throughout the century. But in Stephen's reign, the copious rhetoric against *routiers* focuses on their thievery and their racial

origins and characteristics, not their exclusion from the noble ethos. And in many ways the rhetoric used against *routiers* in the first half of the twelfth century parallels to a large extent that used against knights in the early eleventh century: they were amoral pillagers of the poor and innocent, defying the peace of the king and the church. Commentators were willing to blame the mercenaries and their captains rather than their employer as the cause of the disruption of the time. They were agents of violence. What they clearly were not then were competitors to the rising dignity of a social class. They were not condemned for being outside the noble ethics of the eleventh and mid twelfth century. That in itself is an argument that the claims to nobility had become an issue among knights at the end of the twelfth century, where it had not been at the beginning.

You can draw a surprisingly large conclusion from the anti-*routier* rhetoric in the biography of William Marshal. My contention is that it is one of those symptoms betraying a particular and critical social shift. The generation of William Marshal was the one in which social class took a step towards becoming self-consciously hierarchical. To consolidate that hierarchy of groups, you had to say which were noble and which were not. A principal target was the urban patriciate, but the influential and wealthy *routier* captain was also singled out. In both cases we see the way they might be stigmatised. It was in not subscribing to accepted noble norms of conduct. Never mind that a large number of magnates and knights were equivocal in their devotion to these principles. The fact was that they at least admitted the ethics to be worth pursuing, and would not admit that the warriors in the mercenariat did.[41] And so in the next generation chivalry came about as an exclusive and self-conscious code.

NOTES

[1] Digest from Introduction, in vol. 3 of A.J. Holden and D. Crouch (eds), *History of William Marshal*, trans. S. Gregory (3 vols, Anglo-Norman Text Society, Occasional Publication Series, 4–6, 2002–2007), 26–37, hereafter *HWM*.

[2] *HWM* 1. ll. 7003ff.

[3] *HWM* 2. ll. 10933–56.

[4] *HWM* 2. ll. 11117–11122.

[5] *HWM* 2. ll. 12595–606.

[6] William le Breton, *Philippidos*, in H.F. Delaborde (ed.), *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton Breton* 2 vols (Société de l'Histoire de France, 1882–85) 2. 181–89; D. Crouch, *William Marshal: Knighthood, War and Chivalry* (2nd edn, London, 2002), 91–2.

[7] *Chronicon Lemovicense*, in, *Receuil des Historiens de France*, 18, 216–17.

[8] *Gesta Henrici Secundi*, ed. W. Stubbs 2 vols (Rolls Series, 1867) 1. 228.

[9] Bertran de Born, *Poésies complètes*, ed. A. Thomas (Toulouse, 1888), 94.

[10] Ibid., 45.

[11] *HWM*, 1, lines 4750–85, 5073–95.

[12] N. Vincent, 'William Marshal, King Henry II and the Honour of Châteauroux', *Archives*, 25 (2000), 15.

[13] *HWM* 1. ll. 3409–24.

[14] *HWM* 1. ll. 3995–4036.

[15] *Chanson d'Aspremont*, ed. L. Brandin 2 vols (Classiques français du moyen âge, 1923–4) 1. ll. 2212–23.

[16] *HWM* 1. ll. 5060–6.

[17] *Carmen elegiacum de Waleranno comite Mellenti*, in, *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard*, ed. R. Howlett 4 vols (Rolls Series, 1886–89) 2. 768.

[18] A. Micha (ed.), *Cligés*, Classiques français du moyen âge (Paris, 1957), 11. 188–213.

[19] Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus*, trans. J.J. Sheridan (Toronto, 1973), 185.

[20] *L'abbaye Toussaint d'Angers des origines à 1330. Étude historique et cartulaire*, ed. F. Comte (Société des Études Angevines, 1985), 148.

[21] H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne* 6 vols (Paris, 1861), 3. 312.

[22] Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford, 1999), 198, points out the link between Largesse and Prowess as noble virtues, the latter enabling the former, and therefore finds Chrétien's comments unconvincing because he regards Prowess as the principal chivalric quality. But his comments rely on an interpretation of medieval society as being materialist; sometimes however its outlook was ideological. See on this, D. Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France, 1000–1300* (London, 2005), 68–71.

[23] Raoul de Houdenc, *Le Roman des Eles*, ed. and trans. K. Busby (Utrecht Publications in General and Comparative Literature, 17, Amsterdam, 1983), ll. 144–266, esp. ll. 154–7.

[24] *De magnatibus*, in, *De naturis rerum libri duo*, ed. T. Wright (Rolls Series, 1863), 314. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence*, 193–6, suggests that Largesse was emphasised in noble culture in order to distance the nobility from equally rich but grasping townsfolk, but clearly there were also rich and grasping nobles to contend with.

[25] Crouch, *Birth of Nobility*, 71–79.

[26] *Genealogiae comitum Flandriae*, ed. L.C. Bethmann, in MGH SS 9.303: 'ecclesiarum dei perfectissimus reparator, viduarum orfanorum ac pupillorum piisimus consolator, omnibus in necessitate auxilium ab eo petentibus clementissimus dispensator'.

[27] J. Lair, *Étude sur la vie et la mort de Guillaume Longue-épée duc de Normandie* (Paris, 1893), 61–70 (v. 3).

[28] R.I. Moore, 'The Peace of God and the Social Revolution', in T. Head and R. Landes (eds), *The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the year 1000*, ed. (Ithaca NY, 1992), 318.

[29] J. Flori, *L'idéologie du glaive: préhistoire de la chevalerie* (Geneva, 1983), 137–57.

[30] Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History*, ed. M. Chibnall 6 vols (Oxford, 1969–80) 4. 143; *Le Couronnement de Louis*, ll. 152–9.

[31] R.A. Lodge (ed.), *Le Livre de Manières*, ed. (Geneva, 1979) c. 135: 'Chevalier deit espee prendre por justisier et por defendre cels qui d'els funt les autres pleindre: force et ravine deit esteindre', see also cc. 155, 159, 162; Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus*, in, *Satirical Poets of the Twelfth Century*, ed. T. Wright 2 vols (Rolls Series, 1872) 1. 393. For the Marshal's act of charity, *HWM* 1. ll. 8753–72.

[32] *Jordan Fantosme's Chronicle*, ed. R.C. Johnston (Oxford, 1981), ll. 845–8.

[33] Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus*, trans. J.J. Sheridan (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1973), 184–5.

[34] *HWM* 1. ll. 2541–62; the text later stresses the Marshal's assiduous protection of the young king, ibid., ll. 3612–37.

[35] *HWM* 2. ll.13149–57.

[36] *HWM* 2. ll. 19150–1.

[37] *Le Roman de Thèbes*, ed. F. Mora-Lebrun (Paris, 1995), ll. 9981–10064.

[38] *De diversis ordinibus hominum* in, *The Latin Poems commonly attributed to Walter Mapes*, ed. T. Wright (Camden Society, 1841), 234.

[39] *Die exempla aus den Sermones feriales et communes des Jakob von Vitry*, ed. J. Greven (Heidelberg, 1914), 17; Jean de Joinville, *Vie de Saint Louis*, ed. J. Monfrin (Paris, 1995), 46.

[40] Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, ed. H.R. Luard 7 vols (Rolls Series, 1872–84) 5. 22, 367.

[41] Martin Aurell has already come to this conclusion by the route of looking at the idealised warrior depicted by the later twelfth-century court intellectual, *L'Empire des Plantagenet, 1154–1224* (Paris, 2003), 238.

REVISITING MERCENARIES UNDER HENRY FITZ EMPRESS, 1167–1188

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The late Thomas Keefe once remarked that the most-cited medieval individual for sheer dependence upon mercenaries or *stipendiarii* is King Henry II of England (1154–1189).[1] The historiographical tradition to which he referred can be traced back at least to the writings of William Stubbs, with other significant studies emerging in the post-war years.[2] In 1945, Jacques Boussard put forth the argument that Henry virtu- ally transformed English armies by preferring the shield-tax or *scutage* over the still-functioning feudal levy.[3] Boussard found large quantities of mercenaries in the *Pipe Rolls*, peaking at just over 6,000 effectives during the Great Revolt of 1173–1174. He therefore concluded that Henry had reshaped feudal armies into paid, professional forces that were faster, better-organized, and more effective in both battle and siege operations.[4] In 1962, Michael Powicke called attention to the ramifications of Boussard's study by arguing that Henry's association with mercenaries was 'on a scale not perhaps matched again in intensity until the Hundred Years War'; eleven years later, W.L. Warren declared that mercenary footmen were indeed the mainstay of the king's military power.[5] A departure from such judgments is Michael Prestwich's more recent counter: because the overall percentage of hired soldiers was rather low in Henry's armies, any transformative influence of merce- naries occurred after Henry's death, perhaps in the reigns of Richard (1189–1199) and John (1199–1216).[6]

Numbers and troop ratios aside, equally important is an analysis of *how* and *why* Henry used mercenaries on campaign. We are fortunate to have a contemporary remark on this question, found in Richard fitz Nigel's *Dialogue of the Exchequer*: 'the prince prefers to expose mercenaries, rather than natives to the fortunes of war.'[7] This paternalistic view found ready acceptance in the work of Hans Delbrück and has subsequently survived several decades of historical inquiry.[8] While accepting that Henry sought to protect his vassals, we might also examine the *Dialogue's* passage in a qualitative manner. Underneath Richard's statement lays

a twofold implication. First, the consideration of mortality implies that Henry foresaw combat (e.g. battle, skirmish, or siege) for his army. Second, given that combat was likely, Henry apparently considered his mercenaries worthy substitutes for the native soldiers. Of course, one could argue that neither applies because Henry was either foolish enough to deploy inferior troops or nonchalant about human casualties, but both of these notions are absurd. The king's overriding concern throughout his reign was the effective defense and maintenance of the vast Angevin Empire through his various military exploits. Therefore, we must assume that Henry felt comfortable employing hired soldiers for potentially dangerous military campaigns, even during times of great peril to his realms. We may push the matter further by dispensing with the headcounts for a moment (the rolls are, in any case, incomplete) and instead examine *how* Henry employed his mercenary resources on campaign.[9]

During the High Middle Ages, mercenaries served a variety of functions but in Henry II's armies they were integral to his battle tactics and often operated as independent, coherent units. J.F. Verbruggen has defined the medieval tactical unit thusly: 'a battle formation in which such discipline prevails that the individuals obey the orders of their commander as one.'[10] Hired troops under Henry do not fit this definition exactly because he never arranged them into battle formations; instead, he deployed his mercenary units on separate, specific operations within general areas of conflict. Even so, the spirit of Verbruggen's definition—that each unit obeys commands as one—remains at work here. Today I will offer three examples to illustrate how Henry's mercenaries were deployed as coherent units of men: the use of Welshmen during the siege of Chaumont in 1167; Brabanter operations at the 'Battle of Dol' in 1173; and the relief of Rouen in 1174, which saw Welsh and Brabanter units operating jointly.

My train to Swansea was delayed due to the attacks in London, and I was sad to miss Dr. Rowland's earlier lecture on 'Welsh mercenaries in Angevin Service', which has undoubtedly reacquainted you all with the military skills of the Welsh tribes in the mid-twelfth century.[11] For now I will only recall the oration of Baldwin fitz Gilbert of Clare before the Battle of Lincoln in 1141, in which he calls the Welsh 'object[s] for our contempt…devoid of skill and all knowledge of the art of war, like cattle running upon the hunting-spears.'[12] Henry II's notions of Welsh military ability were quite different from Baldwin's. Not only did skirmishers from Gwynedd nearly dispatch him at Coleshill Wood

in 1157, a combined force of Welshman from Gwynedd, Powys, and Deheubarth fought him to a standstill in 1165 near the Berwyn Hills.[13] In later years, Henry praised their fearlessness and battle prowess in correspondence to the Byzantine emperor Manuel Comnenus (1143–1180).[14] Proving himself to be of the practical sort, Henry ultimately began hiring their services for his own campaigns.

And then there were the *Brabanters* (alternatively, *Brabácons, Cotereaux*, or *Routiers*), a loose term that could refer to soldiers from Brabant, Navarrese, Basques, or even Germans. These men, by whatever name, had a vicious reputation, and were singled out for their ruthlessness during the Third Lateran Council of 1179, which ordered the excommunication of any Christian hiring their services.[15] Yet the practical aspect of their reputation was a decent record of effectiveness in the field. As John France has observed, Brabanters were not always successful, but when commanded from above in an orderly conflict they comprised a useful group.[16] King Henry used Brabanters to great advantage in his own campaigns and is found in the historical record hiring their services quite frequently.

Let us turn to our first example of Henry II deploying tactical units of mercenaries, the siege of Chaumont in 1167. The cause of the siege is to be found seven years prior. Henry's successful ravaging operations during the Toulouse campaign of 1159 produced an agreement between himself and Louis VII of France (1137–1180) in May 1160, which granted Henry general control over Languedoc and the regions outside of Toulouse. The spring of 1167, however, featured events that would test the practicality of his lordship in the south. William VIII, count of Auvergne (d. 1182), broke his succession oath by disinheriting his nephew of the county in April.[17] Henry demanded he stand trial to explain himself; William refused and forged an alliance with Louis instead. In typical fashion, Henry took the affront personally and sent soldiers into Auvergne to ravage William's lands. Louis responded by attacking Normandy and burning several villages in the Vexin between Mantes and Pacy.[18] Yet if William and Louis had hoped to form an effective alliance against the Angevin king they were sorely mistaken. Having successfully cowed William in the south, Henry swiftly marched back north to Normandy in May. Louis refused peace negotiations and Henry moved to Chaumont in July, burning it down in what Warren called a 'brilliantly executed operation.' Henry secretly sent his Welsh mercenaries swimming down the River Epte and into the town while he approached the gates with his army, goading the French to sally

forth to meet him. The ruse was successful: as the garrison exited the gates and began to form up into battle array, the Welshmen were able to enter from behind and torch the buildings. Behind the French Chaumont burst into flames as the fires caught hold. Trapped between the Normans and a burning town, they rushed back into the city to douse the flames and Henry followed, taking the gate in the confusion of the moment. Here Henry deployed his mercenaries as a unit, and because the Welsh followed their orders they played a key tactical role in the siege.[19]

Chaumont is an example of mercenary tactics employed in a constrained area of operations, but in our second case, the Battle of Dol, we find Henry placing more and more trust in the ability of mercenary groups to obey his command and those commands of his subordinates. Hired soldiers featured predominantly in the armies of both Henry and his enemies during the Great Revolt of 1173 and 1174, which include Louis VII and Henry's sons Henry the Younger (d. 1183), Geoffrey (d. 1186), and Richard, as well as an assortment of displeased magnates. Following the initial outbreaks of violence, the elder Henry quickly demonstrated a knack for defensive campaigning. In August 1173, Henry scored a victory at Verneuil that drove Louis and young Henry back into France; moving quickly to address other threats to Normandy, Henry set his sights on Brittany in the west. There, a rebel Breton army led by the malcontents Hugh, earl of Chester (d. 1181), and Ralph de Fougères (d. 1196) was marching towards Avranches. Henry remained in Rouen to coordinate the defense of the northeast and in his place dispatched William de Humet to lead a group of Brabanter cavalry and Norman soldiers towards Brittany, keeping his *familia* and main host in reserve.[20]

The course of action did not favor the rebels. Barricaded in the castle Dol, they spied the Norman banners flying from a distance and gauged the number of warriors marching alongside. Ralph de Fougères concluded that the castle was too weak to resist a protracted siege, so he decided to meet William in the field. On 20 August both sides drew up in battle array and the lines met in a clash of arms at the Battle of Dol, a formal and ultimately decisive battle.[21] The Brabanters rode into the Breton ranks—perhaps in a direct charge of heavy cavalry, although specific details escape us—and routed them, killing up to 1,500. The defeated remainder, which we are told included sixty knights, fled back into the castle and was promptly besieged by the Brabanters.[22] Henry soon joined the advance force and, receiving the good news with joy,

deployed his siege weaponry. The garrison surrendered in the face of such strong opposition, and both Chester and Fougères were taken prisoner.[23] The first phase of the rebellions on the Continent, June to August 1173, had been won with the use of mercenaries. At both Chaumont and Dol Henry II deployed different groups of mercenaries to perform specific military services. Without constituting the bulk of the king's army they nevertheless played important tactical roles.

My final example for today is the relief of Rouen in 1174, another operation during the Great Revolt that saw Henry II deploying Welshmen and Brabanters jointly in order to achieve a single objective. On 22 July Louis VII besieged the Norman capital with Count Philip of Flanders (d. 1191) and Henry the Younger, but the city was too large to blockade fully. As an alternative, the coalition focused their attacks upon one portion of the city, while French soldiers dug protective ditches in front of their camp (so as to dissuade possible sallies by the city garrison) and scheduled eight-hour shifts to sustain the attack up Rouen's walls. In a marvelous story spun by the chronicler William of Newburgh, the citizens of Rouen, loyal to Henry II and supported by his garrison, matched the French by keeping shifts of their own in order to defend the walls. They shouted insults at the besiegers and flashed and mooned them from the river banks. Exasperated, Philip proposed to scale the walls in a devious surprise rush on the feast day of St. Lawrence (10 August). As the French crept towards the city, however, a clerk happened to spy them through a window and rang the signal bell. The citizens immediately leaped to the defense and in a bloody fight tossed the besiegers from the walls.[24] It was a great victory that revealed both the tenacity of Rouen's citizens and the desperate level to which the coalition had sunk.

Rouen's steadfastness was handsomely rewarded. Henry II landed at Barfleur on 8 August and began planning a relief action with his *familia*, a hired force of Brabanters, and up to one thousand Welshmen brought over from England. After arriving at Rouen and surveying the scene, Henry took the Brabanters with him into the city through its western gate on the Seine, which had not been invested. The Welshmen he sent across the river, through the woods, and into the French camp where they ambushed sleeping soldiers and slew more than a hundred; afterwards, they positioned themselves between the French and their supply line. Henry then sallied forth from inside Rouen with his household knights and Brabanters and rushed the ditches. His men

filled the trenches with logs, stones, and piles of earth, leveling the field
before the city and opening a path to the French camp. Behind him
the gates closed and the Rouen garrison manned the walls, ready for
a counterattack that never came. Some of the French soldiers, already
surprised once by the Welsh, chose to remain in their tents, while others
destroyed their siege equipment. His material losses, combined with the
fact that the Henry had reoccupied the city, persuaded King Louis to
withdraw. A portion of his army was sent back into France and peace
negotiations began that same day.[25] At Rouen it appears that Henry II
made deliberate tactical choices with his *stipendiarii* and deployed them
according to collective ability. The implication is that he had figured
them into his overall battle plans, and together the actions there and
at Chaumont and Dol suggest that he had confidence in the ability of
hired men to work together as a unit and follow his orders.

Henry's reliance upon mercenaries was again demonstrated in 1188
when he refused to confront an army of Philip Augustus (1180–1223)
in Normandy without first calling for his Welsh mercenaries from across
the Channel.[26] Here we are confronted with a related issue, Henry's
transportation of hired soldiers overseas. He brought Welshmen to the
Continent in 1174 and again in 1188; in a similar fashion, in 1174 he
also transported hired Brabanters from the Continent to England in
order to confront Scottish rebels in Northumbria.[27] This was a departure
from normative methods of raising troops in the period. C. Warren
Hollister once observed that Anglo-Norman leaders typically hired their
soldiers according to geography; for English campaigns, troops were
recruited in Wales or Scotland, and for Continental campaigns, Flem-
ings or Brabanters.[28] Yet Henry took on the added expense of hiring
locally but then transporting abroad, not a cheap process considering
that England had no standing navy. This must have been a deliberate
strategy—why bother transporting Welshman to France unless there
was some advantage to be gained from it? The answer is that Henry
desired, on certain occasions, the unique attributes particular brands
of mercenaries brought to a campaign.

Despite appearances, however, it would be unwise to always study
Anglo-Norman era mercenaries as cohesive units of men. The actual
number of mercenaries serving in a single campaign varied greatly
and depended upon both the state of the royal treasury as well as the
length and location of the campaign itself.[29] They were recruited in
the towns but often in disparate areas, and we cannot maintain that
within a band of Welsh mercenaries each man viewed the others as his

equal, or even his kin; this holds equally true for Brabanter and Flemish mercenaries. The overall wartime effectiveness of hired men was also terribly inconsistent. John France has argued that because mercenaries were recruited as individuals they were highly divisive and often undependable, as demonstrated by their periodic defeats in battle.[30] Perhaps it took a commander with the requisite leadership ability to motivate mercenaries into following orders as a unit. Much also depended upon the nature of the battle: Henry did not relay commands to the Welsh as they sneaked across the Seine in 1174; rather, he issued a general order that was followed. Had the king ever arrayed the Welsh in formation and attempted to maneuver them in a sustained conflict with changing conditions, the results might have been quite different.

Nevertheless, the significance lays in the fact that he had any confidence in the Welsh at all. It is probable that the frequent rebellions of his own barons forced him to reconsider his methods of raising troops, for the chronicler William of Newburgh wrote that mercenaries were more reliable than Henry's own vassals, who at every moment seemed to turn against him.[31] Henry used scutage from very early on in his reign, and combined with the success of the Welsh against his own armies, there was ample evidence of their military potential. That they served him well at Chaumont in 1167 may have cemented the utility of hired soldiers in his mind, and it is natural that he would call upon their services again. Mercenaries both in England and on the Continent were readily available, effective, and, at least in Henry's reign, rather loyal.[32]

What lesson, then, are we historians to take away from Henry II's incorporation of mercenary units? In 1999, Michael Mallet argued that the mercenary's 'foreignness and expertise' were not recognized until the thirteenth century: today, I would like to suggest that such qualities were actually recognized in the twelfth.[33] The evidence suggests that Henry chose his mercenaries with an eye towards expanding his options in the field. He employed scutage in order to raise funds for hiring them, which was quite often because Henry's many campaigns put him in constant need of men.[34] As a commander, he was aware of the respective merits and limitations of the mercenaries and so deployed them not just within his army ranks but as separate units. These units were regionally distinct in that groups of Brabanters and Welshmen fought with their own during operations. Finally, Henry specifically sought out such mercenary units before initiating military campaigns and delayed his plans until they had arrived. I therefore find the older

views of Boussard, Powicke, and Warren to be interpretations close to the mark: mercenaries did indeed have a transformative influence on Anglo-Norman warfare during the reign of Henry II, not because of their numbers but because of their tactical roles. It is the full extent of this effect of hired men upon the tactics of medieval kings that now merits further exploration.

Notes

[1] T.K. Keefe, *Feudal Assessments and the Political Community under Henry II and his Sons* (Berkeley, 1983), 24–6.

[2] Stubbs felt that Henry used mercenaries for foreign wars and the *fyrd* (which was, in his conception, a national militia reconstituted through the 1181 Assize of Arms) for domestic peace; the feudal levy, on the other hand, was 'occasionally useful.' See *The Constitutional History of England: its Origin and Development*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1880), l. 658–9.

[3] On the matter of scutage, foundational is the analysis of J.H. Round, which focuses exclusively upon the regnal years of Henry II; see 'The Introduction of Knight Service into England,' in *Feudal England* (New York, 1964), 209–25 and esp. 221–2.

[4] See J. Boussard, 'Les mercenaires au xiiᵉ siècle: Henri II Plantagenet et les origins de l'armée de métier,' *Bibliothèque de l'école des Chartes* 106 (1945–6), 189–224.

[5] M. Powicke, *Military Obligation in Medieval England: a Study of Liberty and Duty* (Oxford, 1962), 49; W.L. Warren, *Henry II* (Berkeley, 1973), 232.

[6] M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: the English Experience* (New Haven, 1996), 149–150. For further discussions of the subject, see idem, 'Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,' in A. Haverkamp and H. Vollrath (eds), *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1996), 129–30; and J. Schlight, *Monarchs and Mercenaries: a Reappraisal of the Importance of Knight Service in Norman and Early Angevin England* (Bridgeport, CT, 1968), 74.

[7] Richard FitzNigel, *Dialogus de Scaccario, by Richard, son of Nigel, Treasurer of England and Bishop of London*, ed. A. Hughes, C.G. Crump, and C. Johnson (Oxford, 1902), 99: 'Mauult enim princeps stipendarios quam domesticos bellicis opponere casibus.'

[8] H. Delbrück, *History of the Art of War, Volume III: Medieval Warfare*, trans. W.J. Renfroe (Lincoln, 1982), 167.

[9] The sum of the rolls from Henry II's reign can be found in *Publications of the Pipe Roll Society*, 38 vols. (Reprint, Vaduz, 1966), and in *The Great Rolls of the Pipe for the Second, Third, and Fourth Years of the Reign of King Henry the Second, 1155–58*, ed. J. Hunter (London, 1844).

[10] J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*, trans. S. Willard and S.C.M. Southern, 2nd ed. (Woodbridge, 1997), 2.

[11] This paper was originally delivered in the late afternoon of 7 July 2005, the day of the London subway bombings. Dr. Ifor Rowland's 11:30am paper was titled, 'Welsh Troops in Angevin Service, 1154–1216.'

[12] Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum*, ed. and trans. D. Greenway (Oxford, 1996), 4. 17.

[13] For the Welsh campaigns of 1157 and 1165 see J.D. Hosler, 'Henry II's Military Campaigns in Wales, 1157–1165,' *Journal of Medieval Military History* 2 (2004), 53–71; P. Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign against the Welsh in 1165,' *Welsh History Review* 14 (1989), 523–52; J.G. Edwards, 'Henry II and the Fight at Coleshill: some Further

Reflections,' *Welsh History Review* 3 (1967), 253–61; D.J.C. King, 'The Fight at Coleshill,' *Welsh History Review* 2 (1965) 367–73.

[14] Gerald of Wales records the letter to Manuel in *Itinerarium Kambriæ et Descriptio Kambriæ*, ed. J.F. Dimock, in *Giraldi Cambrensis Opera*, 8 vols. (RS 21, 1868), 6. 181.

[15] See the fifth canon of the council in William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, ed. R. Howlett, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, 4 vols. (RS 82, 1884–9), 1. 209.

[16] J. France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300* (Ithaca, 1999), 74.

[17] This was just one military problem Henry experienced in the south. Raymond V of Toulouse was actively moving against both Henry and the king's ally Alfonso of Aragon between 1167 and 1169; see R. Benjamin, 'A Forty Years War: Toulouse and the Plantagenets, 1156–96,' *Historical Research* 56 (1988), 274–5.

[18] For the wars of 1167–1168, including the action at Chaumont, our primary authority is the single chronicle of Robert of Torigini; see *Chronicle of Robert of Torigini*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I* ed. and tr. R. Howlett, 4 vols (London,1889) 4. 231–9.

[19] For modern narratives of the siege, see Warren, *Henry II*, 106; and P. Warner, *Sieges of the Middle Ages* (London, 1968), 118. The medieval sources are *Ymagines Historiarum*, ed. W. Stubbs, in *Radulfi de Diceto decani Lundoniensis Opera Historica*, 2 vols. (RS 68, 1876), 1. 330; *Chronicle of Robert of Torigini*, 232; *Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene*, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols. (RS 51, 1868–1871), 1. 282.

[20] William de Humet was the son of Richard de Humet, the constable of Normandy; see K.S.B. Keats-Rohan, *Domesday Descendants: a Prosopography of Persons Occurring in English Documents 1066–1166, II. Pipe Rolls to Cartae Baronum* (Woodbridge, 2002), 522. Henry's *familia* at the time included William de Mandeville, earl of Essex (d. 1189); Richard, earl of Clare (d. 1217); and William, earl of Arundel (d. 1176), among others; see R.W. Eyton, *Court, Household, and Itinerary of King Henry II* (London, 1878), 176.

[21] Having yet to find this battle named in modern histories, I have dubbed it the 'Battle of Dol.'

[22] Thus confirming Warren's point that Henry specifically outfitted his mercenaries for siege operations; see *Henry II*, 232.

[23] The medieval accounts of the Battle of Dol are *Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene*, 2. 51–3; *Chronicle of Robert of Torigini*, 259–60; *Ymagines Historiarum*, 1. 378; *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, 1. 176; *Jordan Fantosme's Chronicle*, ed. R.C. Johnston (Oxford, 1981), 12–17; and *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols. (Rolls Series 49, 1867), 1. 56–8.

[24] *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, 1. 190–2

[25] *Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene*, 2. 65–6; *Chronicle of Robert of Torigini*, 265. Roger of Howden's account is especially useful because he was an eyewitness; see J. Gillingham, 'The Travels of Roger of Howden and his Views of the Irish, Scots and Welsh,' in *The English in the Twelfth Century: Imperialism, National Identity and Political Values* (Woodbridge, 2000), 83 n. 99.

[26] *Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene*, 2. 343. J. Beeler, *Warfare in England 1066–1189* (Ithaca, 1966), 306, passes over this notable event by writing, 'as might be expected, stipendiary troops appear less frequently after the end of hostilities in 1174'.

[27] *Chronicle of Robert of Torigini*, 264. In that year King William the Lion (1165–1214) had besieged northern castles with some success, and the Brabanters were probably meant to augment the English levy already operating under the command of the justiciar Richard de Lucy (d. 1179). For a narrative of the events of 1174 in England, see Beeler, *Warfare in England*, 181–4.

[28] C.W. Hollister, *The Military Organization of Norman England* (Oxford, 1965), 177.

[29] See the various remarks in Hollister, *Military Organization*, 167–8, 178–9, and 90.

[30] France, *Western Warfare*, 74–5.

[31] *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, 2.172.

[32] See Warren, *Henry II*, 231, for his use of mercenaries in siege operations and shock warfare.

[33] M. Mallett, 'Mercenaries,' in M. Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: a History* (Oxford, 1999), 211.

[34] From his royal coronation in 1154 to his death in 1189, I count at least 29 separate campaigns.

MEDIEVAL MERCENARIES

METHODOLOGY, DEFINITIONS, AND PROBLEMS

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A few years back when I was assisting in a Genealogical Library a patron asked me for help with some military records for Frederick the Great's Prussia. They were recruitment rolls, and they were quite detailed, listing every identifying trait of a soldier the genealogist could possibly desire. However, on the second page the bottom recruit's record was turned upside down. Asked why, I combed through all of the possible paleographical or codicological reasons for such an occurrence. None were accurate, though, as a couple of pages on another record was also turned around, and this time in the middle of the page; a following page had two upside down listings. We became historical detectives, and it was not too long before we realized the reasons for this—actually I am embarrassed to say that the patron came to the answer before I did—all were bastards. Their illegitimate births caused a stigmatization, at least in the recruitment records of Frederick the Great's Prussia.[1] It struck me odd then, as it does now, that what many might see as the lowest of occupations discriminated between different soldiers for something that none of them were able to personally determine, the legitimacy of their birth.

Why throughout history certain individuals were chosen, or most often recruited, to become a soldier, and why they should want to do fight for someone whom most had never met or knew little about is among the most difficult questions facing military historians of any period. In the case of large national armies, such as those found in the early modern and modern periods, there seems to be little refusal of anyone who showed interest in military service. Frederick the Great could discriminate against bastards, as suggested above, but he did not refuse their service. Napoleon could hardly turn anyone down, the same being the case in the Confederate States during the American Civil War—the Confederates even allowing blacks to fight among their ranks. While every able-bodied male in Great Britain, France, Italy,

Germany, Belgium, Austro-Hungary, Serbia, Turkey and Russia was mustered to fight in World War I and every able-bodied male in Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States were mustered for World War II. Because of this, heavy losses in those conflicts were felt for generations. I still recall my father's remark that in visiting Germany in 1950 he saw no old men and no young men.

It has been claimed that ancient armies were more selective in their recruitment. The idea of only the best, most disciplined, and loyal soldiers finding their way into Roman or Spartan forces is often repeated,[2] while the selectivity of other armies seems reflected in the focus on heroes in the writings of Homer and his ilk.[3] Of course, anyone who scratches the surface of ancient military history recognizes these to be mythical depictions, and that if the numbers of troops suggested in the historical narratives are even close to being accurate, then recruitment was far more general than selective, although the reasons for this general service, meaning why non-heroic soldiers fought, cannot be discovered from the sources.

Of course, such comparisons to medieval armies are only valid for historical context. Medieval military historians can certainly attest to the peculiarity of medieval warfare and those fighting it. Most have spent their careers explaining this peculiarity, and it is safe to assume that such scholarship will continue. But recruitment and fighting motivation remain two areas of medieval warfare that have been largely unexamined, or at least insufficiently examined. Naturally, defining terms is one of the major issues in any era of military history (or any era of any genre of history). Despite an agreement on its peculiarity, medieval military historians have too often chosen to work within historical definitions written by modern military historians. Furthermore, medieval military historians have allowed other medieval historians to hijack their terms, further constricting definitional frameworks.

Take for example the common definition of medieval mercenary. This term has been defined and redefined many times in the recent past, and these definitions—whether written by medieval military historians or not—have been applied to medieval military history. But are any of them accurate? Do any of them define what a 'true' medieval mercenary was? For the sake of argument, let us start with that given by Michael Mallett. Mallett's work on medieval mercenaries is of unquestionable value. His *Mercenaries and their Masters* has been the way most historians have been introduced to late medieval Italian military history, and through such to those mercenaries who deter-

mined so much of that history, the *condottieri*.[4] And because his article, 'Mercenaries,' appears in Maurice Keen's *Medieval Warfare: A History*, Mallett will no doubt continue to introduce many more to the more chronologically general subject of medieval mercenaries. In this article Mallett writes: 'It is the concept of fighting for profit, together with the gradual emergence of a concept of 'foreigness,' which distinguish the true mercenary…from the ordinary paid soldier.'[5] This definition is pretty standard among medieval military historians and can be found in almost all general works on medieval military history—Philippe Contamine's, David Nicolle's, Helen Nicholson's, John France's, Guy Halsall's, and Michael Prestwich's—to name just a few of the more recent good ones.[6] Prestwich, for example, defines the term as 'applied to professionals who fought for pay, and who were not much concerned by whose money they were taking. Hardened foreign soldiers, not subjects of the English crown [Prestwich's focus in this work is medieval English military history] but effectively stateless.'[7]

The words 'paid' and 'foreign' are thus the principle characteristics of the traditional definition of the medieval mercenary. And, of course, these characteristics also fit the archetypical medieval mercenary, John Hawkwood, the renowned English *condottiere* and leader of *condottieri* in fourteenth-century Italy (although they just as easily fit those serving in the French Foreign Legion of *Beau Geste*). But how well do they define the more common medieval mercenary, the one who does not stand out like a John Hawkwood? Indeed, I suggest that it is precisely in the words 'paid' and 'foreign' where the definition of a medieval mercenary fails to meet the needs of a medieval military historian, that this is a modern definition and that in using it we create further difficulty in trying to define the larger, more general issues of recruitment and motivation for fighting.

Let us start with the second term, 'foreign,' first. Of course, it would be ludicrous to suggest that all foreign soldiers fighting in medieval armies be called 'mercenaries,' but what if they are paid foreigners? No contemporary historian of the Hundred Years War describes the Frenchman, Robert of Artois, who served with English King Edward III, or the Constable of Scotland, Sir John Stewart of Darnley, who led a contingent of Scots fighting with the French at the Battle of Herrings, as a 'mercenary.' Nor are the English longbowmen who served with Charles the Bold in his wars against Liège and the Swiss and German League of Constance or the Flemish handgunners who fought with Edward IV ever referred to as mercenaries. The first had

turned against his king, Philip VI, and was seen as a traitor against him; the second allied himself and his countrymen with the French due to their animosity against the English; and the third and fourth were exchanges made as part of a dynastic family alliance: Charles had married Edward's sister, Margaret of York. Artois and Darnley may not have been paid directly—although they certainly received goods and gifts for their service—but the English and Flemings certainly were.[8] And yet, what if pay alone was the reason for their military service? Were they not then mercenaries?

A chronological scan will show how difficult it is to use the term 'foreign' to define mercenaries during the Middle Ages. But first, an important question needs to be asked: is the term 'foreign' in itself a modern construct? Or were medieval people, in particular soldiers, fully aware of nationalist distinctions? These are difficult questions to answer, and whatever answers might be given are contentious. Some historians, like Karl Leyser and Robert Bartlett question the existence of nationalism in the medieval consciousness.[9] However, others claim to have found the formation of distinct national identities, for example between Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Normans (Patrick Wormald) and French and English (Philippe Contamine).[10] My own work has suggested a distinct southern Low Countries' nationalism during the Middle Ages, the building and fostering of an identity which was not French, nor Imperial, and certainly not Burgundian in the later medieval period, but was distinct to the southern Low Countries.[11] Could we not be looking too hard at this question, though. Might it not simply be answered (side-stepped?) by trusting the language of our sources. As the writers of the original sources that we use to determine the history of medieval mercenaries constantly use nationalistic terms, can we believe that the soldiers who are being so identified did not know this, and may have even identified themselves with these names, especially if such could be financially beneficial to them?

Let us begin first by ascertaining who actually served in the armies of the late Roman Empire and their barbarian opponents.[12] Roman citizens in the fourth and fifth centuries were adept at dodging military service. Military conscription laws excluded so many classes and occupations of Romans, that for all intents and purposes no Roman citizen needed to serve in the army. This is evidenced, for example, in the conscriptions of 440 and 443—the last recorded western Imperial conscriptions—the success of which can only be seen on the most local

level in that they produced only local urban militias, serving only for defensive purposes.[13]

But armies *were* raised, so where did they come from? A look at the career of the fascinating Roman general, Aetius, will help answer this question. As a child Aetius was sent first to live with Alaric the Goth where he stayed three years (c. 405–408) and then as a hostage to the Huns (possibly in 410). He thus came to know both groups well, undoubtedly spoke their languages, and, judging from his later personality, 'networked' among them, to use a modern term. After he had risen to military leadership in the Roman Empire these experiences, and the connections he made with them, proved extremely valuable to him. Needing to gain military victories to sustain his position of power, while at the same time needing to protect himself from his political and military rivals, Aetius sought help from both the Goths and the Huns. We know that as early as 425, when he and his political patron and mentor, John, was defeated in trying to usurp the Imperial throne, Aetius had Huns among his forces, evidently such a large number that this forced Emperor Valentinian III to grant him the military command of Gaul despite his obvious treason. (He also probably had Goths fighting with him, but the record does not substantiate this.) In 432, after fighting unsuccessfully against a rival general, Boniface—who was killed in the action—and despite being wounded, Aetius traveled across Pannonia to again seek Hunnic help that, once it was given, again in large numbers, returned him to power. From then on, at least to 451, he seemed always to fight with Huns in his armies: in destroying the Armorican Bagaudae in 435–436; in subduing and resettling the Burgundians in 437; and in putting down the Visigothic revolt in 436–443.

Only in 451 is Aetius not specifically said to have employed Huns as soldiers, but this may have been because that year he faced a large force of Huns led by Attila at the Battle of Catalaunian Fields (also known as the Battle of Catalaunian Plains or the Battle of Chalons). He may well have had Huns serving under him in this conflict—Attila had certainly made his enemies among them—but the sources, most notably Priscus, report only that Aetius was aided by Alans and Visigoths. The Alans were allied with Aetius, whose help they had requested when threatened by Attila's invasion of Gaul, and the Visigoths—whom only a few years earlier Aetius had defeated—were brought to his side by diplomacy, personal promises, treachery, and the threat of the Huns. Moreover, Priscus adds that neither the Visigoths nor the Alans were trusted by

Aetius, while he also viewed the Alans as weak and cowardly, so much so that he was forced to place them in the center of his battlefield formation, between the Romans and Visigoths.

Aetius won the Battle of Catalaunian Fields and two years later Attila died—after a night of drunkenness and debauchery notes the Christian chronicler Jordanes, who deems this to have been a justifiably hideous death for the 'Scourge of God.' Unfortunately for Aetius, none of his victories could keep the resentment of Valentinian III at bay, and on 21/22 September 454, a year after Attila's death, he was slain, struck dead by Valentinian's very hand reports the sources. In revenge, the following March two of Aetius' bodyguards killed Valentinian. Although these are not said to be Huns, judging from Aetius' past relationship with them, and their names, Optila and Thraustila, they very well could have been. A contemporary, Renatus Frigiderus, gave him this epitaph:

> Aetius was of medium height, manly in his habits and well-proportioned. He had no bodily infirmity and was spare in physique. His intelligence was keen; he was full of energy, a superb horseman, a fine shot with an arrow and tireless with the lance. He was extremely able as a soldier and he was skilled in the arts of peace. There was no avarice in him and even less cupidity. He was magnanimous in his behavior and never swayed in his judgement by the advice of unworthy counselors. He bore adversity with great patience, and was ready for any exacting enterprise; he scorned danger and was able to endure hunger, thirst and loss of sleep.[14]

There is no doubt that Aetius could not have achieved what he did politically and militarily—even his legendary death, I suppose—without the aid of the Huns. But why did they fight for him? We know that the Huns had fought in non-Hunnic armies since their very appearance within the borders of the Roman Empire. In 377 some fought with the Goths south of the Danube River. The Roman Emperor Gratian had some serving with his army against the Goths c. 380. And, about that same time, the Huns fought alongside the little-known Dacian Carpi.[15] This list could go on throughout the fifth century, including the service performed as part of Aetius' force. While the reasons for Huns fighting in most of these armies can not be determined from the sources, in the case of the 377 campaign the Roman chronicler Ammianus Marcellinus indicates that they fought with the Goths early in the year for pay and later in the year for the promise of booty.[16] It is likely that there were similar reasons for all of their service: the Huns fought in non-Hunnic

armies for their economic benefit. The Huns serving under Aetius were most likely what modern historians would call mercenaries.

But this leads to further questions. Is it certain that all of the Huns serving in non-Hunnic armies during the late Roman imperial period were ethnic Huns? Or, is it possible that this simply became the generic term for mercenaries in the later Roman Empire, as there is no other term used by writers of the period to indicate this type of military service? A billing as a Hun would naturally drive up the cost of such a mercenary, so why would any non-Hunnic mercenaries be bothered by such a designation or ever suggest they were not Huns? Of course, there is no way of answering these questions given the original sources. But this does introduce a pattern that is repeated throughout the Middle Ages: the identification of groups of mercenaries under a generic 'foreign' name, groups that could not all be the same ethnic foreigners.

The next example is the Saxons. Appearing as 'mercenaries' in the seventh-ninth centuries, Saxons are mentioned serving in several armies, including one that lost to Wamba in Septimania in 673, and another later with Charles the Bald—who used them in the front lines of his army during the Breton campaign—and a third with Louis the Younger at Andernach a generation later.[17] Louis controlled Saxony, so this might be considered some sort of obligatory military service, but Charles did not. Other references exist.[18] Again we have to wonder if all those called 'Saxons' were in fact Saxons, or if this is another example of mercenaries called by a foreign designation both because the Saxons were renowned and ruthless warriors and because there were some who certainly were mercenaries. Indeed, such might well be the case with the famous mercenary Childeric, who fought for and against several Merovingian kings. He is identified as a 'Saxon,' but with a very Frankish sounding name. This has led Guy Halsall to suggest that the epithet *saxo* referred to 'his mercenary status,'[19] but why could it not have also have referred to his 'foreign' mercenary status?

Perhaps the most famous single mercenary unit before the late Middle Ages was the Varangian Guard of the Byzantine army. For almost everyone the Varangian Guard was composed of ex- or exiled Scandinavian Vikings, and certainly fitting this bill is the most famous of these, at least according to later Scandinavian saga tradition—his life story is told in no fewer than six sagas—is King Harald Hardrada (in Old Norse Haraldr Sigurðarson or Haraldr Harðráði) who was killed at the Battle of Stamford Bridge during his invasion of England in 1066.[20] Said to

have been wounded at the Battle of Stiklarstaðir[21] in a vain attempt to restore his brother, Olaf (later St. Olaf) to the Norwegian throne, Harald made his way first to Kievan Russia and then to Constantinople where, in 1034, he joined the Varangian Guard and quickly rose to its command—although according to the *Fagrskinna* and *Heimskringla* Harald arrived at the head of a group of men and these may have been all he ever commanded. He stayed in the Varangian Guard for eight years, fighting for Byzantium in Anatolia, the Holy Land, Bulgaria, and Sicily before being forced to leave both the Guard and the Empire. If we are to believe the sagas, his exit was actually a spectacular escape and abduction of a Byzantine princess, Maria, Empress Zoe's niece, after he had exceedingly irritated the Empress—which, in fact, was not a difficult thing to do.

Harald was a Scandinavian Viking serving in the Varangian Guard, at least for a few years, and there are other Vikings also mentioned in saga literature as members of the Varangian Guard, Hoskuld of *Njal's Saga* (or the *Saga of Burnt Njal*), for example.[22] This seems to confirm their Scandinavian identity. But Harald Hardrada's own group of Guard soldiers was not entirely composed of Scandinavians, but also Russians, Slavs, and perhaps even some Bulgars. The Varangian Guard also saw its numbers grow with the addition of several Anglo-Saxons after their defeat at the Battle of Hastings in 1066.[23] This ethnic diversity is further supported by Hilda Ellis Davidson and Sigfús Blöndel in their impressive studies of the Varangian Guard.[24]

But soldiers from the southern Low Countries are linked more than any other 'foreign' group to mercenary service in the High Middle Ages. Mercenaries fighting in England from the Conquest to the reign of Edward III are often called Flemings, while on the European mainland similar units are called Brabançon (or Brabanters). Flemings are said to have served with William the Conqueror at Hastings and later, with William Rufus, with Stephen in his civil war and at the Battle of the Standard, with Henry II—who is reported to have hired 6000 mercenaries, mostly Flemings—with John—who employed a very large number of Flemings, especially as few of his own countrymen wanted to fight for him—and finally, at least in the person of John Crabbe, with Edward III.[25]

Crabbe was a true Fleming, at least according to Henry Stephen Lucas, and others can be so determined by their cognomens—Walter of Ghent (van Gent) or William of Ypres (Willem van Ieper)—but these were leaders, hence the reason they are identified, and it is not

known if all who were led by them were also Flemings. Others were positively not, for example the Duke of Limburg, referred to in both contemporary and modern sources, as the leader of the Flemings under King John in 1212–1213, and yet clearly not from Flanders.

Perhaps the best example of soldiers called Flemings who were definitely not appears among the forces assembled by William the Conqueror for his attack on England in 1066. Robert H. George in his 1926 article, 'The Contribution of Flanders to the Conquest of England, 1065–1086,' has convinced everyone that the troops from the Low Countries who fought at Hastings were Flemings. And these must also be considered mercenaries in every sense of the word, for they were not there out of any obligation to the Norman ducal leader of the conquest. But the evidence George prints in his article clearly shows that almost every one of these troops were from Boulogne.[26] However in 1066 Count Eustace of Boulogne was not a friend of Count Baldwin V of Flanders.[27] Indeed, the Boulognese participation in the invasion may be the reason Baldwin did not accompany or send many troops with his son-in-law, William, on his conquest of England. Identified then and now as Flemings, these soldiers were in fact not; and, as they were the 'Flemings' who continued to live in England after the conquest, it is likely that they were the same non-Flemings identified as such in the reigns of William Rufus and Henry I.

There are other groups of foreign soldiers serving in English armies mentioned in the original sources, including a group of Bretons during Henry I's reign, a Spaniard, Martin Algais, who fought for John, and Otto de Grandson, a Savoyard, and Pascual de Valencia, also known as Adalid, another Spaniard, who served with Henry II, but references to these national distinctions are extremely rare when compared to the mention of Flemings in English sources.[28] Curiously, there are also only a few references to Brabançons in English forces, although there were some recognized as fighing in Henry II's army on the continent.[29] But on the continent it is the Brabançons who are most often the mercenaries, with the Flemings mentioned much less. Also mentioned are Triaverdins, Catalans, Navarese, and other Iberians, but again far less than the Brabançons.[30]

Brabançons are recognized as superb infantry troops during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially for and against Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, for and against King Philip Augustus of France, and—as mentioned above—for King Henry II of England. But these were not all from Brabant. Part of the confusion comes from

the heavily Nazi-influenced article by H. Grundmann, 'Rotten und Bra-
banzonen: Söldner-Heere im 12. Jahrhundert,' published in the1941–42
Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters.[31] Yet, this was again simply
a name given to the mercenaries, some but certainly not all of whom
were from Brabant. This should have been cleared up by A. Mens in
1946, but unfortunately he published his article, 'De 'Brabanciones' of
bloeddorstige en plunderzieke avonturiers (XIIᵉ–XIIIᵉ eeuw),' only in
Dutch and only in a festschrift to Albert De Meyer.[32] From references
to it, the Mens' article seems to have been read by nobody! By the way,
the use of Low Countries' mercenaries does not end in the thirteenth
century, with Hainaulters, Namurese and Julichers, fighting alongside
Flemings and Brabançons for the English against the Scots in the early
fourteenth century.[33]

The problem with the foreign identity of mercenaries persists into
the last two centuries of the Middle Ages, when most medieval his-
torians believe the use of mercenaries increased greatly.[34] Take the
Catalan Company, for example. This Company of mercenaries was
organized in 1302 by Roger de Flor, a former Knight Templar from
Brindisi—and thus not himself a Catalan. However, it is thought
that it may have originally contained a large number of Iberian sol-
diers—although not all from Catalonia—who had fought together for
the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick II, against Napolese Angevins
during the late thirteenth-century War of Sicilian Vespers. The Catalan
Company was not small, probably numbering at least 6,500, 4,000 of
whom were infantry troops of outstanding skill and ability, and whose
name, *almugávares*, frightened even the most stalwart warriors of the
time.[35] Their first employer was the Byzantine Emperor, Andronicus II
Palaeologus, who was looking for experienced soldiers and could pay
very well. The Catalan Company jumped at the opportunity to travel
from the western to the eastern Mediterranean.[36] There they met with
almost immediate success, first in August 1303 when they sacked the
island of Ceos, off the coast of Anatolia, and then when they chased
the Ottoman Turks from outside the Byzantine capital over the next
few months. Initially this brought so much favor among the Byzantine
people that Roger de Flor even married into the Emperor's family, only
to find that this placed him in the middle of their incessant quarrels
and jealousies; he was murdered by them in April 1305.[37]

Leaderless and wanting nothing further to do with the Byzantine
Emperor, but respected and feared by all in the east, the Catalan
Company withdrew from Constantinople, traveling first to the Darda-

nelles where they established a short-lived state,[38] from there to Thrace and Macedonia, which they conquered, and then, in spring 1309, to Thessaly, thereby threatening Athens, Thebes, and the lower Greek peninsula.[39] Yet, Walter (Gautier) I of Brienne, the Frankish Duke of Athens, rather than fighting against them hired the Catalan Company to fight for him. They responded well and before the end of 1310 had captured more than thirty enemy villages, towns, and strongholds in Thessaly, Epirus and the southern peninsula.[40] But by this time Walter had fallen four months behind in wages, and instead of paying these, he selected 500 of the Catalan Company—200 cavalry and 300 *almugávares*—paid them their money, gave them lands and titles, and then requested that they keep their comrades from Athenian territories. However, the plan backfired, when the rest of the Catalan Company refused to be so easily dismissed, moving into fortifications in southern Thessaly, where they were soon joined by their 500 colleagues who had joyfully accepted Walter of Brienne's bribe and then simply broke their promises to him—quel supris!—and rejoined the Company.[41] On 15 March 1311, the Catalan Company met and defeated the Duke of Athens and his Frankish knights at the Battle of Kephissos. Athenian losses were numerous, with Walter of Brienne among the dead. Greece was the land of the Catalan Company, where it would remain until 1388.[42]

Even before the Battle of Kephissos, probably as early as their move to the Dardanelles, the Catalan Company's number of Spanish mercenaries had been eclipsed by Greek, Byzantine, and even Ottoman recruits. The Aragonese *Chronicle of Morea* indicates that at the time of this battle the Company numbered 6,000, with 2,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, the same numbers as the initial recruitment count given by the chronicler Ramón Muntaner, an actual member of the Catalan Company.[43] Of course, this sounds somewhat suspicious, except that the contemporary Greek chronicler, Nikephoros Gregoras, records that more than 1,100 Turks were added to the Company before their invasion of Thessaly.[44] Yet, they continued to be called the 'Catalan' Company both by contemporary and modern writers.

Even the fourteenth-century Italian *condottieri* were not all foreign. John Hawkwood was certainly English as were many of his troops,[45] and there were other French, German, and Hungarian mercenaries and mercenary captains, especially in the early fourteenth century.[46] But these became fewer and fewer as the century progressed, until Albergio da Barbiano, an Italian mercenary captain, defeated the last

foreign mercenary captain, Sylvestre Budes, at the Battle of Marino in 1380.[47] The fifteenth century saw only Italian *condottieri* leaders in Italy, and while they certainly hired any mercenary they thought could do the job, these also for the most part were Italian.

Finally, in the Hundred Years War English leaders of Free Companies, as mercenary groups were called—for example Robert Knolles—French leaders—for example Perrinet Gressart—and Burgundian leaders—for example Jacques de Lalaing—are all identified with their own nationality, as were their soldiers. Did that mean all of their mercenaries were actually of that same nationality? Probably not, but for the Free Companies during that long war 'foreign' was never a requirement.[48]

But in the Hundred Years War were there any soldiers who were not mercenaries? Almost everyone was paid for their military service. Which brings me to the definitional problems of the second misleading word customarily used to define the medieval mercenary: paid.

'Feudalism' as a word establishing a pattern of socio-economic hierarchy during the Middle Ages has taken a beating lately. Many have questioned its usefulness and accuracy, however by and large their criticism has been directed towards the defining of the lord-peasant relationship and not any military obligation between lords and lesser lords, although there is no doubt that this was a major if not the main component of early feudalism paradigms.[49] Nor has Philippe Contamine's name change to 'feudo-vassalic system' helped here, despite his more focused effort in directing it at the problems of military obligation and recruitment.[50]

Still, for medieval military leaders there was 'obligation,' without a doubt, but for most of the common troops in the middle ages soldiering was an occupation not an obligation. Of course, written evidence for this is hard to come by, with most medieval common soldiers unable or disinclined to write about their military experiences, although there are one or two examples, such as Guillaume Guiart's *Branche des royaux lignages*, written when the author had become a cleric later in his life but recalling his experiences fighting in the French army against the Flemish rebels of 1302–1305.[51]

But other evidence makes up for the lack of written sources. For instance, excavated graves at the battlefields of Visby (1361) and Towton (1461) have shown that men stayed in or returned to military service when needed—sometimes many years after their earlier fighting experiences—as proven by healed combat wounds on several of the skeletons. The most dramatic of these was to a Towton soldier

estimated to have been as old as fifty at the time of his death. He had suffered an incredibly disfiguring sword slash to his face more than 20 or 30 years previously, when he likely fought with the English forces in France. Others had healed wounds in the limbs and even the head but had returned to soldiering.[52] Were these simply men who were trying to regain the adventure and adrenaline-rush of battle? Not likely. They were soldiers by occupation, and that occupation, even if it was only for subsistence, was better than that of a farmer or laborer. If it did bring greater economic rewards—pay and possibly booty or ransom during war, possibly castle guard or garrison duty during peace—all the better. (Of course, they might also gain employment as mercenaries.)

But did regular employment as a soldier make him a stipendiary or a mercenary, and was there a difference? Probably not to the soldier. Take, for example, a hypothetical twelfth-century Flemish soldier listed as a stipendiary in the documents of the time when he is fighting for the Count of Flanders. If he or his unit takes employment as soldiers in England fighting for Henry II, does he then know that he is a mercenary? Or if he is hired to fight in Italy for Frederick Barbarossa is he now a Brabançon?[53]

Medieval levies existed in theory, but were rarely effectively or successfully called, such as in 1300, when Edward I called his already fatigued feudal levy to military service, only forty knights and 366 sergeants responded.[54] With such a small number Edward was unable to fight his war that year. Problems also arose over whom to call up. Peasants and urban militias were often quite numerous but lacked the skills or discipline to make them effective warriors. There was also some hesitation to take soldiers from either the agricultural or tax-paying sector of society. So militias were almost always mustered for defensive purposes only. An example of this can be found in some documents I recently translated and commented on in the *Journal of Medieval Military History*. Following the failure of Duke Philip the Good's Burgundian army to capture Calais in July 1436, urban and rural militias were mustered throughout the southern Low Countries to protect their lands from the anticipated English military response.[55] This came in the form of raids by Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, and the presence of English ships off the coast of Flanders. Many militia members were called and stood watch outside their towns and villages for the month of August. But where were the professional troops, such as those from Ghent and Bruges who were justly blamed for Philip's failure at Calais? They were with the Burgundian army that had been withdrawn to Burgundy. They

were professional soldiers—although bad ones, letting their inter-Flemish rivalry determine their military activities outside of Flanders. They were not militia. In addition, where there were obligation requirements to combine land holdings in providing military service, such as in the Carolingian Empire and Anglo-Saxon Wessex, these only compelled the service of soldiers and not the land-holders.[56]

Finally, it should be pointed out that while it is true that most early medieval mercenaries are not known for their special skill in a single weapon, at the end of the Middle Ages this becomes more frequent. Genoese crossbowmen are perhaps the most well-known of these soldiers because of their role in the French defeat at the Battle of Crécy in 1346—although reflecting on my earlier point these were not all Genoese[57]—but English longbowmen, Burgundian handgunners, and German or Hungarian gunners are also mentioned in the sources.[58] All were paid, and paid well—handgunners in the Burgundian army of the mid-fifteenth century were paid the same as a heavy cavalryman.[59] These would give way to the late fifteenth-/early-sixteenth-century *landsknechts*, well-paid Swiss and German mercenaries, who were, of course, not all Swiss and German.[60]

The recruitment of medieval soldiers and their motivation for fighting are the issues at hand in this article, not just the definition of medieval 'mercenary.' Good soldiers were always needed to fill the ranks of medieval armies, and they were always paid, whether by subsistence, wages, booty, rank, status, or nobility. Soldiering was their occupation. And if they could push their pay higher, why should they not be Huns, Saxons, Varangians, Flemings, Brabançons, Catalan, Genoese, or Swiss, even if they were not Huns, Saxons, Varangians, Flemings, Brabançons, Catalan, Genoese, or Swiss?

Notes

[1] The military records of the Frederick the Great's reign are part of the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, which despite the name is quite accessible. They are also available from the Church of Latter-day Saints Genealogical Library or its branch libraries throughout the world. As an introduction to Frederick's military history see Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (London, 1996).

[2] This has been the point of Victor Davis Hanson's various publications touting his 'western way of war' thesis. See especially *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power* (New York, 2001). Although Hanson does not focus on the Spartans and Romans alone in these works, he certainly pushes the superiority of these and other 'western' soldiers over their enemies. I find the 'western way of warfare' thesis completely untenable as can be seen in my recently published 'Medieval Warfare and

the Value of a Human Life,' in *Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities: Warfare in the Middle Ages*, ed. Niall Christie and Maya Yazigi (Leiden, 2006), pp. 27–55 and my forthcoming *The World's Battlefield: The Preponderance of Warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean from Troy to the Twentieth-First Century*.

[3] The most recent discussion is Barry Strauss, *The Trojan War: A New History* (New York, 2006).

[4] Michael Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (Totowa, 1974).

[5] Michael Mallett, 'Mercenaries,' in *Medieval Warfare: A History*, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), 209. The article is 209–29. I have been very critical of this book in the past as the quality of its individual articles is very uneven. However, Mallett's article is one of the better ones in it.

[6] Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1984); David.Nicolle, *Medieval Warfare Source Book*, vol. 1: *Warfare in Western Christendom* (London, 1995); Helen Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare: Theory and Practice of War in Europe, 300–1500* (Houndmills, 2004); John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300* (Ithaca, 1999); Guy Halsall, *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900* (London, 2003); Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, 1996).

[7] Prestwich, p. 147. Prestwich devotes an entire chapter to 'Mercenaries' in this excellent study of medieval English military history.

[8] The best account of Robert of Artois' service in the English army can be found in Henry Stephen Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War, 1326–1347* (Ann Arbor, 1929) and George T. Diller, 'Robert d'Artois et l'historicité des *Chroniques* de Froissart,' *Moyen Age* 86 (1980), 217–31. On Sir John Stewart of Darnley at Herrings see Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (Stroud, 1999), pp. 66–67. For the English longbowmen see Richard Vaughan, *Charles the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy* (London, 1973), 16–18 and Mark Ballard, 'An Expedition of English Archers to Liège in 1467, and the Anglo-Burgundian Marriage Alliance,' *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 34 (1990), 152–74. And for the Flemish handgunners see Anthony Goodman, *The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society, 1452–97* (London, 1981), 172.

[9] Karl Leyser, 'Concepts of Europe in the Early and High Middle Ages,' *Past and Present* 137 (1992), 25–47 and Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (Princeton, 1993), although Bartlett certainly sees a difference that can only be described as 'national' between societies living on either side of the frontiers.

[10] Patrick Wormald, '*Engla Lond*: the Making of an Allegiance,' *Journal of Historical Sociology* 7 (1994), 1–24 and Philippe Contamine, 'France et Angleterre de Guillaume le Conquérant à Jeanne d'Arc: La formation de États nationaux,' in *Des pouvoirs en France, 1300–1500* (Paris, 1992), 27–36.

[11] I base this on the existence of a distinctive southern Low Countries' vernacular, in both Middle Dutch and Middle French dialects; an increasing recognition of the southern Low Countries as a distinct region by contemporary English, Italian, German, and especially French and Burgundian commentators writing their history, in particular the rebellions of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and the symbolic means of debasement as part of the punishments weighed against the rebels, specifically the Flemings and Liégeois, which after their rebellions were put down could be interpreted as a means of destroying and subduing any wisp of nationalism that might have provoked the rebellions. (Coupled with these ritual debasements were royal, comital, prince-episcopal, or ducal displays also meant to reduce any feelings of southern Low Countries' nationalism.) These conclusions were presented as part of a paper entitled 'The Rebellions of the Southern Low Countries' Towns during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries' at Columbia University on 11 June 2001. However, the editors of the publication in which these papers were to appear (*Power and the City*

in the Netherlandic World, 1000–2000 [Leiden, 2005], 27–44), W. TeBrake and W. Kibler, chose to remove them.

[12] I do recognize that in a paper where I criticize the definitions of other terms I am using terms that historians of the period find equally difficult to define. However, in using the terms 'late Roman' and 'barbarian,' as well as the tribal designations of those barbarians, I am following the recent examples of Peter Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians* (Oxford, 2005) and Bryan Ward-Perkins, *The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization* (Oxford, 2005), who have thankfully returned military causes to the fall of Rome.

[13] See Peter Heather, 'The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire in Western Europe,' *English Historical Review* 110 (1995), 25–26.

[14] A complete analysis of Aetius' life can be found in the recent biography of T. Stickler, *Aetius: Gestaltungsspielraume eines Heermeisters in ausgehenden Weströmischen Reich* (Munich, 2002). See also Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire*, 282–375, who is especially good in describing Aetius' relationship with the Huns. The Battle of Catalaunian Fields is described by me in *Battles of the Ancient World: From Kadesh to Catalaunian Fields* (New York, forthcoming). Jordanes records Attila's death in *Getica*, 49:256–58 (Jordanes, *Romana et Getica*, ed. T. Mommsen, MGH, AA 5.1 [Hannover, 1882]). And the description of Renatus Frigiderius is found in Gregory of Tours, *The History of the Franks*, trans. Lewis Thorpe (Harmondsworth, 1974), 2.8.

[15] Heather 'The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire,' p. 10.

[16] Ammianus Marcellinus, *Rerum gestarum libri*, ed. and trans. J.C. Rolfe, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 3.31.8.4. See also Heather 'The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire,' 10 and Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire*, 175.

[17] Halsall, 111, 114, 189.

[18] Probably the most famous employment of Saxon mercenaries is that of Vortigern in the early to mid fifth century when he hired them to defend his land against the Irish and Picts. Their treachery in remaining in England is related with much hyperbole in Gildas' *De exidio Britanniae* (in *Six Old English Chronicles*, trans. J.A. Giles [London, 1891], no. 23), but has nevertheless been repeated often by modern historians.

[19] Halsall, 111.

[20] For a more complete recounting of the biography of Harald Hardrada see Kelly DeVries, *The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066* (Woodbridge,1999). The sagas are: Theodoricus, *Monumenta historica Norvegiæ: Latinske kildeskrifter til Norges historie I middelalderen*, ed. G. Storm (Christiana [Oslo], 1880); *Ágrip af Nóregs konunga sögum*, ed. F. Jónsson (Halle, 1929); *Fagrskinna: Kortfattet Norsk Konge-Saga*, ed. P.A. Munch and C.R. Unger (Christiania [Oslo], 1847); *Morkinskinna: Pergamentsbog fra forste halvdel af det trettende aarhundrede*, ed. C.R. Unger (Christiania [Oslo], 1867); Snorri Sturluson, *Heimskringla*, ed. B. Aðalbjarnarson, 3 vols. (Reykjavik, 1941–51); and *Flateyjarbók: En samling af Norske Konge-Sagaer*, ed. G. Vigfusson and C.R. Unger, 3 vols. (Christiania [Oslo], 1860–68). Theodoricus' saga is written in Latin, the rest are in Old Norse. For many years only Snorri Sturluson's was translated, which lessened the importance of Harald's life for a non-Old Norse reading audience. However, in the last few years all of the other sagas except for the *Flateyjarbók* have appeared in English translation.

[21] The name of this battle is spelled in many ways, i.e. Stikkelstad, Stiklestad, Stiklestadir, etc. I am using the Old Norse spelling.

[22] *Njal's Saga*, trans. Magnus Magnusson and Hermann Pálsson (Harmondsworth, 1960).

[23] John Godfrey, 'The Defeated Anglo-Saxons Take Service with the Eastern Emperor,' *Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies* 1 (1978), 63–74.

[24] Hilda R. Ellis Davidson, *The Viking Road to Byzantium* (London, 1976) and Sigfús Blöndel, *The Varangians of Byzantium*, trans. B.S. Benedikz (Cambridge, 1978).

[25] For the kings from William the Conqueror to John see Prestwich, 147–50 and Stephen D.B. Brown, 'Military Service and Monetary Reward in the Eleventh and Twelfth

Centuries,' *History* 74 (1989), 20–38. For John Crabbe see Henry Stephen Lucas, 'John Crabbe: Flemish Pirate, Merchant, and Adventurer,' *Speculum* 20 (1945), 334–50.

[26] Robert H. George, 'The Contribution of Flanders to the Conquest of England, 1065–1086,' *Revue Belge de philologie et d'histoire* 5 (1926), 81–99.

[27] See Heather J. Tanner, *Families, Friends and Allies: Boulogne and Politics in Northern France and England, c. 879–1160* (Leiden, 2004).

[28] Prestwich, 150–51, 154.

[29] See John Hosler in this volume.

[30] Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 100–01.

[31] H. Grundmann, 'Rotten und Brabanzonen: Söldner-Heere im 12. Jahrhundert,' *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 5 (1941–42), 419–92.

[32] A. Mens, 'De 'Brabanciones' of bloeddorstige en plunderzieke avonturiers (XIIᵉ–XIIIᵉ eeuw),' in *Miscellanea historia in honorem Alberti De Meyer*, 2 vols (Leuven: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1946), 1. 558–70.

[33] Prestwich, 154–55.

[34] On the occurrence of late medieval mercenaries see Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 99–101, 150–65; Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters*, especially 25–106; Malcolm Vale, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages* (Athens, 1981), 151–57; Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300–c. 1450* (Cambridge, 1988), 73–76; Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, vol. 1: *The Great Companies* (Oxford, 2001); Geoffrey Trease, *The Condottieri: Soldiers of Fortune* (New York, 1971); and two books by William Caferro, *Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena* (Baltimore, 1998), and *John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy* (Baltimore, 2006).

[35] On the numbers in the Catalan Company see Kenneth M. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311–1388* (Cambridge, 1948), 3; Jep Pascot, *Les almugavares: Mercenaires catalans du moyen age (1302–1388)* (Brussels, 1971), 44; and Robert I Burns, 'The Catalan Company and the European Powers, 1305–1311,' *Speculum* 29 (1954), 752.

[36] Setton,, 2; Burns, 752; and David Jacoby, 'La 'compagnie catalane' et l'état catalan de Grèce. Quelques aspects de leur histoire,' *Journal des savants* (1966), 79.

[37] Setton, 3–4; Pascot, 47–85; Burns, 752; and Jacoby, 80–81.

[38] Setton, 4; Pascot, 87–123; and Jacoby, 81–86. In the Dardanelles, at Gallipoli, the Catalan Company was forced to defend themselves not only against the Byzantines, but also against the Genoese and Caucasians.

[39] Setton, 4–5 and Pascot, 125–40. Pascot claims the Catalan Company left Gallipoli because of internal discord. Setton believes that it was because the Catalans had devastated the Dardanelles peninsula and were unable to continue to profit from their raids, or even to feed themselves.

[40] Setton, 7–8 and Pascot, 140–49.

[41] Setton, 8–9.

[42] Setton, 9–13; Pascot, 149–54; and Jacoby, 87. On the Battle of Kephissos see Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology* (Woodbridge, 1996), 58–65.

[43] *Libro de los fechos et conquistas del principado de la Morea compilado por comandamiento de Don Johan Ferrandez de Heredia*, ed. A. Morel-Fatio (Geneva, 1885), 120 and Ramón Muntaner, *Crònica*, trans. H.M. Goodenough, 2 vols. (London, 1920–21), 2.485–86.

[44] Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, in PG 148, 414–15.

[45] A brilliant new biography is Caferro, *John Hawkwood*.

[46] See Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters*.

[47] Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 159–60.

[48] See Fowler and Allmand.

[49] Almost everyone forgets that the modern criticisms of feudalism began with E.A.R. Brown's article, 'The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe,' *American Historical Review* 79 (1974), 1063–88, now referring almost

solely to Susan Reynold's *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford, 1994). Neither address military obligation specifically in their works, despite the fact that earlier studies of feudalism spoke directly to the issue of military obligation and recruitment. See, for example, Carl Stephenson, *Mediaeval Feudalism* (Ithaca, 1942); Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 2 vols., trans. L.A. Manyon (Chicago, 1961); F.L. Ganshof, *Feudalism*, 3rd ed., trans. Philip Grierson (New York, 1964); and Georges Duby, *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, 1980). However, despite its age and some revisionism since it appeared, most medieval military historians studying the subject must still begin with Heinrich Brünner, 'Der Ritterdienst und die Anfänge des Lehenwesens,' *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung* 8 (1887), 1–38.

[50] Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 7. Especially since what follows his introduction of the term describes forms of payment medieval leaders used to recruit their soldiers.

[51] Guillaume Guiart. *Branche des royaux lignages*, in RHGF22.

[52] For Visby see Bengt Thordemann, *Armour from the Battle of Wisby, 1361* (Stockholm, 1939; rpt. Union City: Chivalry Bookshelf, 2001) and for Towton, Veronica Fiorato, Anthea Boylston, and Christopher Knüsel, ed., *Blood Red Roses: The Archaeology of a Mass Grave from the Battle of Towton, AD 1461* (Oxford, 2000). More bodies have been found at Towton and some of these, too, contain healed wounds and other evidence of lengthy military service. Healed wounds can also be seen on the late fifteenth-century excavated skulls on display in the Basel Museum, but these have not been studied or published. (I wish to thank Tim Sutherland for updating me on some of his recent Towton excavations and Bob Woosnam-Savage for introducing me to the Basel holdings.)

[53] Here the distinction between a man employed as a soldier and a militia member called up for temporary service must be made, as David Bachrach does in this volume.

[54] Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 80.

[55] Kelly DeVries, 'Note: Provisions for the Ostend Militia on the Defense, August 1436,' *Journal of Medieval Military History* 3 (2005), 176–83.

[56] For Carolingian land-holder military obligations see F.L. Ganshof, *Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne*, trans. Bruce and Mary Lyon (New York, 1968), p. 66 and for Anglo-Saxon Wessex ones see Nicholas P. Brooks, 'The Development of Military Obligations in Eighth- and Ninth-Century England,' in *England Before the Conquest: Studies in Primary Sources Presented to Dorothy Whitelock.*, ed. P. Clemoes and K. Hughes (Cambridge, 1971), 69–84.

[57] See Gabriella Airaldi, 'The Genoese Art of War,' in *Across the Mediterranean Frontiers: Trade, Politics and Religion, 650–1450: Selected Proceedings of the International Medieval Congress, University of Leeds, 10–13 July 1995, 8–11 July 1996*, ed. Dionisius A. Agius and Ian Richard Netton (Turnhout, 1997), 269–82, and Alessio Cenni, 'The Diffusion of the Crossbow in Italian Warfare,' *Journal of the Society of Archer-Antiquaries* 42 (1999), 46–54.

[58] Although there are many examples of these, for references to English longbowmen and Burgundian handgunners see no. 8 above. For German/Hungarian gunners see Kelly DeVries, 'Gunpowder Weaponry at the Siege of Constantinople, 1453,' in *War, Army and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–16th Centuries*, ed. Yaacov Lev (Leiden, 1996), 343–62.

[59] Charles the Bold's payments to his soldiers are listed in his military ordinances of 1468–1473. See Richard Vaughan, *Charles the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy* (London, 1973), 208–18.

[60] Reinhard Baumann, *Landsknecht: Ihre Geschichte und Kultur vom späten Mittelalter bis zum Drießigjährigen Krieg* (Munich, 1994).

LES MERCENAIRES DANS LES CAMPAGNES NAPOLITAINES DE LOUIS LE GRAND, ROI DE HONGRIE, 1347–1350[1]

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LE CHRONICON DE REBUS IN APULIA GESTIS (1347–1350) PAR DOMENICO DA GRAVINA[2]

De 1347 à 1350 une guerre oppose deux branches de la Maison d'Anjou, les rois de Hongrie et les rois de Sicile (Naples) en Italie du Sud et une seule source contemporaine locale, le *Chronicon de rebus in Apulia gestis (1347–1350)*, écrit par Domenico da Gravina, témoin oculaire, en relate les événements. Ce document décrit une guerre médiévale se déroulant sur trois niveaux différents : une guerre internationale, sur fond de querelle dynastique entre Anjou de Hongrie et de Naples ; une guerre régionale, alimentée par les ambitions des barons et les rivalités entre villes ; une guerre locale, à l'échelle d'une ville, véritable guerre civile entre factions citadines. Ce texte, qui permet d'apprécier les modalités de l'art de la guerre telle qu'elle se pratiquait au milieu du XIV° siècle en Italie du Sud, met en évidence l'utilisation massive des compagnies de mercenaires ainsi que leurs usages et comportements.

LE CONTEXTE HISTORIQUE

Le 19 janvier 1343 le roi Robert d'Anjou, dit le Sage, s'éteint et avec lui se termine l'âge d'or du royaume angevin de Naples. En effet ses dispositions testamentaires relancent les luttes fratricides car sa petite-fille Jeanne y est désignée comme son unique héritière et son époux, André de Hongrie, se trouve de fait exclu de la succession. Les rivalités et les ambitions divergentes des trois branches de la Maison d'Anjou issues des frères du roi Robert (rois de Hongrie, princes de Tarente et ducs de Duras) éclatent au grand jour. André de Hongrie exige sa reconnaissance comme souverain à part entière alors que les Tarente et les Duras essayent de préserver leurs propres chances d'accession

au trône. La question va se régler dans le sang car le prince André est assassiné dans la nuit du 18 au 19 novembre 1345, à Averse, et son frère, Louis le Grand roi de Hongrie décide d'intervenir militairement pour défendre ses droits.

En juin 1347 l'avant-garde de l'armée hongroise pénètre dans le Royaume de Naples, puis suivent alors, par petits contingents successifs pour ne pas soulever d'inquiétude ou des soupçons de conquête dans le territoires traversés, les autres composantes de l'armée, «bannières» hongroises et Compagnies de mercenaires, ces dernières engagées directement en Italie et commandées par de prestigieux chefs de guerre allemands, tels les frères Ulrich et Conrad Wolfhardt ou Werner d'Urslingen. Louis le Grand arrive à L'Aquila le 24 décembre 1347 et la première campagne commence. L'armée napolitaine ne résiste pas longtemps : la reine Jeanne, effrayée, s'embarque précipitamment pour la Provence dans la nuit du 15 janvier, et Louis de Hongrie pénètre dans Naples le 24 janvier 1348. Mais le roi vainqueur ne réussit pas à s'enraciner dans le Royaume et en peu de temps sa crédibilité va s'évanouir. Cependant le souverain hongrois se sent suffisamment en sécurité pour commettre l'erreur de congédier la majorité des troupes mercenaires à son service, à commencer par celles de Werner d'Urslingen, sur lequel pèsent des soupçons de trahison.

En mars 1348 Louis le Grand doit faire face à une nouvelle rupture avec la République de Venise, rupture qui risque de lui couper toute liaison maritime avec la Hongrie par la mer Adriatique, et par ailleurs, en ce même printemps 1348, se diffuse dans toute l'Italie la Grande Peste. Pour échapper à ces deux dangers, fin mai et dans le plus grand secret, Louis le Grand rentre en Hongrie, en laissant ses troupes dans le Royaume de Naples sous le commandement des chefs mercenaires allemands, Conrad et Ulrich Wolfhardt. Le départ impromptu du souverain hongrois ouvre une nouvelle phase de la guerre : les révoltes en faveur de Jeanne se multiplient, et l'amiral Goffredo da Marzano engage au service de la reine les 1500 mercenaires allemands de Werner d'Urslingen ainsi que les hommes de Giovanni Pipino, comte d'Altamura, mercenaires qui opèrent dans les territoires de l'Eglise. Par ailleurs la reine Jeanne et son époux Louis de Tarente sont de retour à Naples à la mi-août 1348 et, progressivement, les Napolitains repoussent les Hongrois, s'emparent des places fortes proches de Naples, et engagent une campagne de reconquête des Pouilles.

En janvier 1349 les renforts hongrois débarquent enfin à Manfredonia, sous le commandement d'Étienne Lackfi, voïvode de Transylvanie,

et font leur jonction avec les mercenaires de Conrad Wolfhardt. Les Napolitains se retirent tandis que Werner d'Urslingen et ses mercenaires, battus et faits prisonniers à Corneto le 1er février, tournent casaque et reviennent à la solde du voïvode Etienne. L'armée hongroise se dirige alors vers Naples et la bataille décisive a lieu le 6 juin 1349, à Melito, entre Averse et Naples : l'armée napolitaine, essentiellement citadine et aristocratique, malgré la présence de 1500 mercenaires allemands sous le commandement de Jean d'Asperg, comte de Sprecht, ne peut tenir le choc face à l'armée «de métier» hongroise et elle est sévèrement battue. Une médiation pontificale aboutit, le 23 août, à une trêve qui désavantage considérablement les Hongrois car elle ôte aux troupes mercenaires, constituant désormais l'essentiel de leur armée, la possibilité de vivre sur le terrain. Rapidement les rapports entre Hongrois et mercenaires se dégradent, ces derniers réclamant le payement de leur solde alors que le voïvode ne dispose plus d'argent frais. Les Hongrois sont contraints de se retirer vers la côte Adriatique tandis que les chefs mercenaires Werner de Urslingen, Conrad de Landau et Conrad Wolfhardt «revendent» aux Napolitains les villes et les forteresses conquises. Finalement, faute de ravitaillement, en décembre 1349, les mercenaires de Werner de Urslingen quittent le royaume de Naples tandis que Conrad Wolfhardt se retire vers les Abruzzes et renoue avec les Hongrois.

A la fin avril 1350 Louis le Grand, ayant enfin réglé les problèmes avec la République de Venise, débarque à son tour à Manfredonia. Cette seconde campagne amène facilement l'armée hongroise devant les murailles d'Averse qui capitule après un mois de siège. La situation de Naples devient critique mais les souverains napolitains cette fois-ci n'abandonnent pas leur capitale : Louis le Grand est de fait à nouveau vainqueur mais ne peut maîtriser et contrôler durablement le Royaume de Naples. En septembre 1350 les négociations aboutissent à une nouvelle trêve et, sous prétexte de se rendre à Rome pour le Jubilé, Louis le Grand prend le chemin du retour vers la Hongrie avec le gros de son armée. Le traité de paix définitif sera souscrit, à Naples, en mars 1352, Louis Le Grand étant alors convaincu de l'inutilité de ses efforts et décidé à abandonner toute prétention sur le trône de Naples.

LES ARMÉES EN PRÉSENCE

Les XIV° et XV° siècles sont des siècles de guerre permanente et cette la guerre n'est plus un événement mais une structure. Par la conjonction des traditions sociales, des circonstances politiques, des nécessités économiques et des exigences techniques, la guerre devient un métier. Du point de vue stratégique et tactique, les contingents féodaux, intrinsèquement temporaires, ne sont plus adaptés à la permanence de la guerre et par ailleurs leur ordonnance vassalique empêche la formation d'unités souples et homogènes. Le recours aux soldats de métier se généralise et l'on remarque que le fait d'engager des Compagnies de mercenaires en temps de guerre, puis leur verser des indemnités de chômage à l'heure des trêves, n'est pas une mesure de circonstance mais tout simplement la conséquence de la transformation de l'ost féodal en une armée de métier contractuelle. Cette adaptation technique de l'art de la guerre est accompagnée, en parallèle, par la montée en puissance des économies monétaires en Europe pendant le XIII° siècle et la conjonction de ces facteurs fait que deux tendances, majeures et contradictoires, se dégagent : d'une par l'émergence des armées « nationales », et d'autre part la professionnalisation du recrutement militaire, principalement en Italie, qui conduit à l'engagement de plus en plus prononcé de mercenaires étrangers.

L'ARMÉE HONGROISE

A l'arrivée des Angevins sur le trône de Hongrie un nouveau système militaire, basé sur les modèles italien et français, est mis en place, tout en prenant en compte la réalité hongroise des armées privées. La structure est typiquement féodale, les éléments constitutifs fondamentaux étant les « bannières », les armées privées qui se battent sous les insignes de leurs seigneurs respectifs. A noter que, dans les opérations militaires à l'intérieur du royaume, les frais des « bannières » sont supportés intégralement par leurs seigneurs respectifs, tandis que pour les expéditions à l'extérieur du royaume tous les frais sont supportés par la Couronne. Les clans aristocratiques et leurs élites forment l'ossature de la cavalerie lourde. En complément de cette armée occidentalisée on trouve une composante très originale, la cavalerie légère, dans le droit fil de la tradition des peuples nomades des steppes. Cette cavalerie légère, composée principalement d'archers à cheval, se recrute principalement

chez les peuples «auxiliaires» (Sicules, Coumans, Iasians). L'habileté de l'armée hongroise à combiner des traditions tactiques occidentales et orientales lui a permis de transformer sa cavalerie légère en un outil de guerre particulièrement efficace.

Pour l'intervention dans le Royaume de Naples, l'armée hongroise est structurée autour de trois pôles : un noyau «national» hongrois, formé de bannières expérimentées, les compagnies de mercenaires et les forces de barons napolitains alliés. Louis de Hongrie montre une préférence marquée pour les troupes payées, rémunérées, privilégiant la qualité à la quantité. La mise en place d'une telle armée implique forcement des frais financiers énormes, frais difficilement supportables par la plus part des monarchies de l'époque mais pas pour la Hongrie, dont les revenus royaux ordinaires sont largement suffisants pour soutenir des campagnes extérieures longues. Concernant les mercenaires, le souverain hongrois les prend à sa solde directement en Allemagne ou en Italie, en choisissant principalement des Allemands (cavalerie lourde) et des Lombards (infanterie) qui connaissent déjà le terrain et les habitudes de combat en Italie. S'il est vrai que ces mercenaires représentent l'élément professionnel, constitué de combattants entraînés et redoutés de l'ennemi, il n'en reste pas moins que le cœur de l'armée est bien le noyau proprement hongrois, composé de chevaliers lourdement armés et de quelques escadrons de cavalerie légère.

L'armée napolitaine

L'aristocratie fournit l'essentiel de l'encadrement de l'armée royale, elle fréquente la cour, mais les barons exercent aussi un pouvoir réel dans les provinces qu'ils administrent. Cette domination territoriale permet à l'aristocratie du Royaume de Naples de négocier sa fidélité au souverain, ce dernier étant réduit souvent à simplement récompenser les fidèles et à essayer de punir les rebelles. Sous les Angevins la féodalité de guerrière devient rentière, plus noble que chevaleresque. La transformation des structures féodales marque la fin de celles-ci comme support militaire du royaume et le remplacement du service militaire féodal par une taxe («adhoa») proportionnelle aux revenus du fief, devient une caractéristique essentielle de l'ordonnancement militaire napolitain. Dans ce compromis typiquement napolitain, la monarchie préserve, par le biais de l'impôt, le principe d'une contrepartie précise à la jouissance des biens et à la condition féodale des barons, principe

constitutif de la souveraineté, et en même temps s'assure les ressources financières nécessaires pour suppléer aux défaillances du service féodal avec des mercenaires.

L'essor des compagnies de mercenaires en Italie du Nord et du Centre va trouver un écho inattendu en Italie du Sud, lorsque la grande féodalité y voit la possibilité de transformer le service militaire obligatoire en en service ambigu, à la fois féodal et mercenaire. La guerre devient une source de profit pour la noblesse et ce double aspect, de seigneur et de «condottiere», ainsi que l'engagement direct de troupes mercenaires, est une caractéristique de l'aristocratie napolitaine. Les armées «privées» napolitaines comportent des «appelés» soldés et des «engagés» stipendiés. Les «appelés» ne sont pas des mercenaires et leur solde résulte plus de l'initiative du baron que du marchandage entre employé et employeur. Les «engagés» constituent le groupe des mercenaires, avec les «*stipendiarii*», généralement des étrangers, régulièrement payés, engagés par contrat et formant le seul élément militaire professionnel, et les «*malandrenii*», hommes d'armes locaux, payés et engagés pour de très longues périodes. L'armée «nationale» napolitaine est principalement composée par les barons du royaume et leurs suites, et par la noblesse citadine, de Naples ou d'autres villes du royaume. Bien entendu, malgré les défaillances du trésor royal, l'armée napolitaine compte, elle-aussi, quelques compagnies de mercenaires allemands, sous le commandement de chefs prestigieux, tel que Jean d'Asperg, comte de Sprecht.

Les Mercenaires

Le concept traditionnel du Moyen Âge de l'obligation militaire des vassaux envers leur seigneur ne doit pas faire oublier l'existence déjà ancienne du concept du service militaire payé et de son évolution. La rémunération de ce service militaire a pris, dans le temps, différentes formes: «suppléments» monétaires pour un service militaire allant au-delà des obligations normales, allocations de subsistance, cadeaux, etc. Au XIV° siècle être soldat devient une façon de vivre et la paye est une composante essentielle de cette vie. Dès cette époque, ce qui distingue un mercenaire d'un soldat ordinaire recevant une solde c'est seulement le concept du combat pour le profit joint à la notion d' «étranger». Au XIII° siècle déjà, quelques seigneurs ont des bandes armées à leur service, composées généralement de soldats originaires du «contado»,

engagés et rémunérés pour défendre leur terre ou leur seigneur, les «masnadieri» (par la suite ce terme a désigné les voleurs et les assassins), puis, au début du XIV° siècle, dans l'Italie communale, naissent les premières bandes armées véritablement mercenaires. Ce ne sont plus les libres citoyens des communes qui se battent pour la liberté de leur ville et ce ne sont pas encore des professionnels de la guerre ; ce sont des chevaliers sans terre, des exilés, des vagabonds, des paysans disposés à se battre et à tuer pour survivre. Ces petites bandes n'ont pas de discipline, leurs membres vivent essentiellement de pillages et parcourent la péninsule italienne en se mettant, occasionnellement, à la solde d'un capitaine du peuple les appelant à combattre pour telle ou telle commune.

Les troupes mercenaires proprement dites sont recrutées sur une base commerciale et cette pratique, dans sa dimension européenne à grande échelle, vient d'Italie. Le contexte géopolitique fragmenté fait que les Italiens, les premiers, font appel à des «entrepreneurs privés» afin de se constituer des armées capables de défendre leurs intérêts et leurs territoires. Les cités-Etats de l'Italie du Nord et du Centre développent des économies florissantes leur donnant les ressources financières nécessaires pour investir dans leur sécurité, sans que leurs riches citoyens soient obligés de se battre personnellement sous les bannières des milices urbaines. Il devient économiquement raisonnable et profitable de payer des mercenaires, d'autant plus qu'il y a un grand nombre d'hommes disponibles sur le marché de la guerre, car l'Italie n'est pas seulement le carrefour où se forment les armées des croisades mais aussi un objectif privilégié pour de nombreuses ambitions étrangères, telles celles des Angevins, cette situation faisant qu'il reste souvent un résidu de troupes ultramontaines prêt à exploiter toute circonstance favorable.

Les compagnies de mercenaires

On trouve des mercenaires en Italie dès le XII° siècle: la première mention date de 1142, avec une troupe commandée par Guido da Montecchio et engagée par Venise lors d'une guerre contre Padoue, et le première condamnation de cette façon "déloyale" de combattre date du Concile Latéran I, en 1179. Les premiers regroupements importants sont signalés dès les années 1320, en Italie centrale, puis des mercenaires, venus en Italie à la suite de Jean de Bohème en 1333, se réunissent près de Plaisance, sous le nom de «Chevaliers de la Colombe». Ils

vivent de rapines et sont engagés successivement par Pérouse, qui se bat contre Arezzo, puis par Florence. Cependant ces mercenaires n'ont pas encore de véritable chef, pas de drapeau propre et pas encore un esprit de corps. Ce n'est que vers la fin des années 1330 qu'arrivent en Italie de véritables chefs charismatiques, capables d'unir sous leur commandement ces soldats de venture et d'en faire des redoutables machines de guerre, les Compagnies de mercenaires.

Lodrisio Visconti, en 1339, réunit ces chefs mercenaires dans la première véritable organisation, la Compagnie de San Giorgio. Mais l'entreprise fait faillite et les divers chefs se vendent au plus offrant jusqu'à ce que l'allemand Werner de Urslingen décide de fonder, en 1342, la Grande Compagnie, forte de 3000 barbues (de l'italien «barbuta», terme qui vient de la crinière portée par les hommes d'armes allemands en Italie et servant à désigner soit un type de casque sans garniture sur le front et sans cimier, soit l'homme d'arme avec deux chevaux, le cheval de bataille et le cheval de service, ce dernier utilisé généralement par un sergent). Cette troupe va ravager pendant deux ans la péninsule italienne, jusqu'au moment ou les seigneurs de l'Italie du Nord offrent au «duc a Guarneri» (le surnom de Werner d'Urslingen) une très forte somme d'argent pour qu'il se retire dans le Frioul. En 1347 Werner d'Urslingen trouve un nouvel employeur, en la personne de Louis le Grand, roi de Hongrie. Entre temps d'autres chefs ont émergé à cette époque, parmi lesquels l'allemand Conrad, comte de Landau, longtemps associé avec Werner d'Urslingen, et le provençal Jean Montréal d'Albano, plus connu sous le nom de Fra' Moriale.

Ces Compagnies sont une sorte d'Etats nomades, commandés par des chefs prestigieux et, pendant la première moitié du XIV° siècle, leur main-d'œuvre est en majorité constituée par les Allemands, qui constituent l'essentiel de la cavalerie lourde, tandis que les Lombards (et les mercenaires de Romagne) fournissent l'infanterie, équipée de longue lances. Une hiérarchie s'établit: alors que dans les rangs inférieurs on trouve les marginaux des campagnes et des villes et en général les exclus, on remarque que les chefs viennent des couches supérieures de la société, et que ce sont souvent des seigneurs attirés par une vie aventurière faite de gains obtenus par l'épée, tandis que les rangs intermédiaires sont occupés par un personnel de plus en plus spécialisé et technique. Bien évidemment, les changements dans le recrutement militaire, avec l'augmentation de l'utilisation de troupes mercenaires, conduisent à une meilleure discipline au combat, à une durée plus longue du service militaire et donc à des structures de commandement permanentes et

efficaces. Si les rois et les princes du sang commandent officiellement les armées « nationales » et les mercenaires qu'ils ont engagés, dans la réalité on retrouve partout une structure professionnelle, composée de connétables, de caporaux et de maréchaux (*comestabuli, caporales, marescalli*), chargé de l'encadrement effectif des troupes. Les Compagnies de mercenaires, devenues des organismes militaires permanents, disciplinés et cohérents, sont désormais des ensembles qui se louent prêts au combat, leur organisation en unités de petite taille, « bannières » ou « connestabilies », de 25 à 50 hommes, assurant la flexibilité des effectifs et leur contrôle. Ces « bannières », unités organiques et hiérarchisées, sont mentionnées plusieurs fois dans notre chronique et, d'après Domenico da Gravina, une « bannière » de mercenaires allemands comporte environ 100 cavaliers aux ordres d'un capitaine confirmé, souvent noble.

Avantages et inconvénients

Mais qu'offrent au juste les mercenaires ? La force des Compagnies de mercenaires réside principalement dans leur organisation, dans la stricte discipline interne et dans la compétence, éléments qui les rendent supérieures au combat par rapport à la cavalerie lourde aristocratique qui en général aspire à la gloire tout en ignorant superbement les règles, les tactiques et les techniques de la guerre. C'est donc une forte expérience militaire qui est attendue de ces troupes, mais aussi, et de plus en plus, des techniciens et spécialistes de l'art de la guerre, au fait des dernières innovations. Lorsque l'armée du voïvode Etienne approche de la ville de Capoue, les Hongrois constatent que celle-ci est bien protégée par le fleuve Volturno qui l'entoure et que le seul pont permettant de le franchir est puissamment défendu par des tours. L'armée hongroise ne peut pas passer et la construction d'un nouveau pont s'avère nécessaire : ce sera fait en seulement deux jours, avec empirisme certes, mais avec une surprenante efficacité, par les mercenaires allemands.

Cependant, parmi les inconvénients majeurs, il y a la question clé de la « loyauté » car, de tout temps, les mercenaires ont été accusés d'une loyauté fragile, fonction essentiellement d'une paye régulière, voire extravagante, et de faire passer leurs intérêts personnels (survie, butin, etc.) avant les intérêts de leur employeur. Cette « loyauté » pour le moins incertaine est parfaitement illustrée par un épisode qui se déroule à Barletta, où Louis de Hongrie réuni son armée au début

de la seconde campagne napolitaine. Le roi étant dans le château de Barletta, une rixe banale a lieu entre habitants de la ville et mercenaires lombards, rixe qui dégénère en véritable sédition, les Lombards, auxquels se joignent les Allemands, commençant à piller et à brûler les maisons. La situation provoque la colère de Louis le Grand mais le calme n'est ramené que lorsque 2000 cavaliers hongrois, drapeau royal au vent et sous le commandement du voïvode Etienne, chargent les mercenaires. En réalité, les Hongrois doivent s'y prendre à deux fois pour faire sortir de la ville les rebelles et ce malgré l'intervention répétée de leurs chefs, dont Conrad Wolfhardt lui-même. Pourtant, le lendemain de ces graves incidents, le roi prend le départ avec toute son armée et rejoint le campement des mercenaires, à l'extérieur de la ville, où il les paye comme si rien ne s'était passé. Cet épisode met bien en évidence la primauté du profit pour les mercenaires et montre à la fois l'importance des troupes «nationales» hongroises, fidèles et aguerries, et l'impossibilité pour le souverain hongrois de se passer des mercenaires. Malgré les incidents, un vrai défi à son autorité, Louis de Hongrie doit bien s'accommoder de la situation, tant les mercenaires sont devenus indispensables et tant le risque est grand qu'ils ne se retournent contre lui en offrant leurs services à l'ennemi.

La solde des mercenaires

La paye, la solde, voilà l'essentiel, car engager des mercenaires ce n'est pas difficile, les payer régulièrement oui, que l'on soit vainqueur ou vaincu. La solde ne se discute pas et notre chronique en donne une preuve significative en rapportant que les mercenaires de l'armée napolitaine, pourtant vaincus et humiliés par le comte de Fondi à Traetto, réclament à la reine Jeanne non seulement les gages convenus mais aussi les «pourboires» («*convicti belli gagia et potalicia petierunt*»), le terme «*potalicia*» désignant probablement un surplus sous forme de nourriture, voire de boisson ou d'argent. Lorsqu'on n'a pas ou plus les moyens d'honorer le contrat avec les mercenaires, les difficultés commencent: le Palatin, qui tient à sa solde plus de 500 mercenaires allemands, essaye de résoudre ce problème en les envoyant faire des razzias quotidiennes pour satisfaire leur désir de pillages et de butin, mais les ressources environnantes ne sont pas inépuisables et les récriminations des mercenaires, d'abord en sourdine, se font de plus en plus vives, ouvrant ainsi le champ à la désertion.

Et les problèmes avec les mercenaires réclamant leur solde ont aussi lieu dans les armées royales. Ainsi, après la victoire d'Averse de l'armée hongroise, les mercenaires commencent à s'agiter : non seulement ils pillent systématiquement la province de Terre de Labour, en s'en prenant d'ailleurs aux ennemis comme aux amis du roi de Hongrie, mais en plus ils réclament sans cesse les arriérés de leur solde (trois mois) et finissent par devenir menaçants. Or le voïvode Etienne n'a plus d'argent liquide, il n'a que des prisonniers de haut rang dont on peut espérer d'importantes rançons. Les chefs des mercenaires, Conrad Wolfhardt et Werner de Urslingen, en exigeant le respect des accords (double paye en cas de bataille et de victoire) annoncent froidement que les rançons concernant les prisonniers de haut rang leur reviennent. La désertion, voire la trahison, est monnaie courante dans la vie des Compagnies de mercenaires, l'argent étant la seule valeur respectée et à ce sujet, les contacts entre les chefs mercenaires engagées par les Hongrois et ceux engagés par les Napolitains sont bien représentatif de cette mentalité.

Le problème du ravitaillement et ses conséquences

Toute trêve est néfaste pour les mercenaires, habitués à vivre sur le terrain, aux dépens des ennemis de celui qui les engage, car le problème du ravitaillement de telles troupes n'est pas simple et le pillage des zones environnantes ne peut pas tout régler. Deux passages de notre chronique sont éloquents à ce sujet. Après la victoire de l'armée hongroise à Melito et le départ du voïvode Etienne vers Manfredonia, les mercenaires restés à Averse sont confrontés au problème du ravitaillement que la trêve signée avec les Napolitains rend de plus en plus difficile, malgré un pillage outrancier de la région. En conséquence, chaque chef mercenaire décide pour lui seul : Werner d'Urslingen, avec plus de 800 cavaliers, laisse le Royaume de Naples pour se diriger vers Rome, puis vers l'Allemagne, tandis que les troupes de Conrad Wolfhardt, décident de laisser la Terre de Labour et de revenir à la solde du voïvode Etienne. Par ailleurs, lors de la guerre locale centrée sur Gravina, on voit le baron Roberto Sanseverino décider de lever le siège de Trani sous prétexte que Louis de Tarente l'appelle à Naples, alors qu'en réalité la campagne militaire ayant trop duré et les difficultés de ravitaillement augmentant, l'armée se défait d'elle-même car l'espoir de butin s'évanouit.

Outre les ravages pour cause de ravitaillement en période de trêve négociée, les Compagnies posent aussi un autre grave problème, celui de leur présence au de-là des périodes contractuelles, car il n'est pas facile de s'en débarrasser et l'inévitable décalage temporel entre les contrats et les périodes «libres», les mois d'hiver par exemple, crée les conditions pour des actions incontrôlées. C'est ce qui se produit dans les Pouilles, lorsque le voïvode se retire à Manfredonia en attendant le retour de Louis le Grand, et que les mercenaires Allemands et Lombards restant en Capitanate, environ 7.000 hommes, se réunissent dans la ville détruite de Canosa. Le manque d'argent (le voïvode Etienne ne peut plus les payer) et de ravitaillement va obliger ces troupes à bouger et l'on voit alors l'ensemble des mercenaires se conduire comme une véritable armée indépendante, capable de nommer ses propres chefs et d'aller faire la guerre pour son propre compte, là où bon lui semble, par exemple en attaquant et pillant la ville d'Andria, pourtant fidèle au roi de Hongrie, leur dernier commanditaire. Ce comportement permet de mieux comprendre l'évolution des Compagnies de mercenaires de la deuxième moitié du XIV° siècle, celles qui deviennent de véritables armées «commerciales» indépendantes pour lesquelles la guerre est à la fois un profit et une nécessité.

STRATÉGIES ET TACTIQUES

La stratégie médiévale paraît dominée par deux principes généraux : la crainte de la bataille rangée et la multiplication des sièges des villes et forteresses. Les conflits sont caractérisés par une progression lente des attaquants, une défense obstinée des attaqués, des opérations limitées dans le temps et dans l'espace, et surtout par la recherche d'un profit matériel immédiat. Les contemporains disent «la guerre est faite avant tout de pillages, souvent de sièges, parfois de batailles»[3].

LES GUERRES «PRUDENTES»

La stratégie militaire habituellement appliquée consiste donc à contrôler les châteaux, les forteresses et les villes fortifiées, à effectuer des raids et à dévaster les terres de l'ennemi de façon à lui infliger des pertes économiques importantes. Il s'agit en fait de guerres «prudentes», dans lesquelles on évite autant que possible les batailles frontales dont

l'issue reste toujours imprévisible, et par conséquent la majeure partie de l'énergie est dépensée dans le pillage des villes, motivation principale de la plus part des combattants, et dans le ravage des campagnes et des cultures environnantes qui forment le substrat économique des sites fortifiés. L'armée envahissante évite les risques : on envoie d'abord des éclaireurs ou des espions pour s'assurer de l'état d'une ville ou pour évaluer une défense, puis on pille les alentours et on cherche du ravitaillement. Pendant ces opérations les chevaliers ne portent pas leurs armures et ne montent pas forcement leurs chevaux de bataille, très chers et qu'il faut ménager. Les armées bougent relativement lentement, au grès des possibilités de pillage qui s'offrent à elles dans leur progression. Les escarmouches, incessantes et à petite échelle, qui caractérisent les guerres de cette époque nécessitent néanmoins des tactiques élaborées et une certaine vision stratégique de la part des chefs militaires.

Les batailles importantes, rares, se résument souvent en un échange fourni de projectiles pendant que de petites unités essayent de couper les routes, d'attaquer les convois de ravitaillement et de défendre les points de passage. Lors des raids, les effectifs peuvent être très réduits et souvent ils incluent une part non négligeable d'infanterie, en particulier des arbalétriers. Les défenseurs, eux, se focalisent sur le harcèlement des forces adverses, sur les embuscades et tout autre moyen capable d'enrayer l'avance des ennemis. En fait la guerre basée sur les sièges reste encore le moyen le plus sûr de s'assurer la conquête de territoires. En Italie la situation est particulière et originale : la péninsule est en effet la partie d'Europe où l'on trouve le plus de fortifications (châteaux, villes, villages) et donc où les sièges font partie du quotidien d'une armée, avec les raids et les chevauchées, même si les forces en jeu sont relativement faibles. Il peu bien sûr y avoir des batailles majeures, mais elles ont généralement moins d'effet sur l'issue finale d'un conflit que celles qui eurent lieu pendant la guerre des Cent Ans entre la France et l'Angleterre. D'autre part, le harcèlement d'une armée en marche est une technique que la géographie accidentée de l'Italie favorise ainsi que la fortification des passages obligés et des défilés.

L'acharnement à détruire systématiquement les richesses agricoles de la région est constamment présent dans le récit de Domenico da Gravina, par exemple la destruction des vignes lors du siège de Corato, ou encore celle des oliveraies lors de l'attaque de Bitetto et celle des moulins à huile lors du siège de Bitonto par le Palatin. L'importance de la vigne est soulignée par le fait que, en temps de vendanges, les habitants des villes n'hésitent pas à engager des mercenaires pour les

défendre ! Plusieurs fois, dans notre chronique, on voit les habitants d'une ville faire appel à des «bannières» de mercenaires pour protéger leurs vendanges : le meilleur exemple on l'a après l'abandon du siège de Corato, lorsque les mercenaires allemands se retirent vers Trani et que les habitants de cette ville, craignant une attaque du Palatin, leurs offrent un contrat de 8 jours, pour deux «bannières», pendant les vendanges.

On peut remarquer, à travers le récit de Domenico da Gravina, que les armées avancent facilement mais que leurs conquêtes se révèlent éphémères. Seuls les châteaux et les forteresses ont une importance militaire réelle et justement les armées évitent soigneusement de s'en prendre à de tels sites car la prise de ces places fortes est relativement difficile et surtout peu rentable pour les mercenaires car il y a peu de butin à prendre. Néanmoins, il est dangereux de laisser derrière soi des châteaux tenus par des ennemis et l'on recourt généralement à la négociation, à la corruption, voire à la trahison, et l'on s'entend souvent entre mercenaires de même nationalité.

L'ÉVOLUTION DE LA GUERRE DE MOUVEMENT

Si la guerre de mouvement au Moyen Âge devait être représentée par une seule image significative, combinant à la fois ses éléments distinctifs et le rôle prédominant d'une aristocratie militaire, cette image serait sûrement celle d'un chevalier en armure, monté sur un cheval de guerre caparaçonné. Symbole du statut social, le cheval de combat élève l'élite militaire au-dessus du reste de la société et démontre sa puissance économique car l'achat des chevaux de combats, ainsi que des armes et des armures nécessaires, implique l'investissement d'un capital substantiel. La culture équestre des élites a une profonde influence sur l'organisation de la guerre et sur la conduite des campagnes militaires pendant tout le Moyen Âge, le noyau des armées étant toujours la cavalerie lourde.

Cependant, la première moitié du XIV° siècle voit apparaître une rupture tactique dans l'art de la guerre de mouvement, lorsque la cavalerie lourde est défaite par des hommes à pied (à Courtrai en 1302, à Bannockburn en 1314 ou encore à Crécy en 1346). L'emploi de l'infanterie se développe rapidement grâce à un coût inférieur et à un meilleur contrôle des troupes. Dans un contexte où les effectifs des armées augmentent rapidement, le rôle de la cavalerie lourde se

trouve minoré d'autant que, lors d'un siège, l'utilité des soldats à pied est évidente. L'évolution dans l'art de la guerre, due principalement à la montée en puissance de l'infanterie et au recrutement massif de mercenaires, implique aussi des profonds changements dans la façon de «penser» la guerre, par un abandon progressif de la mentalité chevaleresque de la classe aristocratique et l'émergence de motivations plus discutables, tels le profit ou l'esprit de vengeance.

L'infanterie montée

Cependant, la présence de nombreux combattants à pied nuit à la mobilité d'une armée en campagne et, dès les années 1330, on cherche une solution à cette difficulté en créant une infanterie montée en complément de la cavalerie lourde. Ces nouvelles unités, tout en partageant la mobilité quotidienne des chevaliers, descendent généralement de leurs montures pour combattre. Ces combattants d'un type nouveau participent à des actions combinées très efficaces, par exemple lorsque, bien protégés par le tir des archers ou des arbalétriers, ils peuvent attaquer à pied une forteresse assiégée ou lorsque, après un choc frontal, ils remontent en selle soit pour poursuivre les ennemis en fuite soit pour se retirer en bon ordre et rapidement. Les mercenaires allemands utilisent souvent cette technique, comme lors de l'attaque de la ville de Foggia par les hommes de Conrad Wolfhardt. Ces combattants, bien adaptés aux exigences stratégiques nouvelles (unités de combat professionnelles et déplacements rapides), et qui sont à l'origine des «chevauchées» (raids rapides), sont par contre totalement inefficaces lorsqu'on requiert une longue occupation territoriale. Ce constat est particulièrement valable pour l'armée de Louis le Grand, son infanterie montée étant constituée principalement par les mercenaires allemands, éléments instables par définition.

Les archers à cheval

A cette même époque on commence aussi à utiliser des archers à cheval, soit en conjonction avec des hommes à pied, dans des formations tactiques disciplinées, soit en exploitant leur mobilité loin du champ de bataille. Le fait de transporter à cheval des archers n'est pas une idée totalement nouvelle car des arbalétriers, et occasionnellement des

archers, apparaissent déjà dans les armées des premiers rois angevins d'Angleterre. Cependant, alors que les archers à cheval restent une spécialité marginale en Europe de l'Ouest, la tradition des peuples de la steppe et l'utilisation d'un arc composite court changent la donne en ce qui concerne les armées de l'Europe de l'Est. L'avantage d'une combinaison tactique entre cavalerie lourde et archers hongrois montés est évident lors de la bataille de Dürnkrut (Champ de Mars), le 26 août 1278, lorsque les chevaliers hongrois et leurs auxiliaires Coumans jouent un rôle essentiel dans la victoire de l'Empereur Rodolphe I sur le roi Otakar de Bohème. Ce système militaire hybride trouve un ultérieur développement sous le règne de Louis le Grand et son efficacité fit la réputation des mercenaires hongrois pendant la seconde moitié du XIV° siècle.

Les archers hongrois disposent de chevaux petits, trapus, sobres et résistants, et sont armés d'arcs à double courbure, légers et maniables, d'une portée supérieure à celle des arcs classiques. La tactique de base est celle de l'encerclement, sans le risque d'un contact frontal. Un exemple typique de cette tactique nous est donné par Domenico da Gravina lorsqu'il relate une escarmouche entre mercenaires allemands à la solde du Palatin et Hongrois, lors de la guerre régionale des Pouilles. Cette rencontre a lieu dans un endroit choisi par les Hongrois, une plaine spacieuse dans laquelle ils peuvent manœuvrer à l'aise et près de laquelle ils se sont embusqués. Les Hongrois sont une vingtaine et les mercenaires allemands, tous des cavaliers, une centaine. Lorsque les Allemands approchent, les Hongrois les «entourent» et éliminent avec leurs flèches les montures des ennemis : la manœuvre d'encerclement est rapide et efficace, la déroute des mercenaires allemands totale.

COMPORTEMENTS ET USAGES DES MERCENAIRES

Solde, pillage, butin, rançon, voilà le gagne-pain des professionnels qui veulent que la guerre dure. C'est que la guerre est une affaire menée par des exploitants (mercenaires, brigands ou exilés) et à ce titre il est intéressant de remarquer que le terme de «compagnie» leur est commun avec les marchands. Et de ce point de vue il y a des zones plus avantageuses que d'autres, telles les grandes routes, les gros villages, les villes riches et peuplées. Triste sort que celui des villes qui ne s'étaient pas rachetées des pillages des mercenaires ou qui n'avaient pas engagé à leur tour des troupes pour leur défense. Domenico da Gravina insiste sur le

désir de pillage propre à toutes les troupes «temporaires», qu'elles soient formées de mercenaires étrangers ou d'occasionnels italiens, l'appas du gain plus que la solde étant la motivation principale, mais en réalité on craignait autant les troupes dites régulières que les mercenaires. Ville prise signifiait ville pillée, et ainsi la guerre nourrissait la guerre.

Le pillage et la répartition du butin

Le pillage est considéré comme un mal non seulement inévitable mais presque nécessaire : lorsque notre chroniqueur et ses amis sont obligés de laisser Gravina aux mains de leurs adversaires, ceux-ci pillent leurs maisons, mais pas toutes. En effet, la fuite de la faction pro hongroise est due à l'avancée de la petite armée de Robert Sanseverino, armée qui inclut des mercenaires qu'il faut absolument satisfaire : donc, un certain nombre de maisons appartenant aux exilés est «réservé» au pillage de ces mercenaires qui ne sont pas encore là («*aliae autem domus nostrorum sequacium, qui nobiscum exierant illa nocte, praedatae non sunt, sed praedandae per futurum exercitus sunt dimissae*»).

Par ailleurs, le partage du butin, lors d'un pillage, semble obéir à ses propres règles et Domenico da Gravina rapporte ce que l'on peut définir comme une véritable entente préalable de vol : cela se passe lors de l'émeute de Barletta en mai 1350, quand les mercenaires allemands et lombards, suite à la rixe qui dégénère, mettent la ville à feu et à sang. Bien entendu, la lutte est inégale entre simples citoyens et mercenaires aguerris, ces derniers parcourant la ville et «marquant» à la hache de combat les maisons dont chacun se réserve le pillage pour éviter que d'autres ne le fassent à leur place («*Theotonici et brigantes, secures acutissimas habentes in manibus, ibant per terram signantes quolibet domum suam ut tollat exinde sibi robam*»). On observe aussi le respect de règles de répartition lors de la mise à sac de Foggia, l'attribution des zones de pillages étant faite à l'avance entre les diverses Compagnies de mercenaires, de façon à éviter de possibles heurts sanglants à l'occasion du pillage proprement dit. Les troupes dites «régulières» ne sont pas en reste et on peut constater que les Hongrois aussi ont l'habitude du pillage lucratif à titre personnel : lorsque l'armée de Louis le Grand s'arrête près de Acerra pour s'y reposer pendant deux jours, les cavaliers hongrois en profitent pour opérer des razzias dans la région, manifestement avec l'accord de leurs chefs («*Ungari plurimi soliti guerrizare.....versus Nolam discurrunt et militant ad lucrandum*»). Généralement les razzias effectuées

par les diverses composantes des armées sont quotidiennes et ont lieu un espace limité à un rayon «d'une journée» («*dieta*»), correspondant à la distance que les cavaliers peuvent effectuer en un jour.

Le pillage est un fait de guerre reconnu, autorisé et géré officiellement par les princes eux-mêmes et l'usage règle avec précision la répartition du butin. Parfois la simple coopération de fait à l'action peut ouvrir un droit au profit : dans son avancée vers Naples, l'armée de Louis le Grand s'empare de la ville de Contursi, qui a refusé obstinément de lui rendre hommage, et le roi accepte que la ville soit pillée. Les Hongrois s'y précipitent, car, ayant conquis Contursi, ils estiment avoir un droit prioritaire au pillage, et ils en chassent par les armes les autres concurrents (Allemands, Latins, Toscans et Lombards). Mais les Hongrois entrent en compétition avec les hommes de la ville de Oliveto, ennemis irréductibles des habitants de Contursi, qui eux aussi ont été parmi les premiers à attaquer et qui exigent leur part du butin. Louis le Grand doit intervenir personnellement en décrétant que, dorénavant, si les Hongrois entrent les premiers dans une ville, la mise à sac de celle-ci leur serait réservée, autrement ils en seraient tout simplement exclus («*si primo Ungaros terram intrare contingat, gens alterius nationis intrare desistat ; si vero Theotonici primo intraverint, Lombardi, sive Latini, nostros Ungaros recessare jubemus*»). Les profits d'un pillage peuvent être considérables, et pour les combattants et pour les habitants des environs : lorsque les Hongrois attaquent et prennent Rutigliano, dans les Pouilles, la ville et ses alentours sont pillés pendant neuf jours et le butin ramassé par les assaillants est énorme. Or, le transport de tous ces biens s'avérant difficile, pour transformer au plus vite le butin en monnaie sonnante et trébuchante tout est immédiatement mis en vente à bas prix, ce qui permet aux populations locales ayant aidé les Hongrois de faire de très bonnes affaires.

Le profit avant tout

Si le pillage est le moteur essentiel de presque toutes les actions violentes, il est aussi une motivation suffisante pour renier et pour trahir toute forme de solidarité et d'allégeance : le chef mercenaire Fra' Moriale, pourtant considéré comme le pivot de l'armée du duc de Duras («*Frater autem Morialis, qui anima et corpus fuit dicti ducis*»), dès l'exécution de ce dernier connue, se précipite pour piller son palais et ses maisons, entraînant par la même occasion le petit peuple de Naples, ravi d'une

telle aubaine. Le pillage de la part des mercenaires allait de pair avec leur indiscipline, à tel point que les grands seigneurs, voire les rois, devaient parfois protéger leurs propres biens contre les compagnies de mercenaires qu'ils ont engagé, ceux-ci ne faisant pas de différence entre ennemis ou amis dès qu'il s'agit de pillage.

Louis le Grand doit envoyer ses propres chevaliers hongrois, sous le commandement du voïvode de Transylvanie et du grand sénéchal de Hongrie, se poster devant la ville de Serra pour s'assurer que cette dernière ne sera pas attaquée et pillée par ses propres mercenaires lors du passage de l'armée. Le baron Roberto Sanseverino, qui avance avec une armée d'environ 1000 cavaliers et beaucoup d'hommes à pied vers Gravina, ville déjà aux mains de ses partisans, envoie en avant-garde quelques messagers pour demander aux habitants de la ville de ne pas laisser entrer les troupes qui éventuellement peuvent le devancer car le risque de pillage serait alors très grand. Une preuve supplémentaire de cet état de fait, justifiant pleinement la méfiance, on la trouve lors de la prise de Capoue par l'armée hongroise, les mercenaires allemands ne respectant pas leur promesse, malgré les efforts des troupes régulières pour maintenir l'ordre (« *Theotonici . . . . . ad disrobandum generaliter totam terram coeperunt, quantumque domini Ungari vellent ipsos Theutonicos refrenare* »).

Les rançons

Du butin, les rançons sont l'élément le plus profitable, et donc le plus recherché, et une sorte de jurisprudence fixe le sort des captifs. Ainsi, un prisonnier appartient à celui qui l'a capturé et doit lui être rendu s'il s'est évadé et qu'un tiers l'ait repris ; le montant de la rançon est fixé par « débat », parfois plus que violent, entre le captif et son « maî-tre », selon un barème coutumier. Par ailleurs si l'intérêt, et accessoi-rement l'honneur, du propriétaire est de bien traiter son captif et de le rançonner dans la limite de ses moyens, celui-ci est réputé « infâme et parjure » s'il ne multiplie pas les efforts pour payer et il est assez fréquent que le captif obtienne la liberté provisoire afin de réunir le montant de sa rançon. Cependant, un prisonnier est aussi un titre de créance et, comme tel, il est négociable. Lors de la bataille de Meleto le nombre de prisonniers fait par l'armée du voïvode Etienne est très élevé et parmi eux figurent de nombreux personnages de haut rang (Robert Sanseverino, Rogeron comte de Tricarico, Raymond des Baux, etc.) dont on peut raisonnablement espérer une rançon juteuse, et la

pratique normale veut que l'on laisse au commandant en chef le choix
des prisonniers qui lui reviennent.

La capture de prisonniers et l'obtention des rançons correspondantes
est une occupation majeure des mercenaires, après le pillage d'une ville
ou l'affrontement avec une armée ennemie, et tous les moyens coercitifs
sont utilisés, en particulier la torture. Domenico da Gravina donne
toujours une note dramatique à ces épisodes sanglants mais tristement
réels et répétitifs. On peut penser qu'il a raison, surtout lorsqu'il rap-
porte que la torture des prisonniers non seulement est une pratique
courante mais qu'elle est aussi recommandé par les chefs militaires, tel
Werner d'Urslingen qui conseille à ses compatriotes d'utiliser la manière
forte pour obtenir des prisonniers la rançon maximum (« *Consulo igitur,
ut captivos dominos in nostris manibus resumamus, et eos ad decentem reccatum
comprimamus eorum flagello corporeo* »).

<center>LES USAGES « CODIFIÉS »</center>

Dans le contexte trouble décrit par Domenico da Gravina, à côté de
certains comportements qu'on peut considérer comme usuels et en
cohérence avec la situation, on note aussi la persistance d'usages que
l'on pourrait définir comme « codifiés », c'est à dire répondant à des
schémas précis et formels, et qui peuvent paraître peu en phase avec la
brutalité et la confusion de l'époque. Il faut rappeler que la fréquence,
voire la permanence des conflits armés, est une constante de l'époque, et
que donc leur règlement, même temporaire, constitue une partie impor-
tante des activités guerrières. C'est pourquoi, à l'arbitrage pontifical et
à la médiation d'un tiers, l'usage ajoute le compromis amiable ou la
négociation directe entre protagonistes. A chaque suspension d'armes
on multiplie les garanties et les sûretés et on confie l'aspect juridique
des éventuels litiges à un tiers. Le Chronicon de Domenico da Gravina
donne une description détaillée de ces usages « codifiés » et montre
l'importance qu'ils revêtent encore vers le milieu du XIV° siècle.

En particulier, on peut connaître le déroulement des négociations
entre assiégeants et assiégés pour écourter un siège, toujours difficile
à maintenir si les opérations se prolongent, ou pour sauver une ville
assiégée du pillage. Cette description met en évidence à quel point les
divers acteurs tiennent à des procédures formelles et reconnues. Le
schéma des négociations entre assiégeants et assiégés semble préétabli
et comprendre essentiellement deux phases : d'abord une suspension

des hostilités, pendant une période de temps donnée et contre le versement par les assiégés d'une somme donnée, puis l'utilisation de cette période de trêve pour informer de la situation le seigneur de la ville et attendre sa décision, soit pour se rendre, soit pour recevoir du secours. Ces accords reçoivent alors une confirmation «formelle», qui engage presque juridiquement les deux parties et qui est en quelque sorte une garantie visible et reconnue par tous. Cette procédure, qui peut paraître insolite dans un contexte trouble où toutes les trahisons et tous les retournements sont possibles, est pourtant généralement bien suivie et ses résultats respectés.

Même les mercenaires se plient à ces usages «codifiés»: on voit ainsi les chefs mercenaires allemands, Conrad Wolfhardt, Werner d'Urslingen et Conrad de Landau, traiter avec Louis de Tarente et arriver à un compromis très proche des procédures utilisées entre assiégeants et assiégés. Louis de Tarente «achète» une trêve, mais si pendant cette trêve le roi de Hongrie revient dans le Royaume de Naples, alors les mercenaires seront libres de choisir leur camp, si non, toujours contre versement d'importantes sommes d'argent, les mercenaires s'engagent à rendre aux Napolitains le château d'Averse, les tours de Capoue et les autres forteresses de la Terre de Labour encore entre leurs mains et même à changer de camp et s'engager au service du prince de Tarente

More Theotonicorum

Le capital des Compagnies de mercenaires réside principalement dans leur main-d'œuvre, leurs chevaux et leur matériel, ce qui explique l'esquive de toute stratégie d'anéantissement. Donc pas de combats dont l'issue est incertaine mais plutôt une guerre de mouvement, de ruse et de trahison: en fait une guerre à stratégie dilatoire. Dans cette perspective les mercenaires allemands ont apporté avec eux, puis imposé un peu partout, leurs usages de guerre, en particulier celui selon lequel les vaincus et les prisonniers ne risquent pas grande chose, leurs vainqueurs étant le plus souvent des mercenaires de même nationalité. Entre mercenaires on évite de se tuer et de se dépouiller. Il en résulte une absence de violences corporelles et une remise en liberté systématique, les vaincus gardant même souvent leurs montures et leur équipement contre une vague promesse de non-belligérance ou alors tout simplement parce que les vainqueurs les engagent à leur service. Domenico da Gravina cite, à ce propos, de nombreux cas : lors de la capture des mercenaires

appartenant à la Compagnie de Werner d'Urslingen, à Corneto
(«*Theotonici autem atque Lombardi viri armigeri qui captivi abducti fuerunt, tum
ex cognitione Theotonicorum et Lombardorum exercitus domini regis Ungariae, tum
etiam quia moris esse dicitur stypendyarüs licitum non esse offendere, fuerunt carcere
leviati; et restitutis eis equis et armis, Theotonicis dicti Corradi tractantibus, ad
gagia dicti domini regis Ungariae retenti fuerunt*»), puis encore à propos des
affrontements partisans dans les Pouilles («*Moris enim est Theotonicorum et
Lombardorum, ut si quando continguat aliquem eorum capi in proelio vel in campo,
captum talem de persona salvare, nec illum in manibus tradere alicujus*»).

Cet usage d'origine allemande est, d'après notre Chronique, prati-
quement toujours respecté y compris par les mercenaires lombards et
par les Hongrois, avec une seule exception, celle concernant les merce-
naires allemands qui avaient causé beaucoup de dommages à la ville de
Barletta et qui furent capturés par des troupes hongroises: dans ce cas,
les habitants de Barletta demandent expressément que l'usage ne soit
pas respecté et, devant l'attitude négative des Hongrois, s'emparent eux
même des mercenaires qu'ils emprisonnent («*Erat…consuetudo e x a ntiguo
servata inter armigeros, quod si contingeret aliquem theotonicum capi in campo sub
armis, quod, sublatis sibi equo et armis, dimittebatur abire sub fide….Barolitani
dixerunt:…nos petimus et volumus, quod lex illa et consuetudo servetur eis, quam
ipsi servant nobis et aliis Latini miseris, qui incidunt in manibus eorum….Et facto
crudeli impetu contra eos Theotonicos…de personis ceperunt*»). Les mercenaires
allemands ne seront autorisés à partir qu'après la libérations des habi-
tants de Barletta détenus par le Palatin et, comme le note le chroniqueur,
le fait de voir que les usages pouvaient ne pas être respectés incita les
mercenaires à beaucoup plus de prudence car dès qu'il y a un risque
véritable, leur «ardeur» guerrière se retrouve mise en question («*Et a
tunc Theotonici….timore casus similis, timebant ita saepius solito equitare, quia
videbant eis consuetudinem solitam non servari*»).

Conclusion

L'étude du *Chronicon* de Domenico da Gravina, quelque soit l'angle
d'attaque de l'analyse, laisse une impression de «vivant», rarement
atteinte dans des œuvres de ce type et de cette époque. Par ailleurs
on peut remarquer que cette œuvre, pourtant la seule, avec le poème
de Buccio di Ranallo sur la ville de L'Aquila, à avoir un caractère
«napolitain» et contemporain, semble avoir été ignorée et écartée
par les historiens de la deuxième moitié du XX° siècle. Il n'y a que

les travaux de E. Léonard, H. Balint et I. Miskolczy, dans les années 1930, qui l'utilisent et encore uniquement dans son aspect événementiel. L'importance géopolitique et les conséquences de la Guerre de Cent Ans ont occulté dans l'historiographie les campagnes napolitaines de Louis le Grand, roi de Hongrie. Sur les 2133 références figurant dans l'Orientation bibliographique et documentaire de «La Guerre au Moyen Âge», ouvrage classique et incontournable de Philippe Contamine, le Chronicon de Domenico da Gravina n'est pas mentionné et dans le texte pas un mot n'est dit sur la guerre menée par Louis le Grand dans le Royaume de Naples. Pourtant ce document unique, dont malheureusement il n'existe qu'une transcription latine datant de 1903 (ce qui explique peut-être son oubli) apporte un témoignage essentiel sur une époque charnière dans l'évolution de l'art de la guerre et mérite une place de choix parmi les œuvres contemporaines. Le récit de Domenico da Gravina met en évidence des situations atypiques et des caractéristiques novatrices remarquables :

- D'abord il s'agit de la confrontation entre deux Etats, la Hongrie et le Royaume de Naples, en quelque sorte «anachroniques» car, dans les deux royaumes, on assiste à un phénomène marqué de reféodalisation alors que dans le reste de l'Europe la tendance générale est celle conduisant à l'Etat «moderne».
- Ensuite, la conception de la guerre par Louis le Grand montre une innovation considérable : le jeune souverain hongrois conduit une guerre de mouvement dans un pays étranger, avec lequel il n'a pas de frontières communes (la mer Adriatique étant de fait une mer «vénitienne»), et pour cela il compte presque exclusivement sur ses moyens financiers l'autorisant à engager des troupes professionnelles directement sur place, loin de ses bases naturelles. La guerre traditionnelle du Moyen Âge est largement dépassée.
- Du fait même de cette stratégie, la composition de l'armée hongroise en Italie du Sud est à son tour atypique et innovatrice. La présence, à côté du noyau dur constitué par la cavalerie lourde, de corps de cavalerie légère composés principalement d'archers à cheval, recrutés parmi les Coumans et autres peuples de la steppe, donne à cette armée une mobilité extraordinaire et permet la mise en place de tactiques guerrières méconnues en Europe de l'Ouest. D'ailleurs, suite au retrait de Louis le Grand du Royaume de Naples, un grand nombre de Hongrois, surtout des archers à cheval, resteront en Italie, principalement au service du Saint-Siège, comme mercenaires auxquels on reconnaît une qualité de combattants inégalée.

• Enfin, devenues incontournables dès les années 1320–1330, les Compagnies de mercenaires auront leur véritable essor vers 1350, en quelque sorte grâce aux campagnes napolitaines de Louis le Grand. En effet, la forte proportion de mercenaires dans l'armée hongroise, et la liberté de commandement et de décision que le déroulement des campagnes napolitaines laisse à leurs chefs, ne sont pas étrangères à la constitution des Compagnies qui vont ravager toute l'Italie Centrale et du Nord dans les décennies suivantes. Sans aucun doute c'est dans le Royaume de Naples que les divers Conrad Wolfhardt, Werner d'Urslingen, Conrad de Landau et Fra' Moriale ont pris conscience de leur force et de leur capacité de nuisance, atouts qu'ils vont exploiter sans miséricorde pour terroriser et rançonner les territoires à leur portée.

NOTES

[1] Extrait du Mémoire de Maîtrise d'Histoire *Aspects d'une guerre médiévale, d'après le Chronicon de Rebus in Apulia gestis (1347–1350) par Domenico da Gravina*, Université d'Angers, Juin 2002.

[2] Domenico da Gravina, *Chronicon de rebus in Apulia gestis (1347–1350)*, ed. A. Sorbelli, (Città di Castello, Fonti per la Storia d'Italia, 1903).

[3] P. Contamine, *La Guerre au Moyen Age* (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1999), 365.

APPENDICE ; LES PRINCIPAUX CHEFS MERCENAIRES INTERVENANT DANS
LES CAMPAGNES NAPOLITAINES DE LOUIS LE GRAND

• ASPERG (D'), Jean, Comte de Sprecht, dit *«Giovanni di Aspruch, di Hohensberg»*,
  (+ vers 1360)

Chef mercenaire allemand en Italie Centrale dès 1341. En novembre 1348,
au service des Napolitains, il essaye envain, avec Giovanni Pipino, comte
d'Altamura, de barrer la route à Conrad Wolfhardt qui descend des Abruzzes
vers les Pouilles. Après la défaite de Corneto, Jean d'Asperg, avec Werner de
Urslingen, passe au service des Hongrois. On le retrouve à nouveau au service
de Napolitains, en mai 1349, lorsqu'il tente sans succés de barrer la route de
Naples au voïvode Etienne et à Conrad Wolfhardt. Il participe à la bataille
de Melito, le 6 juin 1349, du côté napolitain : fait prisonnier il doit payer une
lourde rançon pour recouvrer sa liberté. Jean d'Asperg meurt vers 1360.

• FRA' MORIALE, Jean de Montréal de Bar, Chevalier d'Alban, dit *« Fra'
  Moriale »*, (+ 1354)

Gentilhomme provençal, ancien Frère Mineur devenu chevalier de l'ordre
des Hospitaliers de Saint Jean de Jérusalem, chef mercenaire sous le nom
de Fra' Moriale (le terme «fra» étant l'équivalent de «frère»). Il arrive en
Italie, à Rome puis à Naples, en 1345, et se met au service de Charles, duc
de Duras. En 1348, après l'exécution de Charles de Duras, il n'hésitera pas à
piller, dans Naples, le palais de son commanditaire avant de passer au service
de Louis de Hongrie. Il participe à la bataille de Mileto en 1349 puis il fait
partie du quarteron de chefs mercenaires, avec Werner d'Urslingen, le comte
de Landau et Conrad Wolfhardt, qui va obliger le voïvode Etienne à se retirer
à Manfredonia. Après le départ de Werner d'Urslingen, il pille les terres de
Bénévent en compagnie de Conrad Wolfhardt. En 1350, il rejoint à Barletta
Louis le Grand, qui vient de débarquer à Manfredonia, et participe à la seconde
campagne napolitaine au service du souverain hongrois. L'aventure napoli-
taine de Louis le Grand ayant échoué, Fra' Moriale se retrouve gouverneur
d'Averse en attendant la réalisation des accords passés avec la reine Jeanne. La
paix étant signée entre les souverains de Naples et de Hongrie, Fra' Moriale,
avec le comte de Landau, réuni une Compagnie de mercenaires allemands,
italiens et provençaux et retourne vers Naples. Assiégé en Averse par l'armée
de Louis de Tarente conduite par Malatesta da Rimini, Fra' Moriale doit se
rendre, ne sauvant que sa vie (1352). Il reconstitue alors la Grande Compagnie,
dont l'organisation est remarquable : il y a un conseil, des administrateurs, des
comptables, des juges et même un gibet prêt à exécuter les condamnations à
mort, sans oublier les ménestrels chargés de composer les chants de guerre et
de victoire. Fra' Moriale ravage l'Italie du Centre et du Nord pendant deux ans,
rançonnant systématiquement les villes et les seigneurs et accumulant ainsi une
immense fortune. Cette fortune causera sa perte : Cola di Rienzo, le Tribunum
Urbis, ayant besoin d'argent pour engager des troupes et revenir au pouvoir

à Rome, promet des récompenses extraordinaires en échange de quelques
milliers de florins que les administrateurs de Fra' Moriale lui donnent. Cola
di Rienzo entre triomphalement à Rome le 1ᵉʳ août 1354 mais doit affronter
une opposition déterminée et, de nouveau, a besoin d'argent. Fra' Moriale,
laissant sa Compagnie sous le commandement du comte de Landau, vient
à Rome, probablement pour récupérer ses florins. Arrêté, Fra' Moriale est
décapité sur la place du Capitole, à Rome, le 29 août 1354.

• LANDAU (DE), Conrad, comte de Landau, dit le *«conte Lando»*, (+ 1362)

Chef mercenaire allemand, présent en Italie dès 1339 dans les rangs de la
Compagnie de San Giorgio, il est engagé en 1347 par Louis le Grand lors
de la première campagne napolitaine. Conrad de Landau reste avec Conrad
Wolfhardt au service des Hongrois et va jouer un rôle déterminant lors de la
bataille de Mileto. Après le départ du voïvode Etienne vers la côte adriatique,
il suit Werner d'Urslingen dans sa marche vers le nord de l'Italie, puis, au
printemps de 1351 il revient vers l'Italie du Sud où il effectue la jonction avec
les troupes de Fra' Moriale. Le comte de Landau participe à la reconstitution
de la Grande Compagnie et à toutes les opérations de celle-ci pendant deux
ans. Après la mort de Fra' Moriale à Rome, en 1354, c'est lui qui succède
au commandement de la Grande Compagnie en poursuivant une longue et
fructueuse carrière de chef mercenaire en Italie, malgré une sévère défaite
contre les Toscans en 1358, à Biforco. Le comte de Landau meurt en avril
1362, abandonné par ses mercenaires hongrois (les restes de l'armée de Louis
le Grand) qui refusent de combattre contre leurs collègues de la Compagnie
Blanche d'Albert Sterz et de John Hawkwood (dit «Giovanni Acuto»).

• PIPINO, Giovanni, comte palatin d'Altamura, dit le *«Palatin»*, (+ 1357)

En 1338, Giovanni Pipino, comte d'Altamura, en raison des troubles occa-
sionnés dans la ville de Barletta par la lutte entre les factions des della Marra
et des della Gatta, met sur pied une petite armée et intervient en envahissant
les terres de ses rivaux. Le roi de Naples, Robert, ordonne une trève, non res-
pectée par Giovanni Pipino qui est alors convoqué à Naples en février 1339.
Mais le Palatin refuse d'obéir : déclaré rebelle, en janvier 1341 il est attaqué
à Minervino par les troupes royales et doit capituler. Giovanni Pipino doit
se rendre à Naples où il est emprisonné tandis que ses biens sont confisqués.
Libéré par l'intermédiaire du prince André de Hongrie, sa situation devient
intenable après l'assassinat de ce dernier, en 1345. Le Palatin se rends alors
en Hongrie pour inciter Louis le Grand à prendre sa vengeance et revient
avec lui lors de la première campagne napolitaine de ce dernier. Le départ du
souverain hongrois, au printemps 1348, oblige Giovanni Pipino à se réfugier
dans les Terres de l'Eglise où il ne tarde pas à faire parler de nouveau de lui,
en menant une troupe de mercenaires allemands autour de la ville de Terra-
cina, puis en se portant au secours de familles romaines des Colonna et des
Orsini menacées par le Tribunum Urbis, Cola di Rienzo. Après le retour de la

reine Jeanne et de son époux, Louis de Tarente, à Naples, en 1348, le Palatin, abandonnant le parti hongrois, fait cause commune avec Werner d'Urslingen et se met à leur service. En novembre de la même année on le trouve dans les Abruzzes où, avec Jean de Asperg, il attaque Conrad Wolfhardt en essayant en vain de bloquer les cols des Apennins qui conduisent vers les Pouilles. En avril 1349 il est toujours dans les Pouilles, avec 500 mercenaires allemands à son service exclusif. Il prends les villes de Molfetta et Giovinazzo puis, Louis de Hongrie étant revenu dans le royaume de Naples, il change de nouveau de camp pour retourner à son service. Nouvelle volteface au printemps 1350 : il attaque la ville de Bitonto pour son propre compte mais il en est repoussé par un autre chef mercenaire allemand, Herbinger. Il porte alors, sans succés, sa guerre personnelle vers Bari et Trani. La fin de l'aventure napolitaine de Louis de Hongrie ne change pas son comportement agressif au point que, excédée par ses agissements, la cour de Naples donne ses biens féodaux à la famille rivale des Del Balzo. Dès 1352 il est de nouveau à Naples où il s'oppose à Fra' Moriale. Mais en 1354 il se rebelle contre Louis de Tarente et dès 1355 il appuye la Grande Compagnie et s'empare de la ville de Bari. Admonesté par le Pape Innocent IV pour l'aide qu'il apporte aux mercenaires opérant dans le royaume de Naples, Giovanni Pipino n'en a cure et continue ses raids et ses razzias. En décembre 1357 il est assiégé dans la forteresse de Matera et contraint de se rendre. Le Palatin est amené à Altamura où il est pendu.

• URSLINGEN (D'), Werner, duc d'Urslingen, dit le *«duca Guarneri»*, (+ 1354)

Chef mercenaire allemand, présent en Italie dès 1339 dans les rangs de la Compagnie de San Giorgio (avec Conrad de Landau), il est le fondateur en 1342 de la Grande Compagnie (ou Compagnie de la Couronne) qui ravage l'Italie du Nord pendant deux ans, jusqu'à ce que les seigneurs lui versent une très forte indemnité. Retiré dans le Frioul, au Nord-Est de l'Italie, Werner d'Urslingen reprend du service en 1347, avec 1500 hommes, engagé par Louis le Grand pour sa première campagne napolitaine. Licencié (car soupçonné de possible trahison) en 1348, il ravage les terres de l'Eglise entre 1348 et 1349. En juillet 1349, accompagnépar Giovanni Pipino, comte d'Altamura, il revient dans le royaume de Naples, au service de la reine Jeanne. Il accompagne Louis de Tarente dans ses opérations de reconquête dans les Pouilles mais, fait prisonnier à Corneto par le voïvode Etienne et Conrad Wolfhardt, il change de camp et revient au service du souverain hongrois. Après la bataille de Mileto, en 1349, contre les Napolitains, mécontent des récompenses financières obtenues, il obtient du voïvode Etienne la possession des prisonniers de haut rang afin d'en obtenir rançon à sa guise. Avec les chefs mercenaires, dont Fra' Moriale, Conrad de Landau et Conrad Wolfhardt, il oblige le voïvode à abandonner Averse et à se réfugier dans les places fortes hongroises de la côte adriatique. En janvier 1350, contre le payement d'une somme importante versée par les Napolitains, et non sans avoir auparavant dévastée toute la région, Werner d'Urslingen quitte enfin le Royaume de Naples. On le retrouve, avec Conrad de Landau, à la tête de la Grande Compagnie dans les Etats de l'Eglise, puis

en Romagne. Après quelques mois Werner d'Urslingen rentre définitivement en Allemagne, où il meurt en 1354, tandis que la Grande Compagnie est à nouveau reconstituée par Fra'Moriale et le comte de Landau en 1352.

• WOLFHARDT, Conrad, dit *«Corrado Lupo»*

Chef mercenaire allemand, il est engagé en 1347 par Louis le Grand lors de la première campagne napolitaine. Il restera fidèle à la cause hongroise après le départ de Louis le Grand. En août 1348 il engage 2000 barbues et descend des Abruzzes vers les Pouilles, malgré l'opposition de Giovanni Pipino, comte d'Altamura, et Giovanni di Asperg. En mai 1349, avec le voïvode Etienne, il force le passage de Arpaia, vers Naples, défendu par Giovanni di Asperg, puis il participe à la bataille de Melito de 1349. Avec les autres chefs mercenaires, Werner d'Urslingen, Conrad de Landau et Fra' Moriale, il s'oppose au voïvode Etienne puis il revient à son service et on le retrouve aux côtés de Louis le Grand lors de la deuxième campagne napolitaine du souverain hongrois. Lorsque Louis de Hongrie quitte définitivement la scène napolitaine, en 1350, Conrad Wolfhardt est nommé gouverneur des Abruzzes en attendant la réalisation des accords passés entre Louis le Grand et la reine Jeanne. La paix signée entre les souverains de Naples et de Hongrie, Conrad Wolfhardt réuni sa propre Compagnie de mercenaires et, cette fois-ci sous la bannière de Charles IV, roi de Germanie, recommence ses pillages en terre napolitaine au printemps 1352. Finalement, corrompu par Louis de Tarente, il lui «vend» la ville de Nocera ainsi que le comté de Guglionisi, il abandonne la partie et rentre en Allemagne.

• WOLFHARDT, Ulrich, dit *«Ulrico Lupo»*

Chef mercenaire allemand, frère de Conrad, lui aussi engagé en 1347 par Louis le Grand lors de la première campagne napolitaine. Homme de confiance du souverain hongrois, c'est à lui que ce dernier confie les forteresses de Naples en 1348. Ulrich Wolfhardt restera toujours fidèle à Louis le Grand et il l'accompagnera dans son retour en Hongrie (1350). C'est dans ce pays qu'il finit par s'établir et y fonder une maison noble, les Volfart de Vörösko.

THE DA VARANO LORDS OF CAMERINO AS
CONDOTTIERE PRINCES

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In Italian historiography, mercenary soldiers were for long regarded as an alien presence, alien in a literal sense because so many of them were foreigners; German, Hungarian, Spanish, Greek, Albanian, French, Swiss, English and Scottish soldiers can all be found fighting in Italy. They were also seen as alien in a more figurative sense, as an unwelcome scourge that fed upon, exploited and weakened Italian society and the states of Italy, damaging the economy and exacerbating the political divisions of the Peninsula.[1] However, in more recent years, historians like Daniel Waley, John Hale, Michael Mallett, Nadia Covini and William Caferro have addressed these issues and have re-assessed our perception of the mercenary soldier in late medieval and early renaissance Italy. For example, it is now generally agreed that even in the later fourteenth century, when the presence of foreign—non-Italian—mercenary soldiers in the Peninsula and their political and military influence was at its height, the majority of mercenaries were in fact Italian.[2]

Again it has been argued that that the long-running bias against mercenary troops in Italian historiography was in considerable measure a consequence of the hostile observations of a few eloquent, influential and prejudiced contemporary observers, most notably the Florentine Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527). More recent research has also argued that in late medieval and early renaissance Italy mercenary soldiers were better understood, were better managed and were more effective than was once thought to be the case an earlier 'golden age' of highly motivated, patriotic citizen militia armies is now perceived to have been in large measure a historical myth.[3] Of course, it can be argued on the basis of the recent research of William Caferro that the attempt to 'rehabilitate' the mercenary soldier in Italy may have gone too far; the sufferings of the commune of Siena and its countryside at the hands of mercenary soldiers in the late fourteenth century and the career of the famous—or for some infamous—English mercenary Sir John Hawkwood (c. 1320–94), are a reminder that the views of

Machiavelli were not without foundation and that they were by no means his alone. Nevertheless, the aim of this collection of essays—to reassess the mercenary soldier in a wide chronological and geographical setting—is likely to enhance an understanding of his role and significance in the Italian context. At the same time, it is to be hoped that the focus of this contribution—on the role of the Da Varano lords of Camerino as mercenary captains, as *condottieri*—will make a useful contribution to the wider picture.

Who were the Da Varano of Camerino? Camerino is in the *Marche* of Italy, and in the period dealt with here—the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance—it was a principal city in one of the provinces of the Papal States, and a city recognised as enjoying a strategic position.[4] From the later thirteenth century, it was ruled by a local dynasty, the Da Varano, virtually without a break until 1539, when the family had died out in the main male line, and the Farnese pope—Paul III (1534–39)— assigned the lordship first to his nephew Ottavio, and then brought the city under the direct rule of the Church in 1545.[5] In general terms the Da Varano lordship was similar to those of other signorial dynasties in the Papal States which have been studied to a greater depth and are better known to the English-speaking world. Notable examples are the Malatesta of Rimini in the Romagna or the Montefeltro of Urbino, neighbours of the Da Varano in the *Marche*. Apart from their earnings as *condottieri*, the dynasty drew on the income from a changing 'portfolio' of private, allodial, lands and properties, most obviously concentrated in or near Camerino itself, but also located in other places under Da Varano control, as well as from rights and properties held further afield in other provinces of the Papal States, in Rome and in the Kingdom of Naples.[6] They also drew on the revenues of the communes under their authority, not only in the diocese of Camerino itself but in such neighbouring dioceses as Fermo and Spoleto.

The nature of that authority was also varied and changeable. The earliest Da Varano *signore*, Gentile (1259–1284), held the offices of *podesta* and captain of the people at various times, suggesting that his coming to power had received a degree of sanction and legitimacy from his subjects, as was frequently the case with signorial dynasties elsewhere in Italy in the period.[7] However, it seems likely that such formal concessions to popular acceptance were quickly abandoned. Certainly in the records of the communal councils of Camerino—the *Reformationes*—that survive for 1404, the lord of the city, Rodolfo, is referred to as just that: as Camerino's 'Magnificus Dominus', with the addition of no other title.[8]

Of course, for all their lordships in the Papal States, the Da Varano were vassals of the Church, but even in this respect the precise nature of their authority is often unclear, a situation possibly caused in part by the residence of the papacy in Avignon and the period of the Great Schism. The impression given from the papal grants that survive in the original or in copied form is that the Da Varano 'state' was made up of an amalgam of lordships, within which the nature of their authority varied in legal terms. For example, on 1 March 1400 Pope Boniface IX (1389–1404) issued a bull in favour of Rodolfo da Varano and his two elder sons. They are addressed as *domicelli* of Camerino, a generic term that probably conveys little more than loyalty to the papal household, the Holy See. However, the pope then awards them and their legitimate heirs the two communes of San Ginesio and Tolentino 'in feudo perpetuo.'[9] Later, on 22 April 1418, following the Council of Constance, and presumably to help secure his return to Rome, Martin V (1417–31) *confirmed* to Rodolfo and his sons—again described as papal *domicelli* from Camerino—the 'government' of Camerino and its district, a grant first made 'ante exortum scismi in ecclesia sancta dei.'[10] The role and obligations of a papal 'governor' remain unclear.

By contrast, on 22 August 1420, Martin confirmed the vicariates held by Rodolfo and his sons over a number of communes—not including Camerino itself—in the dioceses of Camerino, Spoleto and Fermo, and in this case the grant was for three years and the obligations of the Da Varano towards their subjects and the Holy See were more clearly spelled out.[11] Later in the century, on 13 May 1468, Paul II (1464–71) granted the governorship of Camerino and other communes to Giulio Cesare da Varano and his immediate heirs, and on 27 February 1474 Sixtus IV awarded Giulio Cesare and his heirs the governorship of Monte Santo in the Duchy of Spoleto.[12] The loyalty the Da Varano had shown the Holy See in helping to crush a rebellion in Spoleto had earned them this award, though the grant makes clear that the family had held the place in the past.[13] The varied nature of the Da Varano lordships might appear to have been ended when Leo X granted them the prestigious title of duke on 30 April 1515.[14] But not all the places held by the Da Varano were encompassed by that award, as when Pope Leo granted Giovanni Maria da Varano the government of Civitanova on the Adriatic coast until a loan of 5000 ducats had been paid off.[15]

Whatever the precise nature of their power in terms of lands, rights and titles, an image of themselves that the Da Varano chose to project, and an image that was recognised by local chroniclers and antiquarians, was one of military prowess. Giulio Cesare Da Varano (1444–1502),

whose own name had clearly been chosen to evoke the military great-
ness of Rome, named two of his sons Annibale and Pirro after other
warrior heroes of the ancient world. His eventual successor, the more
conventionally and piously named Giovanni Maria (1503–27), commis-
sioned a series of frescoes for the great hall of his palace in Camerino
which celebrated his dynasty, and its military achievements; for example,
Giulio Cesare's commands in the service of Florence, Siena, Venice,
the papacy and the kings of Hungary and Naples are recorded.[16] In the
hands of the Da Varano themselves and their apologists such military
achievements could be exaggerated. For example, Edward I of England
did not award the Order of the Garter to Rodolfo da Varano (1284–
1316), though Edward IV and Henry VII did honour their Montefeltro
neighbours in this way in 1474 and 1503.[17] The Venetian Republic did
not express its gratitude to Giulio Cesare by erecting an equestrian
monument in his honour in the city, though it did permit such statues
of this kind to be set up in memory of three of its other commanders,
to Erasmo da Narni—Gattamelata—by Donatello (1443–53) in Padua,
and to Paolo Savelli (c. 1404) and Bartolomeo Colleoni by Verrocchio
(1479–88) in Venice itself.[18]

However, despite such propagandist distortions, the historical re-
cord does confirm that the dynasty did produce a succession of *condot-
tieri* who fought—on the whole—for the Guelph, or pro-papal, cause.
There were some deviations from this political orientation. When
the traditional Guelph configuration of powers broke up during the
so-called 'War of the Eight Saints' between Florence and the papacy
(1375–78), Rodolfo II (1355–84) initially took the Florentine side. But,
feeling slighted by the favour the Republic showed John Hawkwood, he
returned to the papal cause in 1377, the Florentines branding him as
a traitor and having his likeness painted, hanging from the devil.[19] An
even greater break in Da Varano-papal relations came in 1501—long
after the Guelf cause had ceased to have any real political or ideologi-
cal meaning—when Alexander VI (1492–1503) accused Giulio Cesare
of treason and deprived him of his lordships, this being effected the
following year by his son Cesare Borgia.[20] Alexander's death in 1503
allowed the Da Varano to return, and thereafter their relations with the
papacy were in general cordial, until Paul III began setting his sights
on the duchy from 1534.[21]

Why did the Da Varano incline to the Guelph cause? Of course,
as vassals of the papacy they were expected to be loyal to their over-
lord, and this obligation was spelled out in the various specific grants

to lands and offices they received. However, there were probably also other, pragmatic, reasons for their loyalty. Though separated by the Apennines from Rome, they were nevertheless close to the centre of papal power, and they may not have felt that they could risk the freedom of action expected by signorial dynasties further north, like the Montefeltro, the Malatesta or the Este. Secondly, Camerino lay between Rome and the major papal port of Ancona, and for economic reasons the Da Varano may have felt that a break from Rome would have been foolish; moreover, with the return of the papacy to Rome in 1421, that city became one of the greatest markets and 'centres of opportunity' in Italy. To have broken with the papacy would have been to endanger the prosperity and prospects of the Da Varano and their subjects. Moreover, the papacy needed soldiers, and the Da Varano sought employment as *condottieri*.[22]

Why was that the case? One suggestion is that signorial dynasties like the Da Varano drew on military support from their estates to acquire power, and thus had reserves of manpower to use, employ and reward; the analogy would be with the lords of the Romagna studied by John Larner, Philip Jones and others.[23] However, at least in the case of the Da Varano, if they drew on support of that kind to gain power, their actual retention of power does not seem to have depended on force, at least not until the troubled end of their *signoria*. The residences which they acquired in the city, and which eventually emerged as a fully-fledged palace in the later fifteenth century, were in the centre of Camerino and were unfortified. The citadel which came to be built in the early sixteenth century was initiated by the brief Borgia regime, and not by the ousted native dynasty.[24]

Another general reason often suggested by historians of warfare in late medieval and Renaissance Italy, is that lordships like that of the Da Varano were situated in relatively impoverished—even barren—areas of Italy, and that serving as *condottieri* boosted the revenues of the dynasty and allowed it to attain its princely aspirations. Once again, there is probably something in this explanation, but it may somewhat distort the picture. The lordship of Camerino may not have been in the same economic league as the duchy of Milan, but it was nonetheless regarded as potentially profitable for its holder. How else can one explain the intense interest taken in Italy, and elsewhere in Europe, in the fate of the duchy once it had passed to the hands of Giovanni Maria's one legitimate child, Giulia, in 1527, or the determination of Paul III to assign it to a nephew before incorporating it fully within the lands of

the Church?[25] An itemised breakdown of the duchy's *ordinary* budget for 1535 gives a surplus of income over expenditure of just over 34.000 florins.[26] However that appears to apply only to the city of Camerino and its immediate territory; it does not include the revenues from other lordships and rights, whether covered by their ducal title or held elsewhere; nor does it take account of income from their own private possessions in the *Marche* or the return the Da Varano enjoyed from the right to tax the transhumance traffic in the Abruzzo.

Further evidence that the Da Varano were not impoverished *signori* dependent on their earnings as *condottieri* comes from the fact that they can be found lending considerable amounts of money to their actual or potential employers. For example, a document of 31 October 1419 drawn up on the orders of Queen Joanna II of Naples recorded an earlier document of 13 September 1413 in which her brother, Ladislas acknowledged a debt to Berardo da Varano of 400 *uncie*—approximately 2,400 florins—and also an even larger debt incurred by the king of 8000 ducats which she had recognised earlier on 24 September 1415.[27] A century later, the advances the Da Varano made to the papacy helped the dynasty recover from the Borgia interregnum and brought it further benefits. A bull of Leo X of 4 October 1520 recognised an accumulated debt to Giovanni Maria da Varano of 30.000 ducats; he was assigned the revenue from a number of communes in the *Marche* until that debt was paid off.[28]

Of course, this does not mean that the return the Da Varano could expect from military *condotte* (contracts) was inconsiderable. In the case of their neighbour, Federigo da Montefeltro (1444–1482), Cecil Clough has argued that his earnings as a *condottiere* were substantial, allowing him to spend 200.000 ducats on his palace in Urbino, 40.000 ducats on its library, 40.000 ducats on silver plate and 10.000 ducats on Flemish tapestries illustrating the Trojan Wars.[29] In the case of the Da Varano, Berardo signed a contract with the Queen of Naples to run for a year from 1 September 1414 which promised him 57.400 ducats for his force of 400 lances (1.200 cavalry), plus a personal payment of 2000 ducats.[30] On 5 May 1484, Giulio Cesare da Varano reached an agreement with Venice to serve as the Republic's governor general for two years—with a further optional year *di rispetto*—providing a force in wartime of 1.200 cavalry and 50 mounted archers for 50.000 ducats, troop and pay levels halving in time of peace.[31] It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the Da Varano supplemented their income

from their service as *condottieri*—for example—to extend and embellish their residences in the city, but that military *condotte* were not their principal source of financial support.

But what of their subjects; did the *condotte* secured by the Da Varano bring employment to the city and its countryside? Answering this question is made difficult by the fact that no muster rolls have so far been found for their armies, but it seems unlikely that military service was a major source of local employment, even if arguing from silence is always dangerous. To begin with, as has been mentioned, the Da Varano do not normally seem to have depended on bands of armed retainers drawn from their country estates. Secondly, when the size of Da Varano armies can be identified the numbers involved are significant but not large, between 400 and 200 lances which probably represents forces of between 1.200 and 800 men, of whom two thirds were probably front line troops.[32] Moreover, where evidence survives for the working of the commune of Camerino, as in the *Reformationes* of 1404, the government appears to have been in the hands of trade and craft guildsmen, supporting the view of modern economic historians who see the economy of the region in terms of agriculture, trade and industry.[33] The detailed descriptions of their palace from the early sixteenth century do not record what might be called a 'barracks' element, or even guard rooms.[34] Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, there is the account of the state of Camerino written by Lodovico Clodio in late 1502 or early 1503.[35]

Clodio was a servant of the Borgia regime and his *relazione* followed an insurrection in Camerino in favour of the Da Varano in October 1502 and was designed 'alla conservatione di Casa Borgia' in the city. His social and political analysis of the situation was quite detailed, but nowhere does he pinpoint ambitious or disgruntled soldiery as a cause of unrest. When he comes to the 'plebei, poveri e contadini (country people)'—the majority of the population—he refers to the way the Da Varano had won them over with doles of bread, alms, unspecified favours and accessibility. Their court had been a centre for 'ricreazione'—warmth, gossip, games, company, keeping the young occupied. Clodio advised the Borgia to re-establish a court which would continue this form of patronage, but nowhere does he suggest that the Da Varano had been for their subjects a source of employment through military service. It is unlikely, therefore, that Giulio Cesare and his brother transformed 'the poor peasants of the *Marca* countryside into merciless mercenary troops.'[36]

Of course this does not mean that none of their subjects enlisted with the Da Varano. Some kinsmen were probably in their service, like Count Giulio da Montevecchio who married Giovanni Maria's illegitimate daughter Cornelia in 1517 and who emerges as a loyal servant of the dynasty in the 1520s and 1530s.[37] In terms of the rank and file, a contract between the Emperor Charles V and Giovanni Maria da Varano of 22 January 1525 for 1500 well equipped infantry and a smaller cavalry contingent acknowledged that Giovanni Maria might choose to muster his troops in Camerino.[38] But that was not necessarily to be the case, and the likelihood is that the Da Varano recruited professional, experienced, fighting men from many regions of the Peninsula, and did not simply draw on militia or part time soldiers to fulfil the terms of his *condotte*.

This had been the practice with the mercenary companies led by Michele Attendolo, count of Cotignola, between 1425 and 1448. Mario del Treppo's analysis of the account books kept for that company by its treasurer Francesco di Viviano of Arezzo, reveals a diversity of origins in its make-up, with professional soldiers coming from much of mainland Italy.[39] Certainly Attendolo's company was never associated in the eyes of contemporaries with any one region or city, and nor were the armies fielded by the Da Varano identified with Camerino or the *Marche*. In this respect, the *condottiere* armies of fifteenth century Italy present a contrast with the major free companies of the later fourteenth century whose English, or German, or Breton—or Italian—association was noted by contemporaries.

However, if a strictly economic interpretation of the role of the Da Varano as *condottieri* has to be treated with some care, it is nevertheless the case that military employment was probably seen as bringing with it other benefits. Cappelli's entry on Camerino in his *Cronologia, Cronografia e Calendario Perpetuo* reveals a number of prestigious offices held by members of the dynasty outside the *Marche* and in virtue of their military support of the Guelf alliance.[40] For example, Gentile II is recorded as *podestà* of Florence in 1312, while his successor Rodolfo II is down as captain of the people in that city for 1370. He is also recorded as *gonfaloniere* (standard bearer or captain general) of the Church in 1355, while Gentile III appears as senator of Rome in 1368—almost certainly a papal appointment—and *podestà* of Lucca in 1375. It is probable that not all such offices were exercised in person, but it is also likely that they heightened the prestige of the dynasty, extended its influence and brought in revenue. Being more specific, the role of military service as

part of a wider dynastic strategy can be seen clearly in relations between the Da Varano and the crown of Naples in the early fifteenth century, in the period when Ladislas (1386–1414) emerged as one of the most powerful and expansionist rulers in Italy, and whose kingdom bordered on the *Marche*. The communal *Reformationes* of Camerino for January and February 1404 record discussions to send Berardo da Varano, one of the sons of Rodolfo III (1399–1424) with a contingent of soldiers to attend the king and Pope Boniface IX in Naples and to present them with gifts.[41] Throughout, the commune's officials—the *podestà* and the captain of the people—were obliged to pledge their loyalty to the king as well as to the pope and the Da Varano.

Berardo named one of his sons Ladislas, possibly with the king acting as godfather, but the military dimension to the relationship becomes clearer with a treaty of alliance drawn up in Salerno on 31 December 1408, confirming an existing agreement and extending it by fifty years.[42] Essentially this treaty committed the parties to assist one another in the event of attack, even from the papacy their feudal overlord. Ladislas promised to defend the lands, subjects and clients of the Da Varano, while the latter promised to transfer most of their armed men under the command of Berardo da Varano, from the service of the pope to that of Ladislas in one and a half months.

Clearly the association continued and developed. The well-informed Lucchese chronicler Giovanni Sercambi records that Ladislas sent Berardo as his ambassador to meet the emperor elect, Sigismund, in July 1413.[43] When the king recognised a debt to Berardo on 13 September 1413 he was addressed as his loyal councillor and captain of his army.[44] He was also addressed as his 'vicegerens'—or agent—for the 'Provincia Vallisgratis' and the 'Terra Jordane', both in the province of Calabria in the kingdom of Naples. The exact circumstances and nature of this appointment is unclear, and possibly it was granted to offset unpaid *condotte* or loans made to the king. Whatever, on 14 July 1414, Berardo was confirmed in office in Calabria, and after Ladislas's death, his sister Joanna II addressed Berardo in similar terms on 24 September 1415.[45] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Rodolfo and his sons were listed among the 'adherentes et seguaces et recomandati' of the Neapolitan crown on 22 June 1414, or that in the great hall of Varano palace in Camerino, both Rodolfo and Berardo were recorded as serving Ladislas of Naples, the former in a military capacity, the latter as a councillor, though the evidence does suggest that Berardo was in fact the principal *condottiere* of the family.[46]

The use of *condotte* to secure wider aims can be seen again in the agreement reached between Giulio Cesare da Varano and the Republic of Venice in May 1484. Unlike Ladislas, Venice was not a neighbour of the Da Varano, but of course by the 1480s the city was one of the major powers of the Peninsula and held places in the Romagna as well as territory in Dalmatia across the Adriatic. Quite apart from the military and financial 'core' of the contract of 5 May, Venice promised to award Giulio Cesare the title of *gubernator generalis* and to present him with the *vexillum honorificum Sancti Marci pro honore officii gubernatoris*.[47] With such honours came more pragmatic promises: to include the Da Varano among the *raccomandati* and *adherentes* of Venice in future leagues and alliances; to protect Giulio Cesare's present and future state and to support the interests of his legitimate and natural heirs; to exempt the lord of Camerino and his subjects from commercial reprisals during the duration of the *condotta*.

The details of the career of the first and last Da Varano duke, Giovanni Maria (1503–27) as a *condottiere* prince are at present unclear, and at times he was certainly more preoccupied with defending his state against the claims of his nephew, Sigismondo, and his supporters, than looking for employment as a military commander.[48] However a combination of military and financial support probably secured him the good will of the Della Rovere pope Julius II (1503–1513) and the two Medici popes, Leo X (1513–21) and Clement VII (1523–34). As has been mentioned above in connection with Ladislas of Naples, honours and offices may have come to the Da Varano as a result of sums owed them by the crown at least in part for *condottiere* service. In the case of Giovanni Maria, the debt could come first; on 15 November 1521, the duke was awarded the prestigious and privileged office of papal admiral by Leo X in return for a loan or gift of 4.000 ducats.[49]

However, an even more remarkable instance of Giovanni Maria trying to use his military resources to win the good will of a powerful protector occurred when, on 23 September 1522, he tried to secure a *condotta* from Henry VIII of England.[50] The duke's papal protector, Leo X, had recently died. Through money and diplomacy the king of England had been trying to extend his influence in Europe. Giovanni Maria's rival in the *Marche*, Francesco Maria della Rovere duke of Urbino, was supporting his nephew, Sigismondo da Varano, in his claim to the duchy of Camerino and on 22 March 1522 he had offered his military services to the English king. In September, Giovanni Maria was almost certainly trying to counter his rival's offer and more for

diplomatic and political reasons than for straight financial gain. Nothing appears to have come from either the Della Rovere or the Da Varano overtures to England, but both rulers were probably viewing *condottiere* service in terms of alliance, protection and influence, and not simply as paid employment.

In his study of John Hawkwood, William Caferro argues that the English soldier was more than a mercenary captain in Italy: he had dynastic ambitions for himself and his family; he sought lands and status in Italy and England; he acted as a politician and a diplomat as well as a soldier. This was also the case with the Da Varano, though as a native dynasty of long standing, with a 'state' based on Camerino they were not in the same military and political situation as such commanders of free companies as Hawkwood and his contemporaries in the later fourteenth century. Indeed, it is likely that the pay the Da Varano earned as *condottieri* was an 'added extra', while it—and their interests in the *Marche*-conditioned to some extent their military and political activity. Considerations—even 'loyalties'—of this kind did not inhibit the likes of Hawkwood. On the other hand, like many of their predecessors and contemporaries as mercenary soldiers, the Da Varano appear to have sought to use their role as *condottieri* to bring them influence, allies and protection, as well as monetary and territorial rewards. Rather like their marriage alliances, their activity as mercenary captains was part of a wider strategy to sustain and advance the dynasty.

However it is also clear that this strategy could fail as well as succeed. After their ally, protector, employer and debtor, Ladislas, had died on 3 August 1414, the kingdom of Naples—once one of the most powerful states in Italy—succumbed to dynastic conflict, rebellion and invasion. Later in the century, in May 1484, Giulio Cesare da Varano became captain general of another powerful Italian state, the Republic of Venice. That command was extended and then renewed, but Giulio Cesare's failures in the war between the Republic and Sigismondo, archduke of Austria, in the *Trentino*, led to him being cashiered by the Council of Ten on 8 December 1487.[51] He never served Venice again.

The support his son, Giovanni Maria, provided for Julius II, Leo X and Clement VII helped to protect and advance the dynasty, and even secured a Da Varano succession in the female line after the duke's death in 1527. But the accession of Paul III (1534–49), the Farnese pope, brought papal patronage to an end. Moreover, the lack of a male heir exposed the Da Varano not only to disputes over the succession; it also cancelled the family out as credible *condottieri* captains. No longer could

military service earn the dynasty the protection—as well as the pay—of other Italian, let alone European, powers. However, the longer term history of the Da Varano family as mercenary soldiers shows that at no stage could either form of support ever be counted on for long.

NOTES

[1] For a recent study of the economic and political damage inflicted on a society by repeated visitations from mercenary companies in the late fourteenth century, W. Caferro, *Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena* (Baltimore, 1998).

[2] D.P. Waley, 'The army of the Florentine Republic from the twelfth to the fourteenth century', in *Florentine Studies*, ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968), 70–108 and 'Condotte and Condottieri in the Thirteenth Century', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 61 (1975), 337–371; M. Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters* (London, 1974); J.R. Hale and M. Mallett, *The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State* (Cambridge, 1984); Caferro, *Mercenary Companies*; M.N. Covini, *L'Esercito del Duca. Organizzazione Militare e Istituzioni al Tempo degli Sforza* (Rome, 1998); W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood. An English Mercenary in Fourteenth Century Italy* (Baltimore, 2006).

[3] D. Hay and J.E. Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance* (London, 1989), 84–91.

[4] J.E. Law, 'L'interesse dei Tudor per la fine del Ducato di Camerino', in P. Moricone (ed.), *Caterina Cybo Duchessa di Camerino* (Camerino, 2005), 279.

[5] There is no history of the Da Varano in English though James Dennistoun had much to say about them in his pioneering *Memoirs of the Dukes of Urbino* (London, 1851); I have used the edition prepared by Edward Hutton (London, 1909). For the ending of the Da Varano lordship, the 'classic' study remains B. Feliciangeli, *Notizie e Documenti della Vita di Caterina Cibo-Varano* (Camerino, 1891), and see also J.E. Law, 'The ending of the duchy of Camerino', in C. Shaw (ed.), *Italy and the European Powers. The Impact of War 1500–1530* (Leiden-Boston, 2006), 77–90. For a recent general history of the dynasty, M.T. Guerra Medici, *Famiglia e Potere in una Signoria dell'Italia Centrale. I Varano di Camerino* (Camerino, 2002).

[6] See below n. 26 for an indication of their sources of revenue from Camerino itself and its district. Marta Paraventi has published a list of Da Varano properties in the area for 1502, 'Inventario del ducato. Inventario compilato nel settembre 1502 dagli emissari borgeschi relativo al territorio governato di Giulio Cesare da Varano', in M. Paraventi, (ed.), *I Da Varano e le Arti a Camerino a nel Territorio* (Camerino, 2003), 19–26. In the sixteenth century, changes of regime, disputes over the succession and the claims of Giovanni Maria da Varano's widow and descendants created a considerable amount of material on the worth of the duchy and the Da Varano's own holdings in the *Marche* and elsewhere which I am in the course of analysing.

[7] J.E. Law, *Lords of Renaissance Italy* (London, 1981), 4–20.

[8] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza 13, c. 52ff. Over some communes, the Da Varano exercised a protectorate rather than a formal—or even informal—lordship, A. Meriggi, *'Honorabilibus amicis nostris carissimis'. Lettere inedite dei Da Varano di Camerino al Comune di Montevecchio (Treia) 1381–1426* (Camerino, 1996).

[9] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza 13, Item 3/2. G. de Rosa, exploring the evidence for early grants of papal vicariates to the family, cites F. Ciapparoni and suggests that Boniface IX had awarded Gentile da Varano the vicariate of Camerino in 1392, 'Qualche nota sui vicariati dei Da Varano', *Studi Maceratesi*, 18 (1983), 77–8. Had the grant expired by 1400?

[10] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza XIII, 3/3. This possibly refers to a still earlier grant of the vicariate by Gregory XI (1370–8); see also ASF, Diplomatico, 22 April 1418.

[11] This grant probably follows on from that of 22 April 1418; the annual census payments owed the Church are itemised, ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza 13, 3/4; De Rosa/Ciapparoni believe that Camerino was held as a vicariate in 1420, 'Qualche nota', 78. Did the *governorship* granted in 1418 amount to a *vicariate*? See n. 12.

[12] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza XIII, cc. 225–232v; here the copyist equated 'governorship' with 'vicariate'. Conventionally, and until relatively recently, most historians appear to have dated the Da Varano vicariate over Camerino to 1468, De Rosa, 'Qualche nota', 77.

[13] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza XIII, cc. 235–238v.

[14] Because of its significance for the dynasty and its heirs, many copies of the bull survive, e.g. Pesaro, Biblioteca Oliveriana, 387, item 50, cc. 254–7; ASF, Classe I, Filza XIII, 3/11. The grant was not in perpetuity, but for three generations.

[15] The grant referred to the fact that the place had been once granted to the Da Varano by Innocent VII (1404–5), while Leo confirmed his grant—which included other places—in 1519, ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza XIII, c. 265 r–v, 491v.

[16] These frescoes, with their accompanying explanatory captions, or *elogi*, do not survive, but copies of them do, one of which was produced in facsimile and edited by L. Borgia, *Lo Stemmario da Varano di Camerino* (Pesaro, 2005); A.A. Bittarelli, 'Risvolti camerinesi nella vita di Varino Favorino: Gli 'Elogia'', *Camerinum* (Camerino, 1996), 365–376. For the 'image' of the dynasty see P.L. Falaschi (ed.), *I Volti di una Dinastia* (Milan, 2001).

[17] C.H. Clough, 'The relations between the English and Urbino courts 1474–1508', in *The Duchy of Urbino in the Renaissance* (London, 1981), Chapter 11.

[18] For a useful discussion of the significance of the equestrian monument, if in fresco rather than in bronze, see W.J. Wegener, 'That the practice of arms is most excellent declares the statues of valiant men'—the Lucca war and Florentine political ideology in paintings by Uccello and Castagno', *Renaissance Studies*, 7/2 (1993), 129–167. The local antiquarian Camillo Lilii mentions the equestrian statue to Giulio Cesare in Venice but offers no details, *Istoria della Citta di Camerino*, supplemented by F. Camerini (Camerino, 1835), col. 245.

[19] For Rodolfo's desertion of the Florentine cause and the subsequent 'picture of infamy' painted of him, Caferro, *Hawkwood*, 193.

[20] For the Borgia interregnum, J.E. Law, 'City, court and contado in Camerino,' in T. Dean and C. Wickham (eds), *City and Countryside in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy*, (London, 1990), 171–182.

[21] For this period, J.E. Law, 'Relazioni dinastiche tra i Della Rovere e i Varano', in B. Cleri et al. (eds), *I Della Rovere nell'Italia delle Corti*, 2 vols (Urbino, 2002), 2. 21–34 and 'The ending'. Relations between Hadrian VI (1522–23) and Giovanni Maria da Varano were strained, the former accusing the duke of having his nephew, Sigismondo, murdered in 1522, and even attempting to assassinate the pope. However, Hadrian's pontificate was a short interlude between two Medici popes—Leo X (1513–21) and Clement VII (1523–34)—who supported the dynasty. For Clement's exoneration of Giovanni Maria see, for example, ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza XIII, 1/8.

[22] For the economic significance of Camerino, E. di Stefano, *Una Citta Mercantile. Camerino nel Tardo Medioevo* (Camerino, 1998); G. Pinto, 'Camerino nel Quattrocento: il decollo di una economia mercantile e manifatturiera' and I. Ait, 'Rapporti economici fra Roma e Camerino', both in A. de Marchi and P.L. Falaschi (eds), *I Da Varano e le Arti*, eds, 2 vols (Camerino, 2003), 1.53–60, 61–74.

[23] J. Larner, *The Lords of the Romagna* (London, 1965); P.J. Jones, *The Malatesta of Rimini* (Cambridge, 1974).

[24] A considerable amount has been written on the palace, less so on the citadel or *rocca*. For recent studies on the former, F. Paino, 'Il Palazzo ducale di Camerino: storia,

architectettura, ambienti e decorazione pittoriche', in *Da Varano e le Arti*, 55–76 and 'The Palazzo of the da Varano family in Camerino,' in C. Beattie, A. Maslakovic and S. Rees Jones (eds), *The Medieval Household in Christian Europe* (Tournhoot, 2003), 335–358 and G. Remiddi, 'Il Palazzo da Varano di Giulio Cesare,' in *I Da Varano*, 93–104. For the fortress, Law, 'City, Court and Contado', 175–6.

[25] Law, 'Relazioni dinastiche', 28–34.

[26] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza XIII, cc. 274–275v This did not include the cost of the garrison in the citadel, estimated at 2.400 florins a year. An earlier ambassadorial report of 13 February 1531 gave the duchy's annual return as the much lower figures of 12.000 ducats, but then observed that it was worth a lot more, Law, 'L'Interesse', 279.

[27] ASF, Diplomatico, 31 October 1419 and Ducato, Classe I, Filza XVI, 53. Under 1412, the well-informed Lucchese chronicler Giovanni Sercambi lists Berardo da Varano among those lending money—in his case 10.000 florins—to Ladislas to allow him to hire their fellow *condottiere*, Muzio Attendolo Sforza, for the Neapolitan crown, on which see G. Sercambi, *Le Croniche*, ed. S. Bongi 3 vols (Rome,1892), 3.197–8.

[28] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza III, 1/2.

[29] Clough, *The Duchy*, Chapter 3.

[30] ASF, Diplomatico, 31 October 1419.

[31] Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Commemoriali, reg. 17, ff. 28v–29v; ASF, Urbino, Classe III, Filza I, cc. 22.27. For the ducal letters patent announcing Giulio Cesare's appointment, ASF, Diplomatico, 4 June 1484. This *condotta* confirms the view that rates of pay declined in the course of the fifteenth century.

[32] In 1522, Giovanni Maria offered to serve Henry VIII of England with a force of 200 horse, which probably represented 800 men of whom 200 would probably have been squires or pages, see above 98–9 and Law, 'L'Interesse', 277.

[33] See above, n. 22.

[34] See the contributions by E. Tagliacollo and F. Benelli under 'Luoghi monumentali della Camerino varanesca', in A. De Marchi and M.G. Lopez (eds), *Il Quattrocento a Camerino*, eds (Milan, 2002), 270–4.

[35] Law, 'City, court and contado'.

[36] F. Paino citing P.L. Falaschi, 'The Palazzo', 350 n. 36.

[37] Feliciangeli, *Notizie*, passim; Law, 'Relazioni dinastiche' 26–8. A contemporary chronicle identifies the captains in Giulio Cesare da Varano's army in 1487 as his sons Cesare and Annibale, the count of Matelica—Alessandro Ottoni—and a nephew, Count Prospero, G. Soranzo, 'Cronaca di Anonimo Veronese' (Venice, Monumenti Storici pubblicati dalla Deputazione Veneta di Storia Patria, ser. iii, vol. iv, 1915), 413.

[38] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza 16, 54.

[39] M. del Treppo, 'Aspetti di una compagnia di ventura italiana', *Rivista Storica Italiana*, 85 (1983), 253–275.

[40] A. Capelli, *Cronologia, Cronografia e Calendario Perpetuo* (Milan, 1969), 404–5.

[41] See above, n. 8. I am very grateful to Dr Fausta Navarro for information on the close cultural relations between the courts of Camerino and Naples in this period.

[42] ASF, Diplomatico, 31 December 1408.

[43] Sercambi, *Le Croniche*, 3. 209.

[44] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza XVI, 53. Sercambi records Ladislas employing Berardo in 1409, 1412 and 1413, *Le Croniche*, 3.157–8, 197–8, 211–2.

[45] ASF, Diplomatico, 31 October 1419; N. Barone, 'Notizie raccolte dai registri di cancelleria di Ladislao di Durazzo', *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Napoletane* 13 (1888), 34.

[46] A. Cutolo, *Re Ladislao d'Angio-Durazzo* (Naples, 1969), 984–5; Borgia, *Stemmario*. In the great hall of the Da Varano palace, Rodolfo's service to Ladislao was presented in military terms, while Berardo was recorded as one of the king's councillors.

[47] ASVen, Commemoriali, reg. XVIII, c. 28v–29v. No explicit reference is made here to the award of honorific Venetian nobility, though presumably it was granted around this time and Giulio Ceare is referred to as 'nobilis'. According to Lilii, the award was made when Giovanni Mocenigo was doge (1478–1485), *Istoria*, col. 239. See below n. 51.

[48] Law, 'Relazioni dinastiche' and 'The ending'.

[49] ASF, Urbino, Classe I, Filza XIII, 1/6 and 1/7.

[50] Law, 'L'Interesse', 277–8.

[51] The sources for Giulio Cesare's employment and his less than distinguished role in the *Trentino* are identified by Soranzo in his magisterial edition of the 'Cronaca di Anonimo Veronese', 413, 447, 450–1. I intend discussing the Giulio Cesare's role in the *Trentino* war at a future date.

'BENEATH THE BATTLE'?

MINERS AND ENGINEERS AS 'MERCENARIES' IN THE
HOLY LAND (XII–XIII SIÈCLES)[1]

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Recent works on the ideology of crusade have focused mainly on the gap between Christian and Muslim during the crusades and have generally omitted the possibility of diplomatic or pacific exchanges. Indeed, the context of the crusades is often associated with the idea of a global conflict in which all means are employed to extend political and territorial supremacy and impose one faith upon another. However, such conflict didn't prevent the protagonists from appreciating the technological or martial skill of the enemy.[3] As Arnold of Lübeck observed, each society watched his opponent's particular features and sometimes tried to borrow some innovative techniques and experts able to reproduce them.[4] Though prisoners of war were numerous on building and demolition sites, the mercenary phenomenon gained in importance as the lack of experts confronted princes and sultans with new problems.[5] The importance of fortification in the crusading context and the high frequency of siege assaults provided a fertile ground for the genesis of a new social class.[6] Before starting to reflect upon the military engineer and miner as mercenary figures in Frankish and Muslim armies in the Crusades context, I shall introduce two main groups whose technical knowledge seemed to have played a significant part in the science of poliorcetic. In the second place, I shall try to analyse more deeply the reasons for their expertise and the different mechanisms for the recruitment of these individuals or communities.

I—Mercenaries and the 'Other'

Although the mercenary phenomenon was differently considered and regulated in the West, the practice of taking up arms in the service of a rival army is attested in the Latin East in the twelfth and thirteenth

century.[7] It was not rare for Turkish or Arab mercenaries to be employed in the Frankish armies and the Military Orders frequently made use of the speed and military effectiveness of the Turcopoles.[8] Frankish soldiers were likewise recruited in the Turkish armies. In the second half of the thirteenth century, Simon de Saint-Quentin in his 'History of the Tartars' declared that this group was cohesive enough to disturb some of the plans of the Mongols.[9] This custom was obviously not totally new seeing that Adhémar of Monteil—Bishop of le Puy and one the leaders of the First Crusade—remarked that some Franks were engaged by the Seljuk sultan.[10] In this last case, the status of these men can not be compared to that of paid men or mercenaries because they were prisoners of war. Nevertheless, we learn that some of the crusaders who stayed in the Turkish garrison of Adalia in 1148 were paid for the service they offered.[11]

Concerning poliorcetic expertise, crusading sources also mention the recruitment of military engineers and skilled soldiers. The first group or community I want to highlight are the Armenian technicians. The high skill of Armenian archers (*kâws al-arman*), already integrated into the Fatimid army, gained a certain notoriety in the Latin states and in the Islamic world during the twelfth century. These bowmen were engaged in the Mounqidhite lordship of Shayzar in the Oronte Valley and in the Frankish hinterland of Antioch.[12] Moreover, during the siege of Ani in 1064, the sultan Alp Arslan didn't begin his assault on the massive city until he had recruited some skilled Armenian engineers. In this way, the sultan made the most of his good fortune, plundering the Vaspourakan arsenals.[13] The Seljuks lacked experience in siege warfare but the absence of a technical tradition doesn't mean that they rejected it.[14] Such an auxiliary force was necessary to manage siege-towers, activate mangonels and besiege urban walls. Besides, some of the fortresses of Great and Little Armenia like Kysistra, Anarzava, Melitene, Edessa were renowned for the quality of their massive concentric walls. All these urban and rural enclosures were surrounded by deep ditches cut in the rock and built on strategic topographic sites.[15] In this science of fortification, the innovations in active and passive defence were always linked to a deep knowledge of the efficiency of ballistic and siege machinery. In this matter, the ability of Armenians was particularly relevant. The case of the Armenian engineer Haverdic, recruited as a mercenary in the barons' army to build engines during the siege of Tyre in 1124, is well represented in the vast historiography of the art of Crusading warfare. In my opinion, his Armenian origins haven't

been sufficiently emphasised.[16] Other examples corroborate the idea of a particular Armenian skill and mastery in siege or building. Armenian chroniclers remark that, during the siege of Shayzar in 1137–1138 by John Comnenus, the engineers whom the Byzantine leader engaged temporarily for this operation came from Lake Van, which is located in the southwest of Great Armenia.[17] Other craftsmen were also to be found in the retinues of emirs and these were not always slaves, despite the fact that they were Christians, Nestorians or Syriacs. The numerous craftsmen associated with the suite of Altountash, the well-known Islamised Armenian emir in 1150's and 1160's were of great value also.[18] Masons' marks, either Frankish or Armenian found in the fortress of Ajloun suggest that either Frankish or Armenian craftsmen were working for 'Izz al-Dîn al-Mansûr Aybak.[19] During the crusade of Saint Louis (1248–1252) the king's master artilleryman *"magister-attiliator"*— the man in charge of the building and repairing of the king's crossbows— was of Cilician origin and called Jean l'Ermin 'John the Armenian'.[20] He was, as Joinville informs us, recruited during the seventh crusade in the Holy Land and returned to France with the king at the end of the expedition. The fact that Jean l'Ermin was sent to Damascus to buy some materials was not coincidental.[21] The artilleryman was aware of the best trade spots for the crossbows. Nevertheless, these technical skills of Jean l'Ermin was not the main reason for Joinville's interest in him but rather was it the quality of the former's sermons and aptitude for theological debate. In this illustration a foreign mercenary is firmly placed within the context of the Holy War. As an '*exempla*', the story looks like an opportune platform to publicize general views on the differences between Armenian and Muslim customs. This aside, Armenian expertise in archery had became legendary during the fourteenth century when they were still renowned as remarkable '*tornatores*'—fletchers and craftsmen skilled in feathering arrows.[22]

Another community famous in the period of the crusades for its mechanical and building mastery were the technicians of Northern Syria and Northern Iran. These were located in mountainous areas, quarrying sites or urban centres such as Aleppo, Diyarbâkr, Mossoul or the province of Khurasân.[23] The Aleppan stonecutters and the Khurasânîs miners were both recruited in the siege trains of the Zengid and Ayyubid armies from the mid-twelfth to the mid-thirteenth centuries. Chroniclers like Ibn al-Athîr, Ibn Shaddâd, 'Imâd al-Dîn al Isfahânî and the later Ibn al-Furât remarked upon the scope of their expertise.[24] As a military genius, Richard Lionheart is known to have drawn upon this 'reservoir'

of siege experts during the Third Crusade. In fact, if we rely on the account given by Ambroise, the meeting between the Plantagenêt king and these foreign technicians from Aleppo was due to a pure hazard. Before his arrival at Acre, Richard's fleet encountered a Muslim ship—a dromon—which had sailed from Sidon with reinforcements for the siege of Acre. It was full of food, arms, Greek fire pots, and both frame-mounted and hand-operated crossbows.[25] Ambroise, who accompanied the king or perhaps had a clear report of the expedition, adds that the king killed the entire crew and all the soldiers except for thirty- five people known to be engineers and dignitaries:

'La veïssiez fiers cops rüer	*Then you would have seen great blows flying*	*Au dit vaisseau, de fiers coups*
Que li reis Richarz i rüot	*as the king struck fierce blows,*	*Le roi Richard fit lancer*
E les ociet et tüot	*Killing and bringing death*	*et il les occis et les tua*
E en retint, ço m'est avis	*and, I believe, taking*	*et il en retint, à mon avis*
Trente e [v] qu'il fist guarder vis	*Thirty-five whom he kept alive*	*trente-cinq qu'il maintînt en vie*
Admiralz e engin[ë]ors	*Some emirs and engineers*	*des émirs et des ingénieurs.*
Qui savaient d'engins plusors	*well-informed about many engines*	*au courant de nombreux engine.'*[26]

This excerpt is sound testimony of the recruitment of Muslim techni-cians by Richard before his arrival in the Holy Land. This short episode is differently described in the various Arabic chronicles. Ibn Shaddâd, for example, didn't know exactly where and when these renegades were recruited into the army. He merely asserted that the king succeeded in corrupting miners and sappers from Aleppo and Khurâsân.[27] The chronicler Kamal al-Dîn gives a different version of the naval combat. He emphasises the courage of the Muslim soldiers and offers a different ending. For him, the shipwreck of the Muslim boat was not brought about by the king's assault but resulted from the valour of one man, chief of the engineers' company, who dared to sink his own team to avoid their capture by Richard. To the partisan Kamâl-al-Dîn, a native of Aleppo, this story of Muslim specialists kept by Richard represented and affront to the chronicler's pride.[28] From the descriptions of siege operations during the Third Crusade, it is reasonable to assume that these Muslim technicians were effectively working for the Plantagenêt king. This is very clear during the siege of the Darum described by Ambroise and Ibn Shaddâd. The fortress of Darum controlled the access to Sinaï and was a nodal point between Egypt and the Kingdom

of Jerusalem.[29] Ambroise and Ibn Shaddâd both assert that the fortress was strongly defended and mention those 'Turkish and Persian' technicians who assisted Richard during the siege. As usual in this period, the technique of mining and digging large trenches to sap the foundations of the walls was combined with massive use of artillery. The chronicle of Ibn Nazîf al Hamawî, the 'Tarîh al-Mansûr', not widely known but rich in details, relates how an engineer from Aleppo, in the service of Richard, built a great mangonel and knocked down with great accuracy the main tower of the fortress.[30] He added that the Khurasânîs miners were quite effective in the building of large galleries. These ethnic minorities from Khurâsân and Northen Syria were to prove their superiority during the siege campaigns. Their civil experience of digging mines, cutting stone, their knowledge of earthworks and lifting machinery was transferred to military purpose and their efficiency was known in all the Bilâd al-Shâm.

II—From Cultural and Technical Background to the Emergence of Notoriety

Secondly, I would like to discuss the attraction of these foreign auxiliaries in the crusading context. I will focus on the status of these technicians in order to analyse the nature of the relations between military leaders and mercenary companies. The reasons for Armenian technical superiority are multiple. On a theoretical level, Michel Italikos, in his panegyric dedicated to Emperor John Comnenus, considered the science of Armenians and particularly the science of engineers and artificers, equal to that of the Chaldeans, known in the Byzantine tradition for the superior quality of their technical knowledge.[31] Armenian civilisation had enjoyed close relations with the Sassanid and Byzantine cultures and developed an original and remarkable corpus of techniques. The Armenians also bore the influence of famous theorists and practitioners of architecture and engineering. A notable example was the Christian Arab, Qustâ Ibn Luqâ al-Ba'labakkî, a philosopher from Baalbeck, who was invited to the royal court of Ani, capital of Great Armenia, and ended his life there at the beginning of the eleventh century. This figure is well-known for his translation of Philo of Alexandria and for his writings on statics, mechanics and geometry.[32]

Moreover, the presence of al-Jazarî in the entourage of the Ortoqid sultans throws light on the connections between technical treatises and

practical mechanics. This famous author, who wrote the Kitâb al-
Hîyyal—the *Treatise on Mechanical Devices*—also played a practical part in
the construction of the Ortoqid palaces of DiyârBâkr.[33] In addition, Al-
Jazarî also prepared the plans and organised the conception of bronze
carved doors and various automata.[34] Finally, we should remember Alî
Murda al-Tarsûsî, whose *nisâb* suggests that he was a native of Tarsus
(Cilicia).[35] He was the author of a military treatise on arms and siege
engines which was probably copied many times in the reigns of Al-Âdil
and al-Ghâzî (brother and nephew respectively to Salâh al-Dîn).[36] It is
possible that these treatises and translations were not primarily intended
for engineers who may have depended on oral transmission of ideas,
but were contributions to the prestigious technical culture of princes.
However, there was a close connection between the cultural and techni-
cal background and the emergence of distinctive techniques. Otherwise,
the relation between environment, status and technique would be but
poorly understood. The will of the patron, be he king or sultan, also
played also a significant part in this symbiotic process. The status of
these auxiliary troops normally derived from their technical expertise
but the esteem of a prince was equally important.

The Armenian technicians were frequently paid for the services
they offered to the crusaders. Haverdic, for example is considered as a
mercenary who offered his services to the crusaders' army. William of
Tyre noted that a sizeable salary, deducted from the public treasure,
was promised to this Armenian engineer for his siegeworks. Haverdic
was given a fief—possibly a money-fief—in the region of Tyre.[37] This
custom of giving lands, fiefs or other large grants to these skilled
technicians was closely to the desire to have them settled and read-
ily available since engineers in this context, as in others, were often
known for their capacity to change sides in their search for the most
attractive terms of employment. One of the best known examples was
Calamandrinus, a Spanish engineer, literally tied to his post when he
was put in shackles by his own patron, Frederic II of Hohenstaufen
(1212–50). During the siege of Brescia, in 1239, Calamandrinus was
captured by troops from the city whose mayor promptly offered him a
better situation than his previous employer: a house, a life salary and
a beautiful wife.[38] Moreover, the experience acquired in the Holy Land
allowed certain technicians to proclaim their skills when they came back
in Europe. Some Italian examples have already been noted by Aldo
Settia, and the other instances that I have remarked in France, England
and Spain, clearly demonstrate that the 'fortification race' at the end

of the twelfth century generated both European and Mediterranean competition. It cannot be denied that all these belligerent craftsmen and skilled soldiers—military carpenters, engineers, miners or master crossbowmen—were in the heart of this process of competition.

The case of the engineers and miners of Aleppo and Khûrasân in the service of Richard I is also intriguing. Their status is problematic. Were they slaves or mercenaries? According to Ambroise, they were taken prisoner during the shipwreck episode but, according to Ibn Shaddâd, Richard bribed them when they were near Acre, possibly with important grants as indeed he used to do with his own mercenaries, knights and sergeants. In his account, Ibn Nazîf al-Hamawî called the engineers of Aleppo and Khurâsân who received large sums of money from Richard '*these awful renegade technicians*'. Maybe this temporary detention was not incompatible with the payment of important salaries in order to persuade them to besiege their compatriots or co-religionists?[39] The hiring of such mercenary technical experts had already been practised by Roger I (ob. 1101), Roger II (1130–54) and William II of Sicily (1166–89).[40] Nevertheless, it is conceivable that this appeal to non-Christian experts was not only connected with the technical needs of the moment but was also related to a new concept of military organisation. Philip-Augustus, for example was also keen on having miners and technical experts in his entourage. When the king of France organised the siege of Acre in 1191, he was always surrounded by skilled miners. According to Ambroise, they were linked to such an extent to the king that they asked him for a contract of loyalty (O.F. '*liance*').[41] The scope of this expression and the reality of its meaning is quite difficult to analyse but raise the question of non-vassalic oaths sworn to kings and lords in this period. This informal and oral contract possibly included clauses regarding mutual trust and fidelity. In a western context, there are traces of the same phenomenon in the *Philippide* and *Gesta Philippi* of Rigord: concerning Philip-Augustus and his technicians, he noted that these miners were constantly in his retinue: '*Mineatores quos rex semper secum ducebat*'.[42]

These illustrations raise another significant point. A close analysis of army organisation during the Seljuk period demonstrates that Khurâsanî and Aleppan miners were already associated with the sultans' entourage. In fact, the migration of Iranians in political, administrative and military spheres is well attested in the Abbassid period. In the middle of the ninth century, some Khurâsanî constituted the elite corps of the army and Caliphal court. In the Burid period, in the first half of the twelfth

century, the personal guard of the princes was composed of military technicians, slaves and mercenaries, from Khurâsân.[43] Jean-Michel Mouton observed that this elite guard, composed of skilled soldiers and technicians, '*known for their knowledge of mining was always surrounding the prince Shams al-Muluk*'.[44] Zengid and Ayyubids sultans such as Nur al-Dîn and Salah al-Dîn continued this custom. For example, Saladin constituted a personal corps called the '*Salahiya*' which was for the most part composed of miners from Aleppo and Khurasan: '*naqqabat alhalabîyyâ wal khurassanîyâ*'.[45] During the siege of Tiberias, on 2 July 1187, Salâh al-Dîn was obliged to call upon his personal troops. The brief description given by 'Imâd al-Dîn shows that these were composed of elite guards, cunning sappers, and the men of Khurâsân '*who were skilled in throwing larges blocks of stone with their engines*'.[46]

So it would appear that there is a link, between these different customs. We remain unconvinced by a direct influence from one to the other. Richard the Lionheart and Philip Augustus did not need a model to understand that engineers and miners were an essential element in their siege campaigns. Nevertheless, it is significant that the new forms of war in the crusading context created new loyalties and novel types of auxiliaries. The religious or ethnic identity does not seem to have played a significant part. Only renown and technical expertise mattered to kings and princes.

Conclusion

The interdependence between technical expertise, geographical origin and recruitment and the technical fame of certain communities calls into question the conformist vision we have of armies in this period. The Frankish and Muslim armies invariably used the potential of various societies known for their ability in building or siege techniques. Even if all such technicians didn't have the same opportunities and comfortable social position, it is interesting that these fighting craftsmen, underground technicians, were not 'beneath the battle' and only 'low-status' mercenaries. The documents reveal considerable variety in the recruiting of engineers and miners from Armenia, Aleppo and Khurâsân. Such was their proficiency in building siege-machinery and mining walls that they were recruited by western princes.[47] As we demonstrated in the case of Jean l'Ermin ('the Armenian') who seems to have been better at theological debate than artillery, the mention of a foreign technician or mercenary in crusade chronicles can also be a pretext for focussing

on other themes: giving up a new faith or piety, treachery or absolute
fidelity. I would like to conclude with an extract from the *chanson de
geste* of Gerbert de Metz dating from the end of the twelfth century.[48]
This chanson is connected to a wider Carolingian tradition which is
the *Geste des Loherains*. The author describes how Charlemagne besieged
an imaginary castle called *Castel-Fort*. Although the main theme of this
song concerns the quarrels between the Carolingian emperor and his
vassals, the narrative often refers to epic moments derived from the
Reconquista and the Eastern Crusades.

A striking element in this chanson is the '*mise en scène*' performance
of an oriental mercenary, an engineer called Malrin or Maurin in
the service of Charlemagne. The emperor promised beautiful horses,
sumptuous clothes and a thousand of gold marks to his technician if he
succeeded in mining one of the castle's towers. The author attributed
some characteristic features to Malrin. A native of Alexandria, this
engineer was the man of a knight, Constant of Outremer. His valour
and skills, his humility and sense of honour are praised by Gerbert de
Metz who depicted the relationship between the emperor and Malrin as
one of strong and trusting friendship. As if Malrin was his vassal, Char-
lemagne gave him an accolade and an embrace: a '*baiser courtois*'. Who
is the most ridiculous character in this passage: the oriental engineer
with his chivalric presence or the emperor and his cordiality towards
a foreign mercenary? Though transposed to the Carolingian sphere,
this episode nonetheless reflects features representative of the *chanson de
geste* and of mentalities in the age of the Crusades: the appropriation
of the mythic Orient and its fabulous treasures, and above, all the use
of the technical knowledge of 'the Other'. Gerbert de Metz, in his
own satirical way, underlined—as Guiot de Provins did—in the begin-
ning of the thirteenth century, the emergence of new social groups:
those engineers and miners who were so rapidly associated with, and
assimilated by, the power and patronage of kings and princes as to limit
treachery and 'mercenary' behaviour.

NOTES

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[3] Nicolas Prouteau and Philippe Sénac (eds), *Chrétiens et musulmans en Méditerranée médiévale (VIIIᵉ–XIIIᵉ siècles): Contacts et échanges, Actes du Colloque de Beyrouth* (29 avril–2 mai 2002), Civilisation Médiévale n°15 (Poitiers, 2003).

[4] Arnold de Lübeck, *Chronica Slavorum* M.G.H. SS 21. 5: 27, 206.: "*Multa excogitant que nostrates non noverunt nisi forte ab üs didicerint*". The author was in Jerusalem at the end of the twelfth century.

[5] On this topic, see Yvonne Friedmann, *Encounter between enemies. Captivity and Ransom in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Brill, 2002); Hans-Eberhardt Mayer, 'Latins, Muslims and Greeks in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem', *History*, 63 (1978), 175–192; A.J. Kosto, 'Hostages during the Crusades', *Medieval Encounters*, 9 (2004), 3–31.

[6] Nicolas Prouteau, 'L'art de la charpenterie et du génie militaire dans le contexte des Croisades: recrutement et fonctions des techniciens francs', in Nicolas Faucherre, Jean Mesqui, Nicolas Prouteau (eds), *La fortification au temps des Croisades. Actes du Colloque International de Parthenay*, (Rennes, 2004), 279–86. Bernard S.Bachrach, 'Medieval Siege Warfare: A reconnaissance', *The Journal of Military History*, 58 (1994), 119–133.

[7] Jean Richard, 'Les mercenaires francs dans les armées musulmanes au temps des croisades', in *Mélanges de l'Université Saint Joseph, Mémoires en l'honneur de Louis Pouzet (S.J.)*, 58 (Beyrouth, 2005), 227–237.

[8] Alain Demurger, *Chevaliers du Christ, Les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge (XIᵉ–XVIᵉ siècle)*, (Paris, 2002), 144–145.

[9] Simon de Saint-Quentin, *Histoire des Tartares*, ed. J. Richard (Paris, 1965), 64, 65, 72–74, 76, 83–86. At the end of the thirteenth century, some western companies of mercenaries were recruited into the Byzantine Imperial Army (German, English, Catalans, Cretans, Coumans…). On this point, see Nicolas Oïkonomidès, 'A propos des armées des premiers paléologues et des compagnies de soldats', *Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation de Byzance* 8 (1981), 353–371.

[10] Claude Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et de la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris, 1940), 573–574.

[11] Eudes de Deuil, *La Croisade de Louis VII, Roi de France*, ed. Henri Waquet (Paris, 1943), Collection des Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades, n° 3. 79.

[12] William J. Hamblin, *The Fatimid Army during the Early Crusades*, The University of Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1985, 152; Gérard Dédéyan, *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés. Etude sur les pouvoirs arméniens dans le proche-orient méditerranéen (1068–1150)*, 2 vols (Lisbonne, 2003), 2. 459, 881–891.

[13] Marius Canard, 'La campagne arménienne du Sultan Saldjuqide Alp Arslan et la prise d'Ani en 1064', *Revue des Etudes Arméniennes*, 11 (1975–76), 239–259.

[14] Hugh Kennedy, *Les guerres nomades: Mongols, Huns, Vikings Vᵉ–XIIIᵉ s* (Paris, Autrement, 2005).

[15] R.W. Edwards, *The Fortifications of Armenian Cilicia* (Dumbarton Oaks, Princeton, 1986); T.A. Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey: an Architectural and Archaeological Survey*, 4 vols (Pindar Press, 1987).

[16] The same point may be illustrated by the case of John the Monk [*Arm: Hohvannes; Ar: Yuhann al-rahîb*] and his brothers, who built the three main gateways of Cairo in 1089 (Bâb al-Fûtûh, Bâb al-Nâsr and Bâb Zuweila). Although the example was frequently quoted, the fact that these specialists came from Edessa (Sanlı Urfa—Southern Turkey) is generally omitted. Concerning the works of John the Monk in Cairo, see Abu Salih, *The Churches and Monasteries of Egypt and some neighbouring countries*, ed and trans. Basil T.A. Evetts & A.J. Butler, Collection Anecdota Oxoniensia (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1895), 152, n1. fo. 51a. The following references are also helpful: Max Van Berchem, 'Notes d'archéologie arabe', *Journal Asiatique*, 17 (1891) 467; Louis Hautecoeur & Gaston Wiet, *Les Mosquées du Caire*, vol. 1 Texte, Vol. 2 Album (Paris, 1932), 122, 230, 233–239.

[17] Michel Italikos, 'Le Panégyrique de Michel Italikos pour Jean Commène', in H. Bart'ikyan (ed.), *Patma Banasirakan Handes*, 4, 158.

[18] On Altountash, see Gérard Dédéyan, 'Un émir arménien dans le Hawrān entre la principauté turque de Damas et le Royaume latin de Jérusalem', in Michel Balard, Benjamin Kedar and Jonathan Riley-Smith (eds), *Dei Gesta per Francos, études sur les Croisades dédiées à Jean Richard* (Ashgate, 2001), 179–185.

[19] These marks are particularly numerous on the masonry of the south-east tower of the fortress (Aybak tower) built in 1214/1215. Masons marks of this type were also represented at Salt and Salkhad fortresses (Jordany). On this point, see the recent observations of Cyril Yovitchitch, 'La citadelle d'Ajloun', in H.Kennedy (ed.), *Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria. From the coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period* (Brill, 2006), 225–242.

[20] Joinville, *Vie de Saint-Louis*, éd. et trad. J. Monfrin (Paris, 1995), 406–411, 446–450.

[21] Joinville, 406–411, 446–450: '*Jehan li Ermin, qui estoit artillier le roy, ala lors a Damas pour acheter cornes et glus pour faire arbalestres'*.

[22] Michel Balard, *La Romanie Génoise (XIIème-début XVème siècle)* (Rome, 1978), 442–445.

[23] North-East of Iran and in Turkmenistan at present, along the Amou-Darya River.

[24] On this subject, see the notes of M. Reinaud, *Extrait des historiens arabes relatifs aux Croisades* (Paris, 1829), 72; Jean Sauvaget, *Essai sur le développement d'une grande ville syrienne, des origines au milieu du XIXème siècle* (Paris, 1941), 12, 151–152; Anne Marie Eddé, *La Principauté ayyoubide d'Alep (579/1183—658/1260)* (Stuttgart, 1999), 306–307.

[25] *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Orientaux*, 3. 301; Ambroise, *L'Estoire de la guerre sainte,* ed. Gaston Paris (Paris, 1897), 61–66, v. 9195–9243. See also the new edition: *The history of the Holy War. Ambroise's Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*, ed. Marianne Ailes and Malcom Barber, 2 vols, I: Text, II: Translation (Woodbridge, 2003), 1.147–150.

[26] Ambroise 1. 62, v. 2166–2168.

[27] Ambroise, 1. 61, v. 2268–2274.

[28] Bahâ al-Dîn Ibn Shaddâd, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin or al Nawâdir al-Sultâniyya wa'l-Mahâsin al-Yûsufiyya* ed. D.S. Richards (Ashgate, 2001),203, 210; Ambroise, 246–247, v. 9195–9243. 'Imâd al-Dîn al-Isfahânî, *Kitâb Al-Fath al-Qussî fî al-Fath al-Qudsî [Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin]*, ed. Henri Massé (Paris, 1972), 325 remarked that these sappers were from Aleppo and had been assigned originally to observation posts on the wall of Acre (perhaps to prevent countermines).

[29] Kamâl al-Dîn Abu'l-Qâsim 'Umar Ibn Ahmad known as Ibn al-'Adîm (1192–1262), *Zubdat al-h,alab min tar'îh H,alab*, ed. S. Dahân, 3 vols (Damascus, 1951–1968) partly trans. By E.Blochet, 'L'histoire d'Alep de Kamal-al-Dîn', *Revue de L'Orient Latin* 3 (1895), 509–565.

[30] 'Darum':` south' in Hebrew.

[31] Ibn Nazîf al-Hamawî, *Ta'rîh al-Mansûrî*, facsimile P. Gryaznevich (Moscou, 1960), 97 V°.

[32] Michel Italikos, 'Le Panégyrique de Michel Italikos', 224.

[33] F. Gabrieli, 'Nota bibliographica su Qust,â', *Rendiconti dell'Accademia dei* Lincei, 21 (1912) 341–382; 'Les œuvres de Héron et leur contexte historique. Les Mécaniques ou l'élévation des corps lourds', ed. Donald Routledge Hill, Fr. trans by B. Carra de Vaux, introduction by D.R. Hill, notes by A.G. Drachmann (Paris, 1988).

[34] Al-Jazarî (Ismâ'îl Ibn ar-Razzâz), *Kitâb fi ma'rifat al-hiyal al-handasiyya*, ed. and trans. Donald Routledge Hill, *The Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices* (Boston, 1974).

[35] Donald Routledge Hill, *Studies in Medieval Islamic Technology, From Philo to al-Jazarī—From Alexandria to Diyār Bakr*, ed. David A. King (Ashgate, 1998); Michael Meinecke, *Patterns of Stylistic changes in Islamic Architecture, local traditions versus migrating artists* (New York, 1996) 63,136, pl. 18a, 18b; 139, pl. 21a, 21b.

[36] By the end of the Islamic period, Tarsus was already known as a place well-defended by various defensive schemes. The manuscript of another al-Tarsûsî, Abû 'Amr 'Uthmân, provides valuable testimony: '*Tarsus was contained within two walls, each wall having five gates of iron. Those of the outer wall were covered with iron plating (hadîd mulabbas), whilst those of the inner wall adjoining the trench and rampart (khandaq) were of solid iron (hadîd musmat). The first wall, adjacent to the inner city (madîna), was lofty and had upon it 18000 vantage points (shurrâfa) on which could be stationed, in time of military necessity, soldiers armed with a total of 16000 bows and who could fire their arrows as one man. Also on this wall were towers (a hundred in total). Three of these were for h.r.rî mangonels (manjânîq) twenty for large mangonels and twenty for ballistas ('arrâdât). The rest of them were for crossbows (qisiyy al-rijl).*' C.E. Bosworth, 'Abû 'Amr 'Uthmân Al-Tarsûsî's *Siyar al-Thugûr* and the Last Years of Arab Rule in Tarsus (Fourth/Tenth Century)', *Graeco-Arabica* 5 (1993), 183–195. On *h.r.rî mangonels*, see Paul E. Chevedden, 'The Hybrid Trebuchet: The Halfway Step to the Counterweight Trebuchet ' in Donald. J. Kagay & T.M. Vann (eds), *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions, Essays in honour of Joseph F. O'Callaghan*, (Brill, 1998), 179–222.

[37] Claude Cahen, 'Un traité d'armurerie composé pour Saladin', *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales*, 12 (1947), 103–163. See also the critics and new translations in Paul E. Chevedden, 'The invention of the counterweight Trebuchet, a study in cultural diffusion', *Dumbarton Oak Papers*, 54 (2000), 71–116.

[38] On this point, see the paper of Prof. Alan Murray in this volume.

[39] Aldo A. Settia, 'L'ingegneria militare', in Pierre Toubert et Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (eds), *Federico II e le scienze* (Palermo, 1994), 273: *L'avventura arrivo di Calamandrino a Brescia a sua volta si collega al diffuso luogo comune dello straniero dotato di abilità eccezionali che sopravviene al momento opportuno per determinare con la sua opera la conquista di una città imprendibile o la vittoriosa difesa di una fortezza in grave pericolo'*. See also Randall Rogers, *Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford, 1992).

[40] See also Jean Richard, 'Les turcoples au service des royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre: musulmans convertis ou chrétiens orientaux ?', *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 54 (1986), 259–270.

[41] In 1133, the Muslim engineers and miners of Roger II of Sicily played a significant role during the siege of Montepeloso, see Francesco Gabrieli (ed.), *Histoire et Civilisation de l'Islam en Europe, Arabes et Turcs en Occident du VIIᵉ au Xˣᵉ siècle* (Paris, 1983), 99–100.

[42] Ambroise, *L'Estoire…*, 1897, 127, v. 4755—4758.

[43] Rigord, *Gesta Philippi…*, 1882, t. I, p. 95. Rigord wrote his chronicle around 1205, more than ten years after the Third Crusade.

[44] Claude Cahen, 'L'émigration persane des origines de l'Islam aux Mongols', in *La Persia nel medioevo* (Rome, 1971), 181–194.

[45] Jean-Michel Mouton, *Damas et sa principauté sous les Saldjoukides et les Bourides, 468–549/ 1076–1154* (Paris, 1994), 159.

[46] Quoted in Hamilton A.R. Gibb, 'The Armies of Saladin' in his *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Boston, 1962), 74–90, 85, n. 6.

[47] 'Imâd al-Dîn al-Isfahânî, *Kitâb Al-Fath*, 22, 24.

[48] For further development of this point, see the forthcoming publication of my Ph.D. thesis: *Bâtisseurs, ingénieurs et fortifications, contribution à l'étude des échanges techniques entre Orient et Occident* (Brepols, 2008).

[49] Gerbert de Metz, *Chanson de geste du XIIᵉᵐᵉ siècle*, ed. P. Taylor (Namur, 1952), 72.

A meeting between Malrin, 'oriental engineer' and Charlemagne during the siege of the imaginary castle of Castel-Fort.

Charlemagne le jure par Saint-Paul et Saint-Martin	Charlemagne swore by Saint Paul and Saint Martin
Qu'il n'aura de repos avant le jour de sa fin	That he would not rest until the day of his redemption.
Il fit faire des trébuchets, mangonneaux et engins	He ordered trebuchets, mangonels and engines to be made;
Puis il manda Malrin l'ingénieur	Then he summoned Malrin the engineer
Celui-ci était compagnon de Constant d'Outremer	Who was fellow of Constant of Outremer.
Il n'était pas plus sot en futs qu'un clerc en latin	His mastery in carpentry was equal to a clerk's in Latinity.
A Alexandrie, Les Sarrasins l'appréciaient beaucoup.	In Alexandria, he was lauded by the Saracens.
Sous les cieux, il n'est de château si garni	No castle on earth was a refuge—
De vallée, de motte, de palissade qui no soit refuge	Be it furnished with motte, ditch and palisade—
s'il peut y demeurer une quinzaine,	If he was there a fortnight ;
avant qu'il ne les ait brulés, abbatus ou pris.	He would have burnt, levelled or taken them all.
Le Roi fut très content quand il le vit;	The King was so happy when he arrived
Il fut conclu de lui donner mille marcs d'or fin.	That he offered him one thousand marks of fine gold,
Et trente draps et vingt destriers de prix	Thirty cloths of wool and twenty costly chargerse,
Et sept manteaux et dix pelissons gris.	Seven mantels and ten grey coats,
S'il obtenait la reddition de ce château de marbre.	If he could obtain the surrender of this marble castle.
L'ingénieur lui répondit alors:	The engineer answered to him:
' *Je n'en aurai pas un sou vaillant*	'I won't take any of that money
Tant que la tour de marbre	*Until* this marble tower,
qui est plus blanche qu'une hermine	Which is as whiter than ermine,
verra ses bases de pierres choir,	will see its stone foundations fall
et vous pourrez voir ceux de là haut en sortir rapidement;	And you can see those at the top fall out apace.
Ogier en tombera devant vous à merci	Ogier will fall in front of you begging for your mercy
Et tous les autres jouvenceaux et jeunes hommes'	And all the other striplings and young men"
Charlemagne l'écoute et fit un sourire,	Charlemagne listened to him and smiled;
Il prit l'ingénieur entre ses bras,	He took the engineer in his arms,
Il le baisa sur la bouche et le visage et lui dit,	Kissed him on the face and mouth and said:
Or en pensées, jeune damoiseau,	'You have golden thoughts, young squire;
Je vous donnerai tant que nous resterons amis.	So much will I give you that we will stay friends'.

SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE IN THE FLEETS OF CHARLES I OF ANJOU, KING OF SICILY, CA 1265–85

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Count Charles of Anjou, the youngest brother of Louis IX of France, conquered the Kingdom of Sicily in two closely fought battles in 1266 and 1268. On 26 February 1266 he defeated and killed Manfred of Hohenstaufen, the illegitimate son of Frederick II, at the battle of Benevento and on 23 August 1268 he defeated and captured Conradin, the son of Frederick's son Conrad IV, at the battle of Tagliacozzo. Conradin was executed, in an act that was greeted with widespread dismay and disapproval. Manfred's captured widow died in prison in 1271. His daughter was released in 1284 but his sons remained in prison until their deaths. One was still alive in 1309.

In the wake of Benevento and Tagliacozzo, Charles established a French regime in the Kingdom of Sicily, the *Regno*, and many thousands of French, Provençal, and other lords, knights, and other soldiers of fortune found their way to the South. Durrieu's list of those 'French' who acquired lands of some kind runs to some 700 names, but there were many others who did not acquire lands but who sometimes rose to high office in any case.[1] The few names mentioned here who found service with the fleets in one way or another were only a tiny percentage of all those who found service of other kinds. Moreover, as with other Mediterranean powers, terrestrial and maritime commands were frequently one and the same thing. Many who took service with the king as *stipendiarii* in the first instance acquired lands and became *feudatarii* later. The distinction between 'mercenaries' and 'non-mercenaries' in Angevin forces was frequently imprecise. The more so because even *feudatarii* might be paid and certainly *Regnicoli* called to the fleets and armies as oarsmen and infantry were paid. In February 1279 the annual pay of provincial Justiciars, even if *feudatarii*, was 50 ounces of tarins per year, just over 4 tarins a day.[2] Here those *Regnicoli* who held maritime commands, such as Matteo de Ruggiero di Salerno, who was Vice-Admiral of the Principato and Terra di Lavoro from 1278, and Filippo di Santacroce, who was variously *Prothontinus*, port master,

of Barletta and Monopoli, and who exercised several commands at sea, have not been included; although, from a methodological point of view the grounds for not doing so might be argued. In some cases they may have been no less 'soldiers of fortune' than the French and Provençals.

The enormous archive of the Angevin chancery was destroyed by the Germans outside Naples in September 1943; however, it is an ill wind that blows no one any good for the reconstruction and publication of the archives by Riccardo Filangieri and subsequent archivists in Naples has made a wealth of material readily available that would otherwise have been accessible only in the archives. It is a wonderful gift. That being said, a word of warning. A recent request to acquire photocopies of the transcripts from which a particular document was published was met with an indignant assertion by the current archivist that the document had been published 'esattamente' as transcribed. However, it is not true that the published registers are indeed exact transcriptions. There are a great many errors in the published documents; phrases and sentences have been omitted and whole documents have been overlooked. Especially for the period 1283–5, many documents recorded by Minieri Riccio and others have not found their way into the reconstructed registers. The indices are also very unreliable. The task of reconstruction was so massive and the pressure to get the volumes out so intense that the documents as published in the reconstructed registers cannot be trusted. Particularly for any technical matters, it is really necessary to go back to the publications from which they were transcribed, if it was from a publication. Older authorities such as Paul Durrieu and Alain de Boüard can also not be relied upon. In his list of French personnages mentioned in the Angevin registers as having been in the *Regno* during the reign of Charles I Durrieu made a great many mistakes. He quite often gave dates of death or other events which are incorrect. It is unclear how long De Bouard spent in the archives in Naples and by his own admission what he published was incomplete.[3]

From the point of view of the fleets, Charles's reign falls into six phases. First, there were the early years which were spent in the acquisition of Corfu and preparation for an expedition against the Byzantine Empire projected for the summer of 1270, but which had to be shelved because of the Tunis Crusade of Louis IX. This was followed by a period in the 1270s in which Charles attempted to consolidate his hold on Albania. At one point his forces even reached as far inland as to

besiege Belgrade. Thirdly, the successful resistance of Michael VIII Pal-aeologos (1261–82) to Charles's ambitions in the Balkans provoked the preparation of a second Byzantine expedition in 1281. Due to depart in April 1282, it had to be diverted to Sicily because of the uprising of the Sicilian Vespers which broke out on Easter Monday, 31 March 1282. Following that, preparations for an invasion of Sicily occupied the rest of 1282 and the first half of 1283 but this came to nothing because of Roger of Lauria's crushing victory over the Angevin fleet at Malta on 8 July. Fifthly, while Charles was absent in Provence his son, Charles of Salerno, continued preparations for a Sicilian expedition but this all again came to nothing because of his defeat and capture by Roger of Lauria at the battle of the Gulf of Naples on 5 June 1284. Finally, Charles continued to make preparations for yet another Sicil-ian expedition but his death on 7 January 1285 and Roger of Lauria's crushing victory over the French fleet at Las Hormigas on 4 September marked the end of the last phase.[4]

Three kinds of soldiers of fortune are found in relation to the fleets. First, there were those who became fleet commanders, office holders in the *Regno*, and often *feudatarii* to whom fiefs were granted. These are names which can be tracked through the successive registers and whose rise to the top can frequently be traced. Secondly, there were those who appeared occasionally as commanders of individual galleys offering their services on isolated occasions. Sometimes these men have names, sometimes they do not. And, thirdly, there were the large num-bers of nameless crews of galleys which were brought into the fleets, especially after the Vespers.

The twelfth-century Norman obligation imposed on coastal districts to provide oarsmen and sailors for the fleet had long been commuted into a money payment, the *marineria*,[5] although levies of manpower could still be imposed *in extremis*. On 22 April 1283, Prince Charles of Salerno ordered the Justiciars of the Abruzzi, the Capitanata, Bari, and Otranto to enrol all those within 10 miles of the sea who were suitable and robust enough for combat. Those not suitable to be oars-men or marines were to be enrolled as crossbowmen.[6] But even these crews would have had to have been paid. Over the years the rates for galley oarsmen rose from 6 tarins per month in 1269 to 10 in 1283–4, reflecting the increasing difficulty of obtaining them and the extreme unpopularity of service in the fleets. Marines or *supersalientes* were paid 13.5 tarins per month in 1273 but this had risen to 15 by 1284. The four helmsmen for each galley were apparently paid 20 tarins each in

1273, but there is probably a transcription error in the particular document in question, 13.5 tarins in 1276, and 17.5 tarins by 1284. The rates for the two commanders, *comiti*, of each galley remained stable at 27 tarins per month throughout the reign. The majority of galley crews were raised in the *Regno*; however, in moments of crisis recourse was had to foreigners as well.

The most apparent of the 'mercenaries' are those who made careers for themselves. Two early sailors of fortune were Guillaume Olivier and Jacques Caysio, admirals of Nice, to whom the Seneschal of Provence was ordered on 17 October 1266 to pay from the *gabelle* of Nice £130 Provençal for services rendered in the conquest of the *Regno*. Caysio then disappeared from the record but Guillaume Olivier later received on 21 Sept 1268 another payment for services unspecified. He was still Admiral of Nice in September 1268 when his *gagii* and those of his associates were to paid by the Lieutenant of Provence. *Gagii* had the specific sense of wages paid to mercenaries. In February 1269 he was newly knighted and received another unspecified payment. He was still Admiral of Nice in April 1271, received lands in Sicily, and in 1273 was attacking shipping moving along the Ligurian coast to Genoa, with whom Charles was at war. On 22 June 1274 he was ordered to arm his galleys in Nice, Hyères, Toulon, Antibes, and Cannes and to rendezvous at the port of Ollioules. In October the Seneschal of Provence was ordered to pay whatever was owing to him for the arming of two galleys which he brought to Provence in June and September. He was among a number of Provençal officials ordered in October 1274 to find families in Provence to emigrate to populate Lucera, whose Saracen population had been dispersed after Charles had finally starved them into submission in August 1269. In August 1278, he and his son Pierre returned to Nice with the king's permission. Pierre himself had also been engaged in Angevin service and with his galley had captured some Genoese after peace had been concluded between Charles and the Genoese. The prisoners were released but Pierre was compensated by the king to the tune of £100 Tours. Guillaume was dead by 1280 and another son Jacques became a *feudatarius*.[7]

Hugues de Conques, who was also among the earliest to throw in his lot with Charles, came from an old family from the Rouergue who had settled in Marseilles.[8] In 1265 he loaned £263 Tours to the Treasurer of Marseilles to arm galleys which carried Charles's wife, Beatrice of Provence, to Rome. On 5 March 1267 an order was made to pay him a down payment of 600 ounces and a subsequent one of 300 for the

arming of horse transports, *teride*, and by 23 September 1268 he was a *valectus*, valet, of the Crown, being paid by the Treasurer of Marseilles £15–16–4 Tours as his *stipendium*. By 5 July 1269 he was a *dilectus familiaris* and was rewarded with some properties of the Hohenstaufen supporters John of Procida and Riccardo Marcafava. *Familiaris* was a dignity at the Sicilian court rather than an office. During 1269–70 he was a *Prepositus cabellarum [sic! recte galearum] nostrarum* and by August 1269 was in command of 8 galleys sent to put down a rebellion at Augusta and was named 'captain of the galleys'. His squadron seems to have been despatched afterwards by the Admiral, Guillaume Estandard, to Western Sicily as a guard for the Val di Mazara.[9] By March 1270 he was captain of a fleet of 10 galleys and *teride* with their boats sent to Zara to reinforce the Prince of Achaia in *Sclavonia*. By 2 July he was back in Naples in command, together with two other men whose names would also become familiar, Guillaume Cornut and Philippe de Marseille, of one of three galleys taking Charles to Sicily.[10] He was called a *miles* for the first time in November 1270 and returned to Marseilles with the king's blessing in January 1271, but reappeared in February 1273 to July 1274 as *Prepositus maritime* of the Principato and Terra di Lavoro. He was accused between October 1275 and February 1276 of living dissolutely, and his men of bearing prohibited arms, but he was still present in the *Regno* in May 1278, when he married, and later in August, when he still had a command of some sort and was listed among a group of *feudatarii* who were also paid *gagii* of 2 ounces a month. He seems to have done very nicely out of his years of service to Charles although he never obtained fleet command. His property reverted to the crown on 25 February 1279 after his death.[11]

Someone who did obtain fleet command was Gazo Echinard, a nephew of Philippe Echinard, a Cypriot Frank and Admiral under Manfred, who had made him governor of Corfu. After Manfred's death Philippe continued to hold the island; however, he was assassinated by order of the Despot of Epiros, Michael II, and Charles then intervened, at first appointing Gazo to the command but then replacing him with a Provençal knight named Garnier Aleman who had earlier been given a fief on the island by Philippe Echinard.[12] By March 1269 Gazo Echinard was a *dilectus familiaris* paid 50 ounces of gold as his wages and was in command of a galley at Bari destined for service in *Romania*. By late 1269 he was lord of Terlizzi and by 1270 he was being used for missions in *Romania* and on Corfu. On 25 February 1272 he was appointed Vicar General of the Angevin forces in Albania with full

powers. He was replaced on 12 May 1273 by Anselin de Chaus but was given another command. By July 1274 he was in joint command of another fleet at Ischia.[13] His career was by no means over, and in July 1278 he was one of many *feudatarii* ordered to provide ships for the projected expedition against Constantinople, in his case 2 *teride*. In October 1279 he was castellan of the castle of Bari and by October 1282 was Captain of all the galleys, *teride*, and ships' boats of Apulia and the Abruzzi. On 16 November 1282 he received orders to arm and provision all his galleys for the expedition against Sicily planned for the following March and in the following February the *Secretus* and *Portulanus* of Apulia was ordered to provide him with all the arms needed for his ships. By April things were becoming desperate. On 22 April, it was at Gazo Echinard's request that Charles of Salerno ordered the Justiciars of the Abruzzi, the Capitanata, Bari, and Otranto to enrol all those within 10 miles of the sea who were suitable and robust for combat. On 11 April he, Hugues de Brienne, and Narjaud de Toucy, were ordered to rendezvous at Reggio with their forces and on 29 April an order was issued to pay him 6,000 ounces for the pay of the crews of Apulia and the Abruzzi who were to embark on 50 galleys and 50 *teride*.[14] However, on 12 July Gazo was replaced in command of the fleet of Apulia and the Abruzzi by Hugues de Brienne and Lecce, no doubt as a result of the failure of the assault on Sicily. Next year he was again Captain of the vessels of Apulia, and was again summoned with his ships to Sicily. He had been removed by 5 August 1283 on account of old age, and then served on land securing the loyalty of populations in the Terre of Bari and Otranto,[15] after which he disappeared from the registers, no doubt into an honourable retirement. As those of soldiers of fortune in Charles's service went, his was a remarkably long career.

Hugues de Brienne himself was descended from the famous Champenois family which had provided so many adventurers in the South and the East. His grandfather, Gautier, had been invested with the County of Lecce near Brindisi by Innocent III. He had fought with Charles at Benevento and Tagliacozzo and was rewarded with restoration to him of the county, which had been lost to the family under the Hohenstaufens. However, that did not happen until early in 1271 when he first appeared as Count of Brienne and Lecce. In the intervening years he was apparently not in the *Regno*. Then for some years he appears to have remained quiet as a *feudatarius*. In October 1274, and again in 1276, he was sent to Achaia and in December 1275 was part of a mission to Rome. He did not appear with an active command

until April 1280, when sent on a mission to Achaia. Then in July 1283 he replaced Gazo Echinard as Captain of vessels in Apulia and the Abruzzi. On 5 August he was made Captain of all of the fleet for the Sicilian expedition.[16]

Another 'old salt' was Guillaume Cornut, also from an old Marseillese family, members of which are known as far back as 1220.[17] According to the chroniclers, Cornut was killed by Roger of Lauria in single combat on the deck of the Aragonese admiral's galley at the battle of Malta on 8 July 1283; however, there is no corroborating evidence for this in the registers.[18] By December 1266 he was already in Charles's service at the Papal court in Rome, but at that time was still only a *civis* of Marseilles. By 1269 he was *Prepositus* of a squadron of 10 galleys and in July 1270 was in command of one of the three galleys taking Charles to Sicily. In October 1270, at the siege of Tunis, Charles wrote to the Seneschal of Provence ordering him to repay to Cornut £2,000 Tours which he had lent the king and by then he was a Vice-Admiral in Sicily. In March 1274 he was *Prepositus* of a squadron of 3 galleys and 2 *galleones* in custody of the coast from Syracuse to Malta, and in the summer of that same year was, with Guillaume de St Honoré, ordered to patrol between Sicily and Malta to attack Genoese ships. In November 1275 he may have been ordered to prepare two galleys and a *galleon* to take the king's envoys to Tunis to receive the annual tribute. By 1279 he was lord of the Castle of Surtini in Sicily.[19] When Bartholomew Bonvin brought a Marseillese fleet of 18 galleys, 9 barques, and a *panfilus* to Naples on 21 March 1283, Cornut may have been appointed to a joint command with him. However, there is no mention of this appointment in the registers. If Cornut was in fact in joint command of the Angevin fleet at Malta, how he came to be so is unknown.

Bonvin himself was also a sailor of fortune. He was a late-comer who first appeared in November 1282 when made Admiral of 20 Provençal galleys by the Seneschal of Provence at Charles's order. He escaped the massacre in Malta harbour and went on to have a long career under Charles II.[20] Associated with Cornut for a time in the mid 70s was Guillaume de St Honoré, said to have been a Provençal. Belinguer de St Honoré, who was appointed to the command of a royal ship in July 1274, may have been a relative. Guillaume first appeared in March 1272, appointed to the repair of vessels of the crown in Apulia together with some associates, then as Admiral of a fleet of 28 galleys and *teride* in April 1273, and then again on 23 January 1274

when ordered to repair certain vessels. In March of the same year he and Cornut were ordered to the coastguard of Sicily and to patrol the Sicilian Channel against Genoese corsairs. He appeared in an *apodixarius*, an accounting, of Robert l'Enfant for his Justiciarship of Sicily *Ultra flumen Salsum* as *prepositus* of 3 galleys and 2 *galleones* deputed to the coastguard between Palermo and Pantelleria in July to September 1274. In July of the same year he and Cornut were placed under the orders of Philippe de Toucy in a fleet to rendezvous at Ischia to take the offensive against the Genoese.[21] Associated with them both under de Toucy were Hugues de Conques and the Genoese Guelf, Franciscino Grimaldi. The Genoese prepared a fleet under Oberto Doria against them and, predictably, the Angevin fleet accomplished nothing against it and returned to the *Regno*. Charles then resorted to using Marseillese corsairs against the Genoese. On 4 October 1274 he issued a letter of marque to Pierre Aycard of Marseilles, who was already known to the court, and another general one to all Provençals permitting them to sail against the Genoese and other enemies of the crown. In fact he had already begun to do so as early as 7 March 1273.[22]

The actual Admiralcy of the *Regno* was first held by Guillaume de Beaumont, a member of the family of Beaumont-sur-Sarthe, Maine, many of whom came to the South with Charles. He was made Count of Caserta on 19 December 1268, a county seized from a former Hohenstaufen supporter. The king wrote to him on 26 March 1269 outlining the rights and prerogatives of the Admiralcy. He was also made Vicar General in Sicily until replaced by Guillaume de Muideblé, but was dead by 14 July 1269 and his county reverted to the crown. While Vicar General in Sicily he plundered the royal palace in Palermo of war machines, equipment, and provisions for the siege of Sciacca. He also founded the Church of the Blessed Mary *de Apuleyo* in his native Maine, no doubt with the profits from his career in the South.[23]

Beaumont may have been succeeded briefly by a Norman, Guillaume Estandard de Beynes, who first appeared in May 1266 as Seneschal of Provence, Forcalquier, and Lombardy, and who quickly became a *feudatarius* and then Marshal of the *Regno* by July 1269. By 21 August 1269 he was Vicar General in Sicily and by 29 March 1270 was also addressed as Vice-Admiral.[24] He died in 1271 and his lands were inherited by his son, Guillaume junior. In his hands, the Vice-Admiralcy in Sicily appears to have been purely an administrative one, that of a port admiral rather than that of a seaman. This would be the case for some other similar non-seamen knights who became Vice-Admirals. He

was once addressed as Admiral rather than Vice-Admiral but this was probably a case of loose terminology and the actual office of Admiral appears to have remained vacant after the death of Guillaume de Beaumont until the appointment of Philippe de Toucy.

The latter came from the famous Orleanais family of Toucy. His father had taken service under Peter of Courtenay, the Latin emperor of Constantinople, and had become regent. Philippe was regent for Baldwin II and after the fall of Constantinople to the Nicaeans apparently moved to Naples. He first appeared as admiral in June 1271 and became the possessor of various properties and lord of the town of Nardo. In September 1271 he was preparing to sail to Tunis on the court's business and then in October was sent to Achaia with 900 horses. Early in 1272 he was first addressed as a *consanguineus* of the king.[25] By 14 February 1272 his son, Narjaud, was already his lieutenant as Vice-Admiral; however, Philippe was still Admiral in July 1274. In 1272 he had been ordered to provide two galleys to go Zara to bring back to Apulia two ecclesiastics coming to the court. After his return, he was ordered to use the same galleys and another, to be armed at Messina, to convey Thomas of Lentino, the Patriarch elect of Jerusalem, from Messina to Acre. He himself was to arm the galley called *Verde* in Brindisi to embark Adam Morier, the Vicar General in Sicily, to sail for Tunis to collect the annual tribute. On 9 May 1272 he and Narjaud were ordered to assemble 12 galleys at Brindisi, including the 'green galley of Messina', probably the *Verde* again, for some unspecified purpose.[26] In 1273 he was in command of a fleet sent to *Romania*. On 27 February 1274 orders were issued to the *Secreti*, officials in charge of indirect taxation, to prepare and arm a fleet to sail under his command against the Genoese in July. He was given supreme command of all the galleys, *galleones, teride, vascelli*, and other ships of the *Regno*. The fleet rendezvoused at Ischia but achieved nothing. He was still Admiral in November 1276 but died on 12 January 1277. He had married Porzia de Roy, who brought as her dowry the castle of Roy in Burgundy. Of their two sons, Otto, who was Master Justiciar of the *Regno*, inherited the castle after his mother's death and Narjaud went on to further his naval career under Charles.[27]

His brother Anselin also made a career in the *Regno*, including naval commands. He was a *feudatarius* as early as 28 January 1269 and by 7 February 1270 the *Prothontinus* of Bari and Monopoli was under orders to obey him in all things concerning the repair and munitioning of royal ships in Apulia. Although his status was not specified at the time

it eventuated that he was to be put in command of a squadron of 25 ships and a *barchetta* sent to Achaia in 1272 to receive the homage of the Villehardouin and to help defend the Principality. Even though he was a *feudatarius*, late in 1271 he was paid 400 ounces as his *gagii*. The expedition to Achaia did not eventuate until 1273, but Anselin was still alive and a counsellor of the king on 6 October 1277.[28]

Can Narjaud de Toucy be counted as a 'mercenary' or a 'paid man'? By April 1272 he was already a knight and lieutenant of his father. By April 1274 he was already a *consanguineus* of the king and Vicar and Captain of all forces in Albania on a *stipendium* of 4 ounces of gold per month. He made a treaty with the Albanians which Charles ratified on 1 December 1274, but was removed and replaced by Guillaume Bernard late in September 1275.[29] He was given lands in the Terra d'Otranto, became a royal counsellor, and was one of the *feudatarii* ordered to supply ships for the Byzantine expedition in June 1277, in his case 2 *teride*. In November 1278 permission was given to him to marry Lucia, the sister of the Count of Tripoli and Prince of Antioch, and he seems then to have become absent from the *Regno*. On 30 October 1282 he was made Bailiff and Vicar of the Principality of Achaea, which Charles had inherited in 1278. The order appointing him Vicar in Achaia was cancelled 4 days later on 3 November when he was ordered to defend all ships in Brindisi against the enemy in those waters. By April 1283 he was back in Apulia and was one of three Captains of the royal ships in Apulia together with Hugues de Brienne and Gazo Echinard. They were ordered to arm their ships and to rendezvous at Reggio by 20 May for the expedition against Sicily which never eventuated because of Roger of Lauria's victory at Malta.[30] Narjaud lived on until 1293.

Guy d'Alemagne, who appeared for the first time as a knight, Vice-Admiral, and lord of Castelnuovo in the Principato in 1271, may possibly have been from the Provençal family of Aleman from Allemagne near Riez, of which two brothers, Garnier and Thomas, had earlier settled in Patras in Achaia and had then acquired lands on Corfu from Philippe Echinard. Garnier was made Captain and Vicar General of Corfu when Charles acquired the island.[31] Guy married the daughter of Guillaume Boys, acquired many lands, and became a *feudatarius*. By September 1275 he was Vicar of the Principato and *Stratigotus*, governor, of Salerno. He became Justiciar of the Capitanata and Honour of Monte St Angelo and Captain of Lucera sometime prior to 9 January 1278 but was relieved of his command on 13/22 November, becoming Justiciar of the Basilicata by August 1279. He was also among the

feudatarii of the Principato ordered to provide ships for the Byzantine expedition, in his case 1 *terida* and its boat.[32] Although he was named as Vice-Admiral shortly after August 1274, he did not in fact appear in a naval function until December 1280, when he was made Vice-Admiral of Sicily and Calabria to Otranto. After the Vespers he was made Justiciar of Calabria on 10 October 1282, later Captain of La Rocella castle and Gerace, and then castellan of Terranova. However, he must have retained his Vice-Admiralcy because he was one of those removed from the office when Jacques de Burson was made Vice-Admiral on 26 November 1283.[33] Although he was a soldier of fortune, Guy appears not to have been a sailor of any kind and his service with the fleets was brief and most probably administrative rather than active.

Adam Morier, a knight, was a soldier of fortune, although not strictly a 'mercenary' since there is no mention in the registers of him ever having been a *stipendiarius*. He may have come originally from Moriez in Provence. By January 1269 he already held lands in the Terra Bari and by January 1271 he was Marshal of the *Regno* and Vicar General in Sicily, with the powers of Admiral, a post that he held until May 1277; however, there is no evidence that he ever went to sea in a naval capacity. In September 1272 he was one of three ambassadors sent to Tunis to extract the annual tribute. In 1277–9 he was yet another of the *feudatarii* ordered to provide ships for the Byzantine expedition, in his case two *teride*. He was replaced in Sicily by Herbert d'Orleans on 10 April 1280 and was dead by 13 November of the same year.[34]

Someone similar was Simon de Beauvoir, one of a number of members of the same family, probably from Beauvau/Beauval, Maine et Loire, who followed Charles to the South. He married Isolda, the daughter of Enrico, Castellan of Nocera, and inherited and acquired much land in the Terra Bari from 1269. By September 1273 at the latest he was Justiciar of the Terra Bari, a post from which he was removed on 8 March 1278.[35] By 6 April he had replaced Angelo Faraoni as *prepositus* of the vessels and arsenals in Apulia and by 13 March 1278 he was Vice-Admiral from the Tronto to Cotrone, and was then made Justiciar of the Terra d'Otranto as well. He was one of those *feudatarii* ordered in June 1277 to provide ships for the Byzantine expedition, in his case one, and later two, *teride*. Like Adam Morier, he appears not actually to have gone to sea. His functions were those of a port admiral, frequently in support of forces being despatched across the Adriatic. It seems that these support functions were sometimes entrusted to *feudatarii* rather than to *stipendiarii*. He must have been good at his job since he

was not removed as Justiciar until March 1278 and as Vice-Admiral until replaced by Girard de Marseille on 2 January 1281. However, he was written to on 10 May 1280 and chastised for the fact that the forces which should have left for *Romania* on the Wednesday before Palm Sunday were still in Brindisi and that it was his fault because he did not make the ships ready.[36] He was ordered to make good all losses from his own pocket: 17 ounces, 15 tarins, 7 grains per day for the pay of 10 knights, 200 *scudieri*, 20 mounted crossbowmen, 20 foot crossbowmen, 100 lancers, and water and biscuit at 7.5 tarins per *cantaro*; however, he explained the reasons and was excused. He was made Master of Horse and the Royal Stables on 6 July 1281,[37] no doubt as a reward for long and faithful service.

A certain Girard de Marseille was recorded in February 1267 as having been castellan of Trani and as having gone the way of all flesh.[38] By 1270 his son, also Girard, was custodian of the castle of Neocastro and in 1272 was appointed castellan of the castle of Corfu, replacing Garnier Aleman. He appeared as a knight and *socius* appointed to repair and arm vessels in Sicily and Calabria in March 1273 and in the spring of 1273 was one of three men appointed to repair the royal ships in Sicily.[39] Later he became castellan of the castle at Trani and by June 1279 he was a knight of the royal *Hospitium*, being paid *gagii*. He was also a *feudatarius* in Calabria. In April 1280 he was removed as custodian of the castle of Neocastro, only to be promoted to Captain of a fleet of 10 galleys being armed, provisioned and salaried for 3 months, 6 of them in the Terra di Lavoro and 4 in Apulia, for a mission to Corfu and Achaia.[40] He was made Vice-Admiral from the river Tronto to Cotrone on 2 January 1281 in succession to Simon de Beauvoir, and in July was ordered to defend the coasts against four 'pirate' galleys. These were in fact corsairs of Michael VIII Palaiologos. In April 1282 he received orders to bring a fleet of 22 galleys, 8 *teride* horse transports, and 2 *barchette*, which had been armed to go to *Romania*, to Sicily instead. The Vespers had broken out. On 5 June he was ordered to arm two galleys and a *galleon* and, together with 40 *teride* already made ready, to rendezvous at Catania by 30 June to unite with a fleet commanded by Jean Chauderon for the expedition to Sicily. Under Charles's orders he later left Reggio with 14 galleys and 54 *teride* for Brindisi, which he reached on 23 October 1282. At the time his personal wages were 4 tarins a day, or 4 ounces a month.[41] In August 1283 he was in command of a squadron of 6 galleys and 2 *galliones* diverted from the custody of the coasts of Cotrone to carry

envoys to Venice to negotiate for Venetian assistance. These may later have been redirected to the Sicilian expedition. On 15 October of that year, while King Charles was absent in Provence, Charles of Salerno made Girard Captain of the royal vessels of Apulia and the Abruzzi, together with Henri de Girard or Guérard, with power to condemn men to personal punishment or mutilation when considered necessary for the arming of the fleet. However, he was removed from the Vice-Admiralcy of the Tronto to Roseta in November 1283 when Jacques de Burson was made Vice-Admiral of the *Regno*. Nevertheless, he was still a knight and valet of the court in February 1284, when his wages were ordered to be paid, and he lived on until 1289 at least.[42]

Jacques de Burson himself was a soldier of fortune. His origins are uncertain. He was not Provençal, probably came from Northern France, and had first appeared in the *Regno* as a knight and *familiaris* of the king as far back as February 1267. Between 15 and 27 January 1269 he married Ylaria, daughter of the late Count Riccardo Filangieri, and became a *feudatarius*, acquiring a great many lands.[43] By 1272 he was Marshal and Charles's Vicar in Tuscany, a post from which he had been relieved by March 1274. By August 1277 he was Vice-Admiral of the *Regno* and one of two Captains of the forces being sent to 'Hungary', and by 1278 was at Zara as part of the Angevin forces in *Romania*. In 1278 he was another of those ordered to provide ships for the Byzantine expedition, in his case a *terida* and its boat. In July 1278 he was to be conveyed back from Zara to Manfredonia. He became a knight of the Royal Hôtel and *familiaris*.[44] He appears to have held no naval command, however, until his appointment as Vice-Admiral of the *Regno* on 26 November 1283, after which a stream of orders to him, and concerning him, poured out for the forthcoming expedition against Sicily. On 20 December 1283 the Justiciar of the Terra d'Otranto was ordered to pay him 1,000 ounces to repair, man, and arm all ships in Apulia. On 29 January 1284 he was ordered to arm immediately the ships to sail to Sicily in the spring. On 20 February Charles of Salerno ordered the necessary money to be paid to him. Also in February 1284 the Justiciar of the Principato was ordered to provide him with 400 ounces to enrol 1,000 sailors in Pisa for arming the fleet. On 15 March he was ordered to transport 30,000 one- and two-foot crossbow quarrels from Corfu to Brindisi. And, on 17 May 1284 he was ordered to arm 30 new galleys of 112 oars each, 2 new *galleones* of 70 oars, one of 60 oars, and three *vaccette* of 20 oars, and to rendezvous at Naples as soon as possible together with 4 *teride* being

repaired at Naples, 9 galleys of Salerno, and 6 of Amalfi.[45] Presumably he was with the fleet at the disastrous battle of the Gulf of Naples on 5 June 1284 when Charles of Salerno was captured. If so, he may possibly have escaped because apparently he was still Vice-Admiral of the *Regno* on 10 August 1284.[46] However, by 3 October 1284 he had been replaced as Vice-Admiral and also as Vice Master Justiciar of the *Regno* by Henri de Guines.[47]

The latter was presumably a member of the family of the counts of Guines from the Pas de Calais. He first appeared as Justiciar of the Val del Crati and Terra Giordana in Calabria in February 1282. By this time the Count of Guines, Arnoul III, was in dire financial straits and in 1283 he had to sell the county to Phillip III of France to pay his debts. Henri was presumably one of his sons who went adventuring to the South as so many had done before him. He had a meteoric rise to the top. He appears to have made his name as one of three envoys sent to Venice and Ancona to negotiate for 40 galleys for the war against Sicily, with powers to hypothecate Provence and Forcalquier to pay for them. On 25 September 1283 he and Guillaume de Lamanon were made Captains of the galleys, *teride, galleones*, and *barche* of Apulia and the Abruzzi in succession to Gazo Echinard. Henri was made Vice-Admiral of the *Regno* on 5 October 1284 but died in 1287.[48]

Guillaume de Lamanon, a knight of the Lamanon family from Lambesc in eastern Provence, was another late comer, although other members of his family had come earlier. A Bernard de Lamanon had been probably the first Angevin Justiciar of the Principato and Pierre de Lamanon had been Justiciar of *Sicilia ultra Salsum* some time prior to 1 August 1270 and of *Sicilia citra* some time prior to 24 January 1271. Guillaume first appeared in October 1276 as Charles's Marshall in Rome and then in June 1277 as one of the *feudatarii* from the Abruzzi ordered to provide ships for the Byzantine expedition, in his case, 1 *terida* and its *vaccetta*. By 29 July 1281 he was Justiciar of the Principato and Terra Beneventane. On 10 September 1283 he was made Captain of the vessels of Apulia and the Abruzzi together with Henri de Guines, in place of Gazo Echinard; however, the decision appears to have been changed shortly thereafter and they were replaced by Girard de Marseille and Henri de Guérard, after which Lamanon disappears from the record.[49]

Pierre de Sury had appeared much earlier, being made a royal valet on 31 August 1272; however, he appears to have remained inactive until much later. He was French but not Provençal. He appeared as a

knight receiving *gagii* of 4 ounces a month in the retinue of the titular Latin Emperor of Constantinople, but had no fief until he married the widow of the Count of Caserta and acquired her lands at Montoro. He appeared in a document dated 30 July 1281 as a knight, counsellor, *familiaris*, and *fidelis* of the crown and by December 1282 his family were *stipendiarii*. By 3 November 1282 he was part of the mission to Venice and on 11 May 1284 was made Captain of the royal vessels and galleys of Apulia and the Abruzzi, apparently succeeding Girard de Marseille and Henri de Guérard.[50] Turnover was rapid in these years.

Henri de Girard or Guérard was French, but from where is uncertain. He appears not to have been Provençal. He first appeared on 16 February 1272 when made a royal valet. He then became a knight of the Hôtel and was invested with various functions, generally associated with the fleets, in particular Vice-Admiral of Apulia and the Abruzzi from 1278–83. He was at various times Vicar of Monte St Angelo and the Principality of Salerno. Six galleys and two *galleones* were assigned to him, probably in August 1283, and then he was made Captain of the royal vessels of Apulia and the Abruzzi together with Girard de Marseille. He was removed on 26 November 1283 when all the regional Vice-Admirals were replaced by the Vice-Admiral of the *Regno*, and appears to have ended his career as one of the provosts of the royal farms and ranches.[51] Girard/Guérard was almost certainly never a sailor but rather an administrator.

One who was a sailor was Jean Vivaud, a descendant of an illustrious Marseillese family, who first appeared in June 1272 as one of two admirals of Marseilles for whom the Seneschal of Provence was ordered to supply 10 galleys to join a fleet to take the offensive against the Genoese. After the Vespers he brought a Provençal fleet to the *Regno* and joined the king at the siege of Messina. He apparently returned to Provence after the failure of the first Sicilian expedition but then returned to the *Regno* with the king in command of a new Provençal fleet in June 1284. He was still there in September 1284.[52] He was apparently absent from both the battle of Malta and the battle of the Gulf of Naples, a lucky man!

Another Marseillese with a long career of service to the king was Pierre Boniface junior, again from an old Marseillese family. He first appeared at the siege of Tunis in 1270, offering his galley of 120 men for the king's service. He resurfaced in June 1272 when the king ordered that he be paid for the lease of two galleys and a *sagitta*. In July 1274 he was put in charge of 4 galleys for surveillance of the coasts

of Provence to prevent food being shipped to Genoa and in April of the following year the king ordered the Seneschal of Provence to pay him for the arming of galleys. After the Vespers, around 20 August 1282, he was ordered to arm 10 galleys for war against the Sicilians and around October–November 1282 he was ordered to find up to 6 good galleys in Provence at the same rate at which his own galley had been leased. By around August 1283 he had become a *familiaris* of the king, but after that he disappears from the record.[53]

These appear to have been the major non-*Regnicoli* soldiers of fortune who found service in Charles's fleets. They fall fairly neatly into two groups. There were some Provençals, mainly Marseillese, who were actual seamen. Then there were others who were not seamen, some of whom made careers as Vice-Admirals or 'port admirals' with purely administrative functions but some of whom actually did go to sea. In both cases, with the exception of Guillaume Cornut and Bartholomew Bonvin, none of them actually saw major battle. However, as well as those soldiers of fortune who made careers in Charles's fleets or who served in them as part of wider careers, there were men who appeared from time to time with weapons, ships, and men for hire. Here the information is much more scrappy than that for the notable names, because the historians who made transcriptions from the registers were, by and large, interested in the great. The names of those who were not so great and who made occasional appearances were probably frequently regarded as of little interest and therefore overlooked. Moreover, with the exception of Minieri Riccio and Del Giudice, the historians were not primarily interested in matters maritime, and even these two had to be selective. What may now be recovered is no doubt only a very small tip of the iceberg which once existed.

On 24 May 1270, the Court ordered the Vicar and Treasurer of Marseilles to pay to Jacques Blanc of Marseilles a certain sum for the lease of a galley and a *pamphilus* which he was holding ready at royal service, some money which he owed the Court to be deducted, and on 15 June 1270 the Seneschal of Provence was ordered to restore £100 Tours to Raymond de Marseille, a citizen of Nice, which he was owed for the service of two galleys which had carried the archbishop of Arles to Rome and return, by assigning the *gabelle* of Nice to him until the sum was paid. On 24 June 1270 the *Secretus* of the Principato was ordered to provide biscuit for a month for 10 galleys and 11 *teride*, all manned by Provençals, and 4 *barchette* manned by both Provençals

and *Regnicoli*, all of the ships being in port at Naples. On 30 July, at the request of the archbishop of Messina, the *Vice Secretus* of Messina assigned 6 ounces to Godfrey of Genoa for the lease of his galley to carry the archbishop from Naples to Messina on royal business. Next year, on 14 April, the Seneschal of Provence and the Treasurer of Marseilles were ordered to pay £82 *regales*, the currency of Marseilles, to Pierre Lutand of Marseilles for the lease of his galley. On 23 February 1272 the Court ordered payment to Guillaume *de Giuramanno* of Marseilles of 48 ounces and 20 tarins for the lease of a galley and a *barca* in port at Naples to carry wheat or barley to Rome and on 27 May 1272 it ordered payment of 43.5 ounces to three Genoese merchants, Giovanni Cancelliere, Pellegrino del Gallo, and Baliano Larcaro, for the lease of two galleys which had carried two clerics to *Outremer* to do homage to the new Pope. Later in the same year, in October, it leased three galleys from the same merchants, one of which was to be sent to Venice.[54] In the early 1270s there were considerable opportunities for 'mercenary' seamen to make money in the service of Charles I of Anjou.

In March 1273, during the corsair war with Genoa, the *Secretus* of the Principato was ordered to estimate the worth of a *galleon* belonging to the merchant Jean de Marseille in port in Naples and then to buy it and assign it to a certain Gautier de Toulon, the Captain of two *galleones* told off to guard the coasts of the Principato and Terra di Lavoro from Genoese ships. However, on 25 March, Gautier was replaced by a certain Guillaume d'Avignon and Gautier and his 55-oared *galleon*, the *San Marco*, was ordered to Brindisi to join the rest of the fleet. The king was impatient and on 5 April severely chastised him for failure to proceed to Apulia. Guillaume d'Avignon had some success, capturing Genoese goods on some Pisan ships. In February-August 1274, Gautier of Toulon was still in the Adriatic with two galleys in custody of the coasts of Apulia and engaged in missions across the Adriatic; however, by 18 August he had been captured in battle and was in prison and his galleys were assigned to others. In August 1274 Guillaume d'Avignon was still in command of the custody of the coasts of Corneto and the *Secretus* of the Principato was ordered to seize a Pisan galley in Naples harbour for his use.[55] Raymond de Guben was another Marseillese given letters of marque in May 1274 to attack the Genoese with his galley and a *sagettia* wherever he found them.[56] Similarly, in December 1275 Bertrand Isnard of Marseilles was appointed captain of a galley

and a *galleon* to protect the coasts and was unleashed against Genoese commerce and ordered to deposit everything he seized with the castellan of Civitavecchia.[57]

   After the Vespers, the situation became desperate and manpower and ships were sought everywhere. Costs rocketed out of control. On 15 September 1282 Loys of Mons, Captain from Faro to the borders of the Papal States, ordered the Treasurers to pay 188 ounces to the *patroni* of three Marseillese galleys who came with the entourage of the Prince of Salerno to join the royal fleet.[58] Sometime before 17 October 1282, the King ordered the Seneschal of Provence, Jean de Burlas, to send 500 crossbowmen and since he received only 433, he reproached Burlas for the other 67. On 10 November he wrote to Philip III of France asking for a loan of £5,000 Tours to enrol crossbowmen in Provence against the King of Aragon and pledged the County of Anjou and all his lands in France.[59] Burlas, or perhaps Bullas or Bullays, was himself a French soldier of fortune who had served the king in various capacities from 1271 onwards. His son, Jean junior, also held various offices in the *Regno* from 1272 onwards and was made Captain of the royal vessels of the Principato and Terra di Lavore together with Rinaldo d'Avella on 20 June 1284, after the defeat of Charles of Salerno by Roger of Lauria. Events were moving quickly, however, and by 3 October 1284 he had been removed from the office of Captain of the royal vessels of Apulia and the Abruzzi (to which he must have been appointed at some point), together with Rinaldo d'Avella from that of the Principato and Terra di Lavore and Girard de Marseille from the Vice-Admiralcy from the Tronto to Roseta.[60]

   On 30 Oct. 1282, Charles wrote to Burlas in Provence, ordering him to send a fleet to join his own to combat Peter of Aragon by no later than 15 April 1283, and then on 3 November 1282 he despatched ambassadors to Venice to negotiate a treaty for 40 galleys, few of which, if any, ever materialized. On 21 November he ordered his treasurers to take a loan for a month of 4,000 ounces of gold in *Carlini* from Neapolitan merchants and to send £10,000 Tours to Jean de Burlas in Provence to enable him to send 20 Provençal galleys and 2,000 lancers and crossbowmen to the *Regno* in the middle of March. Bartholomew Bonvin, apparently forgiven for the disaster at Malta, was to be in command and the fleet was to be at Naples by 15 March 1283. It actually reached there on 21 March. In the king's absence, Prince Charles of Salerno wrote again to Venice on 23 February 1283 asking for the promised ships, and also wrote to Pisa for the same

purpose. In September 1283 the Genoese Guelf, Niccolo de Mari, armed a galley at Nicotera and put it at the service of the king. The Provençal fleet was still in preparation on 3 December 1283 when 4,000 ounces, borrowed from the Pope, were despatched for the arming of the 20 galleys and on 31 December when the Marseillese admirals, by now Jean Renaud and Philippe d'Anselme, were sent another 6,000 ounces for the same purpose. Philippe d'Anselme was probably the same Philippe de Marseille or Philippe d'Anselme de Marseille who had appeared as far back as 1270 in joint command with Guillaume Cornut and Hugues de Conques. On the same day an embassy was sent to Genoa seeking 50, or at least 40, galleys for the expedition to Sicily. The king would pay the crews but Genoa asked for the privilege to export 200,000 *salme* of cereals free of customs in return. On 31 March 1284 two Pisan nobles were sent to Pisa to enrol 1,000 seamen for the fleet and on 10 April Charles of Salerno wrote to the Captain of the Guelfs of Florence to send immediately five galleys which had been promised. In another intriguing little fragment of a document dated 5 May 1284, he wrote to five named Pisans requiring them and their associates to come to the royal service. That was just a month before he himself was captured and his fleet annihilated by Roger of Lauria at the battle of Gulf of Naples. These five Pisans were almost certainly mercenary galley captains.[61]

A great many soldiers of fortune and mercenary sailors and oarsmen found places in the fleets of Charles of Anjou; however, because of the loss of the registers in 1943 it is no longer possible to do more than to gain an impression of what may have been the case. The careers of a handful of notables can be traced and the occasional impact of a few individual galley commanders can also be documented. But behind those lay many thousands, probably tens of thousands, of unknowns whose employment placed enormous strains on the financial resources of the *Regno*.

NOTES

[1] P. Durrieu, *Les archives angévines de Naples: étude sur les registres du roi Charles Ier (1265–1285)*, 2 vols (Paris, 1886–7), 2. 267–400.

[2] R. Filangieri, ed., *I registri della cancelleria angioina*, 27 vols [for the reign of Charles I] (Naples, 1951–1980) (hereafter RA), Reg. 86, no. 154 [hereafter as 86.154] (vol. 20).

[3] A. de Boüard, *Actes et lettres de Charles Ier roi de Sicile concernant la France (1257–1284)* (Paris, 1926).

⁴ See in general W. Cohn, 'Storia della flotta siciliana sotto il governo di Carlo I d'Angio', *Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale*, ser. 2, 5 (1929), 351–94; 7 (1931), 175–212; 8 (1932), 26–60; 9 (1933), 15–48, 185–222; 10 (1934), 80–109; to be used with extreme caution. There are many inaccuracies and a great deal of information is missing. Cohn was dependent on the publications of Minieri Riccio, Del Giudice, and De Boüard and for this work did not himself work independently in the archives.

⁵ See W. Cohn, *Die Geschichte der Sizilischen Flotte unter der Regierung Friedrichs II (1197–1250)* (Breslau, 1926), 113–14.

⁶ RA, 112.136 (vol 26).

⁷ RA, 2.5, 5.102 (vol. 1); 8.63, Additiones ad Reg. 5.7 (vol. 2); 22.1524 (vol. 6); 35.204, 273 & 37.48, 516 (vol. 8); 41(continuazione).399 (vol. 9); 48.588 (vol. 10); 54.277 & 60.203, 249, 255, 256 (vol. 11); 79.146 (vol. 17); 82.452–453 (vol. 19).

⁸ G. Lesage, *Marseille angévine* (Paris, 1950), 114–17.

⁹ RA, 1.19 & 2.41 & 5.109 (vol. 1); 8.493, 536, 630, 662 & Additiones ad Reg. 7.81 (vol. 2); 16.31 (vol. 5); 22.1004, 1440 (vol. 6).

¹⁰ RA, 12.215 & 13.47, 245, 891, 892 (vol. 3); 14.1141 (vol. 4); 15.142 (vol. 5); 21.121 (vol. 6).

¹¹ RA, 22.1063, 1448 (vol. 6); 42.22 & 47.8, 23 (vol. 9); 48.233, 385 (vol. 10); 55.13 & 59.98, 181, 204 (vol. 11); 70.175 & 71.88 (vol. 13); 73.108 (vol. 14); 80.509, 511 (vol. 18); 82.452, 499 (vol. 19), 85.110 (vol. 20); 87.131 (vol. 21).

¹² RA, 2.97, 240 (vol. 1); 37.482 (vol. 8); Additiones ad Reg. 72.160 (vol. 15).

¹³ RA, 6.215, 219 (vol. 1); 8.88–9, 96, 232 (vol. 2); 12.148 (vol. 3); 14.377, 1017, 1143 (vol. 4); Additiones ad Reg. 1.1 (vol. 5); 22.1268, 1281 (vol. 6); Additiones ad Reg. 16.43 (vol. 7); 36.53, 55–6 & 37.767, 771 & 38.20 & 40.9 (vol. 8); 41(continuazione).274 & 42.62, 69, 145 & 45.212, 227, 231 (vol. 9); 48.37, 310, 404, 462–4 (vol. 10); 59.194 (vol. 11); 68.318 (vol. 12).

¹⁴ RA, 70.34 & 72.43, 124 (vol. 13); 86.61 (vol. 20); 97.67 (vol. 23); 110.140 & 111.22, 30, 47 & 112.30, 65, 136, 178–9 (vol. 26). See also C. Minieri Riccio, 'Memorie della guerra di Sicilia negli anni 1282, 1283, 1284 tratte da' registri angioini dell' Archivio di Stato di Napoli', *Archivio storico per le provincie napolitane*, 1 (1876), 85–105, 285–315, 499–530; here 98.

¹⁵ RA, 112.250, 255, 314, 366, 422, 429, 471, 603 (vol. 26); 121.7, 18 & 123.39 (vol. 27).

¹⁶ RA, 22.238, 439, 548, 688 (vol. 6); 28.312, 315, 376 (vol. 7); 37.102 (vol. 8); 42.107 (vol. 9); 51.41, 69 & 54.144, 192, 233 & 57.56, 142, 151, 191, 321 (vol. 11); 63.513 & 66.18, 32 & 68.178–9 (vol. 12); 69.166 & 70.367 & 72.298 (vol. 13); 76.280 (vol. 14); 78.154, 303 (vol. 16); 82.128 (vol. 19); 86.476 & Additiones ad Reg. 82.12 (vol. 20); 94.211, 260 (vol. 23); 110.8, 190 & 112.178, 250, 261, 274, 402, 421, 471, 505, 526, 535, 594, 603, 654 (vol. 26); 117.182, 263 & 120.10 (vol. 27).

¹⁷ Lesage, *Marseille angévine*, 120.

¹⁸ R. Muntaner, *The chronicle of Muntaner*, trans Lady Goodenough 2 vols (London, Hakluyt Society Publications, ser. 2, 47 & 50, 1920, 1921), 1. 192–3; N. Speciale, *Niccolai Specialis historia Sicula in VIII libros distribuata ab anno MCCLXXXII usque ad annum MCCCXXXVII* [Muratori, RIS, 10] (Milan, 1727), c. 26 (col. 942); Bartolomeo de Neocastro, *Historia Sicula ab anno MCCL ad annum MCCXCIII*, ed. G. Paladino [RIS, new ed. rev., 13(3)] (Bologna, 1921), c. 76 (p. 56). See also J. H. Pryor, 'The naval battles of Roger of Lauria', *Journal of medieval history*, 9 (1983), 179–216; here 180–89.

¹⁹ RA.2.24 (vol. 1); 8.9 (vol. 2); 15.140, 142, 216 & 20.258 (vol. 5); 21.136 & 22.916 (vol. 6); 59.78, 188 (vol. 11); 70.113, 133 (vol. 13); Additiones ad Reg. 89.22 (vol. 21). The only reference to Cornut's involvement in the 1275 embassy to Tunis appears to be in Cohn, 'Storia della flotta siciliana sotto il governo di governo di Carlo I d'Angio', 8 (1932), 35. There is no such reference in the registers.

²⁰ RA, 110.266 & 111.188 & 112.87 & 114.58 (vol. 26); Minieri-Riccio, 'Memorie della guerra di Sicilia', 99–100. See also Lesage, *Marseille angévine*, 117–18.

[21] RA, 47.20, 40 (vol. 9); 48.37, 69, 115, 122, 239, 268 & 49.83, 103 (vol. 10); 54.244 & 59.38, 78, 188, 202 (vol. 11); 78.440 (vol. 16).

[22] RA, 22.1156 (vol. 6); 27.47 (vol. 7); De Boüard, *Actes et lettres…concernant la France*, nos 633, 787–8 (170, 225).

[23] RA, 6.357, 379, 445, 450 (vol. 1); 8.9, 148, 212, 341, 376, 406, 525, 544, 778 & 10.1–2 & Additiones ad Reg. 8.84 (vol. 2); 12.367 & 13.568 (vol. 3); 14.663, 798, 1049, 1141 (vol. 4); 20.15 (vol. 5); 22.903, 934, 1657, 1881 (vol. 6); 23.3 (vol. 7); 35.221 (vol. 8); 57.397 (vol. 11); 70.379, 444 (vol. 13). RA, 20.15, in which Beaumont nominated his executors in the *Regno* and in *Francia*, and which is supposedly dated to March-August 1272 must be misdated. The date of RA, 70.379 [June–July 1276] is also wrong. See also C. Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici intorno i grandi uffizü del Regno di Sicilia durante il regno di Carlo I d'Angio* (Naples, 1872), 17–20. The 'Capitoli dell Ammiraglio' were published by Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, pp. 17–19 and reproduced in RA, 8.148 (vol. 2).

[24] RA, 1.52 & 2.5, 18, 40, 49, 53, 56, 60, 189 & 5.136, 285, 316 (vol. 1); 8.282, 683, 743 & 10.4 (vol. 2); 12.378 & 13.709, 858, 872, 882 (vol. 3); 14.506, 1122, 1141 (vol. 4); 15.111, 190, 256, 275, 380 (vol. 5); 16.8, 18, 288 (vol. 5). As Marshall, 6.354 (vol. 1); 8.637, 692 (vol. 2); 12.187, 378, 430 & 13.709, 872, 884 (vol. 3); 14.506 (vol. 4); 15.398 & 16.18, 288 (vol. 5); 22.276, 607 (vol. 6). As Vice-Admiral, 13.884 (vol. 3); 14.506 (vol. 4); 16.8, 31, 52 (vol. 5). See also C. Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 24–5.

[25] RA, 20.32, 42 (vol. 5); 22.405, 454, 466, 724, 1293, 1333 (vol. 6); 28.302, 306, 341 & 29.29, 41, 83, 86 & 30.192 & 31.55, 65, 76 (vol. 7); 35.228 (vol. 8); 48.89 (vol. 10).

[26] RA, 20.32–3, 42 (vol. 5); 29.83, 86 (vol. 7); 34.33–4 & 35.20, 228, 282 & 36.91 & 37.1, 329, 352, 365 & 40.9 (vol. 8); Additiones ad Reg. 35.8 & 41(continuazione).295 & 42.56–7, 76 & 44.9 (vol. 9); 48.135, 137, 147 & 49.233 & 50.67 (vol. 10); 57.42, 97, 155 (vol. 11). See also Minieri-Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 24–5.

[27] RA, 47.44, 51 (vol. 9); 48.121, 137, 139, 147, 156, 185, 193, 194, 196, 198, 199, 203 & 49.10, 98, 126 & 50.67 (vol. 10); 55.14 & 59.169, 198, 202, 208, 210 & 60.214, 220 (vol. 11); 63.45 & 68.341 (vol. 12); 69.74 & 72.304 (vol. 13); 73.50 & 76.339, 346 (vol. 14); 78.3, 161 (vol. 16). See also Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 24–6.

[28] RA, 6.261 (vol. 1); 13.776 (vol. 3); 14.599, 635, 1029, 1094 (vol. 4); 15.148, 263, 273, 340, 348, 387 & 20.2 (vol. 5); 22.495 (vol. 6); 27.57 & 28.316 & 29.72 & 30.116 (vol. 7); 35.100, 104 (vol. 8); 41(continuazione).304 & 42.58, 173 (vol. 9); 48.89 & 49.105 (vol. 10); 82.44 (vol. 19). RA, 42.173 (vol. 9), which says that he was dead by 23 January 1273, must be misdated.

[29] RA, 35.20 (vol. 8); 49.166 (vol. 10); 57.359 & 59.100, 120, 121, 125, 127, 129, 132, 220, 245 (vol. 11); 63.467–8 & 66.112, 114 & 68.84 (vol. 12); 70.48, 60 (vol. 13); Additiones ad Reg. 66.134 (vol. 15). RA, 78.408 (vol. 16) records that he was still Captain in Dyrrachion and Albania around July–August 1277 but the date must be an error.

[30] RA, 112.30, 178, 421, 471 (vol. 26). See also Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 27–9.

[31] RA, 2.206, 221, 223, 240 (vol. 1); 10.117, 133, 137 (vol. 2); 22.1281 (vol. 6); 31.53 (vol. 7). See also W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant: a history of Frankish Greece (1204–1566)* (London, 1908), 126, 515–16.

[32] RA, 12.59, 261 (vol. 3); 20.148 (vol. 5); 22.100, 155, 264, 384, 648, 1057 (vol. 6); 27.44 & 28.151 (vol. 7); 37.69 & 40.24 (vol. 8); 44.41 & 45.119 (vol. 9); 48.116, 118 (vol. 10); 57.385 (vol. 11); 63.514, 555 (vol. 12); 70.23, 76, 103, 117 (vol. 13); 73.137, 166 & 76.75 (vol. 14); 77.23 & Additiones ad Reg. 70.141 (vol. 15); 78.226 (vol. 16); Additiones ad Reg. 78.21 (vol. 17); 81.255 & 82.97, 128, 255, 450 (vol. 19); 85.67 & 86.61, 569, 577 (vol. 20); 87.68 & 88.22 & 89.98, 112, 115, 130 (vol. 21); 92.164, 214, 216, 237, 238, 244 (vol. 22); 94.180 & 95.34, 94 & 97.53, 69 (vol. 23); 118.310 (vol. 27).

[33] RA, 102.136 (vol. 24); 103.81 & 107.149 (vol. 25); 110.15 & 111.11, 60, 148, 175, 185 & 112.73, 133–4. 161, 181, 187, 203, 212, 337, 351, 390, 465, 508, 530, 560, 631 (vol. 26); 118.33; 120.332, 342 (vol. 27).

³⁴ RA, 6.297, 371 (vol. 1); 8.745 & 10.142 (vol. 2); 12.138 & 13.208 (vol. 3); 14.303, 647 (vol. 4); 15.2 & 16.204 (vol. 5); 22.590, 792, 891, 915, 917, 952, 1011, 1073, 1344 (vol. 6); 24.71 & 28.183 & 30.25 (vol. 7); 35.137 & 37.345 (vol. 8); 42.39 & 44.9, 27, 31 (vol. 9); 48.225, 254, 431, 702, 801–2 & 49.1, 2, 135, 144 (vol. 10); 59.176 (vol. 11); 63.175 & 66.5 & Additiones ad Reg. 59.30 (vol. 12); 70.80, 128–9, 168, 211, 215, 386, 439, 444 (vol. 13); 73.124, 230 & 74.154, 175 & 76.78, 147 (vol. 14); 78.4–5, 125, 171 & Additiones ad Reg. 69.17 (vol. 16); 79.81–2, 156 (vol. 17); 82.72, 98, 357 (vol. 19); 86.61 (vol. 20); 87.71 & 89.143 (vol. 21); 94.86 & 95.17, 27, 66, 91, 129 & 98.2, 43, 90 (vol. 23); esp. 22.1011 (vol. 6); 98.90 (vol. 23); 100.425 (vol. 24). See also Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 227–9; S. Pollastri, 'La noblesse Provençale dans le Royaume de Sicile (1265–1282)', *Annales du Midi*, 100 (1988), 405–34, here 432.

³⁵ RA, 6.390 (vol. 1); 12.161, 331 (vol. 3); 14.380, 382, 391, 393 (vol. 4); 17.5 & 20.301 (vol. 5); 22.381, 435, 724 (vol. 6); 28.312–313, 340–341 & Additiones ad Reg. 16.63–64 (vol. 7); 37.273 (vol. 8); 41(continuazione).295 (vol. 9); 50.63 (vol. 10); 51.64–5 (vol. 11); 61.16 & 63.272 (vol. 12); 73.104 & 74.14 & 76.398 (vol. 14); 77.55 (vol. 15); 78.437 (vol. 16); 82.66, 157, 384 (vol. 19); 85.67 (vol. 20); 101.12 (vol. 24). See also Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 44.

³⁶ RA, 76.79 (vol. 14); 80.611, 789, 793 (vol. 18); 82.272, 305, 385, 386 (vol. 19); 86.61, 545–547, 549, 568, 574, 577, 586, 588, 602 (vol. 20); 89.248–252, 265, 267, 272–278 & 91.36 & Additiones ad Reg. 89.94, 240 (vol. 22); 92.179 (vol. 22); 94.176, 200, 274, 276 & 95.10, 56, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 115, 118, 153, 157, 168, 182, 195, 200, 206, 211, 213, 217 & 97.21, 131, 135, 137, 144, 145, 186 & 98.129, 131, 132, 200, 221, 229 & 99.11 (vol. 23); 100.319, 358, 361, 362, 383 & 102.29, 37, 48 (vol. 24); 103.35–36, 45, 95 & 105.11 & 106.92 (vol. 25).

³⁷ RA, 92.327 & 93.258–260, 271 (vol. 22); 102.151 (vol. 24); 103.306 & 108.21 & 109.24 (vol. 25); 113.6 (vol. 26).

³⁸ RA, 2.165 (vol. 1).

³⁹ RA, 12.86 (vol. 3); 14.975 (vol. 4); 37.49, 56, 175, 445–8, 451, 455–8 (vol. 8); 42.108 & 47.87 (vol. 9); 48.234 & 49.82 (vol. 10); 59.128 (vol. 11); 63.554 (vol. 12); 76.461 (vol. 14).

⁴⁰ RA, 20.298 (vol. 5); 91.187 & Additiones ad Reg. 89.462 (vol. 21); 93.311 (vol. 22); 95.141 & 98.93, 129 (vol. 23).

⁴¹ RA, 100.235, 356 & 102.82, 179 (vol. 24); 103.95 & 106.102 & 107.22, 40, 120 & 108.19 (vol. 25); 110.11, 148 & 111.42 (vol. 26).

⁴² RA, 112.687, 691, 717, 724 (vol. 26); 118.33, 50, 52 & 119.433 (vol. 27); Minieri Riccio, 'Memorie della guerra di Sicilia', 291. See also Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 51.

⁴³ RA, 2.138 & 6.307 (vol. 1); 8.2 (vol. 2); 12.284 & 13.327, 329, 600, 763 (vol. 3); 22.1289 (vol. 6); 24.210 & 28.122, 171 (vol. 7); 74.137 & 76.215 (vol. 14); 78.518 (vol. 16); 115.195–7, 202 & 119.129, 133, 156 & 120.27, 308 (vol. 27). See also Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 52–6.

⁴⁴ RA, 37.85, 152, 331, 346, 711, 746, 756 (vol. 8); 41(continuazione).94 & Additiones ad Reg. 37.15 & 45.2, 9, 27, 61, 82 (vol. 9); 48.606, 652, 659 (vol. 10); 57.349 (vol. 11); 62.38, 63 (vol. 12); 76.75, 92, 299 (vol. 14); 77.240 (vol. 15); 78.378–9, 386 (vol. 16); 79.237–8 (vol. 17); 81.105–6 & 82.397, 405, 424, 450 (vol. 19); 86.61, 277, 303 (vol. 20); 91.169, 189 (vol. 21); 92.88 (vol. 22).

⁴⁵ RA, 115.42, 197, 424, 508 & 116.76, 152 & 117.94, 181, 466 & 118.44, 46, 49, 341, 349 & 119.104, 362, 394, 477, 516, 620, 637, 658, 734, 738 & 120.115, 342, 355, 357, 400, 571 & 123.66 (vol. 27). See also C. Minieri Riccio, *Diario Angioino dal 4 gennaio 1284 al 7 gennaio 1285 formato su registri angioini del grande archivio di Napoli* (Naples, 1873), 4, 10–11, 15, 26–9.

⁴⁶ RA, 123.43 (vol. 27). This is the only document to refer to James of Burson as still being Vice-Admiral after May 1284 and, if the date is wrong, it perhaps should be dated to between 26 November 1283 and 5 June 1284. According to Durrieu

and Minieri Riccio, Burson was captured with Charles of Anjou at the battle of the Gulf of Naples. Durrieu, *Archives angévines de Naples*, 2. 192; Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 53–4. On the grounds that, apart from this single reference, Burson completely disappears from the registers after June 1284, and was replaced as Vice-Admiral in October 1284, it is most probable that in fact he was captured and that the date of this reference is wrong.

[47] RA, 121.14 & 124.50, 55 (vol. 27). See also Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 56–7.

[48] RA, 106.83, 134, 144 & 107.109 (vol. 25); 116.244 & 117.37, 59, 63, 465 & 118.137, 308 & 119.208 & 120.309, 316 & 121.14 & 124.55 (vol. 27). See also Minieri Riccio, 'Memorie della guerra di Sicilia', 292; idem, *Cenni storici*, 56–7.

[49] RA, 13.218 (vol. 3); 15.363 (vol. 5); 22.877 (vol. 6); 76.74 (vol. 14); 78.68, 196, 549 (vol. 16); Additiones ad Reg. 78.7 (vol. 17); 86.61, 139, 277, 303 (vol. 20); Additiones ad Reg. 89.471 (vol. 21); 94.122, 203 (vol. 23); 100.133, 203, 240, 262 & 102.109, 126, 155, 160, 176 (vol. 24); 103.119, 173, 189, 218, 220, 262, 298 & 106.22, 39, 82 & 107.20 & 109.85 (vol. 25); 110.310 & 111.49, 174 & 112.14, 190, 269, 416, 584 & 113.58 & 114.6 (vol. 26); 117.49 & 120.316 (vol. 27).

[50] RA, 20.217 (vol. 5); 70.487 & 71.70 (vol. 13); 85.119, 146, 347 (vol. 20); Additiones ad Reg. 89.449 (vol. 21); 93.82 (vol. 22); 100.290 (vol. 24); 110.35, 143, 270 & 111.114 & 112.76 (vol. 26); 115.426 & 116.135 & 117.162 & 119.76, 470, 659 (vol. 27).

[51] RA, 20.217 (vol. 5); 37.793 (vol. 8); Additiones ad Reg. 89.96, 161 (vol. 21); 98.188 (vol. 23); 103.101 (vol. 25); 112.425 (vol. 26); 117.49, 493 & 118.14, 33 & 119.216, 530 & 120.342 (vol. 27). See Minieri Riccio, *Cenni storici*, 45.

[52] RA, 60.200–205 (vol. 11); 107.73 (vol. 25); 123.17, 31 & 124.96 (vol. 27).

[53] RA, 21.96, 130 (vol. 6); 27.616, 744 (vol. 8); 60.222, 237, 272 (vol. 11); 98.251 [incorrectly dated] (vol. 23); 110.117 & 111.85, 95 (vol. 26). See also Lesage, *Marseille angévine*, 118–19.

[54] RA, 14.1176, 1181 (vol. 4); 15.140, 214 & 20.195 (vol. 5); 22.1610 (vol. 6); 35.12 (vol. 8); 49.202 (vol. 10).

[55] RA, 42.26, 34, 35 & 45.206–7 & 47.9, 19, 28 (vol. 9); 48.106, 197, 262, 807, 809, 813 (vol. 10); 54.172 & 55.25 & 59.52, 125, 134, 220, 221, 225, 228 (vol. 11); 63.399 (vol. 12); 72.217 (vol. 13).

[56] RA, Additiones ad Reg. 59.35 (vol. 12).

[57] RA, 70.161, 467 (vol. 13).

[58] RA, 114.40 (vol. 26).

[59] RA, 111.78, 89 (vol. 26).

[60] RA, 91.101 & Additiones ad Reg. 89.13 (vol. 21); 123.1, 18 & 124.52 (vol. 27).

[61] RA, 15.140, 142, 216 (vol. 5); 110.266 & 111.188 & 112.28, 87, 182–3, 738–9 & 114.56–58 (vol. 26); 117.16 & 118.6, 76, 319 & 119.36 & 120.102 (vol. 27); C. Minieri Riccio, 'Memorie della guerra di Sicilia', 95, 96, 99–100, 277, 297, 304, 315, 500. The names of the Pisan captains were Matheo Paczo, Iohannes Maccaioni, Magnus Nello, Taulinus Turpeto, and Baldus Iunastro.

HOUSEHOLD MEN, MERCENARIES AND VIKINGS IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND

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Mercenary soldiers played a crucial role in both the birth and death of Anglo-Saxon England. What is odd, however, is how little evidence there is for their presence in Britain between the end of the fifth century and the turn of the millennium. What makes this even stranger is that there is considerable evidence for soldiers who fought for wages throughout this period.

I found myself pedagogically wrestling with the distinction between mercenary and paid soldiers while teaching American midshipmen Machiavelli's *Art of War*. Machiavelli's famous (and, in historical context, ironic) denigration of the ability and effectiveness of professional mercenary troops in comparison to patriotic citizen militias led to a spirited discussion in class about how one might classify the United States' all volunteer military. When I asked the midshipmen how many of them were attending the Naval Academy in order to serve the nation out of patriotic duty, all but a few raised their hands. When I followed up by asking how many of them would still be sitting in these seats if they were not going to be paid to serve in the Navy and would be responsible for their own sustenance, every hand went down. A number of students protested that I was creating a false dichotomy. Certainly, they expected to be paid for military service. How could they otherwise serve? Without pay they could not support themselves, let alone a family. But they had not chosen the profession of Naval officer for its material rewards, they insisted, but out of a sense of patriotism. The midshipmen, in other words, conceived their military service as rooted in obligation and loyalty to a nation; their pay, while essential to the performance of that duty, was only incidental to the reason they had chosen the profession of Naval officer.

By protesting the implication that they were mercenary troops, my students were underscoring the negative connotations that this term now possesses.[1] They were also suggesting a distinction between those who fight purely because they are paid to do so, regardless of their

employer, and those who fight because of a sense of duty to a state or
nation, even if they receive wages for doing so. The distinction raised
here is between what Stephen Morillo, in the useful typology that he
proposes in this volume, terms soldiers 'unembedded in the society
of their employer' who 'sell their services according to the best offer
among potential military employers,' the 'classic mercenary,' and sol-
diers embedded in the moral economy of their society but for whom,
nonetheless, market forces play an important role in their choice of
the military profession, the stipendiary soldier.[2] Understood in this way,
the relationship between the mercenary and his master is purely—or,
at least, primarily—commercial, while that of other categories of paid
troops is not.

All cross-cultural definitions are, of course, constructs, and as such
raise difficulties similar to those encountered with more elaborate
historical constructs, such as, most notoriously, 'feudalism.' But the
proposed definition of a 'mercenary' soldier as one who employs his
fighting skills as a commodity is, at least linguistically, anchored in the
meaning of the term during the Anglo-Saxon period.[3] *Mercennarius* in
classical and early medieval Latin, as well as the words that rendered
it into Old English—*celmertmonn, esne-man, med-wyrhta*, and *hyra*—meant
simply one who worked for pay, regardless of the type of labor.[4] For
the most part the words referred to agricultural workers, tradesmen,
and servants. Perhaps significantly, they are never applied to the service
of soldiers in any Anglo-Saxon text.[5]

Terms for hired labor appear relatively rarely in Anglo-Saxon lit-
erature, and then mostly in late texts, which may reflect the generally
uncommercialized character of the English economy before the mid
tenth century. *Celmertmonn* and *esne-man*, for instance, are found only
in translations of the Vulgate, and one suspects that they may have
been coined for that purpose. I could not determine the etymology of
celmertmonn,[6] but the term *esne* carries negative connotations of servility,
which is appropriate given the denigration of *mercenarii* in *John* 10:10–13:
'I am the good shepherd,' John has Jesus declare.

> The good shepherd is one who lays down his life for his sheep. The hired
> man [*mercennarius/celmertmonn*], since he is not the shepherd and the sheep
> do not belong to him, abandons the sheep and runs away as soon as he
> sees a wolf coming, and then the wolf attacks and scatters the sheep;
> this is because he is only a hired man [*quia mercennarius est*] and has no
> concern for the sheep.[7]

Although the attitudes expressed in this passage arose in a different culture, the Gospel's aspersions upon the reliability and loyalty of hirelings may well have colored how early medieval Christian authors, including Anglo-Saxon writers, regarded those who worked merely for wages, including mercenary soldiers.[8] If so, biblical prejudice against mercenary labor confirmed and reinforced an independent cultural distaste among the Anglo-Saxon elite for military service contracted upon a purely economic basis, a distaste rooted in native conceptions of loyalty, manhood, and reciprocity.

In this paper I will draw a distinction between, on the one hand, mercenaries, that is, soldiers who lacked political or social ties to those who employed them, and, on the other, salaried household men and paid expeditionary soldiers whose duty to serve arose, at least in part, from the demands of lordship. In Old English this represents the difference between the *hyra-man*, the *hired-man*, and the *fyrd-man*: the hireling, the household man, and those who performed military service to the king upon his summons because of the bookland they or their lords possessed. Although these categories in practice may have overlapped, the Anglo-Saxons regarded them as different and distinct. I hope to explain in this paper why paid military service was ubiquitous throughout the Anglo-Saxon era, while true mercenaries for whom military service was a commodity to be sold to the highest bidder were rare before the eleventh century. Or perhaps I should say that I hope to explain why few Anglo-Saxon soldiers or their masters before the late tenth century were willing to represent their relationship in purely, or even primarily, economic terms before then. This paper will examine the interrelated political, social, and economic factors that account for this apparent paradox.

Given their subsequent rarity, it is ironic that Anglo-Saxon history begins with the coming of German mercenaries to Britain. This is, at least, how Gildas describes the *adventus Saxonum*. Following the withdrawal of the Roman legions by Constantine III and the subsequent refusal of Roman imperial authorities to defend Britain, a Romano-British '*superbus tyrannus*' (whom Bede names as Vortigern), in consultation with a council of elite landowners, opted to hire German mercenaries, *foederati*, to defend Britain against the incursions of 'barbarian' Picts and Scots. In doing so, Vortigern was following established imperial practice. Gildas underscores this by using technical Roman military terms to describe the terms of their contracted service. Vortigern, he tells us, contracted a *foedus* with these Saxon 'barbarians,' who (in

his words) 'falsely represented themselves as *milites* ready to undergo extreme dangers for their excellent hosts.' The terms of the agreement involved the Britons providing the Saxons with supplies, which Gildas terms variously *annonae, epimenia*, and *munificentia*. Over time, the Saxons grew dissatisfied with their pay. When the Britons refused to meet their demands, they broke their *foedus* and began to plunder the lands of their employers.[9]

As Chris Snyder observed, Gildas' use of technical military administrative terms 'seems to be a strong indicator that Roman fiscal machinery was still operating—at least in the immediate post-Roman years described here by Gildas—in conjunction with some sort of military pay-and-requisition system.'[10] If so, Gildas's account also attests that such vestiges of the imperial Roman military system were slowly giving way in the British principalities and the emerging Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of his day to a different sort of military organization, one characterized by chieftains and their warbands, rather than military officers commanding regular troops and foreign *foederati*.

The German federates whom Vortigern so unwisely invited to Britain may well have been the last mercenaries to ply their trade in England until the late ninth century. Bede, writing in the early eighth century, certainly understood the concept of mercenary soldiers, as evidenced by his incorporation of Gildas's account into his *Ecclesiastical History of the English People*. But if Gildas's use of technical imperial terminology suggests continuity with Roman administration, Bede's elimination of such terms as *epimenia* (monthly allowances) from his narrative suggests just as strongly that by his day the fiscal apparatus of the imperial Roman state was no longer even a memory in Northumbria.[11] Perhaps most significantly, Bede does not mention mercenaries anywhere else in his *History*. The military organization described in Bede's writings was one centered on royal and noble households, composed of veteran soldiers (*duguth*) or *emariti milites* who possessed landed estates and youths (*geoguth* or *iuuentus*) who did not. Both ranks served in expectation of rewards in the form of moveable wealth, most notably gold and silver rings. This was pay of a sort, but the coin of the realm was social prestige rather than economic power.[12] The number and quality of rings worn by a warrior defined his social and political standing; they were material expressions of the 'love' he earned from his lord.

The distinction between 'youths' and 'proved men' was basic to this military society. The former were young, unmarried warriors who, having as yet no land of their own, resided with their lord, ate at his

table, and accompanied him as he progressed through his estates. When a retainer of this sort had proved himself to his lord's satisfaction, he would receive from him a landed endowment, perhaps even the estates that his father had formerly held from that lord. By such grants youths were transformed into *duguth*, or, as Bede puts it, into the 'companions [*comites*] or tried warriors [*emeriti milites*] of secular powers [*potestates saeculi*].'[13] The warrior now ceased to dwell in his lord's household, although he still attended his councils. Now he lived upon his own estates, married, raised a family, and maintained a military household of his own, which would accompany him when he answered his royal lord's summons to war, or when he pursued his own vendettas against his personal enemies.[14]

On first glance, these 'youths' might seem a species of mercenary. Their dependence upon the economic rewards of service led them to seek powerful and wealthy lords, wherever that search might take them. Bede was well aware of this, and worried that the proliferation of spurious monasteries in his native Northumbria was undermining the safety of the realm by depriving King Ceolwulf of disposable land with which to endow the 'sons of noblemen and veteran warriors' [*filii nobilium aut emeritorum militum*].[15] Bede believed that young noble warriors ought to serve their native kings, and that those kings ought to answer that service with the land necessary to graduate these 'youths' into the ranks of the *duguth*. But he acknowledged the practical reality that if a king lacked the landed resources to do so, the young warriors of his realm would seek their fortunes elsewhere. Royal wealth in moveable goods and land translated into political capital and military power.[16] A good king, the *Beowulf*-poet reminded his readers, 'took mead-benches away from enemy bands' and rewarded his followers with a share of the booty so 'that they would stand by him when war came.'[17]

One mark of a successful chieftain, whether king or warlord, in pre-Viking England was his ability to attract followers from other 'peoples.' Bede attests to the exceptional qualities of King Oswine of Deira by observing that 'men of the greatest noblility from almost every 'province' flocked to serve him as retainers.'[18] But King Oswine's neighbor and rival, King Oswiu of Bernicia, was an even greater magnet for the service of warriors, and when the two confronted each other in war, Oswine thought it more prudent to dismiss his forces than to engage Oswiu's larger and more powerful army.[19] Three centuries later, Asser praised his royal lord Alfred by observing that his court swarmed with non-West Saxons. He counted Welshmen, Mercians, Franks, Frisians,

Bretons and even Scandinavians among the king's household men, all drawn to Alfred by his reputation for generosity and his ability to reward.[20]

If we read the literary sources without romantic preconceptions, a quid pro quo of rewards for military service stands out in bold relief. But these were socially embedded exchanges in which the economic value of the gifts given was less important than the social prestige they symbolized. The military retainers in a lord's household, his *hiredmen*, certainly were 'paid soldiers,' stipendiary troops, even though their pay came in the form of bracelets, rings, collars, food, and arms rather than cash; they were not, however, mercenaries. As a good lord, Hrothgar lavishly rewarded Beowulf for freeing Heorot from the monsters that haunted it. Like another hero from poetry, Widsith, Beowulf, having won treasure abroad in the service of foreign kings, returned to his native land, and, as is only proper, handed over the booty he had won to his royal lord. King Hygelac concluded the transaction by giving his kinsman and retainer a valuable sword, a hall, a 'princely seat,' and seven thousand hides of land.[21] None of these transactions ought to be understood as commercial exchanges. Rather, they reflect the principle of reciprocal gift-giving.

The gift-giving lord is a familiar figure in Old English poetry, and it is not surprising that the Anglo-Saxons should have regarded munificence as a great virtue in their rulers. For gift-giving was a tool of governance. The flow of goods between lords and retainers sustained the social hierarchy. In military terms it was reified into the ritual payment of the heriot: the posthumous return to a lord of the weapons and armor he had given the retainer when he entered his service. Since the ritual in which these arms were conferred created a bond of loyalty and service, all booty obtained through the exercise of those arms properly belonged to the man's lord. When Beowulf, Weohstan, or Wiglaf offered their lords the wealth they won, they fulfilled their duty as retainers, and when their lords answered with as much or even greater treasure, they too acted as they should have. A gift in that society bore a value beyond its simple market price, for it created, symbolized, and confirmed the relationship between a man and his lord. The offer of a gift and its acceptance established a social relationship; the recipient of the largess placed himself in moral debt to the giver and obliged himself to requite the favor. The weapons, ring, mead, and, above all,

the land given to a man by his lord constrained that man to respond appropriately; in the words of the oath that he swore to his lord, to 'love all that his lord loved, and to hate all that he hated.' [22]

As a gift looked for its return, so love, freely bestowed, was to be answered in full measure by the open-handed lord. King Alfred in his very loose translation of Augustine's *Soliloquies* enjoined a thegn to prefer the giver to the gift and to be willing to forfeit his worldly wealth if so commanded.[23] Alfred wrote of love in a number of his interpolations in his translations, almost always in the context of true friendship or lordship.[24] For Alfred lordship remained a species of friendship. He conceived of his thegns and, in particular, his household men as his true companions. In his words, it was both 'unjust' and 'unseemly' for a king to rule over a nation of slaves. Only free men could willingly return love and loyalty.[25]

King Alfred's arrangement of his household provides us with the clearest window on to the relationship between Anglo-Saxon kings and their fighting men in the Middle Saxon period. The old distinction between *duguth* and *geoguth* persisted. Alfred's secular household was divided into two classes of followers, men of substance and property who served as officers of the household, and the humbler household warriors resident at court. The former possessed estates and households of their own, and Alfred attempted to lighten the burden of attendance upon his person by dividing them into three cohorts, each of which would serve in various capacities in court for a month, then return for two months to their own estates and attend to their private affairs.[26] The other main group that made up Alfred's secular household was his household warriors. In a famous interpolation in his translation of Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*, Alfred declared that fighting men, along with those who prayed and those who worked, were the necessary tools for royal rule.[27] In the turbulent years of Alfred's reign his household troops played an especially important role. But one should not think of them merely as 'tools' to be used in times of need. They were also Alfred's hearth-companions, who feasted at his table, slept in his hall, shared his delight in the hunt, and followed him into the marshes of Somerset in that dreadful and glorious winter of 878. Asser, influenced by his knowledge of Francia, called them *faselli*, 'vassals,' which captures something of their intimacy with Alfred. Nor were they simply warriors. Alfred's *hiredmen* also played an important role in

the king's civil administration of the realm in their capacity as royal messengers and emissaries, serving as his eyes, ears, and voice in his dealings with local government.

That these transactions between lords and their household military retainers were understood in 'moral' rather than 'commercial' terms, that is as exchanges of free gifts rather than sales of commodities, is supported not only by the language of the sources but by current interpretations of the economy of pre-Viking England. The orthodox view, which owes much to the work of the archaeologist Richard Hodges, represents commerce in the seventh and eighth centuries as having been organized around large coastal trading sites. These *emporia* or *wics* were 'gateway communities' that linked the undeveloped economic periphery, England, with a more economically developed core across the Channel in Francia.[28] Luxury goods from the continent flowed into the emporia, where, under the supervision of royal port-reeves, they were exchanged for raw materials and locally produced craft goods. Emporia such as Hamwic and *Lundenwic* were, according to this model, created and regulated by kings, and served as the terminus points for estate networks through which lords, secular and ecclesiastical, extracted and disposed of surplus wealth in what was a redistributive, command economy. As such, wics 'were symbolic of a command economy, existing to provide the elite with a monopoly access to luxury traded goods, and hence to allow royal patronage, which was still very much the language of power.'[29] Wics did not serve as the heads of regional systems of production and exchange as would the burhs in the tenth and eleventh centuries; they looked outward rather than toward their hinterlands. They were, in short, mechanisms through which the Anglo-Saxon elite, secular and ecclesiastical, could acquire and control the economic and ideological profits of overseas trade in socially prestigious goods.[30]

The agrarian economy was similar. The great estates of the seventh- and eighth-century elite consisted of multiple dependencies, sometimes several miles distant from one another, all of which paid renders or 'tribute' to a central estate. Because these 'multiple estates' were supposed to provide their landlords with all the material resources they required, the outliers would often have specialized economic functions. The entire system was designed to produce 'tribute' for the consumption of the elite.[31] The economic world of pre-Viking England was thus characterized by tribute, gifts, and peasant subsistence rather than by markets and commodity exchange, although the latter certainly existed to some extent.[32]

Given the nature of this economy, it is not to be wondered that traders were regarded as suspicious characters. The late seventh-century West Saxon code of King Ine expresses concern that a company of traders (*ciepemen*) venturing 'up country' might become a band of thieves.[33] Alfred, two centuries later, repeated this concern and ordered that a trader planning to venture inland should report first to a king's reeve, at a public meeting, with all the men he planned to take up country. The trader, according to Alfred's law, was to be responsible for the good behavior of his men and for bringing them to justice.[34] This precaution was necessary precisely because the status of traders was anomalous. As lordless men they did not fit easily into the existing social networks for the maintenance of public order.

The very nature of the pre-Viking English economy thus militated against the employment of mercenaries. Quite simply, the English economy was not sufficiently commercialized in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries for military service to be treated as a high-end commodity. By the late ninth century, however, the English economy had begun to change in significant ways, largely in response to the Viking invasions. The emporia proved ephemeral. They withered and collapsed in the ninth century with the upsurge in North Sea piracy and repeated Viking sackings. Although piracy did not end cross-Channel trade, it did make it far chancier and less profitable. The raids and ravaging of Viking *heres* disrupted the economy of the English hinterlands as well, affecting in particular the endowments of the great monasteries, which had been the hub of much economic activity in the seventh and eighth centuries.

But, paradoxically, the Vikings may also have contributed to England's economic development and growth. Viking activities included trading and settlement as well as raiding, and, as Christopher Dyer reminds us, in the ninth century 'these different sources of profit were closely connected.'[35] When one thinks of Vikings such things as longships, spears, shields, helmets and swords come to mind; but scales and weights are equally representative of the activities engaged in by these Scandinavians abroad. Once Vikings had acquired plunder and slaves, they became traders. In this way they restored into economic circulation large amounts of silver that had been stored in church plate and ornaments. In doing this, the Vikings helped move the focus of commercial activity away from long-distance trade in luxury items to domestic craft production and regional markets. Their demands for tribute also probably contributed to an increase in the amount of coins minted and to

the quality of that currency. Although an immense amount of silver was carried off to Scandinavia, a significant portion of the shared-out tribute was probably spent on the spot.

By the end of Alfred's reign there are indications that the English economy had begun to become more monetized and commercialized. Like all good Anglo-Saxon kings and lords before him, Alfred materially expressed his love for his *hiredmen* through gifts. By the late ninth century, however, these rewards came in the form of coins as well as rings and robes. By his own testimony, Alfred rewarded his household warriors with stipends of cash at regular intervals. In his will he left 'to the men who follow me' 200 pounds in silver coins, to be 'divided between them, to each as much as will belong to him according to the manner in which I have just now [at Easter] made distribution to them.'[36]

Alfred's military household retainers were paid men who served him out of love and loyalty, not mercenaries. But some of the foreigners who flocked to Alfred's court probably were. The Frisian sailors who helped man his newly created fleet in 896, for instance, look very much like naval mercenaries.[37] It would be surprising if mercenary service remained unknown in ninth-century England. From the middle of the ninth century on, Frankish and Breton rulers had been hiring Viking muscle, and at least one Viking mercenary captain, Weland, operated on both sides of the Channel.[38] It is reasonable to think that there was also an active 'market' for the services of 'young guns' across the Channel. That ninth-century Anglo-Saxons were familiar with mercenary service and compared it unfavorably with the service of *hiredmen* is suggested by a passage in the poem *Beowulf*. Beowulf, now an aged king, is made to reflect upon his career, in particular upon the service he rendered his kinsman and lord King Hygelac: 'I repaid in war the treasures [*geald æt guðe*] that he gave me—with bright sword, as was granted by fate: he had given me land, a pleasant dwelling. There was not any need for him, any reason, that he should have to seek among the Gifthas or the Spear-Danes or in Sweden in order to buy with treasure [*weorðe gecypan*] a worse warrior.'[39] The language in this passage invites an unfavorable comparison between honorable retainers, such as Beowulf, who answer past gifts with continuing service, and rootless warriors who could be bought with treasure [*weorðe gecypan*]. *Gecypan*, the standard verb for buying merchandise, is the language of the marketplace, and it is tempting to believe that the poet wanted his audience to think in terms of commercial trafficking. If so, a Christian audience

might well have made the connection with John's parable of the good shepherd and the unreliable hireling. If, as many now believe, *Beowulf* was composed in the late ninth century, perhaps even in association with Alfred's court, the poem's disparagement of mercenary service may help explain why there are no explicit references to mercenaries in the sources for Alfred's reign. Given how carefully Alfred controlled his image, one might speculate that the absence of mercenaries from Asser's *Life of King Alfred* and from the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* was deliberate. Asser may well have recast Alfred's hired soldiers and sailors as loyal *hiredmen*, much as eighth- and ninth-century charters sometimes disguised sales of lands to monasteries as pious donations.[40] The negative connotations of mercenary military service hinted at in *Beowulf* may explain why the heriot, a dead warrior's return of the gift of arms to his lord, resisted commutation into a cash payment.[41]

Alfred's reign marks a watershed in English political and economic history.[42] His creation of a network of fortified towns termed *burhs* to defend Wessex not only provided the political and administrative framework for a highly centralized and effective monarchy but the foundations of a precociously monetized and commericalized economy. During the tenth century England experienced an economic boom, aided by an aggressive royal monetary and economic policy. King Edgar the Peaceable (959–75) ordered that there be one coinage and one system of measurement, and one standard of weights' in the royal realm.[43] English kings from Æthelstan (924–39) on guaranteed the supply, quality, and authenticity of the coinage. Numismatists estimate that tens of millions of silver pennies circulated in late tenth-century England, supporting what had become an increasingly commercialized economy and society. The commercialization of English society occurred in both town and countryside. The burghal system Alfred created and which his children extended to Mercia and the Danelaw worked so well that by the middle of the tenth century the West Saxon dynasty could reasonably claim to be kings of a consolidated kingdom that possessed the approximate boundaries of present-day England.

Neither Alfred nor his children probably planned an urban revolution when they dotted their kingdom with fortified towns and forts. Nonetheless, over the course of the tenth century, their burhs evolved into urban centers for craft production and commercial exchanges. From their inception, burhs served as centers for royal administration. Because market transactions, in particular sales of cattle, were a source of potential disputes leading to public disorder, Alfred's successors took

an active interest in restricting them as much possible to royal towns where these transactions could be conducted before witnesses and under the careful supervision of a 'port reeve.'[44] Similarly, moneyers were only allowed to strike coins in specified burhs.[45] As military threats waned, administrative functions and economic activities eclipsed the burh's original military purpose. Defenses were slighted to facilitate commercial traffic, while burhs poorly sited for commerce were abandoned entirely. There was a virtual explosion in the growth of towns and urban population. In 1066 there were probably over a hundred towns in England.[46] Christopher Dyer estimates that the percentage of town dwellers in England increased fourfold between 850 and 1066, so that by the end of the Anglo-Saxon period urban dwellers accounted for about 10% of the English population.[47]

The agrarian economy also became more highly monetized and commercialized during the tenth century.[48] Money played a critical role in the emerging agrarian economy. Peasants were expected to pay rent to their lords and taxes to the king and church with money obtained from selling their surpluses in town markets. They and their lords also used cash to purchase craft goods, agricultural tools, and jewelry from specialized craftsmen.[49] For the aristocracy, in particular, day to day living had become expensive. The elite foods they ate and the clothes they wore required the outlay of considerable cash.[50] Many of these country gentlemen had residences in the towns and participated actively in the urban economy.[51] Towards the end of the tenth-century the word *rice*, which earlier had meant 'a man of power' (*potens*), assumed its current meaning of one who possesses material wealth.[52]

In short, by the late tenth century, the English economy was far more highly commercialized and monetized than it had been a century before. This had a profound impact upon the military organization of Late Anglo-Saxon England. Military service became, in all of its forms, paid labor. By 1066 royal custom dictated that fyrdmen, the troops levied for royal military campaigns on the basis of one soldier per five hides of land, were to be paid 20 shillings in cash for 60 days of service. We shall return presently to the significance of this level of pay for *fyrdmen*, but before we do, let us first consider the impact of commercialization upon the organization of the late Anglo-Saxon military, and in particular upon the recruitment of mercenaries in the late tenth and eleventh centuries.

When Viking fleets suddenly returned to England in 980, they found a peaceful and wealthy land ripe for pillaging, with a royal administration

capable of extracting immense amounts of silver from the inhabitants. The English military system that King Æthelred II had at his disposal was inadequate to meet the new threat, especially as it intensified in the 990s.[53] But if the Æthelred was 'unready' to deal with the raiders, it was not his fault. Even before he ascended the throne the expensive Alfredian military system of an integrated defensive network of garrisoned burhs supported by a standing mobile field army had disappeared. Some of the boroughs remained defensible, but none now had permanent garrisons. The royal army had been weakened. Not only was Alfred's standing mobile field army a thing of the past, but the fyrd, to some degree, had been privatized. First bishops and abbots and then secular magnates secured royal privileges allowing them to raise and lead the troops owed from their lands.

Æthelred recognized the inadequacy of his kingdom's military resources to counter the Viking raiders and took steps to remedy the situation. Notable among these was his decision to purchase the military services of some of these raiders to ward off others. This policy was being implemented as early as 994. In that year a Viking fleet of 94 ships under the dual command of Olaf Tryggvason and Swein Forkbeard 'did,' in the words of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 'the greatest damage that a *here* could do, by burning, ravaging, and slaying, everywhere along the coast, and in Kent, Sussex, and Hampshire.'[54] Æthelred and his councillors' response was to pay a tribute of 16,000 pounds and raise provisions for the fleet in its winter quarters in Southampton. Subsequently, Æthelred sent to Olaf a high level delegation of bishops and ealdormen to conduct the young Viking chieftain 'with great honour' to the royal palace at Andover. Here Æthelred showered him with gifts worthy of a king and stood sponsor at his confirmation, much as Alfred had done for the Viking chieftains Guthrum and Hasteinn a century before. At this meeting the two apparently concluded a treaty, the text of which has been preserved as II *Æthelred*. After announcing a general truce (*woroldfrið*) between 'Æthelred, and all his people, and the whole raiding-army to which the king gave the tribute,' the treaty dictates:

> (1.1). If any hostile fleet harry in England, we are to have the help of all of them; and we must supply them with provisions as they long as they are with us.
> (1.2). And each of those lands which affords protection to any of those who harry England shall be regarded as an enemy by us and by the whole *here*.[55]

The terms of the treaty included a further payment of 22,000 pounds in gold and silver. Swein is conspicuous by his absence, and it is possible that the treaty was Æthelred's attempt to divide his enemies.[56] Shortly thereafter, Olaf, enriched with English treasure and perhaps accompanied by English missionaries,[57] returned to Norway to seize the kingship in defiance of Swein's claims over that kingdom.[58] But from the treaty's provisions regulating feuds and trading between Danes and Englishmen, it would seem that at least part of the fleet remained in England, serving Æthelred as a mercenary army to deter future raiders. Æthelred endowed some of the fleet's leaders, notably, the Danish chieftain Pallig, with estates in return for pledges of loyalty, in an attempt to embed them into the existing political and social structures. This may not have proved a good bargain as matters turned out. In 997 a Viking fleet, perhaps including some of those who were supposed to be in Æthelred's service, ravaged the West Country. Four years later, when a new Viking fleet appeared off the coast of Devonshire, Pallig joined the raiders with as many ships as he could assemble, 'in spite of all the pledges he had given' and the gifts of land and gold and silver he had received from the king.[59] Æthelred's response was to purchase another peace with the Vikings for 24,000 pounds. On St. Brice's Day in 1002, Æthelred made a bold attempt to eliminate the problem of untrustworthy Danish mercenaries in one fell swoop by ordering (in the words of a royal charter of 1004) a 'most just extermination' of 'all the Danes who had sprung up in this island, sprouting like cockles amongst the wheat'.[60] There can be no clearer testimony than this to Pallig and his fellow Danish mercenaries remaining a people apart.

Æthelred's next attempt to purchase Viking mercenaries proved more satisfactory. Between 1009 and 1012 a large Viking fleet under the command of one of the most successful freelance Vikings of the day, Thorkell the Tall, devastated much of southern England. English forces once more proved completely inadequate and Æthelred in 1012 was forced to pay the raiders an immense tribute, some 48,000 pounds, in addition to supplying them with sufficient food and wine, which in itself was no mean feat. For reasons unknown, Thorkell suddenly decided that it was more profitable to eat at the king's table than to steal food from it. He struck a deal with Æthelred. He and his forty-five ships would defend Æthelred's realm in return for being fed and clothed. To fulfill his end of the bargain Æthelred instituted a regular tax, the much hated impost known as the *heregeld*.[61] When in the fol-

lowing year Æthelred's government collapsed in the face of Swein's invasion and the promised provisions failed to materialize, Thorkell returned to his Viking ways. In spite of this understandable relapse, what is more striking is that Thorkell apparently remained loyal to King Æthelred for the duration of his reign. In this his record is far superior to a number of Æthelred's English earls. In 1013 when it was clear that Æthelred had lost his kingdom, Thorkell's fleet gave the king refuge and carried him to the safety of Normandy. Thorkell, however, probably did switch allegiances to Cnut after Æthelred's death 1016, otherwise it would be impossible to explain why Cnut entrusted him with the province of East Anglia.[62]

Nicholas Hooper has identified two major developments in military organization during Cnut's reign, the establishment of the king's housecarls and what Hooper sees as a standing army, the lithsmen.[63] Neither, I believe, were innovations but rather variations on existing themes. Cnut's housecarls were precisely what the word indicates, his Scandinavian military household. Like King Alfred's household thegns, the housecarls were royal retainers who specialized in, but whose services were not limited to, war. We find them in the sources performing such miscellaneous duties as manning garrisons, witnessing charters, and collecting taxes. That they had some sort of corporate existence and were salaried is beyond serious doubt. The early eleventh-century saw the advent of the gild, and just as there were gilds of thegns and *cnihtas*, there is no reason to believe that there wasn't also a gild of royal housecarls.[64] But in other respects they were traditional, stipendiary royal dependents in the mold of Alfred's salaried household warriors.[65]

Cnut's *lithsmen*, the crews of the forty ships that the new king retained in his service after the rest of his fleet dispersed, may be thought of as the successors to Thorkell's mercenary fleet. In the changed political circumstances of a conquered kingdom, however, they became something new: a standing royal mercenary naval force.[66] One of the first things that Cnut did following his accession to the throne was to reimpose the *heregeld* as a annual levy to maintain the crews of these forty ships. As a foreigner who had won the English throne by force, Cnut needed a standing army to discourage would be rebels, and the lithsmen served that function. By the end of his reign, Cnut felt secure enough to reduce the fleet to sixteen ships, which remained the fleet's size throughout the reign of his successor Harald Harefoot. Hardacnut's accession to the throne in 1040 had the trappings of an invasion. He

came from Denmark with sixty-two ships and immediately imposed a large tax on his new subjects to pay the crews.[67] His English half-brother, Edward the Confessor, on the other hand, in 1050 paid off and dismissed the lithsmen of nine of the fourteen ships that then made up the royal fleet; the crews of the remaining five were promised only twelve-months pay. [68] At the mid-Lent meeting of the royal council in London in 1051 Edward dismissed the remaining ships and formally abolished the *heregeld*. This greatly pleased the author of the 'D' version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, who explained that the *heregeld* had oppressed the English ever since it was first imposed by King Æthelred thirty-nine years before. 'That tax,' he explained, 'always came before other taxes, which were variously paid, and it oppressed people in many ways.'[69]

The oppressive character of the *heregeld* does not come as a surprise. It cost an enormous amount of money to maintain a standing mercenary naval force that at its lowest consisted of fourteen ships manned by about a thousand soldiers and which at its peak comprised sixty-two ships and some four thousand men.[70] The lithsmen's service did not rest upon an ethos of reciprocal love and loyalty but simply on an expectation of payment. Their importance to Cnut and his Danish successors is indicated by how much they were willing to pay for their services. The lithsmen's annual wage of 8 marks, amounting either to four or six pounds, for ordinary sailors and 12 marks for steersmen, was, in James Campbell's words, 'really big money,' and placed them 'among the tiny population which was really well off.'[71] As a standing military force they possessed considerable clout. Indeed in 1035 they played king-maker by supporting Earl Leofric's and Earl Siward's choice of Harald Harefoot in preference to his half-brother Harthacnut.[72] Karl Leyser had a point when he compared the lithsmen to janissaries.[73] As outsiders, they were invaluable to kings who regarded their realm as subject territory, but they were also politically dangerous. Edward the Confessor's decision to dismiss them and to abolish the *heregeld* might seem foolhardy, especially in hindsight. But just as Harthacnut's mercenary fleet of sixty-two ships announced the insecurity of his rule, Edward's grand gesture was a proclamation that England had a legitimate English king who could rely upon the loyalty of his earls and subjects. The notion that only tyrants and illegitimate rulers needed the support of mercenaries may well underlie William

of Malmesbury's tendentious assertion that King Harold Godwineson had very few Englishmen with him at Hastings apart from stipendiary and mercenary soldiers (*stipendiarios et mercennarios milites*).[74]

The monetized character of English society on the eve of the Conquest is reflected by the paid service of fyrdmen, to which I previously alluded, and it is with this topic that I will conclude my survey. The well-known military recruitment rule that appears at the beginning of the Berkshire Domesday Book states that 'if the king sent an army anywhere, only one soldier [*miles*] went from five hides, and four shillings were given for his subsistence or wages from each hide for two months. The money, indeed, was not sent to the king, but was given to the soldiers.'[75] I have written at length on the evidence that Domesday Book affords for military recruitment and obligation on the eve of the Conquest and need not rehearse those arguments here.[76] For our purposes present, it suffices to observe that the *milites* of the Berkshire customs were military tenants and domestic warriors retained by the holders of bookland to acquit their estates of their military liability, and that these soldiers were stipendiary troops paid by those landowners. A salary of 20 shillings for two months service compares favorably with the wages paid the lithsmen earlier in the century. This high level of pay established by the Crown ensured the quality of his fyrd soldiers. By setting the fyrdmen's wages at twenty shillings the king was trying to guarantee that he would receive professional warriors rather than poorly paid and provisioned peasants. That the soldiers brought money rather than provisions with them on campaign suggests that they were expected to purchase their food, drink, and other supplies, perhaps from traders who accompanied the army or at markets set up by the army's commanders. This is another reminder of the commercialized character of the English economy in 1066.

The Berkshire *miles* brings us back to our initial distinction between stipendiary and mercenary forces. Like my students, the fyrdman was a stipendiary soldier whose obligation to service rested on more than the acceptance of wages. Domesday shire customs make it clear that he was either a landowner directly acquitting the military service due from his land, or the commended man of such a landowner. As a paid military retainer, a *miles* of the latter sort was obliged to serve his immediate lord rather than the king. The law codes and Domesday Book make it clear that he was answerable to his lord for any dereliction of duty,

and that his lord, and not he, was accountable to the king.[77] Ethically, the Berkshire *miles* stood in the same relationship to the bookholder who paid him as a household warrior to his lord.

This is not to deny the existence of mercenaries in England in 1066. There clearly were. Domesday Book records military recruitment customs for the boroughs of Oxford, Warwick, and Malmesbury that allowed the burgesses to commute their military obligations at the rate of 20 shillings per fyrdman.[78] Commutation of military service for cash strongly suggests a reservoir of professional mercenaries whom the king could hire in lieu of those fyrdmen. The mysterious butsecarls, 'boatmen,' whom Earl Godwin in 1052 and his son Earl Tostig in 1066 recruited from the boroughs of Sussex and Kent to complement the foreign mercenaries they hired in support of their respective rebellions, may have been professional sailor-warriors for hire. Some have speculated that butsecarls were royal garrison troops in the Cinque Ports.[79] There is some reason to believe that King Edward employed a company of 'butsecarls' for whose upkeep he was responsible. This is the implication of the Domesday custom of the borough of Malmesbury. The burgesses, we are told, had the choice of sending one soldier on royal expeditions or of paying the king 20 shillings to feed ' his butsecarls' (*ad pascendos suos buzecarles*).[80] But one probably ought to resist the temptation of reading 'butsecarl' as a technical term with a single meaning. The word probably meant no more than 'sailor for hire.'

Despite the Domesday Book evidence for mercenary service, I think that the pool of mercenaries hanging around England in 1066 could not have been very large. The demand simply wasn't there. With the exception of the Welsh marches, the kingdom had enjoyed relative peace for over a decade. As sailors for hire, 'butsecarls' could easily find employment in the burgeoning shipping and fishing industries of the Cinque Ports. But dedicated professional mercenary soldiers are quite another matter. Without war or the threat of war, they starve. The Continent was another matter, and even Norman sources show mercenaries flocking to the banner of Duke William, lured by the promise of pay and booty. *Pace* William of Malmesbury, it was the Conqueror and not King Harold whose fortunes rested in the hands of mercenary soldiers.

To conclude, then, stipendiary soldiers, whether their pay was in cash or kind, played an important role throughout the Anglo-Saxon period. With the notable exception of the period between 1012 and 1051, mercenaries did not. In pre-Viking England the lack of mercenaries

was a consequence of an aristocratic ethos that emphasized reciprocal loyalty between lord and dependent, combined with a redistributive, command economy in which commercial exchange played a subordinate role. Although the growing commercialization and monetization of the English economy from the late ninth century on made mercenary military service possible, the old heroic ideals of lordship militated against its respectability. It was not until the end of the tenth century that the English state began to hire mercenaries in earnest, and that was out of desperation. On the other hand, these economic developments led to a situation in which household retainers and fyrdmen alike were paid in cash. The ethos that infused their service, however, remained in both cases very much shaped by traditional ideals of lordship, love, and loyalty.

Notes

[1] Steven Isaac, 'The Problem with Mercenaries', in Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (eds), *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, 1999), 100–10, warns against the tendency to impute later negative connotations to the 'mercenary label' in dealing with eleventh- and twelfth-century Anglo-Norman sources. I would like to thank Stephen Morillo, Steven Isaac, and Robin Fleming for their helpful criticisms and insights. I am also much indebted to my colleagues at the United States Naval Academy who read and discussed an earlier draft of this piece in our History Department's Works-in-Progress Seminar.

[2] Stephen Morillo, *infra*, pp. 243–60.

[3] Guy Halsall, *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900* (London, 2003), 112.

[4] *Mercennarius* in classical Latin: *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed., P.G.W. Glare (Oxford, 1982), 1101; *mercennarius* in early medieval Latin: J.F. Niermeyer (ed.), *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus* (Leiden, 2002) 2.876–7 and see Joseph Bosworth and T. Northcote Toller, *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary* (1989) and *Supplement* (1921) (accessed online at http://www.ling.upenn.edu/~kurisuto/germanic/oe_bosworthtoller_about.html), 672 (defined as '1. a merchant's servant, commercial agent, factor; 2. leaseholder, lessee'; for *mercennarius* glossed or translated as *celmertmonn* (p. 150), *esne-man* and *esne-wyrhtahyra* (258), and *med-gilda* (675).

[5] I could find only one instance in a search of the electronic Old English corpus in which *mercennarius* or any of the Anglo-Saxon words used to translate it appear in a military context. An eleventh-century glossary explains that a *lixa*, a Latin word usually translated as 'sutler' or 'camp-follower,' is a *mercennarius militis qui est calo dicitur*, 'a hired servant of a soldier who is called a *calo*.' L. Kindschi, ed., 'The Latin-Old English Glossaries in Plantin Moretus MS 32 and British Museum MS Additional 32246', Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford U, 1955, line 6. For *lixa*, see Oxford Latin Dictionary, p. 1038. Significantly, even here *mercennarius* is not used to describe military service *per se*, but rather those hired by soldiers to carry their provisions.

[6] The second element of the compound, *mert*, may be derived from *meord*, pay or reward.

⁷ *Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem*, ed. Robert Weber, 3rd edn. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1983), p. 1677; trans. *The Jerusalem Bible*, Reader's Edition (Garden City, New York, 1968), 133. Cf. the matter of fact treatment of military pay, *stipendia*, in Luke 3:14: [Jesus's admonition to soldiers] 'interrogabant autem eum et milites dicentes quid faciemus et nos et ait illis neminem concuciatis neque calumniam faciatis et contenti estote stipendiis vestris'; 1 Cor. 9:7: 'quis militat suis stipendiis umquam quis plantat vineam et fructum eius non edit quis pascit gregem et de lacte gregis non manducat'; 1 Mac 3:28: 'et aperuit aerarium suum et dedit stipendia exercitui in annum et mandavit illis ut essent parati ad omnia'; 1 Mac 14:32: 'tunc restitit Simon et pugnavit pro gente sua et erogavit multas pecunias et armavit viros virtutis gentis suae et dedit eis stipendia.'

⁸ See Ælfric of Eynsham's homily on this text. Peter Clemoes, (ed.), *Ælfric's Catholic Homilies: The First Series, Text*, EETS s.s. 17 (Oxford, 1997), 313, 314, 315.

⁹ Gildas, *The Ruin of Britain and other works*, ed. and trans. Michael Winterbottom (London and Chichester, 1978), Chap. 23 (26–27, 97).

¹⁰ Christopher A. Snyder, *An Age of Tyrants. Britain and the Britons, A.D. 400–600* (Stroud, 1998), 112. See Ian Wood, 'The Ends of Roman Britain: Continental Evidence and Parallels', in Michael Lapidge and David N. Dumville, (eds.), *Gildas: New Approaches* (Woodbridge, 1984), 21; Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Gildas, Vortigern, and Constitutionality in Sub-Roman Britain,' *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 32 (1988), 35. But cf. Michael Lapidge, 'Gildas's Education and the Latin Culture of Sub-Roman Britain,' in Lapidge and Dumville, ed., *Gildas: New Approaches*, 25–50.

¹¹ Bede eliminated the terms *epimenia* and *munificentia*. In rewriting Gildas's account, Bede has Vortigern grant the Saxons, Angles, and Jutes land and wages (*stipendia*), 'on condition that they fought against their foes for the peace and safety of the country.' He retained the terms *foedus* and *annonae*, which he explicitly equated with food supplies (*alimentorum copia*). *Bede's Ecclesiastical History*, 1.15, ed. Bertram Colgrave and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford, 1969), 50, 52.

¹² For the importance of moveable wealth for early Anglo-Saxon rulers, see T.M. Charles-Edwards, 'The Distinction between Land and Moveable Wealth in Anglo-Saxon England', in P.H. Sawyer (ed.) *Medieval Settlement. Continuity, and Change*, (London, 1976), 180–90. James Campbell, 'The Sales of Land and the Economics of Power,' *Haskins Society Journal* 1 (1989), 23–37, reprinted in Campbell, *The Anglo-Saxon State* (London, 2000), 227–45, makes the interesting (though ultimately unpersuasive) suggestion that moveable wealth may have been more important than land for the establishment of stable royal power.

¹³ *Letter to Egbert*, in Charles Plummer (ed.), *Venerabilis Baedae Opera Historica*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1896), 1:405–23, 415.

¹⁴ Richard P. Abels, *Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England* (Los Angeles and London, 1988), 32, citing *Beowulf*, ll. 70–81, 160, 621, 1189–90, 1718–19, 1749–50, 2490–6; *Deor* ll. 35–42; *Widsith* ll. 89–96; Bede, *HE* iii.1, iv.22; *Letter to Egbert*, in Plummer, *Baedae*, 1:405–23, at 414–17.

¹⁵ Plummer, *Baedae*, 1:414–15.

¹⁶ M. Godden, 'Money, Power and Morality in Late Anglo-Saxon England', *Anglo-Saxon England* 19 (1990), 41–65.

¹⁷ *Beowulf*, ll. 4–11.

¹⁸ *HE* iii.14, ed. Colgrave and Mynors, pp. 256–9.

¹⁹ *HE* iii.14, ed. Colgrave and Mynors, pp. 256–9.

²⁰ Asser, ch. 76. *Asser's Life of King Alfred together with the Annals of St. Neots*, ed. W.H. Stevenson (Oxford, 1904), 60.

²¹ *Beowulf*, ll. 2196–99; *Widsith*, ll. 89–96.

²² Abels, *Lordship and Military Obligation*, 30–1; *Swerian*, c. 1, ed. Felix Liebermann, *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, 3 vols. (Halle, 1903–1916), 1:396–7.

²³ *Alfred's Soliloquies*, ed. Carnicelli, 62–3.

[24] Richard Abels, *Alfred the Great: War, Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England* (London, 1998), 254–5.

[25] Walter John Sedgefield, ed., *King Alfred's Old English Version of Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae* (Oxford, 1899), 166–7.

[26] Asser, ch. 10, trans. Keynes and Lapidge, 106.

[27] *King Alfred's Boethius*, ch. 17, trans. Keynes and Lapidge, *Alfred the Great*, 132.

[28] Richard Hodges, *Dark Age Economics. The Origins of Towns and Trade, AD 600–1000*, 2nd edn. (London, 1989), 150–85.

[29] Ben Palmer, 'The Hinterlands of Three Southern English *Emporia*: Some Common Themes,' in Tim Pestell and Katharina Ulmschneider (eds), *Markets in Medieval Europe. Trading and 'Productive' Sites, 650–850*, ed. (Macclesfield, Cheshire, 2003), 48–59, at 49. Although Ben Palmer is skeptical about the validity of this paradigm outside of Wessex, he provides a good summary of its main points.

[30] Christopher Scull, 'Urban Centers in Pre-Viking England?' in John Hines, ed., *The Anglo-Saxons from the Migration Period to the Eighth Century, An Ethnographic Perspective* (Woodbridge, 1997), 284.

[31] Christopher Dyer, *Making a Living in the Middle Ages. The People of Britain, 850–1520* (New Haven and London, 2002), 27–30.

[32] This is not to argue that smaller, local markets did not exist in the hinterlands, or even that there were no periodic 'beach-markets' at which overseas trade was carried on. The recent explosion in seventh- and eighth-century coin finds as a result of the growing popularity of metal-detecting in Britain implies the existence of numerous inland sites at which money was used, perhaps (though not certainly) in local markets. But even these so-called 'productive sites' appear to have been integrated into what was mainly a redistributive rather than true market economy. Most historians still discount their importance to the overall economy, which remained subsistence for peasants and extractive for their lords. For discussions of these 'productive sites' and consideration of their economic significance, see Pestell and Ulmschneider, *Markets in Medieval Europe*.

[33] *Ine* 25.1, ed. F.L. Attenborough, *The Laws of the Earliest English Kings* (Cambridge, 1922; repr. AMS Press, 1974), 44.

[34] Attenborough, *Alfred* 34, 78.

[35] Dyer, *Making a Living in the Middle Ages*, 45–6.

[36] F. E. Harmer, *Select English Historical Documents of the Ninth and Tenth Centuries* (Cambridge, 1914), no. 14: '& þam mannum þe me folgiað, þe ic nu on Eastertidum feoh sealde, twa hund punda agyfe man him & dæle man him betweoh, ælcum swa him to gebyrian wille æfter þære wisan þe ic him nu dælde.'

[37] *ASC*, s.a. 896. See Abels, *Alfred the Great*, 306–7.

[38] *Annals of St Bertin*, s.a. 861. In 860 Weland led a Viking *here* based on the Somme in what proved to be an unsuccessful raid on Wessex. From continental sources, we know that this same Viking army had in the previous year entered into a formal contract, a *locarium*, with the West Frankish King Charles the Bald whereby they were to be paid three thousand pounds of silver to rid the Seine basin of another and, to Charles, more immediately threatening Viking band. Hincmar's use of *locarium*, indicating a pay-for-hire contract, rather than *tributum*, is significant. He used the same term to describe Salomon's arrangement with the twelve ships that he took into his service in 862, and for Lothar II's payment of cash and provisions to Rodulf in 864. Cf. *Annals of St Bertin*, s.a. 884, where *locarium* refers to a formal lease of territory. See Simon Coupland, 'From poachers to gamekeepers: Scandinavian warlords and Carolingian kings', *Early Medieval Europe* 7 (1998), 101–2, n. 91. Niermeyer, *Lexicon Minus*, s.v. *locarius* (.618).

[39] *Beowulf*, ll. 2493–6, trans. E. Talbot Donaldson, in Joseph F. Tuso (ed.), *Beowulf. The Donaldson Translation, Backgrounds and Sources Criticism* (New York, 1975), 44. F. Klaeber (ed.), *Beowulf and the Fight at Finnsburg* (Boston, 1950), 94.

[40] Campbell, 'Sale of Land,' 231, citing Sawyer nos. 282, 319, in 'The Electronic Sawyer: An online version of the revised edition of Sawyer's *Anglo-Saxon Charters*,' prepared by S.E. Kelly and adapted for WWW by S. Miller, http://www.trin.cam. ac.uk/chartwww/eSawyer.99/eSawyer2.html.

[41] Abels, *Lordship and Military Obligation*, 138, 265–66 n. 45.

[42] For its importance for future economic developments, see S.R.H. Jones, 'Transaction Costs, Institutional Change, and the Emergence of a Market Economy in Late Anglo-Saxon England,' *Economic History Review* 46 (1993).

[43] III *Edg* 8.1.

[44] I *Edw* 1; II *As* 12; 14.1; III *Edm* 5; IV *Edg* 6.

[45] II *As* 14; 14.2; IV *Atr.* 9.

[46] David Griffiths, 'Exchange, Trade, and Urbanization', in Wendy Davies (ed.), *From the Vikings to the Normans, 800–1100*, The Short Oxford History of the British Isles (Oxford: Oxford, 2003), 98; Dyer, *Making Living in the Middle Ages*, 62.

[47] Dyer, *Making a Living in the Middle Ages*, 62.

[48] Robin Fleming, 'Lords and Labour,' in Davies, *From the Vikings to the Normans*, 109–11.

[49] Dyer, *Making a Living*, 39–40. See also James Campbell, 'Was it Infancy in England? Some Questions of Comparison,' in Campbell, *The Anglo-Norman State*, 179–99, for a maximalist view of the Anglo-Saxon economy. Robin Fleming points out that excavations of tenth- and eleventh-century thegnly residences have uncovered manufactured goods but little evidence of craft activities on site. Fleming, 'Lords and Labour,' 113.

[50] Robin Fleming, 'The New Wealth, the New Rich, and the New Political Style in Late Anglo-Saxon England,' *Anglo-Norman Studies* 22 (2001), 1–22.

[51] Robin Fleming, 'Rural Elites and Urban Communities in Late-Saxon England,' *Past & Present* 141 (1993), 3–37.

[52] M. Godden, 'Money, Power and Morality in Late Anglo-Saxon England,' *Anglo-Saxon England* 19 (1990), 46–65.

[53] Richard Abels, 'From Alfred to Harold II: The Military Failure of the Late Anglo-Saxon State', in R.P. Abels and B.S. Bachrach (eds), *The Normans and their Adversaries at War* (Woodbridge, 2001), 22–9.

[54] ASC, s.a. 994; trans. D. Whitelock, *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (New Brunswick, 1961), 83.

[55] S.D. Keynes, 'The Historical Context', in Donald Scragg (ed.), *The Battle of Maldon AD 991* (Oxford, 1991), 106; A.J. Robertson, *The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I* (Cambridge, 1925; AMS reprint 1974), 57.

[56] Niels Lund, 'Peace and Non-Peace in the Viking Age Ottar in Biarmaland, the Rus in Byzantium, and Danes and Norwegians in England,' in J.E. Knirk (ed.), *Proceedings of the Tenth Viking Congress* (Oslow, 1987), 255–69, at 265–66.

[57] Lesley Abrams, 'The Anglo-Saxons and the Christianization of Scandinavia', *Anglo-Saxon England* 24 (1995), 213–49, at 220–3.

[58] Niels Lund, 'The Danish Perspective,' in Scragg, *Battle of Maldon*, 138–40; Theodore M. Andersson, 'The Viking Policy of Ethelred the Unready,' *Scandinavian Studies* 99 (1987), 284–95.

[59] For Pallig, see ASC, s.a. 1001. Simon Keynes suggests that Pallig received his 'great gifts, in estates and gold and silver' in connection with this treaty. S.D. Keynes, 'The Vikings in England: c. 790–1016,' in Peter Sawyer (ed.), *Oxford Illustrated History of the Vikings* (Oxford, 1997), 77.

[60] See Ann Williams, *Æthelred the Unready, The Ill-Counselled King* (London and New York, 2003), 52–55. The charter is Sawyer, no. 127, translated in *EHD*, I, no. 127, renewing title-deeds to St. Frideswide's, Oxford. St. Frideswide's lost its charters in a fire set by the burgesses, intent on killing the Danes who had taken refuge in the church.

[61] ASC, s.a. 1012.

[62] S.D. Keynes, 'Cnut's Earls,' in Alexander Rumble (ed.), *The Reign of Cnut, King of England, Denmark and Norway* (London: Leicester University Press, 1994), 54–7.

[63] Nicholas Hooper, 'Military Developments in the Reign of Cnut,' in Rumble, ed., *Reign of Cnut*, 87–105.

[64] Judith Jesch, *Ships and men in the Late Viking Age. The Vocabulary of Runic Inscriptions and Skaldic Verse* (Woodbridge, 2001), 239–43, discusses the use of the word *gildi* in Scandinavian runic inscriptions.

[65] Abels, *Lordship and Military Obligation*, 167–72.

[66] Hooper, 'Military Developments,' 89, 97–100. The word *liðsmen*, it must be acknowledged, in itself does not connote mercenary or paid service. In late tenth- and early eleventh-century Scandinavia the basic meaning of the term *lið* was a troop or crew and, by extension, a fleet. In runic inscriptions and Scandinavian skaldic poetry *liðsmen* often denoted the crews of naval fleets, warrior-sailors. Given that Vikings used their ships to carry them to the territories that they ravaged by land, it is not surprising that the poem *Liðsmannaflokkr* begins with a *liðsman* urging his companions, 'Let us go ashore, before warriors and large militias learn that the English homelands are being traversed with shields: let us be brave in brattle, brandish spears and hurl them; great numbers of the English flee before our swords.' Quoted by Judith Jesch, p. 199. For a full discussion of the terms *lið* and its compounds, see Jesch, pp. 187–95, 198–200.

[67] ASC, s.a. 1040 E, 1040 C.

[68] ASC, s.a. 1050 E, 1049 C.

[69] ASC, s.a. 1052 D.

[70] Lawson, *Cnut*, p. 177.

[71] James Campbell, 'Some Agents and Agencies of the Late Anglo-Saxon State,' in *The Anglo-Saxon State*, 206–7.

[72] ASC, s.a. 1036 E, F.

[73] Karl Leyser, *Communications and Power in Medieval Europe*, ed. Timothy Reuter (London, 1994), 109.

[74] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum Anglorum*, 2.228.12, ed. and trans. R.A.B. Mynors, R.M. Thomson and M. Winterbottom (Oxford, 1998), 1:422.

[75] DB i. 56v.

[76] Abels, *Lordship and Military Obligation*, 97–161.

[77] Abels, *Lordship and Military Obligation*, 145.

[78] DB i. 154, 238, 64v.

[79] For further discussion of the 'butsecarls', see C. Warren Hollister, *Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions on the Eve of the Norman Conquest* (Oxford, 1962), 16–19; Nicholas Hooper, 'Some observations on the navy in late Anglo-Saxon England,' in C. Harper-Bill, C.J. Holdsworth and J.L. Nelson (eds), *Studies in medieval history presented to R. Allen Brown*, (Woodbridge, 1989), 203–13.

[80] DB i. 64v.

MEROVINGIAN MERCENARIES AND PAID SOLDIERS IN IMPERIAL PERSPECTIVE

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I begin with the firm conviction, shared by many other scholars, that the various barbarians, including Franks, who came to dwell within the borders of Roman Gaul from the later third century forward were greatly acculturated.[1] As a result, little of a once widely heralded *Germanentum* survived into the early Middle Ages.[2] Rather, Latin, if the pun be excused, became the *lingua franca* of these barbarians.[3] The so-called *leges barbarorum*, e.g. *lex Salica, lex Burgundionum*, and the early redactions of the *leges Visigothorum*, not only were published in Latin, but were constructed by Gallo-Roman legal experts.[4] Indeed, the redactions are so thoroughly permeated by Roman law that it is difficult to identify very much that may be characterized as 'pure' Germanic law which may be presumed to antedate the settlement of these various groups within the empire.[5]

Patterns of land tenure, such as alods, *beneficia*, and *praecariae*, and, indeed, even including the much discussed *terra Salica*, were established by the imperial government under Roman law and do not reflect ancient Frankish customs.[6] In this context, it is clear that agricultural organization in Gaul during the early period of barbarian settlement was based upon Roman models. These subsequently underwent substantial new development with the introduction of the highly productive bi-partite estate, which was created in the eastern half of the later Roman Empire, and thereafter implanted to the west. This new form of estate organization in no way reflected either the agricultural organization or the tenurial arrangements of the various barbarians during the period when they lived beyond the borders of the empire.[7]

Of course, the Franks became Christians, indeed, Roman Christians, and before the end of the sixth century, both the Burgundians and the Visigoths abandoned the Arianism which they had acquired through missionaries such as Ulfilas prior to settlement within the empire.[8] Local administration, as illustrated by numerous surviving formularies and actual documents drawn upon the use of such formularies, continued

to follow imperial patterns.[9] Following the transfer of *regnum* from the imperial government to various barbarian kings the *civitas*, also called the *pagus*, continued to be the basis for provincial administration. Government at the local level was based within the fortress walls of the *urbs*, from where the *civitas* as a whole was administered. This basic pattern which flourished in the *regnum Francorum* continued to thrive throughout the early Middle Ages and beyond in the French kingdom.[10]

Early modern ideas concerning supposed ethnic or racial purity, which so grossly over-stimulated the imaginations of earlier generations of scholars, finally have been thoroughly discredited in the wake of Germany's defeat in World War Two.[11] It is clear that intermarriage played a key role, especially among the upper classes, in a thoroughgoing process of barbarian acculturation and assimilation.[12] Indeed, it is now clear that there is little reason to believe that any barbarian group of significant size in any part of Gaul was biologically homogeneous, and notions of race have ceased to be of relevance in the scholarly literature.[13] In virtually all matters of political, religious, economic, social, and ideological significance, *imitatio imperii*, where possible, dominated the behavior of the barbarian rulers who settled in Gaul.[14]

It is of great importance regarding military matters, which are the fundamental concern of this study, that the later Roman era saw the acculturation and integration of the barbarians throughout the 'hexagon'.[15] The information provided by Tacitus regarding the supposed military customs of the *Germani* and occasional observations by other Roman writers find little specific resonance in fourth, fifth, and sixth century Gaul and even much less in later times.[16] Even the supposed 'Germanic' *comitatus*, as exploited by generations of scholars committed to a Germanist Middle Ages and still enshrined in most Anglophone textbooks, finally has been put away by professional scholars along with feudalism.[17] It is now widely understood among specialists that the *Gefolgschaft*, evident in the Beowulf epic tradition, is a much distorted construct, embellished well beyond the realities of the historical past, by the overwrought imaginations of romantic historians.[18] I still hold, as I wrote in 1972: 'As with many aspects of Merovingian life, the military organization recalls *Romania* and not *Germania*.'[19]

Recruitment for the Imperial Army

The military organization of the Frankish *regna*, presumably including matters concerning mercenaries and other paid soldiers, was based firmly upon institutions that had functioned in later Roman Gaul. Thus, it is necessary, at the start, to understand the recruitment practices of the Roman government in order to identify which troops may have been considered mercenaries by contemporaries and why they were identified in this manner.[20] First, it is to be recognized that the regular Roman army, for all intents and purposes, was composed of paid conscripts. The vast majority of soldiers were recruited through the medium of a tax payment made by landowners, either individually or in groups.[21] In the west, these taxpayer groups were called chapters (*capitula*).[22] It is important to emphasize, in this context, that the tax was assessed on the value of the land and not as a direct burden on the person of the landowner. This tax was part of the matrix of land taxes and neither a wealth tax nor a personal income tax.[23] If an individual landowner or a group of land owners, constituting a *capitulum*, failed to meet the quota for recruits, the people living in the district, *civitas*, in which the lands were located, were responsible collectively for fulfilling these fiscal responsibilities. In this regard, the situation was no different from other taxes insofar as the people of the district collectively were ultimately responsible for the satisfaction of all local tax liabilities owed to the central government.[24]

The use of the tax system to provide soldiers for the imperial army worked rather simply. Approximately every five years, imperial tax assessors evaluated the resources of all private landed holdings within each *civitas* of the empire and assessed a tax for each *iugum* or other measurable landed asset-designation. Thus, for example, a landowner might be responsible for an annual tax on 900 *iugera* of land. Continuing with this hypothetical example, if one *solidus* of tax *per annum* were assessed for each 10 *iugura* then the 900 *iugera* owed ninety *solidi*. Keeping these data in mind, the imperial government declared that for each thirty *solidi* of tax owed by a landowner, he or she was required, when the government demanded, to provide to the imperial army three acceptable recruits, *tirones*. If a person owned only 100 *iugera*, he could be banded together, for example, with two other men and/or women who each owed a tax on his or her land of ten *solidi*. This group then constituted a *capitulum* and provided one recruit. Since the tax rolls of each *civitas* were very detailed and the entire process was overseen

locally by a specifically delegated official, the *procurator tironum*, few small landowners likely escaped incorporation into a *capitulum*.[25]

The imperial government did not generally require recruits from each and every *civitas* annually. As a result, each landowner did not find it necessary to produce one or more 'warm bodies', as military jargon has it, each year.[26] This system, which generally saw the staggering of recruitment from locality to locality, permitted the emperor to enact the *aurum tironicum*. This was a tax to be paid in gold by those individual landowners as well as those men and women who were formed into a *capitulum*, but who in any given year were not required to provide a recruit or recruits.[27] Following the hypothetical example used above, the *aurum tironicum* in the amount of thirty *solidi* was paid to the imperial government for each 300 assessed *iugera*. In terms of the tax burden levied upon landowners, it should also be noted that each *tiro* was paid a sum of six *solidi* by those who procured his service for the army. These funds ostensibly were to be used by the recruit to meet his expenses prior to being put on the military payroll.[28]

Those recruited into the imperial army had little choice in the matter since most were the tenants or dependents of the landowners who owed the government one or more *tirones*.[29] Nevertheless, once in the army, these men were paid a salary by the imperial government, and most soldiers also received periodic bonuses at one or another time during their service. During some periods of later Roman history, the soldier' salary was paid overwhelming in coin, and, therefore, when not actually on campaign, the soldier was responsible for looking after his own welfare and that of his family with cash in hand. At other times, the soldier was paid overwhelmingly in kind, and then he was responsible for looking after his interests by selling in the market the surplus goods that he had acquired as a part of his salary.[30] Bonuses would appear to have been invariably in cash.[31] In addition, soldiers in the later empire were provided with tax immunities. In particular, all soldiers were exempted from the poll tax or *capitatio*. Other exemptions were established throughout the course of the later empire, and, in general, it seems clear that the more important the individual, the broader the spectrum of exemptions he received. Veterans, who successfully completed their twenty or twenty-five year terms of service, were given lands to farm or money to start a business, and enjoyed tax exemptions for themselves and their wives as well as exemption from curial enrollment.[32]

This method of conscription, it is generally agreed, produced the overwhelming majority of troops who served in the imperial army during the later Roman empire.[33] And it should be noted that those men who, in fact, volunteered for military service were treated, once enrolled, in the same manner as conscripts. In this context, it should be noted, as well, that barbarians living outside the borders of the empire also volunteered for service in the regular army.[34] They too were treated in the same manner as conscripts. Indeed, many Franks in the army of the later empire, men such as Silvanus, Merobaudes, and Arbogast, rose to very high rank after they had been recruited from among various groups of Franks who lived on the frontiers.[35]

As contrasted to volunteers, there was also a well established policy of conscripting a special category of barbarians who lived outside the empire. In the course of the numerous bouts of hostility on the frontiers, large numbers of barbarians, including a great many Franks, found it necessary to surrender to the Roman government, and, as a result, became *dediticii*. Such 'prisoners', on occasion, were conscripted into the Roman army as part of the terms of their capitulation. In some cases, when an entire 'tribe' was defeated, the imperial government did not see fit to end its existence as a political entity. The Roman authorities in some of these cases are known to have imposed upon the vanquished group the responsibility to provide recruits for the Roman army as part of their surrender terms. The terms of peace might require a one time only handover of able bodied young men for army service. In other pacts, multi-year obligations were imposed. Indeed, in some cases, the requirement for an annual levy was imposed with no terminal date having been stipulated. It is of considerable importance that when these barbarian conscripts completed their lengthy terms of service, they were treated like any other veterans and were provided either with farm land upon which to settle or funds to establish themselves in business.[36]

In addition to *dediticii*, some barbarians, men, women, and children, who were at peace with Rome, were permitted by the government to cross into imperial territory and to settle within the borders of empire. These settlements were created for the specific purpose of providing recruits for the Roman army on a regular basis. These barbarians, who are referred to in official government documents as *laeti*, were established in colonies that were designated as *corpora publica* (public corporations). Each colony was governed by a *praefectus*, i.e. an imperial functionary, who is unlikely to have been a native of the colony.[37] In Gaul, alone, there were well in excess of twenty such colonies in

operation through the first third of the fifth century, and for a consid-
erable period thereafter.[38]

The *Notitia Dignitatum*, which was largely kept up to date for Gaul until
c. 430, identifies colonies in the provinces of *Belgica I, II, Lugdunensis I,
II, III, Germania II, and Aquitania I, II*. Unfortunately, the document as
we have it is incomplete with regard to this chapter, and information
from *Germania I, Maxima Sequana, Viennensis, Novempamplona, Narbonnensis
I, Narbonnensis II, Alpes Maritmae*, and *Alpes Graiae et Poenninae* is missing.[39]
It is important to note in this context, that not all of the *laeti* were
'Germans', i.e. speakers of a Germanic language. For example, there
were six colonies of Sarmatians, one of which was mixed with *Taifali*,
and settled in Gaul. In addition, there were 'Gallic' *laeti*, who are identi-
fied as *Batavi, Nervii*, and *Lingones*.[40] It should be noted, that barbarian
conscripts from colonies of *laeti* were, upon completing their terms of
service, treated in the same manner as other veterans.[41]

By contrast with conscripted troops for the regular army, whether
provided as tax payments, terms imposed upon *dediticii*, or arrange-
ments negotiated with *laeti*, the Roman government made contracts or
pacts, *foedera*, with some barbarians living beyond the borders. These
barbarians, however, were groups that had not been subjected to impe-
rial rule and, therefore, were not classified as *dediticii*. Generally, these
pacts were intended to secure the military service needed to provide
a temporary but stable buffer region between the Roman border and
other barbarians living even further from the imperial frontiers. It is
generally agreed that these barbarians, who served under their own
leaders, were very different in their training and discipline from the vari-
ous types of barbarian soldiers, discussed above, who were conscripted
into the imperial army and even those who had volunteered. First, the
foedera almost always restricted military operations to areas beyond the
borders of the empire. However, the imperial government did provide
various incentives to these barbarians, sometimes including food, the
annonae foederaticiae, and the leaders of these groups sometimes were
given honors, including an official imperial rank.[42]

Probably during the later fourth century, and certainly during the
fifth century, the Roman government engineered a major change in
some of the *foedera* it negotiated with frontier barbarians. This change
was discussed by Procopius, writing during the mid-sixth century.[43]
Whereas it had been highly unusual for a *foedus* to require such allied
forces to undertake military action within the empire, the new *foedera*
began to call for the service and even the settlement of entire groups

of barbarians within the borders of the empire.[44] These groups came to be called *foederati*, and are mentioned as such for the first time under this rubric in the *Codex Theodosianus* in 406.[45] This particular type of federate subsequently came to be called a *symmachos* in Greek. By the end of the sixth century, the recently coined term *foederati* came to be reserved for troops who were considered to serve in units that were a part of the regular army.[46] As contrasted to other barbarian military elements, e.g. *laeti* and *dediticii*, however, the federates were not required to undertake the normal training and discipline required of regular soldiers nor were they incorporated into regular units of the Roman army and/or *auxilia*. Rather, they served directly under a barbarian leader, and the latter received block sums of money to pay and maintain his soldiers. In the course of the fifth and early sixth centuries, such groups came to be composed not only of barbarians, but also included Romans, and some groups even would appear to have been led by Romans.[47]

In the first instance, federates were not members of the Roman army, but nevertheless came to operate with increasing frequency within the empire. Thus, it may be thought that they were being contracted to act in a military capacity by government officials contrary to the stipulations of the *Lex Julia de vi publica*. This law prohibited private persons, i.e. those who were neither soldiers (including auxiliaries) nor veterans, from bearing arms legally for military purposes within the borders of the empire. This law did not, of course, prohibit the possession of arms for hunting or even, it would seem, for the protection of one's own possessions.[48] Whatever anomalies in the law may have existed, all problems, real or hypothetical, were made to disappear by the effective repeal of the *Lex Julia* in the West by the emperor Honorius early in the fifth century.[49]

As a result of the repeal of this law, two other military institutions, which previously may be seen to have existed outside or perhaps on the margins of the Roman legal system, were given a fully legitimate constitutional position. The first of these was what modern scholars have come to call the military household. Such forces were employed and had been employed traditionally, and perhaps illegally, by important people, throughout the history of the Roman empire.[50] The second institution was that of the citizen militia, which seems to have begun a rather rapid development in the West during the early fifth century as part of a process that modern scholars describe as the militarization of the civilian population.[51] Arguments, of course, could be made

that both institutions, insofar as they served to protect their households
or those of their employers, however much extended, were legitimate
because they were apparently recruited to act in self-defense. However,
with the repeal of the *Lex Julia*, which certainly was obsolescent by the
early fifth century, if not a great deal earlier, any legal shadow that
might have been cast on the legitimacy of armed forces, which were
composed of non-military personnel in a legal sense, bearing arms for
overt military purposes was removed.

Like those men who were recruited into the regular army, civilian
militia forces may be considered to have had no choice about whether
or not to serve. In effect, they were conscripted into the militia that was
organized to defend the area in which they lived, whether urban or
rural, and were required to serve when called up in order to participate
in the local defense.[52] By contrast, those who were recruited into the
military household of an important person volunteered for such service.
Whether these men volunteered individually or perhaps as a group,
the would be members of a great man's *obsequium* likely negotiated the
term of service, the various types of remuneration, e.g. salary, room,
board, uniforms, weapons, and even in some cases horses, as well as
the types of duties that were required.[53]

Trying to identify those who were considered mercenaries among the
various armed forces, discussed above, is no easy matter. The Romans
used two not very technical terms to denote a mercenary: *conducticius*
and *miles mercenarius* and the meaning depended on context.[54] Both terms
indicate payment for hire. However, official imperial documents of the
period, e.g. edicts, rescripts, and laws, use neither term in discussing
the groups already treated or any other military formations. Indeed,
these terms are rare. For example, writing late in the fourth century, the
author of the *De rebus Bellicis*, who was obsessed with the costs of war,
not only ignores these terms, but fails to use locutions that might be
taken to mean mercenaries.[55] No less surprising is the failure of Isidore
of Seville, who wrote his encyclopaedia early in the seventh century, to
discuss mercenaries.[56] Indeed, these omissions might be construed to
mean that mercenaries were not an important or even an interesting
category for discussion.

By contrast, Vegetius, who reviewed a plethora of legal and narrative
texts in discussing both later Roman military matters and their historical
antecedents, employs the terminology discussed above. However, he does
this only once throughout the entire *De re Militari*, and then only in an
off hand manner. As Vegetius' text on this point is usually translated,

he is seen to observe: 'it costs less to train (*erudere*) one's own men (*armis suos*) than to hire foreign mercenaries.' The operative phrase here is *alienos mercede conducere*, literally, 'to hire foreigners for pay'.[57] Vegetius, the reader should be reminded, wrote toward the end of the fourth century, and thus was a younger contemporary of the author of *De rebus Bellicis*. However, it should always be kept in mind that *De re Militari*, as we now have it, is a revision done at Constantinople in 450.[58]

Vegetius' use of the term *alienus*, surely permits the inference that there were or, at least, there could be men hired for pay who were *indigeni*, i.e. native Romans. It is perhaps of some importance that Vegetius did not select the term *peregrinus*, which, of course, also had the meaning of foreigner, but enjoyed a much more complicated semantic field than *alienus*.[59] In short, *alieni* in some significant way were outside the *res publica*. Whether this means geographic strangeness only, i.e. from beyond the borders, or also possibly cultural strangeness must be considered. In this context, a question may be raised concerning barbarians who came into the empire during the process of recruitment. For example, did an *alienus* become a *peregrinus* once he settled within the empire. The matter is further complicated by Caracalla's edict of 212, which established that all free men, who were living within the imperial borders, became Roman citizens, (*cives*) of the empire.[60]

It is clear that men recruited into the Roman army as a result of tax payments, from *laeti* colonies, or as *dediticii* were paid salaries among other benefits. However, as conscripts, they had no real choice as whether or not to accept the emperor's *solidus*. Therefore, it would seem that at least in Vegetius' view, these soldiers cannot be considered *milites mercenarii* or *conducticii*, because although paid, they lacked the choice of whether or not to hire themselves out for service. Locally organized militia forces not only were conscripted, i.e. they had no choice in the matter, but it is also very likely that they were not paid. Therefore, these militia forces also can be eliminated as possible mercenaries.

By contrast with regular army troops and local militia forces, federates, (Gk. *symmachoi*, Lat. *foederati*) at specific times in their history, whether they carried out military operations beyond the borders of the empire or served and perhaps even were settled on imperial territory, had a choice as to whether they would offer themselves for hire, and also they were paid.[61] The *foedus* or pact by which these men were hired by the imperial government may well be considered a contract for service whether the agreement was made by an individual *foederatus* or by a group of *foederati* serving under a leader of some sort.[62] In this

context, the contract may be considered in law to have been a *locatio conductio*, i.e. a lease and hire agreement, which is considered in Roman law under terms such as *conventio, pactio, conventum*, or *pactum*.[63]

Two criteria: having a choice as regards performing military service and being paid for that service, may perhaps permit the inference that some *foederati*, at least those who came to be called *symmachoi*, were mercenaries. In a similar manner, the fourth group of fighting men, discussed above, i.e. members of the *obsequia* of important men, also may perhaps be considered as mercenaries for the same reasons. Among the many terms used to describe such men, the most common during the fifth century would seem to have been *bucellarius*.[64] However, many other terms also were used to denote the men who served in an *obse-quium*, both prior to and after *bucellarius* became a quasi-technical term. Among the many terms used were *stipendarius, satelles, amicus, cliens*, and *armiger*.[65] These military retainers clearly had a choice of whether or not to offer their services to a potential employer, and they also were paid.[66] These military retainers, who served in the *obsequia* of both military officers and civilians, and, indeed, both lay and ecclesiastical civilians, are mentioned in official government sources, e.g. laws and legal documents, and in a wide variety of narrative sources.[67]

Both the *foederati* and the soldiers of the *obsequium* had a free choice to offer their services and were paid. However, to my knowledge, neither the term *miles mercenarius* nor the term *conducticius*, is to be found in the later Roman sources concerning Gaul to denote either a *foederatus* or the member of an *obsequium*. As a result of the very limited usage of what would appear perhaps to be technical terms for a mercenary, I am wary of drawing the conclusion that free choice to contract for military service and payment for that service together constitute a proper definition of a mercenary for the time period under consideration in the context of later Roman institutions in Gaul. These criteria would seem to be necessary but it is not clear that they are sufficient. I am reminded, for example, that some men volunteered for the Roman army, and, of course, were paid for their service. As a result, the possible definition, offered above, may not be sufficient. If, however, we resort to some adjustment, it might be suggested that once a volunteer entered the regular army, his freedom to contract for service came to an end, and he no longer exercised free choice. However, I am not convinced that an epistemologically sound definition of a mercenary can be constructed for the period under discussion here.[68]

Rome's Merovingian *Nachleben*

During the half-century following the accession of Clovis as ruler of Tournai in 481–482, his conquest of northern Gaul and Aquitaine, and the subjection of the Burgundian kingdom to Frankish *regnum* by his sons by the mid-530s, military organization in Gaul was in a state of flux.[69] By the mid-sixth century, and probably somewhat earlier, the lines of military organization in the *regnum Francorum* become clearer to modern scholars, and this may perhaps indicate that institutional structures had become more firmly established. First and foremost, the general obligation, developed under imperial aegis during the early fifth century, that all laymen living within the hexagon were required to serve in defending the locality in which they lived, whether urban or rural, is firmly in place. Indeed, following the repeal of the *Lex Julia*, the process of militarizing the population went ahead with great success.[70]

By contrast with the continued success of imperially inspired institutions for defense at the local level, the large standing armies of the later Roman empire, as previously recruited according to tax levies, arrangements with *laeti*, and the coercion of *dediticii*, came to an end in Gaul.[71] However, the principle that land taxes were owed to the government did not disappear, and more importantly, the government continued to assess landowners to provide 'warm bodies' for military service.[72] The imperial method, as discussed above, saw recruits enlisted in the army for a term of at least twenty years, while the Frankish government demanded fighting men from landowners for expeditionary service, beyond the perimeters of local defense, only when such troops were needed. When these troops were no longer needed, they were permitted to return home. There is good reason to believe that the landowners provided funds and/or contributions in kind by which these troops, who by and large were their dependents, were sustained when they were serving in the army. It is even likely that some of these expeditionary levies were paid by the men who were responsible for recruiting them.[73]

In addition to the expeditionary levies, who might be required to serve in any part of the *regnum Francorum* and even beyond its borders, there were Franks who held military lands and had similar military obligations. The process by which Franks friendly to the empire were given military lands, i.e. *terra Salica*, would seem to have been initiated by the emperor Constantius I, father of Constantine the Great, in ca. 298.

It was continued by subsequent emperors, and when Clovis had the *Pactus legis Salice* redacted by his Gallo-Roman legal advisers ca. 509, he made sure that previous laws that required *terra Salica* to be held by a man, i.e. someone fit for military service, were included. Women were excluded from possession of *terra Salica*. In addition, the *antiqua consueduto* which required certain *Franci*, i.e. the possessors of *terra Salica*, to come to the muster with food for three months and clothing for six months of campaigning also was maintained.[74]

Neither the military forces limited to local defense obligations nor expeditionary levies, in general, whether recruited by landowners as part of their tax obligations or Franks, who possessed *terra Salica*, would seem to have been mercenaries. The local levies had no real choice regarding their obligation to serve and also seem not to have been paid for their service. While the expeditionary levies may have been remunerated in some way, and those Franks who possessed *terra Salica* certainly enjoyed the fruits of the military lands that they held, their lack of choice in regard to whether or not they would accept the obligation for military service would seem to rule them out as mercenaries.[75] With the elimination of both the local and expeditionary levies from consideration as mercenaries, two groups remain, *foederati* and the members of *obsequia*.

The term *foederati*, which, as noted above, first appears in the Roman legal sources early in the fifth century, was not very popular among subsequent Gallo-Roman writers or their successors in the Frankish kingdom. So far as I have been able to ascertain, it does not seem to have been used to describe contemporary affairs in Gaul.[76] However, some early medieval authors describe various groups, with more or less detail, so that it may perhaps be possible to ascertain whether their relation to the Frankish government can be considered to have had the same basic characteristics that previously had been fundamental to those once considered *foederati*. Thus, by extension, these may perhaps be considered mercenaries. The most important of these writers for the *regnum Francorum* is, of course, Gregory of Tours (ob. 594), who, in general, was very well acquainted with military matters.[77] Other writers, such as Fredegar, his 'Continuators', and the author of the *Liber Historiae Francorum* also provide information that may be of help.[78]

Gregory of Tours tells many stories that are of interest to military historians. Where relevant, it is important to emphasize, he is not averse to providing technical details in an accurate manner so long as these did not undermine the basic theme that he was pursuing at

the time.[79] With regard to the matter of possible *foederati* functioning in sixth-century Gaul, Gregory discusses, in some detail, several situations which might indicate an arrangement consistent with the type of *foedus* under consideration here.[80] One story concerns the behavior of a group of Saxons, a group of Suevi, and other unnamed *gentes*. All of these groups, at one or another time, were settled in the southeastern part of the hexagon for military purposes.[81] While it is clear that the Suevi and the other *gentes* were settled by the Frankish king Sigibert I (ob. 575), the Saxons may perhaps have been established considerably earlier and even possibly by the imperial government.[82] What is certain, however, is that two Merovingian rulers, Chlothar I (ob. 561) and his son Sigibert I, recognized the strategic value of maintaining one or another group settled in this area.[83]

Attention is drawn to these Saxons because the Lombard king Alboin (c. 560s–572), while recruiting troops for his invasion of Italy, negotiated a pact with them. Thus, the Saxons, with their families and all of their moveable goods, abandoned their settlements in Gaul and joined the Lombard invasion force.[84] After the Lombard victory, Alboin provided the Saxons with settlements in Italy, as he did with many of his other 'allies'.[85] However, Alboin apparently refused to permit the Saxons to live under their own laws, the *lex Saxonicum*.[86] As a result of what seems to have been the Lombard king's failure to abide fully by his contract with the Saxons, the latter are said to have abandoned their Italian settlements, and, after much tribulation, returned to Gaul.[87] It was their aim to resettle in the places where they had previously lived.[88] As part of the process by which these Saxons renegotiated their contract to serve King Sigibert, Gregory reports that they swore an oath (*iurantes*) that they would regard themselves as subjects of the kings of the Franks (*ad subiectionem regum . . . Fancorum*). He also makes clear that they obligated themselves to provide the Frankish *reges* with military service (*solatio*), presumably as they had done previously.[89] However, the situation became rather complicated, because after the Saxons had abandoned their settlements in Gaul, King Sigibert settled a group Suevi and other *gentes* in their place.[90]

Without passing judgment on the veracity of all the supposed historical circumstances mentioned above, several points of an institutional or legal nature seem clear. First, these Saxons are presented as regarding themselves as having had the right to contract freely for their military services. Secondly both Frankish and Lombard kings would seem to have given *de facto* recognition of this right by contracting with them.

In this context, prior to their arrangement with Alboin, the Saxons had negotiated some sort of pact with the Frankish kings Chlotar I and Sigibert I which entitled them to live on lands within the *regnum Francorum*, and apparently to do so under their own laws. In return, they were obligated to perform military service. However, when the Saxons abandoned these lands, whatever rights they had enjoyed there were terminated as they abrogated their contract. Thus, Sigibert, in need of having military forces available in this area, installed Suevi and other *gentes* in these same settlements. When the Saxons contracted with Alboin, he also would seem to have promised them lands on which to live, and perhaps misled them regarding his willingness to accept their right to maintain the *lex Saxonicum*. Thus, the Saxons regarded their pact with Alboin null and void, and contracted again with King Sigibert regarding settlement in Gaul.

These contracts, if it is reasonable to generalize from the details provided by Gregory, required the various *gentes*, mentioned above, to recognize themselves as the subjects of the Frankish king and also to recognize their obligation to perform military service. The remuneration for service would seem to have been the usufruct of the agricultural lands of the settlements, and, at least, some right to alienate some of these lands and the movables, e.g. animals, on those lands.[91] Whether other forms of payment were made is unclear. For example, the Saxons, upon their return to Gaul from Italy were in possession of considerable quantities of gold.[92] This may perhaps permit the inference that in addition to having been promised lands in Italy on which to settle, the Saxons had been paid considerable quantities of gold by Alboin for their immediate military service in the invasion.

Stories regarding various peoples, such as the Saxons, Suevi, and other *gentes*, discussed above, whose arrangements with King Sigibert I may perhaps be considered as the institutional *Nachleben* of late Roman *foederati*, appear from time to time in the Merovingian sources. Thus, it would seem that various Merovingian kings maintained the option to contract for the service of troops in this way.[93] By contrast, however, there is far more information concerning *obsequia*, and, therefore, in seeking to identify the thorough institutionalization of mercenaries in the *regnum Francorum*, it would seem that the military household is the place to look. In this context, it should be reemphasized that this institution was widespread in later Roman Gaul, and continued to be an important part of the military organization of the Frankish king-

dom as both laymen and ecclesiastics employed such personal armed followings.[94]

In considering household troops as an institution, the *obsequium* of the emperor or the king obviously should be placed at head of any list. Royal and imperial bodyguards were an old institution in the Western imperial tradition. This institution was very highly developed during the later Roman empire, and not only continued through the Merovingian era into the Carolingian period but persisted well into the Middle Ages.[95] As might be expected, various terms were used during the half-millennium between the reign of Constantine (ob. 337) and that of Charlemagne (ob. 814) to denote such men and the units in which they served.[96] During the Merovingian era, the basic term used to denote the royal *obsequium* was *trustis*, and the rank and file of the men enlisted in the royal *trustis* were called the king's *antrustiones*.[97] Indeed, a formulary entitled 'Concerning a king's *antrustio*' records the process involved in 'hiring' a royal bodyguard.[98]

At the start of this formula, 'the king' asserts a basic principle for a *quid pro quo*, which forms the basis for a legal contract. The would be *antrustio* is required to promise his continuing faith (*fidem*) and swears his faithfulness (*fidelitas*) to the king. In return, the monarch proclaims that such a man is worthy of our support (*auxilium*).[99] It seems clear that the *auxilium* tendered by the king constitutes the general term for the payment, broadly conceived, that is received by the *antrustio*. The formula makes clear that the would-be *antrustio* volunteered for service by going to the royal court in order to enlist as a member of the king's *obsequium*. The text of the formulary, with the name for the new *antrustio* left blank, reads on this point: 'Thus, since our faithful man (*fidelis*) _____, by the will of God, having come to our *palatio* . . . we decree and order. . . .' The formula further indicates that the recruit came 'with his arms [and armor],' (*cum arma sua*).[100] The formulary concludes: 'We [the king] decree and order through this command (*preceptum*) that in the future the aforementioned _____ is to be considered to be numbered among those men [in our service] who are called *antrustiones*.' As a result of having been admitted into the *obsequium*, a new *antrustio* is to be protected by a triple wergild, and he receives a *praeceptum* outlining his status and guaranteeing his wergild.[101] It should be emphasized that *antrustiones* were recruited not only from among *Franci* but from the *Romani* and people of other 'ethnic' groups, as well. In addition, it seems that men who were less than fully free, such as *lidi* and perhaps

even *servi*, were also admitted into the royal *obsequium*.[102] In this context, the frequent mentions of the king's *pueri* in the narrative sources may, in fact, be references to these not fully free elements who served in the royal *obsequium*.[103]

When we return to the *obsequia* of various important men in the Merovingian kingdoms, it is possible to construct a picture that is very similar to that of the king's military household. This pattern of the recruitment of men, generally on an individual basis, who would seem to have had some military experience and reputation, to serve in the military household of a magnate, either lay or ecclesiastical, would appear to have been the norm. Some of these men served for a lengthy period of time in a rather stable situation. They were provided with arms, uniforms, and sustenance. Depending on the nature of their service, some men also were provided with horses.[104]

Whereas the *antrustiones* and the *obsequia* of both lay and ecclesiastical magnates often are seen in the sources as individual professional fighting men at the time of their recruitment, others, who probably also were recruited at some time in the course of their careers as individuals, are depicted in the sources as members of already existing groups serving under their employer. In some cases, the latter is seen to hire out his company to provide armed service to someone in a position to pay. A good example is provided by the band led by a certain Saxon named Childeric during the later sixth century. Initially, Childeric's company was employed by King Guntram (ob. 593), apparently to maintain peace in the area of Poitiers against threats that were being initiated by other companies of armed men, e.g. the band of men led by a Gallo-Roman magnate named Vedastus.[105] Subsequently, Childeric had a falling out with King Guntram and whatever contract that had existed between them was broken.

In the wake of the break between Guntram and Childeric, King Childebert II, the nephew of the former, who at that time was not on good terms with his uncle, hired Childeric. The latter, however, as part of his original contract with Guntram apparently had promised and perhaps even had sworn to his principal that he would not work for Childebert. Nevertheless, not only did King Childebert hire Childeric and his band of fighting men but commissioned him with the *officium* of *dux*, which was a recognizable military title within the context of Merovingian military organization. As part of this *officium*, Childerbert gave Childeric the responsibility for exercising military command over all of the king's cities located south of the Garonne river.[106]

After this commission came to an end, Childeric hired out his company to a rebellious nun named Clotilde, the daughter of the very same King Childebert II, mentioned above. She was intent upon taking control of the convent of St. Radegund at Poitiers by force and driving out the legitimate abbess and her supporters. Gregory of Tours, who was opposed to Clotilde's efforts and found both Childeric and his profession abhorrent, describes the members of his company as *pueri* with the clear implication that they were slaves (*servi*), and condemns them as a pack of thieves, murders, and adulterers.[107] Gregory used the same 'thief, murderer, adulterer' terminology earlier to describe Vedastus.[108] Gregory's negative *parti pris* in matters such as these is well established and his emphasis on the moral degradation of these people as well as their social baseness is part of his normal rhetorical stance.

As a contrast to Gregory's highly inflammatory rhetoric, the actual historical activities undertaken by Childeric and his band of fighting men, as provided by the bishop of Tours, himself, helps us to see a more balanced picture. Thus, it must be emphasized that King Guntram had sufficient confidence in Childeric to employ him to help keep the peace in the Poitou, and by contract to try to limit his ability to sell his services to King Childebert and perhaps to others, as well. Childebert would seem to have been no less positively impressed by Childeric's military and administrative abilities. Not only did he hire Childeric, which exacerbated already existing problems between the two kings, but established him as *dux* in a rather large and rich region of his kingdom with command responsibilities over the *comites* of the *civitates* south of the Garonne.

To conclude: the virtual absence of a widely used and unambiguous technical vocabulary to denote mercenaries during the later Roman empire and in Merovingian *Francia* surely indicates a continuity of thought patterns and probably of institutional structures. However, caution also is signaled to the modern scholar. It is clear that during both periods there were groups of fighting men, perhaps we may call them companies, as well as individual fighting men, who were free to offer their services for hire and who were contracted to perform military duties for various types of remuneration. It may be of heuristic value to consider as mercenaries some *foederati* even when the technical term, itself, is not employed. It is also likely that both our understanding of Merovingian military organization and the history of mercenaries in the West will be deepened if we consider the *obsequia*, employed by both lay and ecclesiastical magnates, to have been mercenaries. Finally,

it is useful to make clear that the ubiquitous militia troops, who were required only to serve in local defense forces, and expeditionary levies, including *Franci* who possessed military lands, both lacked a choice at to whether or not to engage in military service, and, therefore, whether paid or not should not to be considered mercenaries.

Notes

[1] In this context, the development of the theme of 'Late Antique', in general, as well as with specific attention to Gaul, emphasizes both continuity between the empire and the kingdoms that succeeded it. In this process, the barbarians are seen to undergo acculturation. Although J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, *The Barbarian West: 400–1000* (London, 1952), chose the periodization 400–1000 because it had 'unity', he did not use the phrase 'Late Antique'. The Late Antique has been the focus of much of the work of Peter Brown. See, for example, *The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150–750* (New York, 1971); and *The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, AD 200–1000* (2nd Malden-Mass., 2003). Glen W. Bowersock, 'The Vanishing Paradigm of the Fall of Rome,' *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 49 (1996), 29–43; and reprinted in Glen W. Bowersock, *Selected Papers on Late Antiquity* (Bari, 2000), 187–97, at 196, is certainly on the right track, when he observes: 'Now, in 1995, it is probably fair to say that no responsible historian of the ancient or medieval world would want to address or acknowledge the fall of Rome as either fact or paradigm. Bowersock saw no reason to revise this observation when this essay was reprinted five years later. It is gradually becoming clear that modern scholars are beginning to favor the construct 'Late Antique', covering a period of perhaps a half-millennium and even more which focuses on continuity and acculturation. See also, Glen W. Bowersock, 'The Dissolution of the Roman Empire,' in N. Yoffee and G.L. Cowgill (eds), *The Collapse of Ancient Civilizations* (Tucson, 1988), 165–177, reprinted in Glen W. Bowersock, *Selected Papers*, 175–185.

[2] See the two important essays by Walter Goffart, 'Does the Distant Past Impinge on the Invasion Age Germans?' and Alexander Callander Murray, 'Reinhard Wenskus on Ethnogenesis, Ethnicity, and the Origin of the Franks,' in Andrew Gillett (ed.), *On Barbarian Identity: Critical Approaches to Ethnicity in the Early Middle Ages*. (Turnhout-Belgium 2002), 21–39 and 39–68.

[3] Two important works are Michel Banniard, *Viva voce: communication écrite et communicaiton orale du IVe au IXe siècle en occident Latin* (Paris, 1992) and Roger Wright, *Late Latin and Early Romance in Spain and Carolingian France* (Liverpool, 1982).

[4] Rudolf Buchner, *Die Rechtsquellen* (Weimar, 1953), provides a very helpful introduction.

[5] See the excellent study by Alexander Murray, *Germanic Kingship Structure: Studies in Law and Society in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (Toronto, 1983); and the review by Bernard S. Bachrach in *Speculum*, 60 (1985), 1003–1004.

[6] Concerning *terra salica* and the historical context of military lands along with various other tenures in the later Roman empire, early Middle Ages, and the early Byzantine empire, see Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Military Lands in Historical Perspective,' *Journal of the Haskins Society*, 9 (1997), 95–122.

[7] See the breakthrough study by Peter Sarris, 'The Origins of the Manorial Economy: New Insights from Late Antiquity,' *English Historical Review*, 119 (2004), 280–311. With regard to the importance of the bi-partite estate to developments in the west, see numerous studies by Adriaan Verhulst: 'Economic Organization,' in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c. 700–c. 900* II, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge,

1995), 481–509; 'The "Agricultural Revolution" of the Middle Ages Reconsidered,' in Bernard S. Bachrach and David M. Nicholas (eds), *Law, Custom, and the Social Fabric in Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of Bryce Lyon* (Kalamazoo, 1990), 17–28; *The Carolingian Economy* (Cambridge, 2002). See also Jean-Pierre Devroey, *Etudes sur le grand domaine carolingien* (Aldershot, 1993).

[8] Yitzhak Hen, *Culture and religion in Merovingian Gaul, AD 481–751* (Leiden, 1995), provides a sound treatment of this process.

[9] For a general appreciation of these texts as evidence for continuity, see Buchner, *Rechtsquellen*, 49–55. Concerning the texts of the formularies, themselves, see K.Zeumer (ed.), *Formulae Merowingici et Karolini aevi*, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Legum, sectio 5* (Hanover, 1886). Warren Brown, 'When documents are destroyed or lost: lay people and archives in the early Middle Ages,' *Early Medieval Europe*, 11 (2002), 337–366, provides an excellent study of the formulae being used in the West of *Francia*. However, it is unlikely that Brown (344), is correct either in his translation of *rectores civium* as 'rectors of the city' or *curialis provinciae* as 'curia of the province'.

[10] Basic here is Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Imperial Walled cities in the West: an examination of their early medieval *Nachleben*,' in James T. Tracy (ed.), *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective* (Cambridge, 2000), 192–218, with the extensive literature cited throughout. The effort by J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, *Decline and Fall of the Roman City* (Oxford, 2001) to argue for a decaying urban model is unsuccesful, and has been characterized accurately in a recent review by Richard Alston, *Journal of Roman Studies*, 92 (2002), 406, as 'a radically conservative statement that challenges a new orthodoxy among historians of Late Antiquity who tend to emphasize continuity, prefer 'transformation' to 'decline' and are deeply suspicious of grand historical narratives.' An even more extreme version of Liebeschuetz's reaguard action is to be found in the work of Guy Halsall, who employs the model of 'ghost towns' and 'empty shells', well-accepted by English archaeologists as regards Britain, to Gaul and more particularly to Metz. See, for example, Guy Halsall, *Settlement and Social Organization: the Merovingian region of Metz* (Cambridge, 1996); and 'Towns, Societies and Ideas: The Not-so-strange case of late Roman and Early Merovingian Metz,' in Neil Christie and Simon T. Loseby (eds), *Towns in Transition: Urban Evolution in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (Aldershot-U.K., 1996), 235–261; and p. 248, where the 'ghost town' language is highlighted. For an in depth critique of Halsall's methodological misuse of both archaeological and written evidence, see Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Fifth Century Metz: Later Roman Christian Urbs or Ghost Town?' *Antiquité Tardive* 10 (2002), 363–381.

[11] At base, this is the major positive result of Reinhard Wenskus, *Stammesbildung und Verfassung: Das Werden der frühmittelalterliche Gentes* (Köln, 1961); see the detailed discussion by Murray, 'Reinhard Wenskus on 'Ethnogenesis',' pp. 21–39 and Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Medieval Identity: People and Place,' *The International History Review* 25 (2003), 866–870.

[12] Regarding elite and not so elite marriages see Alexander Demandt, 'The Osmosis of Late Roman and Germanic Aristocracies,' in Evangelos K. Chrysos and Andreas Schwarcz (eds), *Das Reich und die Barbaren* (Köln, 1989), 75–89.

[13] Wenskus, *Stammesbildung und Verfassung*, made a major contribution here, and see, for example, Walter Pohl, 'Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition: A Response,' in Andrew Gillett (ed.), *On Barbarian Identity: Critical Approaches to Ethnicity in the Early Middle Ages*. (Turnhout-Belgium, 2002), 221–239, who takes it for granted that the matter of biology and race are not relevant to discussion of various German peoples.

[14] The general idea of *imitatio imperii* is effectively developed by Michael McCormick, *Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium and the Early Medieval West* (Cambridge, 1986). For a similar observation regarding this process of *imitatio* in both administration and military matters in Lombard Italy, see T.S. Brown, *Gentlemen and Officers: Imperial Administration and Aristocratic Power in Byzantine Italy, AD 554–800* (Rome, 1984), 74–75.

[15] The hexagon is the traditional way French scholars describe the French space between its six frontiers, Alps, Mediterannean, Pyrenees, Atlantic, Channel, and Rhine.

[16] For this process of acculturation see the monograph by Bernard S. Bachrach, *Merovingian Military Organization, 481–751* (Minneapolis, 1972), and 'Quelques observations sur la composition et les caractéristiques des armées de Clovis,' in Michael Rouche (ed.), *Clovis: Histoire et Mémoire*, 2 vols (Paris, 1997), 2. 689–703 and 'The Imperial Roots of Merovingian Military Organization,' in Anne Norgard Jorgensen and Birthe L. Clausen (eds), *Military Aspects of Scandinavian Sociaty in a European Perspective, AD 1–1300* (Copenhagen, 1997), 25–31. The broad acceptance of these views led to the invitation to co-author with Charles Bowlus the article 'Heerwesen,' in Heinrich Beck, et al. (eds) *Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde* (Berlin-New York, 2000), 14, 122–136. See also see Bernard S. Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire* (Philadelphia, 2001).

[17] Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted*, (Oxford, 1994), is to be credited for bringing about the demise of 'feudalism'. With regard to the *comitatus*, see Steven C. Fanning, 'Tacitus, Beowulf and the Comitatus,' *The Haskins Society Journal*, 9 (2001) 17–38.

[18] See Fanning, 'Tacitus, Beowulf and the Comitatus,' pp. 36–38, regarding the romantic influences; and, see also Roberta Frank, 'Scaldic verse and the date of Beowulf,' in Colin Chase (ed.), *The Dating of Beowulf* (Toronto, 1981), 123–139, who points out that this epic was a romanticized version of antiquity.

[19] Bachrach, *Merovingian Military Organization*, 128. For the state of the question, see the general observations by Helen Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare* (Basingstoke-UK and New York, 2004), viii, who indicates that traditionally 'scholars regarded the period between the fall of the Western Roman Empire and what they regarded as the recovery of classical learning…as a period of decline and stagnation…. However, modern scholars have stressed the continuity of institutions and learning from the late Western Roman Empire….' In regard to military matters, Nicholson (p. 167, n. 4), relies heavily for the continuity argument on my work and that of Kelly DeVries. In a recent study, Guy Halsall, *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900* (New York, 2003), p. 245, n. 13, asserts that Bachrach's views on continuity 'are somewhat unreliable' and claims to have taken a 'very different, indeed entirely divergent, approach'.

[20] Although modified in detail from time to time by subsequent scholarly work, A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire, 284–602: a social, economic and administrative survey*, 2 vols. (Norman Oklahoma, 1964), 1. 607–686, remains fundamental for study of the later Roman army.

[21] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 615; Martijn J. Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire: The Roman Army From the Reign of Diocletian until the Battle of Adrianople* (Amsterdam, 1998), 94; Hugh Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350–424* (Oxford, 1996), 129.

[22] Jones, *Later Roman Empire* 1. 615; Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 94–95. Early medievalists will recognize this practice of having groups band together to support a fighting man in the Carolingian period and among the Anglo-Saxons, as well. See F.L. Ganshof, 'Charlemagne's Army,' in *Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne*, tr. B. and M. Lyon (Providence, R.I., 1968), 59–68, 151–161; C. Warren Hollister, *Anglo Saxon Military Institutions on the Eve of the Norman Conquest* (Oxford, 1962), 38–58.

[23] Jones, *Later Roman Empire* 1. 615. This basic principle continued into the Carolingian era as shown by Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, 54–55.

[24] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 454–457, 614–615.

[25] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 615–616; Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 94–95; and Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*. 29. Some medievalists may see this substitution of money payments for troops as has having similarities to scutage. Regarding scutage in England, which apparently first appears ca. 1100 but arguably was developed somewhat

earlier, see Reginald Lane Poole, *Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII Centuries* (Oxford, 1946), 40–41; and F. M. Stenton, *The First Century of English Feudalism* (2nd ed.Oxford, 1961), 177. It is not my intention here to enter into the controversy dealing with scutage rates for which see the excellent introduction by C. Warren Hollister, *The Military Organization of Norman England* (Oxford, 1965), 283–286. More study needs to be done regarding the commutation of military service for money in pre-Crusade Europe.

[26] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 619; Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 94–95; Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*, 29.

[27] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 432; Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 95–96; Southern and Dixon, *The Late Roman Army* 67.

[28] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 615; Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 94.

[29] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 616.

[30] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 623–624.

[31] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 435, 624; and Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 94–95.

[32] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 435, 626.

[33] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 614–615.

[34] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 619–620; and Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 92–93.

[35] These and others are discussed in some detail by Bernard S. Bachrach, 'The Education of the "officer corps" in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries,' in Françoise Vallet and Michel Kazanski (eds), *La noblesse romaine et les chefs barbares du IIIe au VIII siècle* (Paris, 1995), 7–13. See also, Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 620; and Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 102–103.

[36] A very useful discussion of *dediticii* is provided by Gehard Wirth, 'Rome and Its Germanic Partners in the Fourth Century,' in Walter Pohl (ed.), *Kingdoms of the Empire: The Integration of Barbarians in Late Antiquity* (Leiden-New York-Köln, 1997), 13–55. See also Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 620; Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 87–88; and Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*, 129–130.

[37] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 620; Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*, 130–131; Southern and Dixon, *The Late Roman Army*, 42.

[38] Otto Seeck (ed.), *Notitia Dignitatum utriusque imperii.* (Berlin, 1876), 42, 33–44. See, Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 620; Southern and Dixon, *The Late Roman Army*, 48; and Philippe Richardot, *La fin de l'armée romaine (284–476)* (2nd ed. revised and expanded, Paris, 2001), 179.

[39] For the surviving part of this section, see *Notitia Dignitatum*. 42. 33–44; and the discussion by Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 620.

[40] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 620; Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*, 132; the *Taifali* gave their name to Tiffauges in the Loire valley and retained some sense of identity down to the twelfth century, on which see Rodulfus Glaber, *Historiarum Libri Quinque* in *Rodulfus Glaber Opera* ed. J. France et al. (Oxford, 1989), lxxxvii, 234 n.a.

[41] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 620.

[42] Unlike Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 611–612, Nicasie, *Twilight of Empire*, 84, calls these men 'mercenaries' but does not establish the criteria for his conclusion; Southern and Dixon, *The Late Roman Army*, 49, 71, do not use the term 'mercenary' to describe the federates.

[43] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1, 612, 663–664; Southern and Dixon, *The Late Roman Army*, 50.

[44] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 612, 663–664; Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*, 91–95; Peter J. Heather, '*Foedera* and *foederati* of the fourth century,' in Pohl, *Kingdoms of the Empire*, 57–74.

[45] *Codex Theodosianus*, ed. Th. Mommsen (Berlin, 1905), 7.13.16; and the discussion by Aurelio Bernardi, 'The Economic Problems of the Roman Empire at the Time of its Decline,' in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), *The Economic Decline of Empire* (London, 1970), 72.

[46] Brown, *Gentlemen and Officers*, 70, 85, for a discussion of *symmachoi*, who are identified as 'barbarians who served in their own ethnic units', and *phoideratoi*, who were part of the regular army. Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1.2, 663–664.

[47] Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1.66.

[48] Adolf Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law* (Philadelphia, 1953), 554, with the literature cited there.

[49] See the discussion by Ian Wood, 'The North-Western Provinces,' in Avril Cameron, Bryan Ward Perkins, and Michael Whitby (eds), *Cambridge Ancient History*, 14. (2nd ed. Cambridge, 2000), 505.

[50] A substantial corpus of information was collected on the topic by Paul Guilhiermoz, *Essai sur l'origine de la noblesse en France au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1902), 49–77, which demonstrates continuity between the later Roman Empire and her successor states in Gaul. See the discussion by Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Early Medieval Europe,' in Kurt Rauflaub and Nathan Rosenstein, *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: Asia, The Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica.* (Cambridge, 1999), 281–286.

[51] The development of the citizen militia from the later Roman Empire into the Carolingian era is summarized with the relevant literature by Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, 52–54.

[52] Bachrach, 'Early Medieval Europe', 284–286.

[53] See the information collected by Guilhiermoz, *Noblesse*, 49–77. It is noteworthy, as seen above, that the *antrustiones* already had their own arms when they were hired as members of the royal *obsequia*.

[54] See, Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, 1879), 410, 1135. This rare usage is reinforced by the study of J.B. Campbell, 'Söldner' in Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schreder (eds), *Der neue Pauly Encyklopädie der Antike* (Stuttgart, 1996), 11. 668–670.

[55] For the text of *De Rebus Bellicis*, see E.A. Thompson, *A Roman Reformer and Inventor: Being a new text of the treatise De Rebus Bellicis with and Translation and Introduction* (Oxford, 1952). Since the author was obsessed with monetary matters, his failure to discuss mercenaries may perhaps be taken as an index of their lack of importance.

[56] For Isidore, see W.M. Lindsey (ed.), *Isidori Hispalensis episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum libri xx*, 2 vols (Oxford, 1911). In *Etymol.* Bk. IX, Cap 4, lines 30–31, Isidore discusses the tradition that '*Mercenarii sunt qui serviunt accepta mercede.*' However, he refrains from discussing the matter in reference to the military, and thus, all *milites* presumably could be considered *mercenarii*. In lines 53–55, Isidore indicates '*Tria sunt militiae genera…*' but uses no locution that might be identified as a reference to mercenary soldiers.

[57] Vegetius, *De Re Militari* ed. C. Lang (Leipzig, 1885) 1. 28. By contrast, J.H.G.W. Liebeschuetz, 'Generals, Federates and Bucellarii in Roman Armies around AD 400,' in P. Freeman and D. Kennedy (eds), *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East: Proceedings of a Colloquium held at the University of Sheffield in April 1986*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1986), 2, 465, points out the financial advantages inherent in using troops who were not part of the regular army. For want of space, I have not discussed here the large number of Franks, who were recruited during the fourth century by the Roman government in Gaul, who might be considered mercenaries from context, but concerning whom no technical terminology is used.

[58] See, Walter Goffart, 'The Date and Purpose of Vegetius' De Re Militari,' *Traditio*, 33 (1977), 65–100, reprinted in his *Rome's Fall and After* (London, 1989), 167–211. Also exceptionally useful is Phillippe Richardot, *Végéce et la culture militaire au moyen âge (V^e–XVe siècles)* (Paris, 1998).

[59] Berger, *Enclopaedic Dictionary*, 626–627.

[60] Liebeschuetz, 'Generals, Federates and Bucellarii,'. 464, who shows that serving soldiers were considered Roman citizens.

[61] Brown, *Officer and Gentlemen*, 70, 85.

[62] Berger, *Encylcopaedic Dictionary*, 474. Evangelos Chrysos, 'Conclusion: De Foederatis Interum,' in Pohl, *Kingdoms of the Empire*, 193, makes the important point regarding terminology: 'vulgarisation of the Roman law…effectively divested the technical terms of their exact meaning and made their appropriate use almost impossible and occasionally anachronistic.'

[63] Berger, *Encylcopaedic Dictionary*, 413–414.

[64] There is an immense bibliography dealing with *bucellarii*, and several useful guides. See, for example, H.-J. Diesner, 'Das Buccelariertum von Stilicho und Sarus bis auf Aetius,' *Klio* 54 (1972), 321–350, who, with full documentation, provides a useful history of the first half-century of the institution of *bucellarii* with a focus on the West. Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*, 102, note 35, provides some helpful scholarly references, and n. 36, provides a lengthy list of both Latin and Greek sources that deal with *bucellarii* for this early period. Halsall, *Warfare and Society*, pp. 45, 111–112, and 246, notes 22–26, seems unaware of the relevant scholarly literature. Here, he fails to connect the *bucellarii* with mercenaries, and, as a result, ignores them in his discussion of mercenaries. In his brief discussion of *bucellarii* (p. 264, n. 26), Halsall demonstrates both a misunderstanding of Procopius' use of technical terminology, which is not to be confused with his writing style, and, fails to recognize that *excubitores* is a legitimate Latin term for imperial body guards, who served at the court under the command of a *comes*. This term, *excubitor* continued to be used well after the dissolution of imperial power in the West. See, for example, Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 658–659; and in greater detail, Richard I. Frank, *Scholae Palatinae: The Palace Guards of the Later Roman Empire* (Rome, 1969), 122, n.92, 153, 164–165, 205, 211–213.

[65] Liebeschuetz, 'Generals, Federates and Bucellarii,', 468. Brown, *Gentlemen and Officers*, 71–74, considers similar companies that operated in Italy during the later sixth and seventh centuries to be mercenaries, and their leaders to be 'soldiers of fortune' and *condottieri*. Brown draws these reasonable conclusions on patterns of behavior and not on the use of specific terminology.

[66] Diesner, 'Das Buccelariertum von Stilicho und Sarus bis auf Aetius', 321–350; and Liebeschuetz, 'Generals, Federates and Bucellarii', 468–470.

[67] Diesner, 'Das Buccelariertum von Stilicho und Sarus bis auf Aetius', 321–350; and Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*, 102, n. 36.

[68] Although many Roman writers are well known to have been very interested in various sorts of technical terminology, it seems that they had little interest in developing and applying mercenary-terminology in a particular narrative or legal context. See, Campbell, 'Söldner,' cols. 668–670. This contrasts rather starkly with the Greeks of the classical world. See, for example, H.W. Parke, *The Greek Mercenary Soldier* (Oxford, 1933); G.T. Griffith, *The mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935); and Matthew Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries: from the Late Archaic to Alexander* (London-New York, 1994). Of particular interest is the study by D. Whitehead, 'Who Equipped Mercenary Troops,' *Historia*, 40 (1991), 105–112. Byzantine writers, who often demonstrate a strong affinity for imitating classical models, seem to have followed the Roman tradition in showing a serious lack of interest in defining particular terms for mercenaries. See, for example, the discussion by John Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204* (London, 1999), 91–96, 125–126, 262–264.

[69] Several works by Bachrach, *Merovingian Military Organization*, 3–35; 'Quelques observations sur la composition et les caractéristiques des armées de Clovis,' 689–703, 'The Imperial Roots of Merovingian Military Organization,' 25–31; and finally a work that Bachrach co-authored with Bowlus, 'Heerwesen,' 122–136.

[70] Bachrach, 'The imperial roots of Merovingian military organization,' 25–31, is followed in its basic points by Edward James, 'The Militarisation of Roman society, 400–700,' in Jorgensen and Clausen, *Military Aspects of Scandinavian Society*, 19–24.

[71] Conscription, in general, was brought to an end in the West during the later fifth century by the Roman government. See, for example, Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 1. 619; Brown, *Gentlemen and Officers*, 85.

[72] Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, 54–55. On taxes in Merovingian Gaul, in general, see Walter Goffart, 'Old and New Merovingian Taxation,' *Past and Present*, 96 (1982), 3–2, reprinted in Goffart, *Rome's Fall*, 213–231.

[73] Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, 54–55.

[74] Bachrach, 'Military Lands in Historical Perspective', 98–102; Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, 55, 77.

[75] It is clear that all landowners and/or landholders, e.g. women, children, old men, and the infirm, could not perform military service. Thus, they either had to send men, who were dependent upon them, to do the service or had to hire men to do this service. Those men in this latter group may perhaps be considered mercenaries or at least professional soldiers. See Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, 59–60.

[76] Writing in the early sixth century, Gildas, who was committed to a vocabulary that emphasized *imitatio imperii*, used the *foedus*-terminology to describe the recruitment of Hengst and Hosa by Vortigern in ca. 450. See the discussion of this text by Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Gildas, Vortigern and Constitutionality in Sub-Roman Britain,' *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 32 (1988): 126–140; and reprinted with the same pagination in Bernard S. Bachrach, *Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West* (London, 1993), 135.

[77] Regarding Gregory of Tours's knowledge of military matters, see two articles by Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Gregory of Tours as a Military Historian,' in Kathleen Mitchell and Ian Wood (eds.), *The World of Gregory of Tours* (Leiden, 2002), 351–363; and 'Gregory of Tours, Vegetius, and the Study of War,' in Martin Aurell and Thomas Deswarte (eds), *Famille, violence et christianisation au Moyen Âge: Mélanges offerts à Michel Rouche* (Paris, 2005), 299–308. Gregory, *Liberi Historiarum X*, ed. Bruno Krusch and Wilhelm Levison in *Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum*, I.1: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* (2nd ed. Hanover, 1951).

[78] The basic work on Fredegar remains Walter Goffart, 'The Fredegar Problem Reconsidered,' *Speculum*, 38 (1963), 206–241 (reprinted with *addenda* in Goffart, *Rome's Fall*, 354–319); and the stylistic study by Alvar Erikson, 'The Problem of Authorship in the Chronicle of Fredegar,' *Eranos*, 63 (1965), 47–76, that confirms Goffart's views. The essay by Roger Collins, 'Fredegar,' in *Authors* 13 (1996), 81–58, is useful for reviewing various questions with regard both to Fredegar and to the 'Continuations'. Regarding the *Liber Historiae Francorum*, see Richard Gerberding, *The Rise of the Carolingians and the Liber Historiae Francorum* (Oxford, 1987). See, in general, Rosamond McKitterick, *History and Memory in the Carolingian World* (Cambridge, 2004), 13, 22, 36, 57–58, for Fredegar; pp. 138–140 for the continuations; and pp. 9–19, 134–139, for the *Liber*. For the texts, themselves, see: *Chronicarum quae dicuntur Fredegarii Chronicorum Libri IV cum Continuationibus*, ed. Bruno Krusch in SRM 2, MGH (Hanover, 1888), 1–199; *Fredegarii Chronicorum Liber Quartus cum Continuationibus*, ed. and trans. J. M. Wallace-Hadrill (London, 1960); *Liber Historiae Francorum*, ed. Bruno Krusch in SRM 2, MGH (Hanover, 1988) 241–328.

[79] See the discussion of this matter by Bachrach, 'Gregory of Tours as a Military Historian,' 351–363. In this context, it may be noted that Gregory, 3. 32, calls attention to the emperor Justinian I hiring (*conductis praetio*) *gentes* to provide *solatium* for Narses' military efforts in Italy.

[80] It is clear that Gregory, 4.49 knew and used the term *foedus*, and did so for example on two occasions in the same chapter to indicate a military alliance between two Merovingian kings. However, in the same chapter, he discusses King Sigibert I's recruitment of an *exercitus* composed of pagan *gentes* from beyond the Rhine (*ultra Rhenum*) but does not use the term *foedus* to describe this relationship. Sigibert is seen to use these same *gentes* in Gregory, 4. 50.

[81] Gregory 4. 42.

[82] Barbarians settled by the Romans in Gaul did not simply disappear or lose their identity when imperial rule throughout the hexagon came to an end. See, for example, the interesting case of the Taifals settled in the western Poitou, and discussed at some length by Bachrach, *Merovingian Military Organization*, 12, 17, 29, 33, 36, 44; Elton, *Warfare in Roman Europe*, pp. 132–133, misses the point; and Halsall, *Warfare and Society*, 44, while recognizing continuity, ignores the information provided by *Notitia Dignitatum*, 42. 65, suggests that they were settled in western Gaul as allies of the Visigoths in 418 for which the present writer can see no evidence.

[83] Gregory, 5. 15.

[84] Gregory, 5. 15. The chronology here is problematic as Chlotar I died in 561, and Alboin did not invade Italy until 569. This episode is also discussed by Paul the Deacon, *Historia Langobardorum*, ed. Ludwig Bethmann and Georg Waitz in *Scriptores rerum Langobardicarum et Italicarum, saec. VI–IX*: MGH (Hanover, 1878), 2. 6, who relies both on Gregory' account and also on the now lost chronicle of Secundus of Trent.

[85] Paul, 3. 6, for the unsuccessful Saxon settlement; and 2. 26, for the various peoples, e.g. Gepids, Bulgars, Sarmatians, Pannonians, Suevi, Noricans, and others, who were recruited by Alboin for the invasion, and subsequently were settled in Italy.

[86] Gregory, 4. 42, makes no mention of the Saxon laws in this context. This information is provided by Paul, 3. 6, who likely is relying here on information provided in the now lost chronicle of Secundus of Trent.

[87] Paul, 3.5, 6.

[88] Gregory, 6. 42; Paul, 3. 5, 6.

[89] Gregory, 4. 42.

[90] Gregory, 4. 42; Paul, 3. 7.

[91] Gregory, 4. 42; Paul, 3. 7.

[92] Gregory, 4. 42, and were assumed by the local authorities in the southeastern reaches of the *regnum Francorum* to have had even greater amounts of this precious metal.

[93] See, for example, Fredegar, 4. 72, regarding the recruitment of a large group of Bulgar fighting men, accompanied by their families.

[94] Guilhiermoz, *Noblesse*, 49–77.

[95] Regarding the early Carolingian soldiers of the royal bodyguard and their Romano-Merovingian background, see Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, 65–76; and for later developments, see J.O. Prestwich, 'The Military Household of the Norman Kings,' *The English Historical Review*, 96 (1981), 1–35.

[96] See, for example, Frank, *Schola Palatinae*, for a detailed examination of these institutions during the later Roman Empire; and Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, pp. 65–76, for the Merovingians and Carolingians.

[97] Maximin Deloche, *La trustis et l'antrustion royal sous les deux premières races* (Paris, 1878), remains basic but is badly in need of revision.

[98] *Marculfi Formulae*, 1. 18. It seems that perhaps in its present form the document was drawn up toward the mid-seventh century, at the earliest. However, it is very likely that this formula was still in use during the early eighth century when the Carolingian Mayor of the Palace already controlled the royal household and was doing the hiring of the royal bodyguards. See Buchner, *Die Rechtsquellen*, 51–52, who notes two possible dating patterns, i.e. ca. 650 and 721–735.

[99] *Marculfi Formulae*, 1. 18.

[100] *Marculfi Formulae*, 1. 18.

[101] *Marculfi Formulae*, 1. 18. Whether each and every *antrustio* could read his own *praeceptum* must remain a matter for speculation, and I am skeptical. However, the drafting of such a document surely permits the inference that there was an expectation in some quarters among men in positions of authority that likely there would be occasions when the royal *praeceptum* would be of some use to the *antrustio*. In short, the

antrustio or members of his family might have need of this document with regard to litigation in court regarding the payment of the wergild. Thus, one may surely presume, from the documents under discussion, the functioning of a constellation of officials who could be expected to understand the value of these *praecepta* in a legal proceeding. In regard to the widespread use of written documentation for secular governmental purposes see, in general, Rosamund McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the Written Word* (Cambridge, 1989).

[102] This is a controversial matter for which the basic text is *Recapitulatio legis salicae*, cap. 30. See the extended discussion by Deloche, *Trustis et l'antrustion royal*, 66–79 and the refutation by Simon L. Guterman, *The Principle of the Personality of Law in the Germanic Kingdoms of Western Europe from the Fifth to the Eleventh Century* (New York, 1990), 6–7.

[103] For a large collection of references, see Guilhiermoz, N*oblesse*, 52–57, 67–68, 70–72; see also the discussion of the complexity of the royal military household, Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, 68–76. Halsall, *Warfare and Society*, 49, thinks that all references to *pueri* in the royal military household are to free youths. However, it is clear that a distinction is to be made between those free and perhaps even aristocratic youths who were being given a military education at the court and unfree men, who because of their low legal status, were called 'boys'.

[104] In addition to the references provided by Guilhiermoz, *Noblesse*, 52–79 see Bachrach, *Merovingian Military Organization*, 22–24; and Bachrach, 'Early Medieval Europe,' 281–286.

[105] Gregory, 7.3, indicates that Childeric confronted a Gallo-Roman named Vedastus Avius, who is described as using his armed followers to cause problems in the region. In this confrontation, one of Childeric's soldiers, called a *puer* by Gregory of Tours, killed Vedastus. Halsall, *Warfare and Society*, 111, follows Bernard S. Bachrach, *The Anatomy of a Little War: A Diplomatic and Military History of the Gundovald Affair: 568–586* (Boulder-Colorado, 1994), p. 151, in considering Childeric a mercenary but doubts that he was a Saxon. Halsall bases his doubts on the unsupported belief that Childeric 'is not a particularly Saxon name', and then speculates, again with no evidence, that the 'epithet' *saxo* may have meant 'mercenary'. Yet another group of Saxons, distinguished by contemporaries from both Gallo-Romans and *Franci* are identified as flourishing in a military colony in the area of Bayeux during the sixth century. This group kept their identity well into the ninth century and were used by Charles the Bald for operations against the Bretons. See Ferdinand Lot, 'Migrations Saxonnes en Gaule et en Grande-Bretagne du IIIe au Ve siècle,' *Revue Historique*, 119 (1915), 1040 and reprinted in Ferdinand Lot, *Recueil des travaux historques de Ferdinand Lot*, 3 vols (Geneva-Paris, 1968–1973), 2. 23–62.

[106] Gregory 8. 18. For further discussion of Childeric, Bachrach, *The Anatomy of a Little War*, 151, 164.

[107] Gregory, 9. 10, 40 and 10. 22.

[108] Gregory 7. 3.

THE EARLY HUNGARIANS AS MERCENARIES
860–955

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In the year 896 the Hungarians (also known as Magyars) crossed the Carpathian Mountains from the steppes adjacent to the Black Sea.[1] They were primarily warriors, horse archers, when they settled on the plains of the middle Danube, whence they made periodic incursions into western Europe. Their invasions came to an abrupt halt in 955, however, when the East Frankish king, Otto I, annihilated their swarms in an encounter generally known as the battle of Lechfeld.[2] Popular historians and even some scholars have echoed medieval annalists and hagiographers who portrayed the Hungarians as invincible hordes of wild and undisciplined barbarians whose incursions served no useful purpose. While Scandinavian and Muslim pirates were attacking Europe from the north, west, and south, Magyar horse archers began attacking from the east. Though independent of one another, all together their depredations putavatively caused the collapse of the Carolingian Empire and arrested the political, economic, and social development of Europe for at least a century. The leaders of the Latin West could only respond, so the argument continues, by developing (heavy) cavalry forces of their own to deal with the invaders in the field and by studding the landscape of Europe with fortresses to protect their movable assets. From iron, stone, and mortar local elites in the Latin West fashioned the 'first feudal age' to deal with these invasions, a scenario still common in undergraduate textbooks.[3]

Despite its persistence, this paradigm has been out of date for more than a half century—at least as far as the Hungarians are concerned. Already, in 1945, Gina Fasoli demolished the myth that Magyar predators were in any way arbitrary or capricious.[4] The Hungarians were not a cause of the collapse of the Carolingian Empire. Rather they understood and profited from the rivalries and internecine conflicts that persisted as Charlemagne's realm disintegrated in the late ninth and early tenth centuries. In 1968 Szabolcs de Vajay butressed Fasoli's conclusions, arguing convincingly that as early as 860 (well before

they finally settled in the Carpathian Basin) the Magyars made their martial services available to the Movarian leader Rastislav and later to his nephew Sventibald both of whom were involved in conflicts with various East Frankish rulers. In 892, a late Carolingian king, Arnulf of Carinthia, turned the tables when he employed Magyar horsemen against Sventibald.[5] In addition the Hungarians may well have been involved in Arnulf's invasions of Italy that resulted in his imperial coronation in 896, the very year that they began to settle permanently in the Carpathian Basin. Recently, Aldo A. Settia has called attention to the fact that there is little evidence of massive destruction by the Magyars during their frequent incursions into Italy, and Barbara Rosenwein has observed that Berengar I, Margrave of Friuli and King of Italy, who had a terrible reputation as a warrior, prevailed against numerous rivals partially because of his skilfull use of Hungarians against his opponents.[6] Most serious scholars no longer portray the Magyars as a *gens detestanda*, who brought only death and destruction, but rather as wily military entrepreneurs who knew how to exploit for gain the chaotic conditions of the late ninth and early tenth centuries.[7] Moreover, after 955 they settled down to form a stable Christian kingdom, and from then on, as a *gens ad fidem Christi conversa*, they became a bulwark against further nomadic incursions from the East.[8] Why this transformation?

As we have seen, when the Hungarians began their settlement in 896 they were no strangers to the Carpathian Basin. They had already used their martial skills in the service first of the Moravians and then, reversing themselves, in Arnulf's wars against the Sventibald. This mercenary behavior was nothing new to them, for, while still in Ethelköz, the area north of the Black Sea, they had served the Byzantines for profit prior to their westward trek. The Hungarians made their decision to settle permanently along the middle Danube, when Petchenegs, in the service of Bulgars, attacked Magyar camps and absconded with their women and children, a practice that was not uncommon in most of the Eurasian steppes. The Hungarians continued their profession as classic nomadic mercenaries in their new homeland across the great forests of the Carpathians (Transylvania). Because they had martial skills that complemented those of indigeneous elites who were warring against one another, Magyars could find willing customers for their 'service industry.' Although such terms as *mercenarius, solidarius*, and *stipendarius* are never used to describe the early Hungarians, they were mercenaries indeed, for they fought for material rewards that came most frequently in the form of precious metals (*aurum et argentum*).[9] Economically it was

much more rational to fight for pay or tribute than for plunder or even slaves. When they took captives they frequently ransomed them quickly for hard cash, for to herd human chattel hampered their mobility, their greatest tactical asset.[10]

The fact that the Hungarians frequently fought as mercenaries has to do with the very nature of their tactics and military organization. Their services were in great demand for the same reasons that they were feared. Monetary rewards came to them because their tactical repretoire was based on the types of forces lacking in Carolingian and Ottonian Europe: durable light steppe cavalry who unleashed from their composite bows lethal hail storms of arrows that rained down on their opponents from great distances.[11] Even if their renumeration was sometimes disguised in the form of gifts, it is clear that they fought for hire. Gift-giving in return for military service is mercenary behavior, no matter how anthropologists might explain it.[12] The Magyars did their share of looting to be sure, but so did mercenaries of later epochs. They were not simply rowdies 'who occasionally roughed up the natives'.[13] The Byzantine Emperor Leo VI noted that the early Hungarians were highly disciplined and did not begin to pillage until the enemy had been thoroughly routed.[14] There is evidence, however, that this discipline was breaking down in the middle of the tenth century.[15]

The Magyars certainly were not chary when it came to taking subsidies from sedentary powers in return for military services, and they sometimes successfully demanded tribute from richer neighbors in return for leaving them in peace after having menaced them by invading their realms.[16] Thus the Hungarians occupied a different niche from those barbarians who lived as tributaries on the fringes of sedentary empires. Rather than paying tribute to neighboring imperial powers, the Magyars demanded tribute for themselves *from* them, and they very often got what they wanted.[17]

Like the Huns and Avars before them, the early Hungarians came to realize that as horse archers they could not subjugate, occupy, and govern either the Latin West or the Byzantine Empire. Their base in the Carpathian Basin was simply not large enough to allow them to become a nomadic 'superpower' like the Mongols became later. The ecology of the basin simply could not support a force of mounted archers that was large enough to subdue neighboring empires. Thus the Magyars had two choices. They could create a sedentary kingdom based on agriculture and small scale transhumance capable of supporting towns where specialized trades could develop or they could create

in the Carpathian Basin a society of mercenaries living like parasites on their neighbours. In the short run the pressures to pursue careers as predatory warriors were great. However the farmers, the herdsmen, and burgesses won out in the long run. Why?

Denis Sinor and Rudi Paul Lindner have attempted to answer this question by devising ecological and geographic models to estimate the number of steppe warriors who could be sustained by the pastures of the Carpathian Basin.[18] Although sources speak of great multitudes of archers, Sinor has concluded that the entire basin could only nourish enough horses to provide mounts for 60,000 bowmen. Lindner reduces this number even more drastically. He presumes that Huns, Avars, and Hungarians were first and foremost pastoralists who would not have excluded other herbivores, cattle, sheep, and goats, from their herds. Thus he reasoned that no more than half of the Alföld, the great plain of south-east Hungary, could ever have been given over to horse pasture. On the basis of that premise he reasoned that only 150,000 horses would have been available as mounts for Attila's horde. Assuming that each archer required ten mounts, Lindner concluded that the Great Plain could not have provided mounts for more than 15,000 horse archers. 'Our Huns, it seems, could not even have mustered two Mongol divisions, or 20,000 horsemen, against the Romans' much larger resources.' Although he primarily discusses Huns, Lindner emphasizes that his analysis also applies to Avars and Hungarians, whose 'military experiences [were] echoes of Attila's.' He argued that shortages of pasture led Attlia to modify his armies to the point that by the end of his reign mounted archers constituted only a tiny portion of his army. By implication the Magyars must have been forced to follow the same course.

An alternative view has recently been posited by Peter Heather.[19] He suggests that 15,000 highly skilled mounted archers on the Danubian frontier of the Roman Empire would have constituted a formidable fighting force that could do quite well for itself in a parasitic relationship with its neighbors. Settling on the fringes of the wealthy and sedentary world of the Mediterranean, steppe peoples (Huns, Avars, and Magyars) would have had powerful incentives to abandon pastoral nomadism altogether and become full-time military specialists, for whom Heather has no qualms about using the term mercenaries. Assuming that they could live more profitably from the spoils of war than from cattle, sheep, and goats, Heather argues that they would surely have been

motivated to curtail other forms of husbandry in order to increase the
rangeland available for war horses. He posits that 'predatory nomad-
ism' (a term that includes mercenary service) was a more economically
rational use of the limited steppes of the Carpathian Basin than was
pastoralism. Since the Magyars could not realistically use the pastures
of the Carpathian Basin to become a nomadic superpower, and since
they possessed martial skills that their sedentary neighbors lacked, it
was logical for them to seek a livelihood as mercenaries.

Moreover, it must be noted that Sinor, Lindner, and Heather actually
underestimate the number of horses required to provide 15,000–20,000
steppe warriors with ten mounts each. Steppe warriors did not sim-
ply round up feral horses and dash off to rape, pillage, and burn. To
produce an adequate supply of warhorses (generally geldings), steppe
peoples had to manage their herds carefully. Taking into consideration
the structure of herds, I have elsewhere estimated that to provide
each warrior with ten mounts sufficiently mature to stand the rigors
of campaigning, a herd of at least twenty-six horses would have been
required—one stallion, ten mares, five of whom were pregnant, another
five nursing, five foals of one-two years and two of three years. Includ-
ing the ten war-geldings, the total herd necessary for each archer was
thirty-six.[20] Thus a total of 720,000 horses (not 200,000) would have
been needed to maintain 20,000 archers with ten war geldings each,
a number far exceeding the resources of the Carpathian Basin. The
majority of these horses would never taste combat. In fact, at most only
twenty-eight percent of the total herd would consist of geldings ready
for expeditions. If the steppe lands of Hungary could have supported
150,000 horses (Lindner's figure) or 300,000 (excluding all other forms
of husbandry as Heather suggests), then only 36,000 or 72,000 war-
geldings would have been available to furnish mounts for either 3,600
or 7,200 archers assuming ten-horses per archer. No matter which of
these scenarios that one might pick, the Magyars were not capable
of putting even one Mongol division in the field, at least not if each
archer had a train of ten mounts.

But the assumption is also suspect that steppe warriors went off on
campaigns in western Europe riding one horse while trailing a minium
of nine others on a line. Such a large number of horses would have
been difficult to manage on expeditions. Extra horses were of tactical
importance only in-so-far as they guaranteed steppe warriors fresh
mounts before entering battle. Mounted archers certainly did not go into
battle with strings of horses *en train*, for in such a case these bowmen

could not possiblly launch their arrows. A steppe warrior with five
horses would still have been highly mobile strategically in that he could
alternate his mounts frequently and maintain a pace of one hundred
kilometers or more per day. It might be argued that extra horses would
have been important as pack animals for steppe warriors returning to
the Carpathian Basin with their booty following predatory raids. If, on
the other hand, the archers were were primarily involved in mercenary
activies, seeking monetary gain, *aurum et argentum*, not bulky goods,
extra horses would not have been particularly useful. Thus by limiting
the number of horses per archer to five, the Hungarians could double
their numbers, their fire power, and, hence, their value as mercenaries
to potential employers.

    Another consideration confronting the early Hungarians was the
question of the availability of pasture along the invasion routes that
they used when they were campaigning in the Latin West. It made little
difference how many horses could be raised on the steppelands of the
Carpathian Basin, if there were not adequate resources to support them
during expeditions in Europe. It also made sense for potential employ-
ers of Hungarian mercenaries to engage bands that had fewer horses
and a higher percentage of archers. By limiting the number of horses
per archer more grazing lands would be available for other animals
back in the Carpathian Basin. Horses are expensive animals to keep.
Cattle, sheep, and goats yield much more protein, hides, and fibers on
the hoof than do horses whose digestive systems are inefficient when
compared with ruminators. Moreover, it is important to point out that
the Carpathian Basin does not consist entirely of steppes. There are
substantial regions of fertile loess and clay soils which agriculturalist
were exploiting at the time of Hungarian settlement.[21] Thus the Mag-
yars would not have expanded their equestrian herds to the very limits
of the carrying capacity of the Carpathian Basin, if the eco-systems
of the kingdoms of Italy and East and West Francia could not have
sustained large steppe armies.

    To be sure there were some very good pastures with steppe-like
vegetation scattered throughout western Europe, but most of these
were not large enough to nourish Hungarian horses for very long.
They were islands of grasslands, like 'stepping stones', allowing small
bands of Hungarians access and egress.[22] The Magyars learned where
these routes were, and they used them. Unfortunately for the invaders,
however, their victims also knew these routes and they were aware of
the fact that Hungarians seeking grazing lands for their horses would

have to visit them. Consequently the defenders improvised ambushes for the interlopers when they returned to their homeland. An important reason why mercenary service was attractive to the Hungarians was that by entering into agreements with local magnates they could sometimes avoid ambushes by securing in advance safe routes of ingress and egress.

Durable light Hungarian warriors were in demand as mercenaries primarily because of their formidable archery which allowed them to inflict heavy casualities on their enemies without irrevocably committing themselves to close combat.[23] Procopius, a Byzantine military historian writing in the sixth century, called the composite bows of the Huns 'miracle weapons'. The Emperor Maurice, however, who wrote his *Strategikon* less than a half century later, noted that composite bows were sensitive to inclement weather. These weapons came unglued when wet. Consequently, he advised his commanders to attack mounted archers when it rained. Examples from various parts of Eurasia show that Maurice's observation was indeed correct. Especially in the Latin West north of the Alps, where rainfall is evenly distributed throughout the year, Hungarians on many occasions were forced to put away their bows in waterproof cases and flee when torrential rains or even sudden showers caught them by surprise. The archery of steppe warriors was affected not only by rainfall, but by other micro-climatic and geographic factors as well. Composite bows were most effective when archers released arrows as rapidly as possible at an angle of approximately forty-five degrees which ensured that arrows would fall in clusters at the maximum range of the weapons and with maximum force and killing power. In this kind of archery precise aiming at individual targets point-blank was of little importance. Archers lofted projectiles into a target zone several hundered meters away. To do this the bowman had to estimate accurately the distance and the windage, and he also had to make an educated guess as to the whereabouts of his enemies several seconds after the volley when the missiles (powered by gravity on their downward trajectories) landed. The weight of the arrow and even that of the bowstring affected flight of projectiles.

Archers needed open landscapes. In 955 Otto I was able to protect his forces from Magyar archery by marching his men through a forest on the way to relieve the siege of Augsburg. Thus Hungarian horse archery was not effective under all conditions. It was a tactic that could be devastating. Releasing hailstorms of arrows, horse archers sometimes completely destroyed opposing armies in the field; nevertheless, their

tactical repertoire was too limited to allow them to become an army of conquest under the climatic conditions in the Latin West, even if the Carpathian Basin could have supported more horses. At best their tactics could only complement those of sedentary armies. These tactics were well suited for forces paid to accomplished specialized task, that is for mercenaries, but not for conquerors.

But mercenary service had its pitfalls for the Magyars. An unequivocal example comes from the role of the Hungarians in a major rebellion against Otto in 954, just one year before the so-called battle of Lech-feld.[24] The principal rebels were Otto's son and heir apparent, Liudolf (Duke of Swabia), as well as his son-in-law Conrad 'the Red' (Duke of Lothringia), and Arnulf (Count Palatine of Regensburg), the leader of a powerful Bavarian clan, the Liutpoldings.[25] The motives of the rebels were varied. Liudolf was apprehensive about Otto's marriage in 951 to the fertile Adelheid, who had already borne him three children. Conrad was jealous of the growing influence that Otto's brothers, Henry, Duke of Bavaria, and Brun, Archbishop of Cologne, were exercizing over the king. Arnulf, whose father had been Duke of the Bavarians, wanted to regain this title for himself and his clan. In addition Otto had lost some support from the nobles of Saxony, his heartland. The primary supporters of the king were his brothers, Duke Henry of Bavaria and Archbishop Brun of Cologne. The power of the king seemed in jeopardy.

Early in the year 954 the Magyars became involved in these civil wars as mercenaries.[26] Liudolf accused his uncle, Henry, of inviting them to attack him and his allies. The Bavarian duke then angrily responded that it was the rebels in Liudolf's camp who had induced the Magyars to invade. Modern historians are divided between those who believe that Liudolf, Conrad, and the Liutpoldings were responsible for the Hungarian intervention and those who are convinced that Henry was behind it all along. However, the case against Duke Henry is implausible. Liudolf's accusations were subterfuge. As Duke of Bavaria, Henry had often threatened the Hungarians; and he had recently acquired the Italian frontier lordships of Friuli and Verona, giving him control of territories stretching from the headwaters of the Adriatic to the borders of Swabia and Franconia. Henry not only defended Otto's kingdom against Hungarian invasions from the southeast, but he was also in a position to attack their territories, which he had already done on at least one occasion. The Liutpoldings, who wanted to regain the ducal title and who had a tradition of alliances with the Hungarians

had on the other hand the strongest motives to employ the Magyars to support the rebellion.

The chronology of the Hungarians' part in the uprising supports this contention. The steppe warriors began by entering Bavaria in March; however there are no reports that they caused any destruction there, an indication that the Liutpoldings, who were in control of Bavaria at that time, had instigated their expedition.[27] They then swept swiftly through Bavaria and neighboring Swabia, where Liudolf actually provided them with guides to Rhine Franconia. On Palm Sunday (19 March) they arrived in Worms, Conrad the Red's power center, where he greeted them, treated them to a lavish banquet, and gave them many 'gifts' of gold and silver.[28] Widukind is unambiguous on this point. Conrad concluded a treaty with the Magyars, in which they promised to pillage only the estates of his enemies in Lower Lothringia, who had gone over to Archbishop Brun. The duke then personally led them to Maastricht, where he left them to their own devices to do what they had promised.[29] This is an example of classic mercenary behavior very similar to how it was practiced during the great age of mercenary service in the late medieval and early modern periods.

When simply viewing arrows on a map, the Magyar expedition of 954 gives the illusion of a spectacularly successful undertaking. It is doubtful, however, that the campaign yielded much. In Lothringia the Hungarians began with an attempt to storm the monastery of Gorze.[30] Yet, despite the fact that the walls had been torn down, they failed to take the abbey. On 2 April they attacked the monastery of Lobbes, which was only lightly fortified. The *milites* who guarded this abbey drove them off in disarray when heavy rains made it impossible for them to use their archery.[31] A few days later (6 April) the Magyars attempted to storm the fortified episcopal city of Cambrai, only to be repulsed once again.[32] The Hungarian leader Horka Bulksu ordered the pillaging of the nearby church of St Géry. Taking a small number of captives, whom they drove along with whips, the Hungarians departed Lotharingia. However they had great difficulty keeping their chattels together, for Flodoard reports that most escaped.[33] Eventually they reached Burgundy, where they suffered numerous ambuscades plus an outbreak of disease in their camp. Finally they crossed the Alps into Italy and returned to the Carpathian Basin in early June with little to show for their efforts.

Rather than being an impressive achievement, this Hungarian expedition reveals the basic weaknesses of forces that depend on steppe

tactics alone. This incursion, which swept rapidly across a large part of
Europe, was obviously made up solely of mounted archers. Although
they wreaked havoc, moving about swiftly, surprising their victims, taking
captives and devastating a few unprotected villages, they were unable
to storm even poorly fortified localities. Incursions by mounted archers
deep into the bowels of Europe with pillaging in mind were not very
profitable. Steppe warriors were limited by the carrying capacities of
their mounts, and captives could (and obviously did) slip away.

The disappointing yield of the 954 expedition brought about a major
change in Hungarian strategy. In 955 they invaded the East Frankish
kingdom once again, but on this occasion with a very large army that
consisted of impressed infantry forces and a siege train that was pre-
pared to invest the city of Augsburg. Rather than moving rapidly as
they had done the year before, dashing through Bavaria and Swabia
into Rhine-Franconia, thence onto Lower Lothringia, Burgundy, and
Italy before returning to their camps in the Carpathian Basin, this
army moved at a glacial pace. A year earlier Otto's forces had been
unable to catch up with their swarms; however, in 955 the Hungarian
army, obviously looking for a pitched battle, waited for the king in the
environs of Augsburg, where the broad plain of the Lech River (the
Lechfeld) offered an ideal site for their tactics, a steppe-like environment
surrounding Augsburg on three sides. In the year 910 the Magyars had
destroyed an East Frankish army there by feigning a retreat to draw
their lumbering opponents onto the treeless landscape of the Lechfeld
where their archery annihilated them.

In 955, however, the Magyars did not come as mercenaries, for
there was no one remaining to pay them. The rebellion against Otto
had collapsed almost completely by the Spring of 955. Liudolf was in
the custody of his uncle, Archbishop Brun, and Conrad, who had sur-
rendered earlier, lost his ducal title, though he retained some comital
lordships and had joined the king against the Magyars. As for the Count
Palatine Arnulf, he had perished when Otto captured Regensburg in
the Spring of 955. It is possible that their leaders harbored dreams of
a conquest of the East Frankish kingdom. On the other hand it is more
likely that they hoped to gain a decisive victory that would allow them
to demand tribute once again. The tactical plan was to meet Otto's
forces in a pitched battle on terrain where the mounted archers could
prevail.[34] By laying siege to Augsburg the Hungarian leadership wanted
to tempt Otto to march in relief and then draw the king's soldiers onto
the Lechfeld as their ancestors had done in 910. Because they had

advanced slowly into Bavaria, a well rested Magyar force awaited the king's army, exhaused from more than two years of almost constant fighting, marching to and fro across the face of central Europe. Otto foiled the Hungarians' plans, however, when he protected his men from their archery by leading them through the Rauherforst, a woodland west of Augsburg. When the Hungarians attempted to feign retreat and to lure his army onto the Lechfeld, Otto's pursuit was cautious, he avoided ambushes, and he returned to the safety of Augsburg as night fell. On the days that followed events took a decisive turn, but not in favor of the Hungarians. Heavy rains caused severe flooding in eastern Bavaria cutting Magyar lines of retreat. Their huge army was completely anni-hilated by forces guarding river crossings and operating in their rear.[35] This was the last Hungarian invasion of the Latin West.

If the expedition of 954 exposed the limits of the Magyars as mercenaries, the so-called Lechfeld expedition demonstrated that the Magyars could not hope to reimpose tribute on the East Frankish King-dom, much less conquer significant parts of Latin Europe. Heather's suggestion cannot stand that steppe peoples on the fringes of the West could live better from military predation than from a combination of farming and pastoralism. The best choice for the Hungarians was indeed the one that they made after the debacle of 955. They gave up on predatory nomadism and built a society based on agriculture and small scale transhumance, one that could take advantage of Hungary's geographic situation between the Latin West and the Byzantine East. The Hungarians could not have created a viable culture for themselves in the Carpathian Basin by turning over all of its steppes into pastures for the horses of predatory archers. Wealth derived from cattle, sheep, and goats, plus the labors of farmers who tilled the loess and clay soils that make up the majority of the land area, became the basis of the medieval Hungarian kingdom. Two centers dominated political life there during the next century. One of these was around Budapest in the north. The second controlled the region of Szeged-Csongrad in the south. These centers were on the fringes of the Great Hungar-ian Plain, but they were not of the steppes. It was from these centers that competition arose to determine the direction (political, economic, confessional, etc.) of the Hungarian kingdom during the late tenth and eleventh centuries. Both the Latin (Roman) Empire in the West and the Greek (Byzantine) Empire in the East attempted to exercise influence, the West around Budapest and the Byzantines in the distirct of Szeged-Csongrad. In contrast, the region in the far northeast, Nyriség, which

had been a major center of a predatory warrior culture in the first half of the tenth century, went into a steep decline after 955. Earlier some of the richest graves in Hungary had adorned the Spartan steppe-like landscape of Nyirség, where agriculture was not a viable alternative. Archaeological evidence suggests that before Lechfeld there had been in Nyirség a flourishing bachelor culture based on mercenary activities.[36] Afterwards there was a crash from which the region did not recover until the late middle ages when, ironically, Hungarian cowboys drove long-horned cattle on the hoof up the Danube to burgeoning cities such as Nuremberg and Augsburg. In the long run military predation was not a better way for the Hungarians to make a living in the Carpathian Basin than agriculture and pastoralism.

Notes

[1] C.A. Macartney, *The Magyars of the IX Century* (Cambridge, 1930). E.N. Lüttich, *Ungarnzüge in Europa im 10. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1910). I. Fodor, *In Search of a New Homeland: The Prehistory of the Hungarian People and the Conquest* (Budapest, 1968). Andre Róna-Tas, *Hungarians and Europe in the Early Middle Ages* (Budapest, 1996).

[2] B. Eberl, *Die Ungarnschlacht auf dem Lechfeld (Gunzele) im Jahre 955* (Augsburg. 1955). Karl Leyser, 'Henry I and the Beginnings of the Saxon Empire,' and 'The Battle at the Lech.' In K. Leyser, *Medieval Germany and its Neighbors 900–1250* (London, 1982), 11–68. Charles R. Bowlus, *The Battle of Lechfeld and its Aftermath, 955. The End of the Age of Migrations in the Latin West* (Aldershot, 2006).

[3] Marc Bloch, *La sociéte féodal* 1 (Paris, 1940).

[4] Gina Fasoli, *Le incursione Ungare in Europa nel secolo X.* (Florence, 1945).

[5] Szaboles de Vajay, *Der Eintritt des ungarischen Stämmebundes in die Europäische Geschichte (862–933)* (Mainz, 1968).

[6] Aldo A. Settia, 'Gli Ungari in Italia e i mutamenti territoriali fra VIII–X secolo,' *I barbari in Italia*. Ed. M.B. Anamonte et al. (Milan, 1984). Barbara Rosenwein, 'The Family Politics of Berengar I, King of Italy (888–924),' *Speculum* 71 (1996), 247–89.

[7] Maximillian-Georg Kellner, *Die Ungarneinfälle im Bild der Quellen bis 1150. Von der 'Gens detestanda' zur 'Gens ad fidem Christi conversa'.* (Munich, 1997).

[8] Nora Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom. Jews, Muslims amd 'Pagans' in medieval Hungary c. 1000–c. 1300.* (Cambridge, 2002).

[9] Kellner, *Ungarneinfälle*, 99–101.

[10] Ibid. 103.

[11] Bowlus, *Lechfeld*, 27–36.

[12] Many modern scholars have been confused by the surviving sources. Byzantine officials, for example, went to great lengths to disguise any form of payment as gifts in order to avoid the stain of having paid tribute to inferiors. For an intelligent discussion of the Byzantine-Avar relationship, see Walter Pohl, *Die Awaren. Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa 567–822* (Munich, 1988), 209–15.

[13] Here I am referring to Bernard S. Bachrach's sarcastic use of a famous quote by J.M. Wallace-Hadrill. Bowlus, *Lechfeld*, 37.

[14] Leo VI, *Tactica*, a partial translation in Gerard Chaliand, *The Art of War in World History: from antiquity to the nuclear age* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1994), 363.

[15] Thomas von Bogyay, *Lechfeld. Ende und Anfang. Geschichtliche Hintergründe, ideeler Inhalt und Folgen der Ungarnzüge. Ein Ungarischer Beitrag zur Tausendjahrfeier des Sieges am Lechfeld* (Munich, 1955), 23–24.

[16] Paul Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier. A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900–1204* (Cambridge, 2000), 38–45.

[17] The best known example is found in *Widukindi monachi Coreiensis rerum gestarum Saxonicarum libri tres*, MGH SS rerum Germanicarum in usus scholarum 60, eds P. Hirsch and E. Lohmann (Hannover, 1935), Bk I, ch. 32, 45, where the East Frankish king, Henry I, agrees to pay the Hungarians tribute in return for a truce of nine years.

[18] Denis Sinor, 'Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History,' *Oriens extremus* 19, 171–84. Rudi Paul Lindner, 'Nomadism, Horses, and Huns,' *Past and Present* 92 (1981), 3–19.

[19] Heather first made this thesis public in *Abstracts of Papers, Twenty-First Annual Byzantine Studies Conference* (1995). He has now published it, Peter Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire. A new History of Rome and the Barbarians* (Oxford, 2006), 326–29.

[20] Bowlus, *Lechfeld*, 25–7.

[21] On the soils of the Carpathian Basin see Cs. Bálint, *Südungarn im 10. Jahrhundert* (Budapest, 1991).

[22] Bowlus, *Lechfeld*, 76–88.

[23] For a more complete discussion of archery with references to recent literature, see Bowlus, *Lechfeld*, 27–36. See also the discussions of archery by B.W. Kooi, 'On the Mechanics of the Modern Working-recurve Bow,' *Computational Mechanics* (1991) 8. 291–304. Also see Kooi's web site, wwwbio.vio.nl/thb/usuers/kooi. Heather, *The Fall*, 154–58, discusses the Hunic bow arguing that the invention of the asymmetric bow was the major reason for the successes of Huns, Avars, and Magyars of the fringes of Latin Christendom.

[24] Bowlus, *Lechfeld*, 88–95.

[25] For a discussion of this rebellion, see H. Naumann, 'Rätsel des letzten Aufstandes gegen Otto I: (953–954),' in H. Zimmermann (ed.), *Otto der Grosse* Wege der Forschung, 450 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 70–136.

[26] Johannes Laudage, *Otto der Große. Eine Biographie* (Regensburg, 2001), 151 makes a convincing case that the rebels bore the primary responsibility for the Hungarian intervention. Leyser, 'Battle,' 50, thinks that the Magyars acted completely on their own initative.

[27] The Liutpoldings were in control of Bavaria at that time. Duke Henry and his wife Judith had fled the duchy.

[28] Widukind, *Res gestae Saxonicae*, Bk III, ch. 30, 118. '*Dominica ante pascha Wormatiae eis est publice ministratum et muneribus auri et argenti plurimum donatum.*'

[29] *Flodoardi annales a. 919–966* in MGH SS 3. ed. G. Pertz (Hannover, 1839), 402.

[30] *Vita Johannis Gorziensis*, in MGH SS 4. ed. G. Pertz (Hannover, 1841), 356.

[31] *Gesta Abbatum Loibensium*, in MGH SS 4. ed. G. Pertz (Hannover, 1841), 67.

[32] *Gesta Episcoporum Cameracensium*, in MGH SS 7. (Hannover, 1846), 428.

[33] *Flodoardi Historia Remensis Ecclesiae* MGH SS 13. ed. G. Waitz (Hannover, 1881), 451. Cf. Leyser, 'Battle,' 50.

[34] Bowlus, *Lechfeld*, 98–103.

[35] Bowlus, *Lechfeld*, 132–62.

[36] Balint, *Südungarn*, 201–5.

'WARRIORS FIT FOR A PRINCE'

WELSH TROOPS IN ANGEVIN SERVICE, 1154–1216[1]

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In November 1176 Henry II's court at Westminster was the setting for intense diplomatic activity involving delegations from the kingdoms of Sicily, Castile and Navarre, the German Empire and the duchy of Savoy but possibly the most distinguished and surely the most weary were the envoys sent to 'his most dearly-beloved friend' by the Byzantine Emperor, Manuel I Komnenos.[2] Howden gives the text of the letter addressed to Henry II in which he gives the best gloss on the setbacks suffered in his campaign against Konya (Iconium) and is at pains to mention the gallantry of his rearguard which was made up not only of Greeks but also of Latins and men of many other nations including some of Henry's own nobility. On this occasion, the king sent Manuel some hounds.[3] On another occasion Henry sent a letter of his own in which *inter alia* he drew the emperor's attention to one of the nations of Britain, namely the Welsh, whose courage and ferocity were such that they would do battle with fully armed opponents though unarmed themselves.[4] It is unlikely that the king had in mind his ignominious Welsh campaign of 1165; rather did his reference to them represent a desire to convey to Emperor Manuel that he too could deploy warriors from the various *gentes* and *nationes* subject to his dominion. This paper then will treat of the evidence for the deployment, recruitment and organisation of troops from Wales by Henry II, Richard I and John before, in a manner suitably modest for a non-specialist on these occasions, reflecting upon the contribution such a survey might make to the apparently still contentious issue of mercenary identity.

Given the incompleteness and of the surviving record, such a survey for the Angevin period does not permit us to generalise with that degree of confidence permitted to historians of military recruitment from the reign of Edward I onwards when administrative documents such as pay-rolls, writs of array and muster rolls become more plentiful as the activity of spending departments such as the Wardrobe intensified. This qualitative and quantitative difference is all to familiar to the historian

of military architecture as he moves from a scrutiny of the undifferen-
tiated aggregate totals for supplies, manpower and building materials
which is the most that the annual audits at the Exchequer vouchsafe
to the detailed and sometimes diurnal computation of expenditure
found in the later 'rolls of particulars' and contracts for piecework etc.
As a result a great deal can be known about the recruitment by the
English crown of Welsh troops from the last quarter of the thirteenth
century onwards for campaigns in Wales itself, in Scotland and Ireland
and, most noteworthy of course, in France and Flanders during the
Hundred Years' War.

   The studies of J.E. Morris, D.L. Evans and, most recently, Michael
Prestwich, have demonstrated how effectively successive English kings
exploited their lordship therein to afforce the other contingents under
their banner with impressive totals of men from the Principality and
Marcher lands in Wales.[5] The extension of Crown lands in Wales that
followed upon the Edwardian Conquest together with the recovery
of Marcher territory and the creation, indeed, of new lordships of
the March (e.g. Denbigh and Ruthin) greatly increased the pool of
available Welsh manpower. The traditional pre-Conquest obligation
of free Welshmen to provide military service to their native lords was
now transferred to the Crown. Gerald of Wales's prediction was fully
realised.[6] In Edward 1 had 9,000 Welsh foot in his pay in 1276–7,
c. 7,500 in 1287, 5,300 in Flanders in 1297–8 and as many as 10,900
in the Falkirk campaign of 1298.[7] The Marcher contribution to such
totals was significant, e.g. 6,340 from the March were summoned to
Scotland in 1322 while in 1346 some 2,310 Marcher Welshmen were
summoned to join the army before Calais.[8] Numbers recruited in this
later period from the pre-1284 lordships of the March—'the lord's
proprietary armies' in Rees Davies's telling phrase—provide some of
the following totals: 500 (Builth), 1,000 (Glamorgan), 300 (Kidwelly
and Monmouth), 400 (Abergavenny), 300 (Gower) summoned in
1298; 332 (Glamorgan), 199 (Abergavenny), 83 (Ewyas Harold/Lacy)
in 1343.[9] For future reference, it is worth bearing in mind that for the
whole Angevin period, the English crown had few lordships of its own
in Wales save what came to it by marriage, custody or escheat in the
March; Pembroke had been granted away and Carmarthen was only
intermittently under its control. After the aberration of the Glyndŵr
rebellion (1400–c. 1415), Henry V recruited as widely as his predecessors
in Principality and Marches alike, and for his French campaigns raised

troops by indentures with individual lords and captains. Wages were paid for specified terms of service. Carmarthenshire, Cardiganshire and the lordship of Brecon contributed 500 men out of the 9,000 mustered from England and Wales.[10] Recruitment of Welshmen continued apace in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; so much so that it has been estimated that 'between 1594 and 1602, 6,611 men or 2.9% of the estimated population of Wales were called up for service in Ireland, as compared with 0.76% for England.'[11]

My concern here is with the 'prehistory', as it were, of this tradition of service between 1154 and 1216. No attempt has been made to trace it much earlier than the reign of Henry II, although chroniclers record the appearance of Welshmen in the forces of the pro-Angevin Robert, earl of Gloucester in 1139 and later at the battle of Lincoln in February 1141 under Ranulf, earl of Chester, where they were positioned directly opposite the royal vanguard composed of Bretons and Flemings.[12] The morale of the royalist army was doubtless stiffened by the address of Baldwin fitz Gilbert of Clare who urged them to scorn the earl of Chester's Welsh whom he likened to stampeding cattle rather than proper soldiers ('*arte et usu belli carentes*'). Of greater interest to us is Orderic Vitalis's naming of the 'brothers', Cadwaladr and Madog, as leaders of Earl Ranulf's Welsh contingents. His editor follows J.E. Lloyd in identifying these as Cadwaladr ap Gruffudd (d. 1172) of Gwynedd, brother to Owain Gwynedd (d. 1170) and a 'foil to the (latter's) greatness', and his brother-in-law Madog ap Maredudd (d. 1160) of Powys.[13] Infra-dynastic tension, the weft and weave of native politics, may explain Cadwaladr's association with his powerful neighbour, the earl of Chester, while the Powysian's presence at Lincoln betrays his own rivalry with Owain Gwynedd which culminated in the latter's triumph at Coleshill nine years later, even though Madog's force was augmented by troops sent to him by the same earl.[14] The earl of Chester's Welshmen at Lincoln were confederates in a political alliance against the Crown rather than mercenaries and, in the absence of contrary evidence, it is likely that the earl of Gloucester's Welshmen came from his lordships of Glamorgan and Gwynllŵg and were therefore his homagers rather than his mercenaries. Likewise the '*multitudo intolerabilis*' led by Miles of Gloucester, earl of Hereford, to Lincoln may well have followed him as tenants and freemen of his lordship of Brecon. Baldwin, son of Gilbert fitz Richard of Clare, whose dismissive description of Welsh military skills was quoted by above should have

known better: his brother Richard fitz Gilbert, lord of Clare, Tonbridge and Ceredigion, had fallen victim to a Welsh ambush in the valley of the Usk in 1136.

Another Clare, Richard fitz Gilbert (Strongbow), had a higher regard for the value of Welsh troops for he and his fellow-conquerors of Leinster took a substantial number with them to Ireland in 1169 and 1170.[15] Gerald of Wales, whose family involvement in the enterprise explains his keen interest, rather disconcerts the reader when in his account of the arrival in Ireland of Raymond le Gros and Robert fitz Stephen with their contingents he uses the formulaic '*sagittariis pedestribus de electa Kambrie iuventute trescentis*' (le Gros) and '*sagittariis quoque pedestribus quasi trescentis de electa Guallie iuventute*' (fitz Stephen). In both accounts however the distinction is between the knights from the kin, close relatives and dependants of le Gros and of fitz Stephen, on the one hand, and the archers, both mounted and infantry, on the other. Another adventurer, Maurice fitz Gerald and uncle to the archdeacon of Brecon, is very likely to have used Welsh troops especially as he is not known to have had any landed resources outside Wales. The later verse chronicle of the story of the Anglo-Normans in Ireland speaks of Wales and of men from Pembrokeshire but whilst it distinguishes the Flemings it does not categorise the 'Welsh' as a distinct element in their contingents; rather are they are lumped together as '*Engleis*'—the common liege-men of Henry 11 '*li rei engelis*'.[16]

Before turning to the recruitment of Welshmen by the crown in the period 1154–1216, we may briefly consider the political crises in England occasioned by the policies of Richard I's chancellor, William Longchamp in 1191, the captivity of the king in December 1192 and the mischief of his younger brother John, count of Mortain, who took advantage of both.[17] In July 1191 John brought some 4,000 Welshmen with him to Winchester for a showdown with the chancellor who took the precaution of hiring Welshmen of his own.[18] In 1193 matters took a more serious turn when the count's forces occupied Wallingford and Windsor whose castles provided bases of operation for the many Welshmen he had recruited together with men from the France and from which the former ravaged the countryside as far as Kingston.[19] It was precisely such deployment of its native fighting men that prompted J.O. Prestwich in his study of war as it impacted upon English history in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to remind his readers that 'Wales…was and long had been a large reservoir of military manpower.'[20] Indeed, it is striking how contemporary accounts tended to

employ terms such as 'multitude' to convey the sense of the sheer numbers of Welshmen involved; it is possible, on the other hand, that in describing large numbers of infantry such writers were trying to convey orders of magnitude rather than any numerical precision. The evidential value of our chroniclers is compromised in another sense—they do not and probably cannot tell us whence these Welshmen came. It is probable that Count John as earl of Gloucester drew on the Welsh of his Marcher lordships of Glamorgan and Gwynllŵg but the recruiting ground of Longchamp's Welshmen of 1191 is more problematic. There is no trace of them in the relevant Pipe Roll for Michaelmas of that year and he may of course have paid them from his own purse. During the greater crisis of 1193 they would appear to have been recruited from other English lordships there since that year's audit reveals that both mounted and infantry sergeants were recruited and paid in the 'Marches of Wales' by, amongst others, William de Briouze, lord of Brecon, and William Marshal, lord of Chepstow, before being brought to Windsor.[21] There are two related difficulties here which admit of no certain solution: in no account for this Exchequer year are there troops specifically designated '*Walenses*' and it is by no means certain that the government's usage of the terms '*Marchiae Wallie*' or '*Marchia Wallie*' at this date was fixed in its later exclusive sense of lordships that lay neither in *pura Wallia* (native Wales) nor in '*Anglia*' (English shired land).[22] It is possible that some of these troops were recruited from the border counties of Herefordshire and Gloucester of which de Briouze and the Marshal were at this time the sheriffs and, as such, may have been recruited from the Welsh communities therein. At the very least the imprecision of the evidence counsels against too dogmatic an interpretation.

For the period from 1154–1216 a useful starting-point is the once oft-cited 1946 essay by Jacques Boussard: '*Les mercenaries au X11ᵉ siècle: Henri 11 Plantegenêt et les origines de l'armée de métier*'.[23] He identified considerable changes in the art of war in the twelfth century, not the least of which was an appreciation of the '*valeur collective de troupes de métier*' and its corollary, namely the strengthening of the links between military power and disposable wealth. To paraphrase Warren, 'mercenaries put up the cost of defiance.' Boussard, furthermore, attributed a pioneering grasp of the utility, both strategic and tactical, of these changes to the genius of Henry II. He drew attention to that monarch's deployment of Welsh troops and went on to assert that '*C'est visiblement à ses mercenaries brabançons et gallois qu'il doit sa puissance militaire*'.[24] Unfortunately, the

evidential base for his discussion of Welsh, as opposed to Brabançon, troops was a rather narrow one, although the entire Pipe Rolls for Henry II's reign had been published by 1925. Even so, his essay had the merit of placing the deployment of Welsh 'mercenaries' within a wider European context. Given that my chronology is self-evidently wider than Boussard's, I shall trespass beyond 1189 and, in addition to the works of chroniclers and other contemporary commentators, I shall estreat (to use an Exchequer term) material not only from the Pipe Rolls for 1189–1216 but also from the records of the Chancery whose enrolment of writs and letters from 1199 onwards enables the historian to advance beyond the informative but necessarily limited annual audits of the Westminster Exchequer. The records for the reigns of Richard I and John are particularly rewarding and unsurprisingly so given the stretch of their military commitments. Furthermore, King John came to the throne with more 'hands-on' experience of Welsh affairs and itinerated within it and along its frontiers more frequently than any of his predecessors.[25] His father's legerdemain had obtained for him the whole inheritance of his first and soon discarded wife, Isabella of Gloucester, which included the lordships of Glamorgan and Gwynllŵg in that country's south-eastern littoral and the fall of William de Briouze brought his extensive lordships in the March into royal custody.

The first chronicled deployment of Welsh troops by Henry II on French soil occurred in June 1167 when, in response to Louis VII's ravaging of the Norman Vexin, they were let loose on the French king's main base and arsenal at Chaumont. The fullest, and certainly most vivid, account is that given by Etienne de Rouen, who has the Welsh incendiarists swim across the Epte in a manoeuvre later repeated across the Seine at Rouen.[26] The recruitment and transportation of these particular troops cannot be securely traced in the Westminster accounts for Michaelmas 1167 and it may well be that their expenses were charged to the *camera regis*.[27] Individual Welshmen in receipt of liveries or pensions crop up on the Shropshire account from Michaelmas 1168 to 1171 but, as one might expect, Wales was drawn upon more extensively in the course of the great crisis of Henry II's reign, namely the rebellions of 1173–4.[28] The activities of Welsh troops in England and France, as described by a number of chroniclers, left traces in the 1174 accounts for the counties of Hereford, Gloucester and Oxford through which they passed on their way across the Channel; some had moved south from the siege of Tutbury.[29] Roger of Howden and Robert of Torigny wrote of the bold move whereby at first light Henry II sent

his Welsh across the Seine to scout out the encampment of the French army besieging Rouen in 1174. The enemy were completely surprised, suffered heavy casualties, lost their supply train and withdrew in some haste.[30] The identity of these Welshmen is tolerably certain—they were contingents provided by Rhys ap Gruffudd ap Rhys ('The Lord Rhys') of Deheubarth whose wide personal hegemony in south and mid-Wales had been formally recognised by the Crown. Rhys had led his men to Tutbury but it is unlikely that he accompanied them across the Channel in the summer; this task he entrusted to his son Hywel.[31] Whether this service stemmed from Rhys's *fidelitas* to his Angevin overlord is problematic, but it may at its least strict be interpreted as the *quid pro quo* that flowed from the rapprochement between the Welsh ruler and Henry II.

Liveries or victuals for Welshmen do not trouble the accountants much thereafter until the 1180's.[32] At Michaelmas 1186 allowances were claimed by the sheriffs of Hereford, Shropshire and Yorkshire for liveries to troops from North and South Wales (i.e. not from the March), some of whom are identified as going to Galloway. This agrees with Howden's account of the '*magnum exercitum*' collected by Henry II for his show of force at Carlisle in that year.[33] 1187 marks the beginning of period of intermittent but significant deployment of troops from Wales on the continent and, more specifically, in the duchy of Normandy which continued (save during Richard I's participation in the Third Crusade and his subsequent captivity) until the loss of that province under John The 1187 audit records liveries and advances to Welshmen and troops from the March crossing with the king to Normandy together with sums charged to the accounts for Herefordshire, Shropshire and Worcestershire for as many as 525 sergeants in the same deployment.[34] At the following Michaelmas liveries for still more substantial numbers of Welshmen making their way from Cardiff to London via Gloucester are recorded and it is clear that most, if not all, of these came from the Welsh communities in the upland *commotes* of the lordship of Glamorgan which had been in the hands of the Crown since 1183.[35] Their pay from Cardiff to Gloucester is entered on the Glamorgan account and their pay from Gloucester to London is entered on that county's account, but the two totals do not in every instance tally; if we take those paid from Gloucester to London, we obtain a total of just over 870 (mainly foot). Those troops who were paid for the journey from London to Normandy on the Hereford account would give us another contingent of over 500; those likewise paid from the issues of Shrop-

shire would bring in some 165 more but we cannot be sure that these were Welsh.[36] Howden confirms that Henry II crossed to Normandy in July 1188 with a large army which included Welshmen who, unknown to their royal commander, entered the lands of the French king near Damville (on the River Itun) and plundered at will. As earnest of his desire for a peace Henry, we are told, sent his mercenaries and Welsh home; here we may note that the writer distinguishes between the king's '*solidarii*' and his '*Walenses*'.[37] Not all the Welsh were repatriated for some of them were killed in the Angevin retreat from Le Mans in the following summer.[38]

The Third Crusade and his captivity aside, the greater part of Richard I's time was consumed by diplomatic and military efforts in the defence and recovery of his lands in France and much of that in the period from his landing at Barfleur on 12 May 1194 to his death on 6 April 1199 when repressing a rebellion in the Limousin. Our sources, including accounts enrolled at the ducal exchequer at Caen, suggest that in his deployment of Welsh troops, as in much else, he followed his father's practice. Payment to Meurig ap Roger of Powys and his troops for their service in Normandy is entered on the Shropshire account for Michaelmas 1194.[39] These, or others from Wales, were involved in a bloody *contretemps* with some Brabanters at Portsmouth while the king was away from the port on a brief visit to Stanstead. He had to put an end to their mutual animosities ('*malitia*') before waiting for a favourable crossing on May 12.[40] It is possible that the force of some 1,358, whose passage to the duchy appears on the Hampshire account for Michaelmas 1195, included some Welshmen, though none are identified as such. The roll of the Norman exchequer for the same period does however more than make up for this with its references to Welshmen at Vaudreuil and Pont de L'Arche, their crossing to Ouistreham and the transport of the casualties amongst them to Rouen. At least five shiploads had made their way across to the duchy.[41] Their complements were afforced by further contingents whose expenses were allowed to various sheriffs at the Westminster exchequer of Michaelmas 1196.[42] An accurate total for the Welsh active in Normandy in 1196 cannot be established. The editor of that year's Pipe Roll has estimated a minimum figure of 2,100 which gives some credence to the claim by William le Breton that some 3,400 Welsh were killed by the French near Les Andelys in August of that year.[43] Further Welsh contingents were sent abroad in 1197 and 1198, though it is evident that others were recruited for service in Wales and the March as government dealt

with the destabilisation of that region consequent upon the death of the Lord Rhys and the perceived threat from Gwenwynwyn of Powys.[44] During this period a Welsh contingent were paid for their station at Tillières-sur-Avre in the southernmost Evrecin.[45]

King John's ultimately unsuccessful defence of the duchy of Normandy and his other lordships in northern France was the main charge upon his military and financial resources in the period up to 1204, although neither then nor later did this provide the sole theatre of operations for his deployment of Welsh troops. The latter is evidenced by the curious matter of the despatch of two shiploads of mainly Welsh troops, together with provisions, to Norway in 1201—possibly as a demonstration of support for King Sverrir in any confrontation with the king of Scots.[46] Such troops are certainly to be found in Normandy in 1202: the crossing of 200 Welsh infantry is charged to the account of the Justiciar, Geoffrey fitz Peter, and the passage of 560 Welsh foot and horse to the Sussex account.[47] In Normandy itself a contingent of 300 Welsh infantry and their unit commanders were in receipt of their pay for a term of twenty days from 30 July in that year.[48] Such occasional references in the records produced by different agencies makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to be certain that we are following the same complement of men from one location to another over a given period of time, though this is sometimes possible if the leader of a Welsh contingent is named in the document. One such leader, Cadwallon ab Ifor of Senghennydd, was still in the duchy in 1203 when he met up with his well-connected cousin Gerald of Wales.[49] Cadwallon crossed to Normandy once more in 1204 together with 200 Welsh under Lleision ab Morgan.[50] The collapse of Angevin Normandy in that year confined the crown's deployment of its Welsh troops thereafter to the British Isles—save for the ill-fated campaign to Poitou ten years later. There is no good evidence for their recruitment in the spring of 1205 when preparations were made for a major expedition across the Channel—probably the largest amphibious force put in place since the fleet and army of Richard I was got ready in 1189. The whole enterprise was abandoned, though a smaller force did reach Poitou in 1206, and while this was comprised of a substantial baronial element and a regiment of crossbowmen assembled from various castle garrisons, Welshmen do not appear to have accompanied them. It is possible, of course, that liveries for the latter may have been disbursed from the chamber (wherever it happened to be), but one would have expected some trace of them to have appeared either in the Exchequer

accounts of the border shires and of others through which they would
have traversed on their way to embarkation or in the many writs relat-
ing to the expedition that were enrolled.[51]

King John's major campaigns in 1209, 1210 and 1211 took him
to Scotland, Ireland and Wales respectively. Llywelyn ap Iorwerth of
Gwynedd evidently thought it politic to join the English army at Nor-
ham in July 1209, but it would not appear that brought any substantial
body of troops with him and received merely his expenses.[52] Then
and clearly later the situation in Wales itself impacted on recruitment
for service elsewhere: Fawkes de Breauté, keeper of Glamorgan, was
allowed monies at the Michaelmas in 1209 for bringing Welsh troops
to an 'army of Wales'.[53] Not the least reason for the need to police
parts of that country was the fall-out consequent upon the outlawry
of that 'earl of March *manqué*', William de Briouze. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the considerable force led by the king to Ireland in June
1210 lacked Welsh troops if not knightly retinues from the March.[54]
The 'army of Wales' was reinforced by 500 sergeants from Glamorgan,
while on August 30, at Newport on the king's return journey through
south Wales, Henry de Vere received £240 as prests for those sergeants
on their way to the country with the constable of Chester.[55] John led
two campaigns against Llywelyn and his satellites in the following year;
these did not produce an enduring settlement and a third campaign
planned for the spring of 1212 was only aborted because of a politi-
cal crisis in England. Thereafter the recovery of his French dominions
absorbed almost the whole of the king's attention culminating in the
limited success of his Poitevin campaign and the defeat of his allies
at Bouvines in 1214. These successive crises demanded skills of man
management and political judgment which John conspicuously lacked
and he was unable to head off rebellion in the spring of 1215 or to
prevent the outbreak of a civil war which afflicted his kingdom for two
years from the autumn of 1215 onwards. The political communities in
Wales and the March were not, course, bystanders: the native Welsh,
on the whole, made common cause with the king's opponents while
the Marchers (save for the Briouzes), for the most part, had perforce
to support John.

King John did not lack for allies, albeit minor players, in Wales during
these years and payments of one kind or another were issued to them
but it is moot whether such payments were pensions or inducements
to neutrality rather than liveries for fighting men. Those not leagued
with Llywelyn from 1212 onwards, such as Madog ap Gruffudd Maelor,

Maredudd ap Robert of Cydewain and Rhys and Owain ap Gruffudd of Deheubarth, received tokens of royal favour and some monies but it is not clear whether they reciprocated with military contingents.[56] Welsh troops, however, appear on the surviving *misae* roll for 4 May 1212–22 May 1213, which record payments made by the exchequer to the various departments of the royal household.[57] These disbursements recur from the third week of March 1213 until the last recorded payment in the second week of May 1213. They clearly relate to John's mustering of an army and fleet in the spring of that year for a continental campaign that was to begin at Portsmouth but which, in the event, became an army of national defence centred on Canterbury and prepared to repel an expected French invasion.[58] Payments to Welshmen going to Winchester were made to the Fleming, Godescal de Malines, constable of Hereford, and thereafter their liveries were the responsibility of Engelard de Cigogné's household staff: 500 were paid from 22 April to 6 May, while liveries for another 500 Welsh foot were paid to the clerk of Fawkes de Breauté for the period from 22 April to 8 May. Further tranches of pay for 1,200 Welsh infantry were handed over to a knight of de Cigogné's to cover the periods 7–14 May and 15 to 22 May.[59] Welsh troops in units or '*custodiae*' of 500 each may therefore have been amalgamated into a single larger unit at a later stage but the evidence does not permit us to establish with certainty that the aggregate of Welshmen recruited in 1213 was in excess of 1,200 although this is by itself an impressive figure. In this particular regard, as in others, it is to be regretted that the Pipe Roll for the same exchequer year has not survived. The aborted campaign to Poitou was eventually launched in early February 1214 and mandates were issued as late as mid-August to both Engelard de Cigogné, William and John Marshal to send selected units of 300 Welsh each to Portsmouth.[60] One of the leaders of these Welsh units can be identified as Llywelyn's ousted rival, Gruffudd ap Rhodri, to whom the king had made speculative grants of land in Perfeddwlad in 1212 in return for specified renders and, significantly, personal military service.[61] From the autumn of 1215 until his death in October 1216 King John's primary objectives were the security of his throne and the defeat not only of the rebels, leagued with Llywelyn and Alexander III of Scotland, but also of an army under the command of Louis of France. He was still able to recruit Welshmen before the 'firm peace' made at Runnymede on 19 June 1215: 240 Welshmen were sent to Bristol in May and Fawkes de Breauté (again) was ordered to send 400 Welsh to Salisbury by

9 June.[62] The uncertainty of these days is reflected in the fact that the mandate to Fawkes to send a trusted confidant to collect the Welshmen's pay was issued under the privy seal. It has not been possible to trace the later movements of these Welshmen nor to identify them with any confidence as members of the unit of fully paid up 300 Welsh who were sent by the dying king at Newark castle in the valley of the Trent to his Poitevin commander, Savari de Mauleon, in the third week of October 1216.[63] This was very likely the last administrative order of that king to be copied on the roll of letters close—other commands of course may have been given *ex ore*—and brings somewhat fittingly to an end the long, if intermittent, link between Welsh troops and the Angevin dynasty in England. When his son achieved his majority, he also recruited Welshmen for continental service as illustrated by the 500 who were despatched to Gascony in 1225; his grandson, as we have seen, deployed them on an even greater scale.[64] Narratives of the rebellion and civil war of 1215–17 yield up but few instances of Welshmen in action, e.g., their employment in the service of the king's opponents at the sieges of Exeter (1215) and Windsor (1216); on record too is surely their least glorious feat of arms—the theft of fourteen chickens from the bishop of Winchester's manor of Rimpton![65] The latter instance may have been but a less serious example of other and graver incidents of pillage to which parts of the English of the kingdom were subjected by disbanded or unpaid companies of Welshmen and other such troops.

   The military utility of the Welsh troops whose appearance in our documentation I have delineated above may be a matter best left to students of warfare, but it is difficult to imagine that commanders better versed that ourselves in the conduct of warfare would not have gone to the inconvenience of recruiting and rewarding 'the Gurkhas of the twelfth century' if their value was limited to the impact of their numbers and the ferocity and perceived 'bestiality' of their character. With regard to the latter, we may suspect that contemporary writers drew—and sometimes unconsciously—on the rhetoric and *topoi* of their classical texts.[66] Elements of classical ethnography permeated the description of Wales by Gerald de Barri in which landscape, terrain, climate and nurture gave rise to modes of dress, eating and fighting that were features of a non-urban and pastoral 'heroic' society. His account of their militarist ethos and their lightly-armed and hence agile infantry well-versed in mountain and woodland fighting became a classic and was taken up, for instance, by Philip Augustus's court historian, Guil-

laume le Breton.[67] Another contemporary who warned his country-
men against the neglect of military preparedness in periods of peace
or through lapses into easy-living, cited the example of King Harold
whose successes against the Welsh ('Britons of Snowdon') in the 1060's
was based on discipline and selection by which he meant fighting the
Welsh in the Welsh way, i.e. with light-armour, javelins, bows and small
shields and in close pursuit.[68] The Angevins clearly appreciated their
value not only—and most obviously—when campaigning in Wales itself
but also when deployed in northern France in those circumstances in
which their skills in woodland fighting and river-crossing, as instanced
above, gave their commanders a tactical advantage.[69] These troops were
useful in a 'horses for courses' way and in the appropriate environment
and properly disciplined offered a discerning commander an edge over
troops recruited from the footloose urban proletariat. They were agile
and offered speed of operations; they required less logistical support than
other detachments; they were adept at ambuscade and night attacks;
they would make good scouts. Their bows and javelins meant they
could inflict damage without close combat. To see them as Boussard
saw them, i.e. as '*mi-soldats et mi-brigands*' is not helpful. Any sensible
commander would or should have had the good sense not to deploy
them in battle or open engagement where the utility of light armour and
mobility were largely nullified. Sometimes, however, commanders were
not sensible Later certainly, and by 1200 possibly, the law of unintended
consequences came into operation in the sense that these decades spent
campaigning in royal armies can only have made them more formidable
and 'street-wise' when the English encountered them as the enemy
rather than uncomfortable comrades in arms. This was demonstrably
the case at officer level: the bards penned many an encomium for the
Welsh squires who fought for the king in fourteenth-century France
and for Glyndŵr in early fifteenth-century Wales. It may or may not be
significant that the pre-Conquest court poets and the compilers of the
Brut y Tywysogyon are silent about the exploits of Welshmen in Angevin
service. The poets of the period did, however, invariably praise their
princely patrons in the formulaic manner of a heroic age: they are as
'shields', as 'wolves' and fearsome in battle.[70] The writers of romance
saw them through a different prism. Chrétien de Troyes's Wales lay in
the Waste Forest wherein the '*Galois sont tot par nature/Plus fol que bestes
en pasture;/Cist* [Perceval] *est aussi comme unde este.*' Before Perceval's
introduction to Arthur's court and his transformation into a *courtois*,
he is mocked for his lack of knightly weapons and armour. Though

noble, he is ignorant of chivalry—a difficult concept for a French noble audience to grasp. This naïf Welshman (and 'hoodie', to boot!) sports the javelin though his prescient mother urges him not to take all three of these weapons to court lest he immediately betray his origins.[71] Fictional mockery held no perils but it was otherwise in reality: when a French knight taunted the Welshmen in Henry II's service at Gisors in 1188, he was promptly wounded in the head by an arrow from one of their number![72] A more thoughtful and less patronising continental observer clearly appreciated the significance of such men in any consideration of the military capability of the Angevin 'Empire'. Richard I's great wealth and landed resources provided him with a '*trop grant ost, que de ses homes que de ses soudres. Les Flamens avoit, qui od lui estoient en soudées, et les Brabençons. S'avoit par somonce les Englois et les Normans et les Bretons et les Manseaus et les Angevins et les Poitevins. Adès avoit plusiors routes.... Encore ot li rois d'Engleterre une autre manière de gent que on apeloit Galois, qi'il amena de sa terre de Gales. Cels doutoient molt li François quant il estoient logié près de forest: car cil venoient à els traire par nuit, et lor faisoient molt de maus.*' The '*Encore*' here is, I think, quite telling.[73]

I leave it to those more expert in the field to reflect whether the Angevins went to no little trouble to recruit, organise and pay Welsh troops because they were unable or unwilling to mobilise and pay infantrymen from the English shire and urban communities on anything like a comparable scale. In an oft-quoted passage, Robert de Torigny tells us that for the Toulouse campaign of 1159 Henry 11 mustered his barons and mercenaries and levied a scutage so as not to burden '*agrarios milites nec...burgensium nec rusticorum multitudinem*'. The exclusion of the latter, one suspects, was more a tribute to the king's military good sense in not transporting to, and leading through, France a mass of untrained, inexperienced and poorly armed multitude than a tenderness of regard for their welfare.[74] It was not until 1212, it would appear, that an Angevin king set out to mobilise a select urban militia of some 820 men for service overseas, and though writs of summons were sent to thirty-eight cities, boroughs and towns on that occasion, there is no good evidence that these men actually came to a muster.[75] Michael Powicke identified the significance of the Assize of Arms of 1181 and the defensive 'potentialities' of the royal summonses of 1205 and 1213–14 but, until more work is done, it is difficult to speak with any confidence about a system for infantry and archer recruitment before the reign of Henry III.[76] Welsh troops could make up this deficiency. The absence of particulars of account, of pay rolls, of commissions

of array, relevant writs of summons etc. makes any conclusions as to the pay and organisation of Welsh troops in this period rather tentative but certain features may be discerned. Infantry were paid at 2d. a day though higher rates applied to those Welsh who were mounted or who could sport at least a hauberk. More precise incremental scales are found in the 1213 accounts discussed above: most infantry take 2d. a day, a few take 4d. a day; those with 2 mounts have 12d. a day. Of the total of 1,200 Welsh paid in May 1213, 60 received 4d. a day and the remainder half that and those with 2 mounts take 12d. a day. On occasion, reference is made to *magistri* (paid 4d. a day) and *constabularii (*paid 12d. a day) who receive higher pro rata payments; in later parlance, these would be regarded as non-commissioned officers.[77] Rates may of course have varied from one campaign to another but it is clear that substantial numbers of Welsh could be recruited without a huge drain on the treasury, chamber or local revenues. For an outlay of £100, the king could obtain the services of 240 Welsh foot for fifty days or 480 foot for twenty five days—any computation would provide good value for money. There are, to be sure, references to Welsh archers but these are few and do not enable us to determine whether their expertise was with a long or short bow. What remains problematic is what these monies or *liberationes* represented. Were they regarded as expenses to defray the cost involved in their movement from their lordships in Wales to the port of embarkation or could they be regarded in most cases as *vadia* or wages?[78] The Welsh lawbooks treat of the division of spoils but no trace of such ordinances appear in our twelfth-century administrative records although it may be assumed that a regulated share of plunder was regarded as a legitimate inducement and reward.[79] Such information as may be gleaned concerning organisation or orders of battle, i.e. the sub-division of Welsh infantry in our period into medieval equivalents of, or units roughly comparable to, companies, battalions and regiments suggest that, in composition if not in name, we can identify—even if fitfully—the later divisions of a 20-man unit under a master and a 100-man unit under a constable. We may sense that in this regard, as in so many others, the twelfth century is the formative period.

There remains the matter of the status of these Welshmen who entered the service of the kings of England between 1154 and 1216. To what extent, if at all, do they fit into the category of 'mercenaries'? In the writings of Gerald of Wales and others, it is clear that the native inhabitants of *Wallia* or *terra Wallie* were readily comprehended as a *gens* or *natio.* They had a clear ethnic identity. Whether they were

seen as *Brittones* or descendants of Brutus depended in large measure on whether the outside observer subscribed to Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia Regum Brttanniae* or wished to display a patina of antiquarian learning. Although British descent remained a conceit of the Welsh historical tradition, in the course of the twelfth century the native annalist was content to call the inhabitants of western Britain *Cymry*, Latinised as *Walenses* (M. Fr. *Galeis* or *Galois*). In this sense they were distinguished, as we have seen, from the Brabanters ('*Brabançons*') and the Flemings ('*Flamens*'). Likewise were they distinguished from the '*routiers*' who appear in our records bereft of any ethnic designation; their pariah status in part stemmed from the perception that they, like the poor, could be found anywhere and everywhere.[80] They were defined by what they did and not by who they were. At the basic bureaucratic level, i.e. within the categorisation deployed by those responsible for the expenditure and auditing of the king's treasure, our soldiers are not problematic. These men are 'Welshmen in the king's service in receipt of his monies' or, in some records '*ad denarios domini regis*': no more and no less. Clearly there was a monetary or cash nexus but it may make better historical sense to see them in terms of a seigniorial nexus, if one may so term it. Service operated within the nexus of lordship; these men were, in contemporary parlance, following a lord—*dominum sequentes*—and this places them more comprehensibly in the world of contemporary political realities and group loyalties. For the most part, though not in every instance, our Welshmen appear on the rolls in association with a native or Marcher lord or a royal official; they do not appear to be enlisted separately. Not only does our subject matter relate to the changing political configurations within native and Marcher Wales but also to the chronology of dynastic turbulence, Marcher advance or retreat and, of course, royal interventionism. The fragmentation of Deheubarth and Gwynedd after the deaths respectively of the Lord Rhys (1197) and Owain Gwynedd (1170), the fitful resurgence of Powys under Gwenwynwyn (1196–8), assertions of royal authority by Henry 11 and by Richard 1's ministers, the growing ambition of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (from 1194 onwards) and the emergence of King John as a major stakeholder in the southern March (from 1189 onwards)—all these in part at least explain both the chronology and the pattern of the recruitment of Welsh troops in Angevin service. It is significant that in a cluster of charters issued by John at Poitiers in December 1199 in favour of Gwenwynwyn of Powys, Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd and Maelgwn ap Rhys of Deheubarth, the king confirms them their

lands in return for their homage and service so that each '*nobis fideliter serviet . . . contra omnes mortales*': such fealty would surely include rather than exclude military service?[81] It is therefore to the March, to the king's own lordships therein and to those native Welsh lords needful of royal support and favour that we must turn for our explanatory context: dis-inheritance may well have been the spur in the latter case. An instance is provided by extensive Briouze lands in the Middle March which were a major source of native soldiery when mediatised through William III de Briouze (d. 1211) and more so after the king's acquisition of them from 1209 onwards. A native dynasty, that of Roger of Powys and his lineage, protected their vulnerable position on the Welsh side of the central Marches by accommodation with the Crown and this was realised in various castle custodies, support for the royal campaign in 1165 and Meurig ap Roger's command of Welsh troops in Normandy in 1194.[82] More notable providers and leaders of Welsh contingents were native lords from the lordships of Glamorgan and Gwynllŵg.[83] Especially evident were members of the dynasty of Senghenydd such Gruffudd ab Ifor and his sons Cadwallon and Maredudd who served under Richard I in Normandy in 1188 and under his successor. Another Welsh lord with lands in Gwynllŵg, Hywel ab Iorwerth of Caerleon, found it prudent to ally with the crown in the defence of Glamorgan in 1184–5. The lord of Afan in western Glamorgan, Lleision ap Morgan, whose father had participated in the Welsh offensives in the 1180's, commanded 200 Welshmen in Normandy in 1204. In the summer of 1214 a body of 300 Welsh mustered for Poitou were commanded by Gruffudd ap Rhodri, Llywelyn's cousin, to whom, as noted above, John had made speculative grants in Gwynedd.[84] Where Welsh are paid or arrayed ('*bonos electos*') by Marcher lords such as William Marshal or by royal custodians of Marcher lordships such as de Cigogné or de Breauté, it is highly probable that they were recruited from the Welsh of their lordships—as was the later practice.

Military lordship produced fighting men. The Scottish Highlander, asked what his land brought in for him answered 'five hundred men'; a Marcher lord of the early thirteenth century would have answered in similar vein—he had no need for mercenaries.[85] The native Welsh lord who committed his retinue and free tenants to royal service might receive a money-fief or a money sum for himself together with pro-visions and daily allowances for his men but, arguably, it was fealty, political calculation and self-interest which prompted his participation. Richard I summons them from his land of Wales: '*sa terre de Gales*'; they

are his Welshmen. The distinction resided not in reward, inducement or pay: it lay in the obligation, in the nexus of fealty or the contingency of political alliance. Paid soldiers recruited from within a lord's dominion are not his mercenaries; paid men from outside his *dominium* may be the lord's mercenaries. It follows that to regard our Welshmen as mercenaries does not assist either in understanding them or those who properly were. Some modern historians are perhaps prone to see mercenaries where contemporaries did not. Neither monastic chronicler nor Chancery clerk felt it appropriate or necessary to designate the Welshmen in the service of the English crown as '*coterelli*', '*stipendiarii*' or '*ruptarii*': neither should we.

NOTES

[1] Gerald of Wales, *Opera*, ed. James F. Dimock 8 vols (London, Rolls Series, 1868), 4. 222: the Welsh, once conquered, '*non solum in finibus istis, verum et alibi, in necessitatis articulis, tam remotis partibus quam propinquis, egregie principi militare*'. This paper will be chiefly concerned with 'those in parts farther afield'.

[2] Roger of Hovenden, *Chronica Rogeri de Hovedene*, ed. W. Stubbs 4 vols. (London, Rolls Series, 1868–71), 2. 94–5, 103–4, 120–31; *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis*, i. ed. W. Stubbs (London, Rolls Series, 1867), 115–7, 128–30; Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum* in *Opera Historica* ed. W. Stubbs 2 vols. (London, Rolls Series, 1876), 1. 408, 514–6, 418–20; Gervase of Canterbury, *Historical Works*. ed. W. Stubbs 2 vols (London, Rolls Series, 1879–80), 1. 260–1. For the Byzantine context, see Paul Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel 1 Komnenes, 1143–80* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 91–9, 458–9 and A.A. Vasiliev, 'Manuel Comnenos and Henry Plantagenet', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 29 (1929–30), 233–44.

[3] *P(ipe) R(oll) 24 Henry 11*, p. 19 for the £6 6s. 9d. charged to the Norfolk and Suffolk account as the cost of a ship of Bremen to transport the king's dogs to the 'Emperor of Constantinople'.

[4] Gerald, 6. 181. Gerald asserts that he is quoting from the text of Henry's letter.

[5] J.E. Morris, *The Welsh Wars of Edward 1: A Contribution to Medieval Military History* (Oxford, 1901); D.L. Evans, 'Some Notes on the History of the Principality of Wales in the time of the Black Prince', *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1925–6), 25–110; Michael Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance under Edward 1* (London, 1972) especially 92–110; *id.*, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* Yale University Press, 1996), 116–18, 122–33. See also A.D. Carr, 'Welshmen and the Hundred Years' War', *Welsh History Review*, 4 (1968), 21–46.

[6] For the militarist ethos of the free Welsh communities, see R.R. Davies, *Conquest, Conflict and Co-Existence: Wales, 1063–1415* (Oxford, 1987), 66: 'military service was regarded as the irreducible obligation of all free men' and 254: 'All free men over the age of fourteen owed him (i.e. the lord) military service, indefinitely within his own dominions and once a year for six weeks outside his land'. For a fuller analysis, see Sean Davies, *Welsh Military Institutions, 633–1283* (Ph.D. thesis, Cardiff, 2004).

[7] Prestwich, *War, Politics*, 92–5.

[8] R.R. Davies, *Lordship and Society in the March of Wales, 1282–1400* (Oxford, 1978), 81–2; D.L. Evans, 'Some Notes', 59.

[9] J.E. Morris, *The Welsh Wars*, 286–7; D.L. Evans, 'Some Notes', 47–7.

[10] Glanmor Williams, R*enewal and Reformation Wales, c. 1415–1642* (Oxford, 1993), 164–170 especially for Welsh captains in France.

[11] Williams, *Renewal*, 368.

[12] Ordericus Vitalis *The Ecclesiastical History*, ed. Marjorie Chibnall 6 vols (Oxford, 1978), 2.536,540; *Gesta Stephani: The Deeds of Stephen*, ed. K.R. Potter (London, 1976), 110–11 for the Welsh brought to Lincoln by Miles of Gloucester, earl of Hereford; Henry archdeacon of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum. The History of the English People*, ed. Diana Greenway (Oxford, 1996), 726, 734.

[13] Ordericus, 6. 524 n. 2; J.E. Lloyd, *A History of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest* 2 vols (London, new imp., 1948), 2. 489.

[14] J.E. Lloyd, *A History of Wales*, 2. 494.

[15] Gerald of Wales, *Expugnatio Hibernica.The Conquest of Ireland*, ed. A.B. Scott and F.X. Martin (Dublin, 1978), 30,140. See also M.T. Flanagan, *Irish Society: Anglo-Norman Settlers and Angevin Kingship* (Oxford, 1989), 100, 163–4 where it is suggested, quite plausibly, that troops were drawn from Netherwent and Pembroke lordships subject to Strongbow. Lynn H. Nelson, *The Normans in South Wales, 1070–1171* (Univ. of Texas, 1966), 130–50 deploys the somewhat unhelpful term 'Cambro-Norman' in his account of the conquests in Ireland.

[16] *La Geste des Engleis en Yrlande.The Deeds of the Normans in Ireland*, ed. Evelyn Mullaly (Dublin, 2002), 312, 408–19, 439–66.

[17] For the context, see Ralph V. Turner and Richard R. Heiser, *The Reign of Richard Lionheart.Ruler of the Angevin Empire, 1189–99* (London, 2000), 110–40 and John Gillingham, *Richard 1* (London, 1999), 227–39.

[18] Richard of Devizes, *Chronicon*, ed. and trans. J.T. Appleby (London, 1963), 55; William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglicanum*, ed. R. Howlett in *Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry 11 and Richard*, 4 vols. (London, Rolls Series, 1884), 1. 559.

[19] Gervase, 1. 514–5; *Annales Monastici, II: Annales de Waverleia*, ed H.R. Luard (London, Rolls Series, 1865), 248: '…*insurrexit contra regem Ricardum Johannes comes frater eius cum Walensibus*'.

[20] Michael Prestwich (ed.), *The Place of War in English History, 1066–1214*, ed. (Boydell, 2004), 2. It may be worth noting that in an earlier (and admittedly less important) act of defiance Roger, earl of Hereford, reacted to Henry 11's recovery of castle custodies in 1155 by fortifying Gloucester and Hereford against him with arms, provisions and '*Walensium copiis a quibus mater sua originem trahebat*' Gervase, 1. 161.

[21] *P.R. 5 Richard 1*, 86–7 (Herefordshire); p. 148 (account of William Marshal) for 500 sergeants at Windsor and 450 at Gloucester; 99 (account of Geoffrey fitz Peter) wherein £218 15s. 0d. was allowed for 500 foot sergeants with 25 masters retained in the March of Wales from 29 March to 17 May, before being led to Windsor.

[22] E.g. as in Magna Carta (1215) cl. 56: '*et si contencio super hoc orta fuerit, tunc fiat in Marchia per judicium parium suorum de tenementis Anglie secundum legem Anglie; de tenementis Wallie secundum legem Wallie; de tenementis Marchie secundum legem Marchie*'. K. Mann, 'The March of Wales: A Question of Terminology', *Welsh History Review* 18 (1996), 1–12 is bolder in this matter than I and in this he may of course be right.

[23] Jacques Boussard, 'Les mercenaries au X11ᵉ siècle: Henri 11 Plantegenêt et les origines de l'armée de metier,' *Bibliothéque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, 106, 189–224. Its evidence was deployed to good effect by W.L. Warren, *Henry 11* (London, 1973), 189–224.

[24] Boussard, 202.

[25] For the wider context, see I.W. Rowlands, 'King John and Wales', *King John: New Interpretations*, ed. S.D. Church (Boydell, 1999), 273–87.

[26] *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry 11 and Richard 1*, 2. 687–95 and Appendix [A] below. For their crossing of the Seine, see below, n. 30. Howden, *Chronica*, 1. 282 tells how King Louis burnt Andeli in 1169 in retaliation for Henry's burning of Chaumont '*anno praecedenti…per Walenses suos*'. It is placed under 1167 by Ralph of Diceto, *Opera Historica*, 1. 330 and by Robert of Torigny, *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry 11 and Richard 1*, 4. 231–2; neither Torigny nor Diceto refer specifically to the Welsh.

[27] The Gloucestershire account was charged with 116s. by king's writ for '*ii.tonellis plenis sagittis et igngaignis missis ultra mare*', *P.R. 13 Hen. 11*, 142. Earl Conan and Roger de Nonant accounted for monies—£175 3s. 4d. and £76 5s.—respectively, for '*servientibus de Wal*', p. 89 (Yorks.) and p. 170 (Devon) but these references are insufficiently precise to identify where they sergeants were deployed.

[28] *P.R. 14 Hen. 11*, pp. 93, 199*; P.R. 15 Hen. 11*, 108*; P.R. 16 Hen. 11*, 146; *P.R. 17 Hen. 11*, 96. For some of these, see Frederick Suppe, 'Roger of Powys, Henry II's Anglo-Welsh Middleman and his Lineage', *Welsh History Review*, 21 (2002–3), 1–23.

[29] *P.R. 20 Hen. 11*. 21 (Glos.); p. 77 (Oxon.); 121 (Heref.). Ralph of Diceto, 1. 384; William of Newburgh, 1. 195–6. See also Appendix [B] below.

[30] *Gesta*, 1. 74: '*Braibacenos et mille Wallenses*'; Robert of Torigni, 4. 265: '*misit marchisos suos Walenses trans Secanam*'.

[31] J.E. Lloyd, *A History of Wales* 2. 544 and n. 39; cf. *Brut y Tywysogyon or the Chronicle of the Princes (Peniarth MS. 20 Version)*, ed. and trans. Thomas Jones (Cardiff, 1952), 69.

[32] Hywel ap Iorwerth of Caerleon received monies for his support in the March and specifically at Newport (Gwent) during the Welsh rising in Glamorgan in 1185, *P.R. 30 Hen. 11*, 59–60*; P.R. 31 Hen. 11*, p. 7.

[33] *Gesta*, 1. 348–9; *P.R. 32 Hen. 11*, p. 29 (Heref.), 55 (Salop.), 86 (Yorks.). Two hundred mounted and foot sergeants were charged to the honour of Chester for their liveries in going to and returning from Carlisle, though these are not identified as Welsh, 150.

[34] *P.R. 33 Hen. 11*, 40 (London), 45 (Oxon.), 63 (Salop), 130–1 (Heref.), 215 (Worcs.).Those on the accounts for the border shires were likely to have been Welsh given that their liveries were for 8 days, i.e. payments from time they left Wales to travel through these counties to their port(s) of embarkation and possibly including the voyage to Normandy itself.

[35] *P.R. 34 Hen. 11*, 106–7 (Glos.), 8–9 (Glamorgan).

[36] *P.R. Hen. 35.11*, 95, 210. These are not however designated as Welsh nor associated with any named Welsh commander/paymaster save for 13 foot under Adam Bideboc.

[37] *Gesta*, 2. 40, 46 and 50; *Chronica* 2. 343.

[38] Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, 2. 364. The context suggests that the Welsh infantry, as the slowest moving column, were the more obvious victims for the French.

[39] *P.R. 6 Richard 1.* 141 (Salop).

[40] Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, 3. 251. It may be significant that no trace of these Brabanters can be found on the English pipe roll. It may be that they had been paid either from the *camera Regis* or from some of the king's treasure deposited in his French dominions.

[41] *Magni Rotuli Scaccarii Normanniae sub regibus Anglie*, ed. T. Stapleton 2 vols (London, 1840), 1. 155, 185 and 275. £100 (angevin) was disbursed from the treasury at Caen for payment to Welshmen and '*Bigordenses*', 236.

[42] *Chancellor's Roll 8 Richard 1*, 19, 41–2, 60, 88, 138 and 290.

[43] Ibid., xvij–xviij; Appendix [B] below. In retaliation, Richard ordered that three French prisoners be flung from the top of the rock of Andelys to the valley below.

[44] *P.R. 10 Richard 1*, 172, 224 and 108 and xxxj (Introduction).

[45] *Magni Rotuli Scaccarii Normanniae.*, 2. 300, 302, 303, 350 and 361.

[46] *P.R. 3 John*, 128 for 12 sergeants sent to Norway with corn as a gift to its king (Norfolk/Suffolk); 137 for 57 Welsh foot, 7 constables and 4 mounted archers sent there (Norfolk/Suffolk); 264 for pay of 51 Welsh sent to Norway (Hereford).

[47] *P.R. 4 John*, 68, 129, 137.

[48] *Rotuli Normannorum*, ed. T.D. Hardy (London, Record Commission, 1835), 53: the writ was addressed to Robert Tresgoz. In addition to the 300 Welsh, 15 of their '*magistri*' were also to be paid but at double their rate ('*dulplicem liberationem*').

[49] *Gerald*, 3. 303.

[50] *Rotuli de Liberatis et Misis et Praestitis, regnante Johanne*, ed. T.D. Hardy (London, Record Commission, 1844), 85, 88; *P.R. 6 John*, 146 (Glos.).

[51] *P.R. 8 John*, 109 the gift to Cadwallon and the expenses of the Welsh sent by Llywelyn to Winchester do not appear to have an immediate military context and the latter may well have been connected to the nuptials of the prince of Gwynedd and the king's daughter, Joan.

[52] *Rotuli de. Liberatis.*, 129 for £19. 2s. 8d. given to his clerk for Llywelyn's '*vadia*'.

[53] *P.R. 11 John*, 187.; p. 151 Thomas of Erdington, sheriff of Shropshire, was likewise allowed for the liveries of 500 foot and horse sergeants in the 'army of Wales'. For John's show of force in Wales at this time, see *Annales Monastici*, iv.397.

[54] *Rotuli de.Liberatis*, 174–229 (Prest Roll, 1210) provides much detailed information. For a full discussion of it's value, see Stephen Church, 'The 1210 campaign in Ireland: evidence for a military revolution?', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 20 (1998), 45–57.

[55] *Rotuli de Liberatis*, 229 Substantial sums were paid in the following days to de Vere and others for crossbowmen and sergeants but, given the sizeable totals involved, these were probably those discharged from the Irish force rather than being in the field in Wales, e.g. 232, 233,234,235.

[56] *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum in turri Londoniensi asservati*, ed. T.D. Hardy 2 vols (London, Record Commission, 1833–4), 1. 121, 123, 129, 137; it is possible that others in addition to Madog ap Gruffudd were retained by money fiefs. The troops needed by Fawkes de Breauté to hold Glamorgan may have been recruited from the Welsh of that lordship, 119.

[57] National Archives, E 101/349/2–3, edited by Henry Cole, *Documents illustrative of English History in the 13th and 14th centuries* (London, Record Commission, 1844), 231–69.

[58] For this, see now Nicholas Vincent, 'A roll of knights summoned to campaign in 1213', *Historical Research*, 66 (1993), 89–97.

[59] Henry Cole, *Documents*, 257, 258, 260, 262, 263 and 264; de Cigogné was commanded on 13 April to send what Welshmen he could to Winchester, *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum* 1.129. De Malines later became constable of Montgomery; his toponym may tentatively be identified with Malines [Machelen] (Flanders Or., *arr*. Gand, *cant*. Deinze).

[60] Ibid. 210; de Cigogné was allowed £10 14s. on his Herefordshire account for his 300 Welsh going to Portsmouth, *P.R. 16 John*, 135. John Marshal was appointed warden of the Welsh Marches in early 1214, *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum*, 1. 209.

[61] *Rotuli Chartarum in turri Londoniensi asservati*, ed. T.D. Hardy (London, Record Commission, 1837), 188 (30 October): '*Preterea ipsi ambo* (the other being Owain ab Dafydd) *ibit in servicium nostrum cum gentibus suis de dictis cantredis et alius remanebit si voluerimus*'.

[62] Fragment of Close Roll for 1215, printed in R.A. Brown, ed., *Memoranda Roll 10 John 1208* (Pipe Roll Society, N.S. 31, 1958), 140.

[63] *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum*, 1. 291.

[64] *Foreign Accounts Henry 111*, ed. Fred. A. Cazel, Jr. (Pipe Roll Society, N. S., 44, 1974), 59.

[65] *Histoire des Ducs de Normandie et des Rois d'Angleterre*, ed. F. Michel (Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1840), 148 and 178; Nicholas Vincent, *Peter des Roches, An Alien in English Politics, 1205–1238* (Cambridge, 1996), 131, n. 95.

[66] W.L. Warren, *Henry 11* (1973), 158. See also the discussion in J. Gillingham, 'Conquering the barbarians: war and chivalry in twelfth-century Britain', *Haskins Society Journal*, 4 (1992), 67–84.

[67] Appendix [C] below; cf. le Breton's account, Appendix [B].

[68] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, ed. and trans. Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 112–114.

[69] J. Gillingham, *Richard 1*, 296 n. on Richard's surprise attack from the forest upon the French rearguard as it returned from its assault on Dieppe in August 1195: 'As perceived at the Capetian court, Richard's capacity to wage 'forest war' owed much to his employment of terrifyingly fierce Welsh troops'.

[70] See the numerous examples in *Cyfres Beirdd y Tywysogion* (Poets of the Princes Series) e.g. *Gwaith Cynddelw Brydydd Mawri*, ed. Nerys Ann Jones and Ann Parry Owen

[71] (Cardiff, 1991) nos. 1, 6, 7; *Gwaith Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr 11*, ed. Nerys Ann Jones and Ann Parry Owen (Cardiff, 1995), nos. 5, 8 and 13; *Gwait Llywarch ap Llywelyn*, ed. Elin M. Jones (Cardiff, 1991), nos. 5 and 13.

[71] Chrétien de Troyes, *Perceval or The Story of the Grail*, trans. R.H. Cline, 2 vols (University of Georgia, Athens), 2.242–5, 497–507, 599–611; see also R.T. Pickens, *The Welsh Knight: Paradoxicality in Chrétien's 'Conte Del Graal'* (Lexington, 1977), 113.

[72] *History of William Marshal*, ed. A.J. Holden, trans. S. Gregory and historical notes by D. Crouch 3 vols (Anglo-Norman Text Society, Occas. Pub. Ser., no. 4, 2002), ll. 7409–28. The story is further incidental evidence for Welsh archers in English service at this date.

[73] 'Extrait d'une Chronique française des rois de France par un anonyme de Béthune', ed. L. Delisle, *Receuil des Historiens de France*, 24 (ii). 758. Indirectly, by his use of '*sa terre*' here, the author appears to convey the sense that these soldiers are Richard's subjects rather than his mercenaries.

[74] *Chronica*, 4. 202; cf. the sentiments in *Dialogus de Scaccario*, ed. C. Johnson (London, 1950), 111.

[75] *P.R. 14 John*, xxj–xxij.

[76] *Military Obligation in Medieval England* (Oxford, 1962), 48–62. The reader may wish to consult Dr. David Bacharach's conference paper in this regard.

[77] *Rotulus de Liberatis*, 264; *P.R. 3 John*, 137; *Rotuli Normanniae*, 53. It may be noted here that infantry other than Welsh were also paid 2d. a day, *Rotuli Litterarum. Clausarum*, 1.27 (1205). The differential pay rates for masters and constables a few decades later are found, for example, in *Calendar of Liberate Rolls, vol. iii., 1245–51* (London, H.M.S.O., 1937), 47 for Welsh going to Gascony in 1248. For the constables as mounted men, note the concern expressed a royal official in North Wales to Edward 1 in 1277 that whilst he can find Welshmen for the king's service, he 'cannot find constables…because there is no one in the land who has an adequate mount', *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence relating to Wales*, ed. J. Goronwy Edwards (Cardiff, 1935), 80.

[78] Costs charged to sheriffs and other accountants for payments to Welsh as far as ports of embarkation in England or to disembarkation at Ouistreham or Barfleur appear on the rolls, e.g. *Magni Rotuli Scaccarii Normanniae*, i. 185 (Ouistreham, 1195). In 1214, for instance, 300 Welsh were summoned to Portsmouth by 29 August for their crossing to Poitou and their paymaster, Engelard de Cigogné, was to give them liveries from the day when they set out on their journey and to the time of their arrival at the port, *Rotuli Littararum Clausarum*, 1. 210 (August 14).

[79] *The Law of Hywel Dda.Law Texts from Medieval Wales*, trans. and ed. Dafydd Jenkins (Cardiff, 1990), 10, 14, 17–20, 29, 35. For a later reference (1277), see *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence*, 42.

[80] 'L'anonyme de Béthune', 758.

[81] *Rotuli Chartarum*, 63.

[82] 'Roger of Powys', 1–23; *P.R. 6 Richard 1*, 141 (for 1194).

[83] For these lineages, see J. Beverley Smith, 'The Kingdom of Morgannwg and the Norman Conquest of Glamorgan', *Glamorgan County History: The Middle Ages*, 6 vols ed. T.B. Pugh (Cardiff, 1971), 3. 33–44; D. Crouch, 'The slow death of kingship in Glamorgan, 1067–1158', *Morgannwg*, 29 (1985), 20–41.

[84] Above, n. 62; *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum* 1. 209,210. It is unlikely that Gruffudd had a landed base in Gwynedd east of the Conway by this stage though it is possible that he was able to recruit some men there together with others from communities in the Cheshire and Shropshire. It is improbable that he would have been an acceptable commander to Welsh troops provided by lords from elsewhere in Wales itself.

[85] Quoted in M. Bloch, *French Rural History* trans. Janet Sondheimer (London, 1966), 72 from I.F. Grant, *Everyday Life in an Old Highland Farm 1769–1782. William Mackintosh of Balmespick's Account Book* (London, 1924), 98.

APPENDICES

[A] 'His rex [Henry 11] impulsus Gisortia moenia linquit, / Agminis ex armis sol magis ipse nitet. / Ex Normannigenis, Walensibus, agmine juncto, / Hunc equitem ducit, currit at ille pedes. / Calmontem, clarum castrum, petit inde, quod armis, / Milite, valle, situ, divitiisque viget…(Rex) imperat armatis Walensibus ingrediantur / Castellum, fluvii quo fluit unda liquens. / Hinc cum Northmannis ad castri moenia tendit, / Cernitur ipsa phalanx, dum tenet arva soli…. Cum Normannigenis a tergo rex galeatus / Insequitur, castrum pascitur ipse rogus. / Tranarant fluvium Walenses, moenibus ipsis / Vulcanum dederant, depopulantur opes. Clamor prosequitur fugientes, clamor ubique, / Cum gemitu planctus aëris ampla replet. / Innatus vigor et levitas Walensibus arma / Suggerit, implentur quaeque furore, rogo…. Praeda ditatus Walensis tendit ad arcem, / Ignibus et ferro solvere clausa cupit. / Parcere sed victis, confusio quos sua clausit, / Rex jubet, armatos detinet ipse retro. / Hinc rediens Normannigenum vim laudat et arma, / Francorum probitas senserat ista duo. / Egressis cuneis, Vulcanus seavit, et audax / Aeolus e contra praelia firma gerit. / Impellunt sese mutuo per tecta per aulas, / Bella Ceres sentit, paene perusta gemit. / Pampmineas Bacchus dum perdit et ipse coronas, / Walenses pedites abluit unda dei, / Vulcani varias transmittit Juno favillas, / Aethereo fratri flava Diana jubet. / Haec magni Martis rabies violenta peregit, / Imperio solo numina tanta movet. / Omnibus exustis, dum moenia sola relinquit, / Francigenas pandit quam sit ad arma petens.' [Étienne de Rouen, 'Draco Normannicus', *Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry 11 and Richard 1*, ed. Richard Howlett (Rolls Series, 1885), vol. ii., pp. 681–86]

[B] 'Protinus extremis Anglorum finibus agmen / Wallorum immensum numero [Richard 1] vocat, ut nemorosa / Per loca discurrant, ferroque ignique, furore / Innato, nostri vastent confinia regni. / Gens Wallensis habet hoc naturale per omnes / Indigenas primis proprium quod servat ab annis; / Pro domibus silvas, bellum pro pace frequentat; / Irasci facilis, agilis per devia cursu; / Nec soleis plantas, caligis nec cura gravatur, / Frigus docta pati, nulli cessura labori. / Veste brevi, corpus nullis oneratur ab armis; / Nec munit thorace latus, nec casside frontem, / Sola gerens, hosti cedem quibus inferat, arma, / Clavam cum jaculo, venabula, gesa, bipennem, / Arcum cum pharetris, nodosaque tela vel hastam; / Assiduis gaudens predis, fusoque cruore, / Raro fit ut quis ibi subeat, nisi vulnere, mortem; / Si cui quis proprium sine cede obiisse parentem, / Improperare queat, summum putat esee pudorem. / Caseus et butyrum cum carnibus haud bene coctis / Deliciosa viris reputantur fercula magnis, / Arboris in fisse trunco quas sepe prementes, / Sic etiam comedunt expresso sanguine tantum. / Hec vice sunt panis, pro vino lacteus humor. / Hi, nostros fines, aditus ubicumque patebant, / Predantes, inconsolabiliter cruciebant / Cum senibus juvenes, partier cum prole parentes; / Quos ita constrinxit exercitus Andeliane / Vallis in ingressu, turmis prudenter et ante / Et retro dispositis, quod eorum morte ruisee / Viderit una dies tria millia bisque ducentos.' [Guillaume le Breton, 'Philippidos', *Oeuvres de Rigord*

et de Guillaume Le Breton, ed. H.-F. Delaborde (Paris, 1885), ii. pp. 135–6 (liber v., ll. 276–306)]

[C] 'Gens igitur haec gens levis et agilis, gens aspera magis quam robusta, gens armis dedita tota. Non enim nobiles hic solum, sed totus populus ad arma paratus: bellica tuba sonante, non segnius ab aratro ruricola, quam aulicus ab aula prorumpit ad arma.... Totus propemodum populus armentis pascitur et avenis, lacte, caseo, et butyro. Carne plenius, pane parcius vesci solent.... De his igitur hoc spectabile, quod nudi multoties cum ferro vestitis, inermes cum armatis, pedestres cum equitibus congredi non verentur. In quo plerumque conflictu sola fiunt agilitate et animositate victores.... Armis tamen utuntur levibus, agilitatem non impedientibus; loricis minoribus, sagittarum manipulis, et lanceis longis: galeis et clipeis, ocreisque ferries rarius. Equis autem cursoribus et generosis, quos patria gignit, nobiliores ad bella feruntur. Pars autem populi major propter terras palustres partier et inaequales, ad praelia pedestres incedunt. Equites autem, pro locorum et temporum opportunitate, seu fugiendo seu fugando facile pedites fiunt.... Pacis quoque et juventutis tempore, silvas et saltus transpenetrare, montium alta transcurrere, dies huic labori noctibus continuare, ex industria praediscunt; et quasi sub pace praelia dum cogitant, nunc lanceando, nunc sagittando, bella praeludunt.' [Giraldus Cambrensis, *Opera*, ed. James F. Dimock (Rolls Series, 1868), vi. 179–181 (*Descriptio Kambriae*, lib. i, cap. vii)]

URBAN MILITARY FORCES OF ENGLAND AND GERMANY C. 1240–C. 1315, A COMPARISON

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Scholars long have recognized the important roles played by urban fighting forces in the military conflicts of the High Middle Ages from the eleventh through the early fourteenth century. Such forces pushed the Christian frontiers of Spain ever southward in this period, and the numerous surviving city ordinances, the *fueros*, record the obligations and rights of the townsmen who fought.[1] Urban militias provided the bulk of the manpower for the internecine wars among the cities of Northern Italy.[2] In addition, these same urban militias, combined into the Lombard league, eventually overcame the might of the imperial armies commanded by Frederick I Barbarossa (1153–1190) at Legnano in 1176. The militias of Paris, Mieux, Orléans, Rheims, and numerous other cities provided much of the manpower available to Philip Augustus at Bouvines in 1214, and for Louis IX's campaign at Beauvais in 1235.[3] At Courtrai, in 1302, the urban militias of Flanders inflicted a devastating defeat on King Philip IV's mounted forces.[4] However, despite the valiant efforts of a few scholars, including several gathered at Swansea University in July 2005, the contributions of urban militias to the military forces of the kingdoms of England and Germany in the High Middle Ages have not received their due attention when compared with Spain, Italy, and France.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, German historians, although driven by a strong romantic-nationalist *parti pris* focused on the nobility, were very productive in writing military history. During the Nazi period, including the Second World War, however, military history was often put at the service of the government's propaganda machine to demonstrate Germany's superiority. Following Germany's defeat and humiliation, the process of de-Nazification led German historians largely to abandon military history, except as it relates to noble or knightly mentality. All in all, contemporary German historiography of medieval warfare does not take account of the advances achieved in military history over the past six decades.[5]

Unlike specialists in medieval German history, scholars working on medieval England have devoted considerable attention to military history, focusing their research, particularly in the post-conquest period, on the exceptionally rich narrative sources available from the twelfth to the fourteenth century. By contrast, scholars have tended not to take advantage of administrative documents, and particularly unpublished administrative documents, with which England is even more richly endowed during the same period. As a consequence of this focus on narrative texts, at the expense if not to the exclusion of government records, the presentation of English warfare by scholars has tended to reflect the biases of contemporary authors more interested in pleasing their noble patrons than in providing detailed information about the actual conduct of war.[6] Despite individual scholarly contributions of great merit, therefore, discussion of medieval English military history is still dominated by romance, chivalry, and the earthly manifestation of these platonic forms—the mounted knight,—who is still treated by many scholars as the most important element in the armies of England.[7]

Modern neglect of medieval urban military forces in Germany and England is perplexing because the sources for both kingdoms are rich. The archaeological evidence for Germany is immense.[8] In addition, historians have available a substantial number of narrative sources, many of which provide good coverage of urban history, some of which were even written by urban dwellers on behalf of their own cities.[9] In England, as noted above, the sources are even richer. However, they have not been used intensively to explore the relative importance of the numerous urban elements that made up English fighting forces. First, a selective reading of narrative sources, without sufficient regard for their aristocratic *parti pris*, has promoted what one specialist in military history recently has called romantic elitism.[10] Second, the neglect, except by a small handful of scholars, of the vast body of surviving administrative documents, particularly those that have not been published, has obscured the enormous importance placed by the royal government on all types of "non-knightly" fighting forces, including urban militias.[11]

The burden of this paper is to highlight the essential features of urban military forces in England and Germany with the intention of drawing some comparisons and contrasts. These two kingdoms, of course, were organized on very different political and constitutional foundations, which had substantial influence on the organization of urban fighting forces. This study, therefore, concludes with some observations concerning the differences as well as the similarities in the urban fighting forces

mobilized in England and Germany. Because of limitations of time and
the large scale of this task, this present work is limited to the period
extending from the mid-thirteenth to the early fourteenth century. It
also focuses on military matters *stricto sensu* leaving aside paramilitary
and extra-legal activities such as policing duties and piracy.

<div align="center">ENGLAND</div>

Perhaps the best known, and certainly the most studied urban military
force in the territories subject to the kings of England consisted of the
naval and human resources of the Cinque Ports. The Cinque Ports
originally included Hastings, Dover, Sandwich, Rolney, and Hythe, but
subsequently expanded, under royal charter, to embrace several dozen
other port towns and cities, including most prominently Winchelsea
and Rye.[12] Less well studied are the scores of other coastal towns and
cities, which also provided considerable naval and human resources to
the royal government. Throughout the reigns of Henry III (1216–1272)
and Edward I (1272–1307), the crown mobilized enormous numbers
of ships and men from the Cinque Ports and most other coastal towns
and cities. The contributions of these urban centers made it possible
for the royal government to conduct large-scale military operations.

  There are many thousands of surviving administrative documents
from the mid-thirteenth to the early fourteenth century detailing the
deployment of thousands of ships and tens of thousands of men from
coastal towns for service carrying supplies, harrying enemies forces,
defending the coast, as well as transporting troops and horses. In 1242,
for example, Henry III mobilized considerable naval forces from numer-
ous towns for his campaign against Louis IX of France in the Poitou.
In June of that year, Henry issued orders to the Cinque Port towns
of Hastings, Sandwich, Dover, Hythe, Romney, Winchelsea, and Rye
requiring them to harry the coasts of Brittany and Normandy, and
the northern channel port of Boulogne.[13] In August of the same year,
Henry ordered the mobilization of hundreds of additional ships and
thousands of men, including 25 well-equipped vessels and contingents
of marines armed with crossbows from Dunwich, Yarmouth, Ipswich,
Orford, and Blakeny, to rendezvous at the port of Dover and place
themselves under the command of the royal constable there.[14] In sup-
port of military operations in Wales in March 1258, Henry's govern-
ment issued orders to the members of the Cinque Ports to mobilize

200 horse transports. One hundred of these ships were to be capable of carrying 24 horses each, while the other half of fleet was to be capable of carrying 16 horses. In short, they were to transport a total of 4,000 horses for operations in Wales.[15]

Edward I, because the scale of his military operations was much larger than those of his father, made even greater use of the military resources of his coastal towns and cities than had Henry III. In April 1282, for example, Edward mobilized very large military forces from the Cinque Ports for operations in Wales.[16] In August 1295, fearing an invasion by King Philip IV of France, Edward mobilized the military forces of Great Yarmouth, Colchester, Ipswich, Dunwich, Blakeneye, Lynn, and Little Yarmouth to guard the coast against attack.[17] While preparing for a renewed offensive in Scotland in March 1303, Edward issued letters to all royal officers with jurisdictions along the coast from Southampton to Cornwall to have all of the towns and cities in this region provide ships, men, and materiel for that summer's operations.[18]

The increasingly large deployments of ships and crews for military operations by Edward I caused the burden on coastal urban centers and their individual citizens to grow correspondingly. In order to alleviate the economic hardship that these urban populations endured when deploying large numbers of ships and armed townsmen for the king's campaigns, Edward made a practice of broadening the taxable base of the individual cities. In 1295, for example, Edward issued orders to the bailiffs of Yarmouth to make sure that all the men who owed money to support the city's ships pay their share.[19] In the body of the royal order, the king's clerk referred to the government's grant to Yarmouth of the right to levy fleet taxes on all persons possessing or owning lands and rents in the town who did not, themselves, live there.[20]

It was not only as sailors and marines, however, that urban fighting men served the kings of England. Contingents of city militia forces were deployed by the royal government on campaigns in the field, in defense of royal fortifications, as well as in defense of their own home cities. In 1242, for example, the sheriffs of London were ordered to send a contingent of 120 crossbowmen drawn from the city militia to join at Dover the royal army which was preparing to invade France.[21] In July 1264, a unit of militiamen from Greenwich accompanied by a contingent of 48 militiamen from London, under the command of the sheriff of Kent, were deployed to help defend the Thames and Medway estuaries from potential French invasion.[22] In 1287–1288, several units detailed from the city militia from London, as well as contingents from

Bristol were mobilized to serve in Wales.[23] During the Welsh war of 1294–1295, a contingent of 50 crossbowmen from Bristol was deployed to support the forces holding Lampeter castle.[24] In 1295, two separate units of "picked militiamen" from London served in the garrison of the Isle of Wight.[25] Moreover, the use of urban militiamen to serve as part of royal garrisons was continued into the reign of Edward II. In 1315, a contingent of city militia from York traveled to Berwick to serve in the garrison there. Each man in this unit was equipped with a crossbow, a gambeson, and a good helmet.[26]

The largest number of English urban militiamen, however, served in defense of their own towns and cities. This was particularly true in the dangerous border regions, and in newly conquered territories in Wales and Scotland, where the English government not only built massive fortifications but established towns as well whose populations provided the bulk of the manpower to defend the walls of the fortified royal centers. This process is particularly well-documented in Wales where the number of weapons stored in royal strongholds, such as Harlech, Conway, and Caernarvon far outstripped the rather small number of professional soldiers deployed in the garrisons there.[27] The deployments of lots of up to 300 crossbows and many tens of thousands of quarrels to the royal castle-towns with professional garrisons of 15 to 20 men makes clear that the burden of defense rested largely on the urban population.[28]

In brief, the urban military forces in the territories ruled by kings of England in Britain were both substantial in their own right and crucial to the conduct of the royal government's wars. The naval resources, including both blue water and riverine assets, the trained sailors, and the marines of the coastal cities and towns were essential to the transport and supply of the king's armies. These naval forces also protected the English coast and harried the coasts of the king's enemies. Well-armed and equipped contingents of city militiamen served in the king's campaigns in the field and in royal garrisons throughout Britain. Finally, urban militiamen provided the crucial manpower reserve for maintaining royal conquests in Scotland, and particularly in Wales. In terms of both the numbers of men and of the costs incurred by the royal government in deploying them, the urban fighting forces, often dominated by crossbowmen, dwarfed mounted troops of all types, and even more so the "knightly" contingents that fill the accounts of contemporary chroniclers and affect the focus of modern scholars who do not give due attention to unpublished administrative records.

GERMANY

In contrast to contemporary English narrative sources, many of which
were written for the upper strata of secular and particularly ecclesiastical
society, many of the chronicles from thirteenth and early fourteenth
century Germany were written for, and sometimes by, city dwellers.
Moreover, many of the authors of these narrative sources made
extensive use of urban administrative documents, most no longer extant,
as the basis for their texts.[29] As a result, these accounts frequently discuss
the deployment of German urban military forces, and provide extensive
details regarding the cost, duration, and conditions of their deployment
in a manner consistent with administrative documents produced by
the English royal government. Particularly enlightening in this regard
are the thirteenth-century chronicles of the city of Worms, which as
an urban center was on par with Bristol or Dover, but considerably
smaller than London.[30]

   A close reading of the chronicles of Worms as well as the surviving
Urkunden for the city makes clear that this Rhenish port city possessed
extensive military resources, including a fleet, a large expeditionary levy,
and even an artillery train. In the summer of 1242, for example, at the
same time that Henry III of England was preparing for his invasion of
the Poitou, the city of Worms deployed substantial naval assets in two
separate campaigns. In the early summer, the city council of Worms
sent a fleet of warships (*naves bellicae*), as well as a large contingent of
troops, to the aid of the royal *civitas* of Kastel, located on the right bank
of the Rhine opposite Mainz. The size and military capability of the
force from Worms is indicated by the fact that Archbishop Siegfried III
of Mainz (1230–1249), who was besieging Kastel, is reported to have
panicked at the sight of the relieving force. He broke off his siege so
quickly that he did not even have time to dismantle his siege engines.
Instead, he burned them so that they would not fall into the hands of
the Worms' city militia. Following its bloodless victory and raising of the
siege, the city council of Worms ordered that a contingent of archers
was to be deployed at Kastel to help reinforce the garrison there.[31]
About two months later, King Conrad IV (1245–1254) of Germany
arrived in person in the middle Rhine region to deal with Archbishop
Siegfried's rebellion. In support of the military operations undertaken
by Conrad, the city of Worms again deployed a substantial fleet of
warships as well as a unit of some 200 well-equipped fighting men,
who served with the king for six weeks.[32] The next year, in 1243, the

city of Worms again deployed a fleet on behalf of the king, along with an additional force of armored fighting men (*armigeri*) and archers.[33] In all three expeditions, the cost of the operations was born by the city of Worms.

In addition to having operational control over a considerable section of the Rhine river and the territories along its banks, the city of Worms also deployed large land-based forces to campaign throughout the middle Rhine region. In 1250, Worms mobilized 2,000 city militiamen as well as a specially trained contingent of 100 crossbowmen (*balistari*) to serve with King Conrad's army as the latter campaigned against William of Holland, a pretender to the German crown. The forces from Worms played an integral part during this campaign in capturing rebel strongholds and devastating the territories of Conrad's opponents in the district. In 1260, during the so-called "interregnum period," Worms committed even larger military forces to the field. During the siege of the fortress city of Alzey, Worms deployed 4,000 fighting men. Of particular interest in this context, is the fact that the city of Worms also deployed along with its forces numerous siege engines (*machinae et instrumenta*), many of which were specially constructed for this campaign.[34]

The city of Worms was by no means unique in its deployment of substantial military forces for offensive campaigns. The major Rhenish metropolitan sees of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier regularly mobilized large contingents of troops for offensive campaigns. Cologne's urban militia most famously fought triumphantly at the battle of Worringen in 1288 against Archbishop Siegfried of Cologne (1275–1297).[35] However, earlier in the century, the Cologne city militia had fought on behalf of their archbishop. In 1239, the citizens mobilized a fleet of warships (*naves armatae*) to aid Archbishop Conrad (1238–1261) against the count of Seyn.[36] The city of Mainz played a leading role in the Rhenish League (1254–1256). In 1254, Mainz led an alliance of cities against the territorial lord Werner of Bolanden capturing and then destroying his capacity to defend his fortress at Ingelheim.[37] Two years later, in 1256, Mainz led another alliance of cities against Count Diether of Katzenelnbogen attacking and then rendering indefensible his fortress at Rheinfels.[38] Trier, for its part, had a force of 1,500 armored mounted troops (*equi phalerati*) equipped for service with the German king Adolf of Nassau (1292–1298) in 1292.[39]

Smaller German cities also deployed quite large and well-equipped military forces. In 1242, for example, the citizens of Aachen held fast

to the cause of the Staufen Emperor Frederick II (1212–1250) and
King Conrad IV, and provided a substantial military force to help
maintain royal control in the lower Rhineland. *Milites* and *cives* from
Aachen served in the army of Count William of Jülich, the leader of
the Staufen party in this region, until the latter was driven from the
field by the forces of Archbishop Conrad, noted above.[40] In 1269, the
citizens of Colmar joined forces with Rudolf of Habsburg, the future
German king (1273–1291), and captured the fortress of Reichenstein,
located near modern Riquewihr in Alsace.[41] In 1274, the year after
Rudolf became king, the citizens of Strassburg provided him with 1,500
well armed fighting men (*milites armati*) to help in his siege of Bern.[42]
In 1287, the *consules*, i.e. the ruling council, of Strassburg ordered their
fellow citizens to prepare a force of 2,000 mounted men to serve in
Rudolf's army.[43]

The citizens of Strassburg were accustomed to working with Rudolf
because, before his accession as king in 1273, the Habsburg count had
served as the commander (*dux*) of the city *militia*.[44] Indeed, the relation-
ship of the city of Strassburg with Rudolf went back to 1259 when
its citizens gained independence from their bishop. In this year, The
citizens mobilized a large force of both mounted (*eques*) and foot soldiers
(*pedites*), reported to have comprised half the militia forces of the city,
in order to capture the episcopal stronghold of Mundolsheim located
about 10 kilometers from Strassburg. In addition to these mounted and
foot soldiers, the Strassburgers also deployed a siege train that included
stone-throwing artillery (*lapicidiae*) as well as other engines (*operarii*).[45]

Conclusion

In both Germany and England, cities deployed considerable military
forces and played a major role in the conduct of warfare during the
thirteenth and early fourteenth century. There were, however, several
significant differences between the urban fighting forces of the two
kingdoms. In considering urban military forces in England and the
other territories subject to the English crown, in Wales, Scotland, and
on the continent, it is of crucial importance to recognize that they
could operate legally only under royal authority. This was a major
constitutional difference between the cities of Germany and England.
The militia forces of London, Bristol, and York, for example, did not
undertake military campaigns against local earls or bishops. Even the

raiding activities of the coastal cities against the ships of foreign powers were highly regulated by the crown. By contrast, cities such as Worms, Cologne, Mainz, and Strassburg regularly undertook military action on their own initiative and in their own interest. They functioned much in the same manner as the city-states of northern Italy which also were part of the German empire.

The size of the military forces deployed by individual cities is also significantly different in the two kingdoms. In aggregate, the military forces available from England's cities and towns, particularly naval forces, may well have been roughly equivalent to those in Germany. However, no individual English town or city deployed more than a fraction of the infantry forces of the mid- and large-sized German urban centers. London, for example, had a much larger population than Worms, perhaps three or four times greater, but the city generally was not called upon by the royal government to deploy 4,000 or even 2,000 men for a single campaign during the thirteenth and early fourteenth century.[46]

It also should be noted that the English royal government maintained firm control over the production and possession of siege engines, and that there is no evidence that individual English cities possessed their own heavy siege equipment. By contrast, German cities possessed, and indeed, built and deployed their own siege engines. In this context, it may be emphasized that military engineers and skilled craftsmen were employed directly by German cities. By contrast, such highly trained personnel were under direct royal control in England during the later thirteenth and early fourteenth century. This probably is further evidence of the relative political independence of German cities as contrasted with contemporary urban centers in Britain. Finally, it is of some interest in the context of the Swansea conference on mercenaries and paid fighting men that the kings of England routinely paid the expenses and usually the wages of urban fighting men. By contrast, the cities of Germany largely paid for their own military operations, even when these were conducted on behalf of the king.

Notes

[1] For a valuable overview of the development of urban fighting forces in Iberia and their contribution to the conquest of territories from the Muslins, see James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Berkeley, 1988).

² See, in this regard, William M. Bowsky, *A Medieval Italian Commune: Sienna under the Nine 1287–1355* (Berkeley, 1981), 128–150; Daniel Waley *The Italian City-Republics*, third ed. (New York, 1988), esp. 53; Daniel Waley, *Siena and the Sienese in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1991), passim.

³ On this point, see Léon Louis Borrelli de Serres, *Recherches sur divers services publics du XIIIᵉ au XVIIᵉ siècle*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1895), 465–527; Edouard Audouin, *Essai sur l'armée au temps de Philippe Auguste* (Paris, 1913), 4–32; and John W. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustu*s: *Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1986), 165–175.

⁴ See the discussion of the battle of Courtrai by Kelly DeVries, *Warfare in the early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology* (Woodbridge, 1996).

⁵ Concerning the failure of modern scholars to address the central questions of medieval German military history, see Hans-Hennig Kortüm, 'Der Krieg im Mittelalter als Gegenstand der historischen Kultur-Wissenschaften: Einer Annäherung,' in *Krieg im Mittelalter*, ed. idem. (Berlin, 2001), 13–43.With respect to the noble and particularly knight-centered focus of German medieval military historiography in the period before the Second World War, see, for example, Hans Fehr, 'Das Waffenrecht der Bauern im Mittelalter,' *Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Germanistische Abteilung* 35 (1914), 111–121, esp. 118, which, despite its title, is focused on the superiority and greater importance of mounted warriors as contrasted with foot soldiers in medieval German warfare; Hans Delbrück, *Medieval Warfare: History of the Art of War III*, trans. W.J. Renfroe (Lincoln, 1982), 365–375, originally published under the title *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, 2nd edit. (Berlin, 1923); Paul Schmitthenner, 'Lehnskriegwesen und Söldnertum im abendländischen Imperium des Mittelalters,' *Historische Zeitschrift* 150 (1934), 229–67. For the period after the Second World War, see Leopold Auer, 'Zum Kriegswesen unter der früheren Babenbergern,' *Jahrbuch für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich* 42 (1976), 9–25, esp. 16–19 and (idem) 'Formen des Krieges im abendländischen Mittelalter,' in *Formen des Krieges*, ed. Manfried Rauchensteiner and Erwin A. Schmidl (Graz, 1991), 17–43, esp. 19–23; Hagen Keller, 'Reichsstruktur und Herrschaftsauffasung in ottonisch-frühsalischer Zeit,' *Frühmittelalterliche Studien* 16 (1982), 74–128, esp. 82; Gerd Althoff and Hagen Keller, *Heinrich I. und Otto der Grosse: Neubeginn auf karolingischem Erbe*, 2nd edit., vol. 1 (Göttingen, 1994), 87; Timothy Reuter, 'Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare,' in Maurice Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History* (Oxford, 1999), 13–35.

⁶ Concerning the *parti pris* of English chroniclers regarding the importance of mounted troops in general and nobles in particular, see Matthew Bennett, 'The Myth of the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry,' in M. Strickland (ed.), *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France* (Stamford, 1998), 304–316.

⁷ For a clear statement of the perceived poor quality and limited importance of non-noble elements within the English armies of the thirteenth century by the leading specialist in thirteenth-century English warfare, see Michael Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I* (London, 1972), 92–113; restated in (idem.), *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (Yale, 1996), passim; and 'Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,' in *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages*, ed. Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath (Oxford, 1996), 29–150, esp. 130. With respect to the continuing scholarly efforts to justify the relevance of chivalry in the context of medieval military historiography, see Maurice Keen, 'Introduction,' in *Medieval Warfare: A History* 1–9.

⁸ See, for example, Carlrichard Brühl, *Palatium und Civitas: Studien zur Profantopographie spätantiker Civitates vom 3. bis 13. Jahrhundert*, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1975, repr. 1990).

⁹ A large number of these urban chronicles are published in the *Scriptores* series by the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. The two chronicles that are the focus of the second half of this study were reedited from the original MGH edition and published by Heinrich Boos, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Worms III: Annalen und Chroniken* (Berlin, 1893), 143–199. For an overview of city chronicles see Elisabeth M.C. Van Houts, *Local and Regional Chronicles* (Turnhout, 1995), 15.

[10] This term was coined by Professor Bernard S. Bachrach to denote the focus by military historians on nobles and other chivalric figures at the expense of the great mass of fighting men.

[11] The number of studies devoted to identifying knight service in England dwarfs the literature that has as its focus the military organization or administration of English warfare.

[12] The basic study on the history of the Cinque Ports remains, K.M.E. Murray, *The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports* (Manchester, 1935). There are several studies of individual members of the Cinque Ports. See, for example, K.M.E. Murray, 'Dengmarsh and the Cinque Ports,' *The English Historical Review* (1939), 664–673; Derek F. Renn, 'The Castles of Rye and Winchelsea,' *The Archaeological Journal* 136 (1979), 193–202; E.W. Parkin, 'The Ancient Cinque Port of Sandwich,' *Archaeologia Cantiana* 101 (1984), 189–216; N.A.M. Rodger, 'The Naval Service of the Cinque Ports,' *The English Historical Review* (1996), 636–651; David R. Oliver, *Late Medieval Thanet and the Cinque Ports* (Broadstairs, Kent, 1997).

[13] *Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III 1216–1272* (London, 1902–1938), here *Close Rolls 1237–1242*, 482.

[14] *Close Rolls 1237–1242*, 456.

[15] *Close Rolls 1256–1259*, 297.

[16] *Welsh Rolls in the Calendar of Various Chancery Rolls A.D. 1277–1326* (London, 1912), 247.

[17] *Calendar of Close Rolls 1272–1307* (London, 1900–1908), here *Close Rolls 1288–1296*, 456.

[18] *Calendar of Close Rolls 1296–1302*, 128.

[19] *Calendar of Close Rolls 1288–1296*, 460.

[20] *Calendar of Close Rolls 1288–1296*, 460.

[21] *Close Rolls 1237–1242*, 456.

[22] *Close Rolls 1261–1264*, 392.

[23] E372/132 1v. and 22r; E372/133 18r and 29r; C62/65 4r.

[24] E101/5/19.

[25] E101/5/27.

[26] E101/14/33.

[27] Concerning the use of the population around fortresses as militia forces, see Ifor Rowlands, 'The Edwardian Conquest and its Military Consolidation,' in Trevor Herbert and Gareth Elwyn Jones (eds), *Edward I and Wales* (Cardiff, 1988), 41–72, 52–3; Frederick C. Suppe, *Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire A.D. 1066–1300* (Woodbridge, 1994), 17.

[28] Concerning the deployment of 300 crossbows at Caernarvon castle in June 1290, see C62/66 4r.

[29] This is particularly clear, for example, in the *Annales Wormtienses* and the *Chronicon Wormatiensis*. A comparison of the extant charters for Worms with the texts of these two narrative sources makes clear that the authors of the latter copied administrative documents verbatim into their texts. See, in this context, Johannes Fried, 'Ladenburg am Neckar und der Rheinische Bund von 1254/56,' *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 120 (1972), 457–467, 466.

[30] The population of London in 1300 may have been as large as 80,000 people. In this regard, see John Schofield, 'When London became a European Capital,' *British Archaeology* 45 (1999), 12–13. Scholars have not yet established a population range for the city of Worms during the thirteenth century. During the mid-thirteenth century, the city of Worms doubled the size of its wall to 5,300 meters. See Brühl, *Palatium und Civitas*, II: 120 and 126. A wall of this size required approximately 4,200 defenders. With respect to the requirement to have one defender for approximately 4 1/8 feet of wall, see Bernard S. Bachrach and Rutherford Aris, 'Military Technology and Garrison Organization: Some Observations on Anglo-Saxon Military Thinking in Light of the Burghal Hidage,' *Technology and Culture* 3 (1990), 1–17, and reprinted with the same

pagination in Bernard S. Bachrach, *Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe* (Aldershot, 2002). In addition to requiring a very substantial military force to defend its walls, the city of Worms, as will be seen below, had an expeditionary levy of 4,000 men. Under normal circumstances in a pre-modern health environment, approximately one-third of the population was comprised of males between the ages of 15 and 44. Concerning this demographic division, see Ansley Coale and Paul Demeny, *Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations* (Princeton, 1966). Under a largest-scale scenario, in which the city required a full complement of defenders for the walls and sent out its entire expeditionary levy on campaign, an armed population of 8,200 men would require a minimum population of approximately 25,000 people. Even if this minimum were increased by 50 percent, the population of Worms would still amount to less than half of that of London at the same time.

[31] Boos, *Annales Wormatienses*, 149.

[32] Boos, *Annales Wormatienses*, 149.

[33] Boos, *Annales Wormatienses*, 150.

[34] Boos, *Annales Wormatienses*, 150.

[35] The most recent overview of the battle of Worringen and its political implications for the lower Rhineland is Ulrich Lehnart, *Die Schlacht von Worringen 1288: Kriegführung im Mittelalter* (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), but see also J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. From the Eighth Century to 1340* tr. S. Willard and R.W. Southern (Woodbridge, 1997), 260–75.

[36] H. Cardauns (ed.), *Annales Sancti Pantaleonis Coloniensis*, MGH SS 22 (Hanover, 1872, repr. Stuttgart, 1963), 531.

[37] Boos, *Annales Wormatienses*, 154.

[38] Boos, *Annales Wormtienses*, 155.

[39] Ph. Jaffé (ed.), *Chronicon Colmariense*, MGH SS 17 (Berlin, 1861, repr. Stuttgart, 1963), 257.

[40] H. Cardauns (ed.), *Annales Sancti Pantaleonis Coloniensis*, MGH SS 22 (Hanover, 1872, repr. Stuttgart, 1963), 536.

[41] Ph. Jaffé (ed.), *Annales Basileenses*, MGH SS 17 (Berlin, 1861, repr. Stuttgart, 1963), 193.

[42] Ph. Jaffé (ed.), *Ellenhardi Chronicon*, MGH SS 17 (Berlin, 1861, repr. Stuttgart, 1963), 123.

[43] Ph. Jaffé, *Annales Colmarienses Maiores*, MGH SS 17 (Berlin, 1861, repr. Stuttgart, 1963), 214.

[44] *Ellenhardi Chronicon*, 123.

[45] G.H. Pertz (ed.), *Bellum Walterium*, MGH SS 17 (Berlin, 1861, repr. Stuttgart, 1963), 109.

[46] The only occasion on which the city militia of London was mobilized in substantial part for a military campaign on land was during the baronial revolt of 1264–1266. In 1264, Simon de Montfort brought the city militia of London with him to Lewes, where the Londoners composed about one third of the army. According to William Rishanger, the total baronial force at Lewes amounted to 15,000 men. See William de Rishanger, *The Chronicle of the Barons' War*, ed. James Orchard Halliwell (London, 1840, repr. London, 1968), 27. If William was correct about the size of the baronial force, the contingent from London may have had as many as 5,000 men.

MERCENARIES, MAMLUKS AND MILITIA

TOWARDS A CROSS-CULTURAL TYPOLOGY OF MILITARY SERVICE

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Introduction

In the second half of the 24th century BCE, Nubanda Mardune entered paid service in Sargon of Akkadia's royal guard as 'captain of the Amorites'.[1] Similarly, thirty five centuries later, the Scandinavian Harald Hardraada served as a paid captain in the Varangian Guard of the Byzantine Emperor Basil II. In the following century, the Fleming William of Ypres served for pay as a commander in the forces of king Stephen of England. In the mid-twentieth century, Irishman Mike Hoare led troops of paid soldiers serving in the Congo. Many other examples of paid military leaders and their men were presented at this conference, as these proceedings show.

Are they all of a type, and is that type 'mercenary leader'? Are their men uniformly 'mercenaries'? Or do differences of context—whether of time period, military practice, political structure or economic development—make such clumping uncomfortable? I suspect most of us think there are differences between sorts of paid service, as well as variations in unpaid service. Indeed, past societies seemingly recognized such differences, as reflected in the differing cultural images societies have had of various paid military forces: the often strongly negative connotations of the word 'mercenary' in modern culture are one attestation of this phenomenon. And indeed the differing self-images paid fighters have constructed at different times speak to this as well. But I am unaware of any successful attempt to create a typology of military service that could distinguish, along a consistent and limited set of variables and in a cross-culturally valid way, between the varieties of paid (and unpaid) military service. This is what I will attempt in this article.

I set out, in other words, to answer three questions. First, can we arrive at a consistent, cross-cultural typology or set of definitions of

the varieties of paid and unpaid military service? Second, can we make those definitions correspond, at least roughly, to variations in different societies' views of variations of military service, especially as they affected notions of the cultural identity of paid fighters? And third, can we do this without, in the words of Bernard Bachrach, 'committing sociology'? I will spend most of this paper addressing the first two questions. Methodologically the answer to the third question must be 'no', though I suppose I prefer the term 'world history' to 'sociology'. The evidence for my committing sociology is that my thesis will end up in the form of a distribution field built around two intersecting axes representing the key variables determining a typology of paid military service: first, the 'embeddedness' (or not) of the terms of paid service in the social fabric of the employing society; second, the balance between an economic market and politics in setting terms of service. In other words, I shall build a model abstracted from a wide range of comparative cases rather than conducting a close study of any individual case or cases. I shall get to more careful definitions of the key variables in the model shortly, but only after considering how this field has been previously plowed.

Problematic Definitions

If I understand Bachrach's objection to 'committing sociology' correctly, a large part of it consists of a thoughtful consideration of the problem of comparison in history. Abstraction to a model such as I will produce necessarily entails looking for common features and eliding the fine details of difference that give historical events their unique texture, across cases whose differences can in fact appear to be very significant indeed. Paid military service has existed from early in the history of state-level societies, as the case of Nubanda Mardune shows, through the present day. This temporal range obviously includes economic, social, political and military contexts for paid service that are as different as the entire sweep of recorded human history can produce. Is it really possible to derive meaningful information from a comparison of conscription systems, say, in third century BCE China and nineteenth century Europe, the one an underdeveloped agricultural economy using Bronze Age weapons, the other an industrializing world of steel and explosives?[2] From my perspective, the philosophical answer must be 'yes', for only a matter of scale—of quantity, not quality—separates a case such as this

from comparisons of the service of household knights in England in the reign of Henry I with such service under Edward I. The *reductio* of this objection is that no two historical events can ever be compared, for circumstances and context are always different. I consider this a *reductio ad absurdum*, a denial of the basic mechanisms of human intelligence, the use of pattern recognition and metaphor.

This is not to deny that comparisons at the world historical scale are potentially problematic. They are prone to the impositions of centrisms and the shoehorning of obstinate cases into pre-established categories.[3] A good example is the typology of military service that John Keegan outlines in his *History of Warfare*, including as it does the category of 'feudalism' among other types, all of which are familiar to European military history.[4] A representative result in terms of shoehorning is that Japanese samurai and the Mamluks of Egypt (and Muslim military organization more generally, though he fails to deal with this specifically) are jammed together into the same category when, to my eye at least, they represent very different sorts of socio-military structures. John Lynn, on the other hand, in his examination of army types between 800 and 2000 CE, confines himself to one civilization over a defined period of time and presents a chronological description rather than a typological schema; the result avoids centrisms and shoehorning but fails to produce a system with comparative analytic value.[5] In terms of mercenaries, neither offers much more than a rough descriptive definition with some examples of what constitutes mercenary service. The definitions are not spelled out enough to distinguish some sorts of paid service clearly from others: Keegan's definition seems to come down to 'military forces hired from outside the manpower resources of the state'.[6] A brief consideration of the myriad ways states have related to societies in world history immediately raises questions the definition cannot answer.[7]

Other definitions of mercenaries are equally problematic. To show that I'm an equal opportunity critic, I'll mention my own definition of mercenary service in my book on Anglo-Norman warfare, where I equate 'mercenary' with 'paid professional'.[8] In the context of a narrow study of Anglo-Norman warfare this was arguably a justifiable move, but in any broader context does not make nearly enough distinctions to usefully separate out some categories of troops from others. And in fact I'm no longer comfortable with the equation even for Anglo-Norman warfare, as it elides useful distinctions between troops with very different relationships to their employers. In medieval military history

more generally, the standard definitions of 'mercenary' come down to little more than 'paid foreign soldier'. Michael Mallett, in his chapter on mercenaries in Maurice Keen's *Medieval Warfare*, says 'it is the concept of fighting for profit, together with the gradual emergence of a concept of 'foreignness', which distinguishes the true mercenary, the subject of this chapter, from the ordinary paid soldier.'[9] Yet he includes 'companies of infantry mercenaries' from the twelfth century, before the rise of his 'concept of foreignness', in his discussion, and indeed says that the real theme of his chapter is 'a real change in the perception of the issue from the later thirteenth century'.[10] So there are 'mercenaries' and there are 'true mercenaries', and the difference between them is a matter of cultural perceptions of foreignness, not terms of service. Kenneth Fowler's examination of the Great Companies, by focusing on a restricted set of cases from the period that Mallett says is characterized by 'true mercenary' service depends on the combined notions of pay and foreignness to define mercenary service.[11] Serge Yalichev's *Mercenaries of the Ancient World* provides a final representative example of inadequately worked out definitions of mercenary service—indeed of implied definitions, since like many authors he apparently takes the definition of mercenary service to be self-evident and in need of no more than exemplification. He claims of one set of troops that 'service in a foreign army classified them as mercenaries at least in terms of status if not motive', and in another place seems to equate mercenaries with paid professionals, or at least foreign ones.[12]

   Disentangling the implications of the claims these various authors make leads us to several problematic places. Aside from the problem of equating any paid service with mercenary service, the distinctions drawn here rely heavily on the concept of 'foreignness', and Yalichev explicitly opposes mercenary service to 'national' service. But nationalism *as we know it* is a very recent historical phenomenon, dating to the 18th or early 19th century. Therefore what counted as 'foreign' in the large, multi-cultural empires, geographically mutable kingdoms, and across the multivalent political and cultural boundaries that dominate the history of the ancient and medieval worlds is not easy to decide and is readily subject, as in Yalichev's example, to anachronism. 'Foreignness' as the key variable in determining mercenary status is therefore problematic in itself. But how are we to combine it with the notion that what really counts is 'motive': presumably meaning that what makes a mercenary is that pay is a soldier's only or at least key motivation for fighting—'fighting for profit', as Mallett has it? Does this make mer-

cenaries of 'nationals' who volunteer for service only in order to be paid? Do foreigners who serve another polity out of deep ideological commitment to that polity's program avoid being mercenaries? And all such questions beg the larger question of evidence this factor creates, for knowing exactly what the motives of soldiers who joined particular armies were will often be beyond our reach.

A Proposed Typology

What these various examples and problems point out is that we need a more careful approach to defining military service, paid and unpaid. As I noted above, I propose in this paper a typology built around two intersecting axes, producing a distribution field consisting of four quadrants. Before discussing the particulars of the resulting graph, I will now define the terms constituting the axes more closely. Both axes, it should be noted, are to be understood not as binary options but as continuums running from one extreme to the other.

The first axis has to do with how embedded in the social fabric of a particular society the service of a group of soldiers or warriors is. By 'embedded' I mean that the terms of service of embedded soldiers arise out of the social structure of their society and reflect their social roles and status; the terms of service of unembedded soldiers ignore social relationships or even consciously set the soldiers apart from society in real and symbolic ways. The crucial distinction to be understood here is that a group of soldiers may be deeply embedded in the political structures of a state without being embedded in the social networks of the society the state governs. 'Palace guards' often play a central role in the politics of the states they serve, intervening in succession disputes, for example, while at the same time being intentionally set off from society through having special status and privileges as well as special restrictions designed to guarantee their loyalty to the ruler over against the interest of powerful social groups. Despite their political role, such troops would count on this axis as socially fairly unembedded. Culturally, the terms of service of deeply embedded soldiers will tend to be constructed in terms of recognized nexuses of social relationships: examples might include service connected to recognition of lordship in a society organized around a powerful aristocracy, service constructed around the principles of Confucian hierarchy in a Confucian society, and so forth. Those of unembedded soldiers ignore or even violate

such nexuses: turning again to the case of palace guards, restriction on their right to marry (or restrictions on who they can marry) recognize by negation the importance of marriage politics to the social ties of many aristocracies.[13]

Framing the question of embedding this way avoids, I hope, any question of centrism or shoehorning of specific cases, for it recognizes explicitly that embedding will mean different things in different societies and cultures. Different nexuses of social relationships—what I have elsewhere called the ideological framework of discourse mediating, among other things, negotiations between states and societies[14]—produce different criteria for evaluating the embeddedness of different groups of soldiers. 'Foreignness', which serves as a bad proxy for embeddedness precisely because it arises from a particular social reality (our own today) that does not necessarily translate across cultural boundaries, is in fact subsumed under the broader category of embeddedness. Furthermore, I take the notions of social structure and the cultural or ideological framework of discourse to encompass a fairly broad range of factors, including ideological and political components, though most questions of politics as they relate to formal state power, as opposed to the informal social power exercised in any social structure, I reserve to the second axis of my schema.

That axis runs between two poles: at one end, terms of service that are determined exclusively (or virtually so) by considerations of politics—that is, of the exercise of formal state power; at the other end, terms of service that are determined by the choices available to potential soldiers in a free economic market.[15] The former sorts of terms of service will tend to be instantiated in terms of laws, edicts, treaties, or other formal state mechanisms, and will often, *vis-à-vis* individual service, have a more or less compulsory nature. Political terms of service also include arrangements in which obligations arising from social status gain the force of customary law, or in which military service becomes a crucial performance not just of social power but of elite politics, as was the case for most military aristocracies and warrior elites. Economically determined terms of service, on the other hand, will tend to be instantiated in terms recognizable in a free economic market, meaning (most often) mutually binding contracts, voluntarily entered into, whether formal or informal, oral or written, individual or group.

It is on this axis that the issue of motivation to fight appears, though it remains fraught with evidentiary problems. But by using a soldier's motivation to service not as an independent variable determinative

of mercenary (or not) status, but as a piece of an equation evaluating the relative importance of politics versus economics in shaping terms of service, we reduce the impact of the problem of evidence while reframing the question in a broader way that admits more evidence and less speculative interpretation—essentially, institutional arrangements largely replace psychology in the equation. Another aspect of this axis worth considering in evaluating where particular cases will fall is the presence or absence of market options available to potential soldiers, no matter what their motivation. That is, pay alone is a poor indicator, for pay may exist in conditions where market options are severely limited either by political fiat or by political, geographic, social or other circumstances that limit or eliminate competition for a soldier's services. In such cases, the political component will necessarily rise in the equation of a soldier's terms of service.

By combining these two axes we get a distribution field divided into four quadrants. [See Figure 1.] Examination of each of these quadrants and the cases that I believe fall into each will, I hope, make all this clearer, less abstract and perhaps less 'sociological'. In each case I have assigned an overall label for the various types of service found in each quadrant for ease of discussion. Furthermore the points placed on this graph should be taken as somewhat generalized versions—or best estimates of weighted mean centers of gravity—of truly specific cases that would scatter around these centers of gravity. In some cases (with a few noted below), such scattering could include examples of a specific type that fall in a different quadrant from where the center point appears on this graph. But with regard to the placement of particular types, the graph itself, especially the construction of the two axes, is the point of this proposal: I would assert that arguments about where a point should fall on the graph implies acceptance of the assumptions of the graph; only cases that cannot be placed because some other axis of determination is at work would undermine the graph itself as an analytic tool. Most military systems, it should be noted, will tend to be made up of several different types of soldier, perhaps drawn from very different quadrants of the graph. The sorts of combinations rulers resorted to reflect the various strengths and weaknesses (or risks and opportunities) represented by soldiers of each type, as well as the political and social constraints rulers and states face in creating armed forces.

Finally, two short notes. First, 'soldiers of fortune' and others who fight for gain but on their own initiative do not appear on this graph because they enter into no employment relationship, and it is the

dynamics of employment relationships that the graph is designed to analyze. Second, as Richard Abels' analysis of Thorkell makes clear, the relationships that hold a band of soldiers together need not be the same as those that bind the band as a whole to an employer. [16] A purely mercenary band vis a vis an employing state may, internally, be a purely political grouping constructed by lordship, for instance.

<div align="center">

EMBEDDED, POLITICAL: 'SOCIAL ARMIES'

</div>

This quadrant, especially at its extreme, contains those military forms that reflect a tight integration of social structure and politics: the triad of militia, conscripts and warrior elites are not only closely related but often appear together as complementary parts of many military systems. Soldiers in this quadrant serve largely out of a combination of social obligation (in the case of warrior elites) and legal obligation (in the case of conscripts) or both (militia), though these obligations do not preclude such service being compensated: conscripted forces are almost always paid, and warrior elites often receive compensation both informally, in the form of their share of plunder and as political rewards and gifts, and formally in terms of stipends, per diems, and replacement of lost equipment.[17] The economic component of fief holding (in medieval western Europe) is larger than for the other types exemplified in this quadrant, but fief-holding remains a predominantly political system, at least when functioning *as a system of raising military manpower*. The later history of European fief-holding as a legal structure of landholding retained some political character, but as it became predominantly economic it also became non-military in nature.[18] On the other hand, the socially embedded nature of fief-holding—both in terms of the importance of fief-holding arrangements to elite social bonds (second only to and tied up with marriage alliances) and in the local social and legal power fief-holders exercised over the peasantry—remained constant whatever the military use of the system. The lack of such local authority over peasants made Japanese shōen holders of the Kamakura period less embedded in this way. And although their embeddedness in elite social relationships was similar to their European counterparts, the more one-sided nature of their relationship to their superiors also decreased their political options.[19] In short, military manpower types that fall into this quadrant tend to be heavily shaped by the sorts of internal politics that reflect important social divisions and groupings.

The care taken by European states adopting the Prussian system of universal military conscription in the 19th century (including Prussia itself) to indoctrinate its conscripts with nationalist ideas and education reflect such political concerns and the perceived dangers of arming the working classes.[20]

<div align="center">EMBEDDED, ECONOMIC: 'STIPENDIARIES'</div>

In this quadrant, the level of social embeddedness can still be very high, but market considerations play a much larger role in the creation of armed force. The extreme and paradigmatic case is a national volunteer army such as the current US military, both the regular army and even more the national guard. Such forces are clearly deeply embedded in the social and cultural matrices of their societies: one must be a citizen to serve, and US National Guard soldiers, training and serving (in normal, non-Iraq War times) only for several days a month, retain their civilian identities. Yet this National Guard is not a true militia because there is no universal obligation to serve that is activated only in times of emergency. Rather, just like their regular army counterparts, such soldiers serve not out of social or legal obligation, and not just out of a sense of ideological commitment to their society, but as much or more for the pay (and related compensation such as support for college tuition). The competition for military recruiters here is not from other potential military employers but from other potential employers in the domestic society: note the lengths to which recruiters must go to make this job attractive, including television advertising with carefully crafted slogans: 'It's not just a job, it's an adventure!'

Indentures, the medieval European form of a military service contract, mostly fall in this quadrant as well, as military service represented one option among other domestic employment opportunities for those who signed on to serve, say, Edward III in the Hundred Years' War.[21] The political component of service arising from a hierarchical society and monarchical polity was undoubtedly higher than in the modern U.S., but remained secondary to the economic incentives on offer. Drawn from the ranks of local society, indentured soldiers were clearly socially embedded, though long service overseas could loosen their local ties considerably, moving them somewhat towards the unembedded side of that axis. Money fiefs, essentially indentures enforced with the oaths of vassalage that bound fief-holders, combined the reality of economic

service with the form of political obligation, moving them slightly higher up the political axis. Socially, an apparently contradictory impression may be resolved by close analysis. On the one hand, the oath-vassalage form would seem to reflect social embeddedness. On the other hand, the lack of land holdings necessarily separated money-fief holders from local peasant society. The use of money fiefs to attract warriors who were not political subjects of the employing monarch or, as in the use of money fiefs in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, who were not native to the local society, argues further for unembeddedness. The oath-vassalage form appears clearly from this perspective as a mechanism designed to encourage greater embeddedness and political loyalty, in a moral language widely recognizable for those very characteristics, on a form whose economic motivations could call the embeddedness and related loyalty of money fief holders into question. Nevertheless, and especially when money fiefs were granted to politically independent powers, as in the 1101 money fief arrangement between Henry I of England and the Count of Flanders, many money fief arrangements could easily slide over and up into the 'Political Armies' quadrant as a form of subsidized alliance.[22]

Unembedded, Political: 'Political Armies'

The extreme case in this quadrant consists of the varieties of Muslim slave soldiers: armies constructed from men whose slave status reflects both an extreme lack of market options on one axis and an extreme separation (especially in the case of foreign slave soldiers, as most were) from civil society. Praetorian guards (palace guards writ large), though less extreme, still reflect the desire on the part of rulers to construct a force deliberately separate from society. Such a desire usually arose from a disjunction between state and society or deep divisions between segments of society that made the raising of socially embedded troops potentially dangerous. This condition was endemic among medieval and early modern Islamic polities,[23] accounting for the prevalence of slave soldiers at the core of their military systems. It also affected the role of 'iqta holders, who not only often lacked ties to the local peasantry, making them resemble shōen holders in this respect, but also sometimes opposed their nominally pastoralist lifestyle to their agriculturalist peasants culturally. Some 'iqta holders, however, did assume roles that included local social leadership, and so the full scattergram of 'iqta

examples would undoubtedly include data points closer to fief holders on this graph. Similarly, Byzantine *pronoiars*, often foreign and lacking authority over peasant producers, represent military forces that are more a political creation than a social expression.[24]

Forces in this quadrant can also reflect geo-political environments that put a premium on management of external politics, either by the employer or by a state whose forces are employed by another state. Federates and auxiliaries represent politically motivated recruiting by a major power among nominally independent but politically subordinate border states, usually in a mixture of providing employment for and drawing off the potentially disruptive activities of a warlike population and managing political relations with local rulers. This is not to deny, of course, such troops' purely military utility. Subsidizing allies is another way that major powers, especially those with readier monetary than manpower reserves, have availed themselves of military force. Britain's support for Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War, which helped occupy French forces while British naval supremacy was brought to bear on French possessions around the world, comes to mind as a paradigmatic case.[25] Many cases of Italian *condotta* arrangements, including the military diplomacy of the Varano of Camerino, are better read as subsidized alliance arrangements than as true mercenary service.[26] The role of formal state-to-state relationships in making subsidized alliances is a key feature distinguishing them from mercenary terms of service. Similarly, freebooting marauders, including many Viking bands and Magyar marauders, who leverage the threat they pose into an employment arrangement with the state they threaten are best viewed as a form of subsidized ally or federate in which the usual employer-employee power relationships are reversed.[27]

Finally, sitting essentially at the intersection of the two axes but probably in most cases falling just inside this quadrant are armies of long term professionals. The Roman legions after the reforms of Marius are one example of this sort of army, as are the royal armies of eighteenth century Europe and the French model of long term professionals in the nineteenth century that represented an alternate solution to the Prussian conscription-plus-indoctrination model for ensuring the political reliability of armies.[28] The essence of such forces from the perspective of this schema is their finely balanced mixture of characteristics on both axes: armies that are just unembedded enough to serve as an instrument of state power against its own citizens, yet embedded enough to represent the 'national' character of the society; armies whose terms

of service offer economic incentives tied to service terms long enough as to represent a political choice. The balance could be expressed in interestingly opposed restrictions and opportunities, as with Roman legionnaires who were separated from civil society while active in their careers, but who were actively reintegrated into society on retirement via settlement in military colonies.

Unembedded, Economic: 'Mercenaries'

The extreme case in this quadrant, the classic mercenary, is not only unembedded in the society of his employer—a condition for which being 'foreign' is, as we have seen, a rough but problematic synonym—but sells his services to the best offer among many potential military employers. In other words, one condition for true mercenary service is that there be not only pay, but market options unconstrained by limited numbers of potential employers. Such limitations might arise either from a real shortage of polities with the monetary resources to hire military manpower or from political and cultural factors that effectively limit the choices of soldiers for hire as to their choice of employer. Cultural factors can include not just obvious limits such as religious affiliation (though the employment of Christian mercenaries by North African Muslim states shows that this factor need not inhibit mercenary service) but the inability of a society to conceptualize market relationships as an option.[29] This latter factor means that a wider social context of market economics and capitalist or proto-capitalist business organization are likely preconditions for the rise of a true mercenary market. This helps to explain why the social effect of mercenary service, the product of military recruiting as capitalism, is summed up so beautifully by the words of the Communist Manifesto: it 'puts an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has left no other nexus between people than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment."' Some mercenary-employer relationships, though theoretically still open to market options, acquire ties of tradition, as for instance Swiss service for French monarchs did in the sixteenth century, and so move up the scale of political influence on terms of service, even if they move very little towards greater embeddedness in their employer's society. 'Traditional source' mercenary relationships

can be conceptualized in modern market terms as 'preferred provider' arrangements, and reflect the advantages of security and reliability of supply such arrangements can create.

It should be clear from the qualifications and restrictions with which this model surrounds true mercenary service that it should be, compared to most other types of service represented on the graph, a fairly rare phenomenon. And despite the fairly common use of the term in informal usage, close examination of a multitude of cases confirms this relative rarity, as many of the other papers presented at this conference confirmed.[30] In most cases commonly identified as 'mercenary', some combination of restricted market options, strong political influence on terms of service, or higher levels of social embedding than the model accepts for true mercenary service means that the cases should, by the terms of this schema, be more properly identified as subsidized allies, federates, or some form of stipendiary. A short list of the major periods of mercenary activity include the fourth century BCE with Greek mercenaries employed both within Greece and around the wider eastern Mediterranean; the seventeenth century in western Europe, a period and place where almost every aspect of military service operated according to merchant capitalist models; and the second half of the twentieth century globally, during the age of global capitalism. There have undoubtedly been true mercenaries in other times and places, but they are not common.

The distribution of cases on this graph highlight some fairly obvious facts about the construction of the various military systems that have appeared throughout history (and in theory every sort of military service outside of freebooting, as noted above, should fit into this schema). That there are a set of paradigmatic cases at the extreme corners, but that the bulk of non-extreme cases tend to cluster towards the middle of the diagram, reflects the fact that there is usually input in terms of both capital and coercion, to use one of Charles Tilly's pairings, in raising armies, resulting in compromises that push cases towards the middle of my vertical axis. [31] There is some bias towards the political end since armies and politics, as Clausewitz noted, are pretty closely and 'naturally' associated as mechanisms of power projection, more closely certainly than are armies and markets. Second, that there is often a tension between the sorts of loyalties produced in embedded forces and the sorts of loyalties produced in unembedded forces, a tension that tends to balance out towards the middle of my horizontal

axis, though less restrictively and more evenly than in the balance of political and economic forces.

<center>QUADRANTS AND CULTURE</center>

Aside from providing a typology of military service, the graph may offer insight into the cultural identity of various types of soldiers—both outsiders' perceptions of different types and the self-construction of identity by different types of soldiers. The traditional perception of mercenaries, for example, is that they are ravening wolves prone to disloyalty. These are 'natural' perceptions given mercenaries' lack of social embeddedness, but also given their market relationship to their employer.[32] In fact it may be this as much or more than their perceived status as outsiders that accounts for their foul reputation, for in the traditional world, at least, untrammeled market relationships were commonly seen as destructive of 'natural' social and political bonds (as Marx so perceptively noted). This explains the somewhat counterintuitive affinity on *one* axis, at least, that the graph makes visible between mass volunteer armies and mercenaries. For mass volunteer armies—largely a product of the mass politics of the last two centuries, but including the spontaneous gatherings of some Crusader forces—have often been viewed with deep suspicion by powerful elites for reasons that bear at least some relationship to those affecting the perception of mercenaries: that their economic freedom renders them dangerously uncontrollable politically. A similar antipathy with the same cause has usually colored elite views of merchants, with an interestingly gendered difference. Since mercenaries display a classic masculine virtue by being fighters, the elite cultural response is to bestialize (i.e. dehumanize) them ('ravening wolves'). Since merchant activity is rarely constructed as inherently masculine (though men often monopolize merchant activity, this results more from its public interface, with women confined to the private sphere), the elite cultural response to merchants more often includes feminizing them. In general, the variable tension between elite politics, social organization and cultural dynamics is a potentially interesting line of inquiry into the construction of military forces highlighted by this graph.[33] On the other hand, the negative reaction to mercenaries is not so 'natural' as to be necessary or universal: it is a construction resulting

largely from the conflict between the implicit values of mercenary service and the wider values of different societies. Where no such conflict occurs, mercenary identity need not be negative. The Greek mercenaries of the fourth century BCE were an accepted part of the wider social and political arrangements of the eastern Mediterranean, for example, and suffered no stigma for their service either to Greek *poleis* not their own or to Persian or Egyptian employers.[34]

The responses of various soldier types to the common perception of mercenaries is also telling. Orderic comments on the protests of Robert of Belleme's stipendiaries at the surrender of Bridgnorth to Henry I in 1102, 'so that their downfall might not bring contempt on other stipendiaries'.[35] The main concern here seems to me to be these troops' stress on their loyal service to their lord, loyalty which would distinguish them as stipendiaries from mercenaries by stressing their social embeddedness, even though they serve for pay. But the response also hints at the tendency to group solidarity and formation of a separate cultural identity with its own codes, dress, membership criteria and mechanisms of self help that have often characterized groups separated from mainstream society by their economic function, including not just true mercenaries but prostitutes, early modern journeymen, late seventeenth century pirates, and both Hindu outcastes and Japanese *burakumin.*[36] Unlike most such groups, however (except perhaps Caribbean pirates at their height), some mercenaries could use their economic specialization in the use of force to attempt a move not along the horizontal axis towards greater social embeddedness, but up the vertical axis toward greater political power—the name Wallenstein can stand as shorthand for examples of such cases that could include, I suspect, some medieval examples.

There are, I hope, other useful observations to be provoked by this graph. What I hope I have arrived at is, if not a precise set of definitions of different types of military service, at least a useful typology. I think at a minimum it can usefully distinguish between the praetorians Nubanda Mardune and Harald Hardraada, the stipendiary William of Ypres, and the truly mercenary and perhaps too appropriately named Mike Hoare.

Notes

[1] Serge Yalichev, *Mercenaries of the Ancient World* (London, 1997), 13.

[2] Cf. the objections to definitions of 'feudalism' as an 'ideal type' that could occur in societies widely separated in time and by level of economic development in Rene Barendse, 'The Feudal Mutation: Military and Economic Transformations of the Ethnosphere in the 10th–13th Centuries', *Journal of World History* 14 (2003), 530.

[3] I discuss these problem in Stephen Morillo, 'A 'Feudal Mutation'? Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns in World History', *Journal of World History* 14 (2003), 531–550, and 'Guns and Government: A Comparative Study of Europe and Japan', *Journal of World History* 6 (1995), 75–106.

[4] John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York, 1993), 227–234.

[5] John Lynn, 'The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800–2000,' *International History Review* 18, no. 3 (August 1996), 505–45.

[6] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 231.

[7] He includes 'the Gurkhas of Nepal' among mercenaries, but their 'outsidedness' relative to the British state in its imperial form is open to question, for example; Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 231.

[8] Morillo, *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 1066–1135* (Woodbridge, 1994), 11.

[9] Michael Mallett, 'Mercenaries' in Maurice Keen, ed., *Medieval Warfare. A History* (Oxford, 1999), 209.

[10] Mallett, 'Mercenaries', 213, 210.

[11] Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Great Companies* (Oxford, 2001).

[12] Yalichev, *Mercenaries of the Ancient World*, 2, 10.

[13] The direct analogue of such restrictions is to eunuchs, who were literally cut off from social and familial ties. Though problems with the deleterious effect of castration on the development of military skill and (perhaps more basically) with sheer numbers prevented the creation of armies of eunuchs, eunuchs have served regularly in key command positions for a variety of rulers. Examples include Xerxes' eunuch general Hermotimus (see Barry Strauss, *The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece—and Western Civilization* (New York, 2005) Ch. 3) and Zheng He, the eunuch Admiral of the Ming Treasure Fleets (see Louise Levathes, *When China Ruled the Seas. The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433* (Oxford, 1994)).

[14] Morillo, 'The Sword of Justice: War and State Formation in Comparative Perspective', *Journal of Medieval Military History* 4 (2006).

[15] Any free non-black market is of course a political creation, in that political regulation of some sort is necessary to its operation. But the largely negative role of the state in setting off and regulating a market contrasts with the positive role of the state in constructing non-market mechanisms such as bureaucracies. International markets, perhaps especially those for mercenaries, to the extent that they rely on rules recognized by any state whose members participate in it, fall even farther outside the political power of one state to shape in positive ways.

[16] Richard Abels, 'Household Men, Mercenaries, and Vikings in Anglo-Saxon England', in this volume.

[17] As, for example, was the case under Edward III: see Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1999).

[18] See, among others, Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford, 1996).

[19] Morillo, 'Guns and Government: A Comparative Study of Europe and Japan.' *Journal of World History* 6 (1995), 75–106.

[20] Geoffrey Wawro, *War and Society in Europe, 1792–1914* (London, 2000), Ch. 4.

[21] The basic work remains Bryce Lyon, *From Fief to Indenture. The transition from feudal to non-feudal contract in Western Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 1957). See also Alan Murray, 'The Origin of Money-Fiefs in the Kingdom of Jerusalem' in this volume.

[22] *Diplomatic Documents Preserved in the PRO*, vol. 1, 1042–1272, ed. Pierre Chaplais (London, 1964), no. 1.

[23] For this conclusion arrived at from two different perspectives, see Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses. The Evolution of the Islamic Polity* (Cambridge, 1980) and Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs. Military and Society in the Early Islamic State* (London, 2004).

[24] Mark Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453* (Philadelphia, 1997).

[25] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (Cambridge, MA, 1988), Ch. 2.

[26] J. Law, 'A Condottiere Dynasty: The Varano of Camerino', in this volume.

[27] See Abels, 'Household Men', and Charles Bowlus, 'Mercenaries or Marauders? The Hungarians and Europe, 862–955', both in this volume.

[28] Wawro, *War and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, Ch. 3.

[29] Simon Barton, 'Christians in the Service of Islam: Spanish Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb',and Richard Abels, 'Household Men', in this volume.

[30] See especially Steven Isaac, ' "I know it when I see it": Defining Mercenaries in the Twelfth Century' and Kelly DeVries, 'Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology, Definitions, Problems', both in this volume.

[31] This was not an aspect of the distribution of cases I set out to create; rather it emerged from my placement of individual types without regard for each other. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, 900–1990* (Oxford, 1990).

[32] The similarities in the social and economic positions and resulting cultural perceptions of mercenaries and prostitutes highlighted by this graph would be well worth exploring.

[33] See the analysis by David Crouch, 'William Marshal and the Mercenariat' in this volume.

[34] Matthew Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries from the Late Archaic Period to Alexander* (London, 2004), 10–79.

[35] OV 6: 28–9. Note that Chibnall translates *stipendiarii* as 'mercenaries'.

[36] Robert Jones, 'Military Culture, Mercenary Culture and Martial Display' and Ciaran og O'Reilly, 'The Irish Mercenary Tradition in the 1600s', both in this volume. George Huppert, *After the Black Death: A Social History of Early Modern Europe* (Bloomington, 1998), Ch. VIII. Marcus Reddiker, 'Under the Banner of King Death', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 38 (1981), 203–227; the common role of capitalist social economics in many of these cases is striking.

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Distribution Field of Military Service Types

THE ANGLO-FLEMISH TREATIES AND FLEMISH SOLDIERS IN ENGLAND 1101–1163[1]

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The geographical proximity of medieval England and Flanders was conducive to a wide variety of relations, including political, economic, military, social and cultural exchanges.[2] Immigrant soldiers, mercenaries and paid men are a particularly interesting topic in this respect; not only as examples of individuals travelling from one place to another, but as a means of examining the political frameworks and social circumstances which surrounded the travel of people across the Channel. My focus will be on the interplay between the wider context of the experiences of itinerant Flemings, and the series of diplomatic treaties that were concluded between the kings of England and the counts of Flanders over the course of the twelfth century. Three examples of these treaties survive to the present day, all concluded in Dover in 1101, 1110 and 1163, though these represent only a sample of the diplomatic exchanges that took place between England and Flanders. The Dover treaties concern an arrangement by which the counts of Flanders promised to provide a force of knights in return for an annual money fief. While records of money fief payments being made to the counts survive, there is no clear-cut case of Flemish military obligations being activated exactly in the manner outlined in the clauses. That the Anglo-Flemish treaties were concluded over and over again during the twelfth century nevertheless demonstrates the keen interest that rulers on both sides of the Channel had in regulating and encouraging the flow of armed men.

While long known to scholars, the Anglo-Flemish treaties have not been comprehensively analysed as a set of source materials. I will use them in examining firstly what kind of men the mercenaries were, and secondly what role mercenaries, mercenary recruitment, and military service played in the socio-political continuity from the Norman Conquest to the second half of the twelfth century. The oldest of the surviving treaties was concluded in 1101, but it is probable that this treaty represented a continuation of an earlier, perhaps oral,

agreement. William the Conqueror (duke of Normandy 1035–87, king of England 1066–87) had granted Count Baldwin V (1053–67) and Count Baldwin VI (1067–70) an annual money fief of 300 marks, a practise that was later reinstated between the Conqueror's son King William Rufus (1087–1100) and Count Robert II (1093–1111). Robert and Rufus met in Dover in the summer of 1093, a year before Rufus went to war against his brother Duke Robert Curthose in Normandy; it seems likely that the money fief and accompanying military services were negotiated at this meeting. By the time Henry I (1100–35) ascended to English throne, the Anglo-Flemish money fief had thus acquired historical weight—upon returning from the First Crusade in 1100 and finding Henry on the throne of England, Robert II reputedly demanded, 'almost in the tone of command', the new king to respect the pact. William of Malmesbury remarks that Henry I was quick to rebuke such posturing, but as we shall see he was also quick to recognise the advantages of an Anglo-Flemish alliance.[3]

On 10 March 1101 Henry I and Robert II met at Dover to conclude a political and military pact between their realms.[4] The core of the treaty was simple: the count of Flanders swore to defend the king of England and his kingdom against all enemies, subject only to the fealty that Flanders owed to the king of France. Specifically, when summoned the count was to gather one thousand mounted soldiers and to lead them in person to the service of the king. Only illness, loss of land, or pre-existing obligations to the kings of France and Germany could excuse the count from appearing in person. The possibility of conflicting obligations was taken into account: in case the king of France made war on the king of England, the count was to go and serve the former with only his household troops (20 *milites*), and send the remaining men (980 *milites*) to join the king of England. The king had the right to activate the treaty should an enemy invade England, or if his own barons turned rebel. Attention was paid to how the transport of the troops was to be handled: specific port towns in Flanders were named from which the soldiers were to be collected, and the responsibilities for arranging and paying for the shipping were negotiated. Once in England, the king was to provide for the Flemish soldiers as if they were his own household troops. Furthermore, the count was always to allow free passage through his county to all men intending to enter into the king's service, and to withhold from offering refuge to the enemies of the king. The treaty also allowed the king to

call the count to Normandy and Maine. Unlike the other scenarios, this clause is silent on the need for a pre-existing threat to justify the summons; this is hardly surprising, since in 1101 Normandy was not under the control of King Henry I, but under that of his estranged older brother Duke Robert Curthose. Here the formula becomes more specific, listing precise periods of service and allowing the count to ignore summons if they were repeated within the space of one year. In exchange for these services, the king promised to grant the count an annual money fief of 500 pounds. Finally, the treaty included twelve guarantors from both sides. These men, uniformly high-ranking nobles and royal or comital officials, acted as witnesses and, in the case of a dispute, were to mediate between the two rulers. The comital guarantors were in addition tasked with leading the Flemish soldiers should the count be indisposed.

The numbers outlined in the treaty are substantial, even without taking into account animal handlers, servants and other followers that necessarily would be needed to accompany the soldiers. Part of the army was probably to be made up of the count's own levies and vassals.[5] One thousand mounted soldiers, however, is a very considerable force—by way of comparison, Duke William led an estimated seven thousand warriors to England in 1066. Many of these came from outside Normandy, including Flanders, and only 2–3000 were mounted soldiers. After establishing himself in England and redistributing the lands, William could theoretically call upon five to six thousand knights who owed him two months of military service per annum.[6] These are figures from a large kingdom, and those of a single county must compare poorly to them. For instance, when Count Baldwin VII of Flanders invaded Normandy in 1117 as a part of a major military undertaking aimed at wrestling the control of the duchy from Henry I, he took with him five hundred knights.[7] One thousand fighters would probably equal or even exceed the Flemish counts' reserve of readily available mounted soldiers.

It is possible that, despite all the care paid to the detail, the numbers given in treaty were only advisory. Perhaps a thousand *milites* did not really translate to 'a thousand men, each with three horses' but simply to 'a large mounted army.' Yet, it is clear that the treaty speaks of an armed force of a certain order of magnitude, whatever the exact numbers of fighters may have been, and organising such a host presented logistical problems. Where to find all these men? If the comital host

was not up to the task, then the count must have expected to venture further afield, and make up the numbers by recruiting mercenaries himself. Where could these mercenaries have come from? The obscurity of most Flemings encountered in the late eleventh or twelfth centuries in England makes it difficult to establish the precise circumstances in which they arrived. Two high-profile cases from the generation preceding the Anglo-Flemish treaty, however, suggest themselves. The first is Arnold II, lord of Ardres 1094–*c.* 1138, who made a name for himself under William the Conqueror; the second is Gilbert of Ghent, count Baldwin V's maternal cousin, who established a family that remained highly influential in England until the end of the twelfth century. Both men arrived to England at or shortly after the battle of Hastings in 1066. Arnold, the heir of a prominent Low Countries' magnate, carved an independent career for himself in England long before succeeding to his father's inheritance on the continent. While Gilbert's family was equally high-ranking, he was a younger son, well removed from succession. As Renée Nip suggests, perhaps he simply had to find a place for himself elsewhere.[8] Attracting recruits from among *milites* in similar circumstances was not difficult. Flanders and its environs remained places of considerable social unrest and violence in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Local lords and petty aristocracy often ran their lands with a great deal of independence, and contemporary sources contain many accounts of endemic violence that the counts and their barons were hard-pressed to contain.[9] One source of fuel for these disturbances were the scions of the local noble or knightly families, men such as Gilbert and Arnold. Inheritance fragmentation left young men, in particular the younger sons of knightly families, with some starting capital but reduced long-term prospects. Trained but often impoverished warriors, whose careers were best served by the search for employment and patrons abroad, were a ready source of mercenary manpower.[10] Encouraging such men to serve on expeditions abroad served two purposes: it helped to meet the obligations outlined in the treaties, and also created for them potential career opportunities.

The Anglo-Flemish treaties suggest how the Flemish counts attempted to cultivate and manage the flow of Low Countries mercenaries to England and Normandy. Roughly half of the Flemish guarantors in these treaties were castellans, or comital officials in charge of the military, governmental and judicial rights of the Flemish castellanies

(administrative districts). The rest were otherwise associated with comital administration or were powerful local lords. The places of origin of these guarantors reveal a significant concentration in the middle parts of the county. The historical core of the comital territories lay in the north-eastern third of the county, and the provinces in the far south and south-west of Flanders, especially Artois and the minor counties of Boulogne, Guines and St Pol, were either mostly or wholly independent, and in general areas over which the count had little direct control.[11] They were a rich source of mercenaries: Flemish tenants-in-chief encountered in the Domesday Book predominantly originated from this region.[12] In the central and coastal areas of the county, where these zones overlapped, local power met comital administration. Often operating from castellan towns, which in themselves represented a point of mediation between comital authority and local power, the guarantors featured in the Anglo-Flemish treaties were excellently positioned for attracting, organising and channelling mercenary activity.

Indeed, Flemish fighters might not have needed much encouragement to enter into Anglo-Norman service, for successful mercenaries could find far brighter prospect abroad than at home. The land grant that Lambert of Wattrelos's uncle received in return for military services under King Henry I must have been the kind of reward that many aimed for.[13] But the flow of mercenaries from Flanders into England was not just a trickle of hopeful individuals. Almost 2% of names occurring in English administrative sources between 1066 and 1166 are identified as Flemish.[14] During King Henry I's reign, probably between 1107 and 1111, entire communities of Flemish immigrants were set up by a royal decree in the Welsh marches.[15] As Malmesbury would have it: 'Many Flemings who had trooped over in his [Henry I] father's time, relying on their kinship of his mother, were lying low in England, in such numbers as actually to seem a burden on the realm itself; and so he collected them all together, as though into some great midden, in the Welsh province of Rhos, with all their belongings and relatives, thereby simultaneously purging his kingdom and putting a brake on his headstrong and barbarous enemies.'[16] The king's aim must have been to break up politically hazardous concentrations of Flemish landed interests in central England, suggesting that the Flemish presence had grown to be quite significant in the years after the Conquest. They remained so, whether in England or in Wales:

c. 1143 Albert of Beverley listed Flemings among the six principal nations that lived in Britain.[17]

Given the proximity of England to Flanders, and considering the number of people of Flemish descent in the kingdom, the extent and strength of the network of social connections thus created was considerable. Both Gilbert and Arnold had benefited from patronage and pre-existing connections with England: Gilbert through his family, and Arnold through his association with the Conqueror's ally Count Eustace II of Boulogne.[18] Anglo-Flemish families held land or otherwise maintained connections over several generations from one side of the English Channel to the other. Count Manasses of Guines received estates in England as his wife's dowry between 1106 and 1110, which his family still controlled in 1169.[19] The English estates of Sigard of Chocques, one of the Flemings mentioned in the Domesday survey, resurfaced in 1160 still in Flemish possession when they were granted by the family of castellan Baldwin of Lens to advocate Robert of Bethune as part of a dispute settlement.[20] Such ties provided an important avenue by which mercenaries could enter into English service without the need for a formal treaty.

In this environment, redolent with informal connections, diplomatic contracts continued to reflect the state of Anglo-Flemish relations. Merely by aligning Flanders politically with England, the treaties created important political repercussions. In 1101 King Henry I had just acceded to the English throne, his relations with his brother Duke Robert Curthose of Normandy were precarious, and reaffirming the friendship of Count Robert II, the king's closest continental neighbour, was a vital move. Robert was perhaps more than a silent partner, and it is possible that he began to make preparations to invade Normandy, although his actual participation in Henry's victorious campaign in the duchy in 1105–6 remains conjectural.[21] A few years later, in 1110, the treaty was revised and re-signed. The number of troops Count Robert was expected to provide was halved to 500, and the money fief reduced by a like amount.[22] One would imagine these changes represented more realistic guidelines agreed after a decade's worth of experience on the matter.

Henry I fell out with Count Robert's son Baldwin VII (1111–19), but narrative sources relate that the king concluded agreements with counts Charles the Good (1119–27) and Thierry of Alsace (1128–68) soon after their respective accessions in Flanders. Galbert of Bruges notes that 'our

Count Thierry was acceptable to the kings of France and England, and they freely granted him investiture with the fiefs and benefices which the most holy and pious Count Charles had held from them.'[23] Were these benefices money fiefs similar to the 1101 and 1110 treaties? This is very likely. The 1163 Anglo-Flemish treaty between Thierry and Henry I's grandson Henry II speaks of the homage that Thierry had given to Henry I, associating itself with Thierry's earlier agreement.[24] Renewal of ancient practises was an enduring emblem of the Anglo-Flemish treaties. The above quotation is the closing line of Galbert's account of the civil war that gripped Flanders in 1127–8 after Count Charles' murder. It is clearly constructed to represent the re-establishment of lawful rule, accompanied by the return of the traditions that had bound England and Flanders together over the past generations.

Interestingly, during the period when Flemish mercenaries are most often mentioned by twelfth-century English sources—the civil wars of King Stephen's reign (1135–54)—there is no evidence of a treaty having been concluded between Stephen and Count Thierry. Yet we know that Stephen employed the services of Flemish mercenaries, and relied in particular on Thierry's illegitimate cousin, William of Ypres, who was one of the king's most prominent supporters from 1137 until his retirement from active duty in the late 1140s.[25] Though later chroniclers took pains to paint the Flemish mercenaries as the standard bearers of strife and to specifically associate them with Stephen, the king's rivals, the faction supporting Empress Matilda, employed them just as readily.[26] Robert fitzHubert, the most infamous Flemish mercenary-turned-robber-baron, once served Earl Robert of Gloucester.[27] Yet another employer of unruly Flemish retainers, Geoffrey of Mandeville, fought on both sides of the conflict.[28] In this turbulent political climate, the ability to draw military strength from places outside the divided kingdom was a powerful advantage. Flanders, alongside Brittany, was the most important sources of mercenaries.[29] The absence of any mention of a formal agreement with Count Thierry, however, leads one to suspect that mercenary recruitment occurred informally, through the channels provided by the Anglo-Flemish community or through personal connections with the Anglo-Norman aristocracy. Geoffrey, for instance, even sent his son William to be reared in Thierry's court.[30]

Whatever the reason for Thierry's reticence, it ended with the triumph of Empress Matilda's faction. Thierry met with King Stephen and Matilda's son, the future King Henry II (1154–89) in Dover in

February 1154, again with Stephen in Dover in October, and was present at Henry's coronation ceremony in December.[31] In 1156 he and his wife Sibyl met with Henry II in Rouen.[32] The royal Pipe Rolls show annual payments of *c*. 400 pounds being made to the count between 1156 and 1160.[33] It is very probably that these reflect the re-establishment of the Anglo-Flemish money fief. If Flemish mercenaries served in the king's armies on his continental campaigns in Brittany and Toulouse in 1158 and 1159, then a diplomatic contract would have formed a useful channel through which to conduct the recruitment.[34]

The count of Flanders was an important political ally to the young king on the international scene, but Henry II must have also looked for his help in dealing with Flemings already in England. In the late 1150s he expelled or neutralised many of King Stephen's Flemish supporters.[35] Many of these Flemings had arrived to England as mercenaries but relatively recently, and so must have maintained connections to the continent in the form of property or family. Henry's ability to call upon Thierry's aid in handling their cases was thus a useful tool. An equally pressing concern must have been the wrestling of control over mercenary recruitment from the lower rungs of the aristocracy back into the hands of rulers. For Henry II, this consolidated royal power and diminished the threat of a potentially dangerous accumulation of independent military might among his vassals. For Thierry, this meant the re-establishment of a lucrative money fief and a greater degree of control over Flanders' free-floating military resources. The amount of diplomatic traffic that is evident during these years suggests that both sides were eager to create firm relations, and mercenaries continued to play an important role in the military and political relations between the two realms.

Henry II and Thierry met again in Dover on 19 March 1163 to formally renew the Anglo-Flemish treaty. The document survives, and at a first glance seems to fit into the pattern establishes in 1101, dealing with the exchange of one thousand mounted soldiers against a money fief of 500 marks.[36] But it is, in fact, a very curious text. Apart from one or two additional clauses and an updated witness list, the 1163 treaty is, nearly word-for-word, identical to the 1101 document. Over half-a-century later it was seen fit to produce a treaty which, with its emphases on Flemish military service in Normandy, an area already controlled by Henry II, reflected a bygone political situation. Intriguingly, Thierry's wife, Countess Sibyl of Flanders, was included

in the provisions of the treaty, awarded a portion of the money fief, and given responsibilities similar to those of her husband. Sybil was Henry's paternal aunt and, as such, well suited to the role of a mediator between the two rulers. But she had entered a convent in Palestine between 1157 and 1159, and it is not possible that she could have in any way been involved with matters in Flanders or in England. Furthermore, Count Thierry left for a crusade to the Holy Land in 1164, a year after the treaty was concluded.[37] Given that the preparations for a crusade in the twelfth century were quite extensive, it is certain that Henry was well aware of the count's prospective crusading plans and could not expect him to provide personal military service. Most damningly, no payments to the count of Flanders are recorded in the Pipe Rolls between 1162 and 1166. It is clear that the 1163 treaty was, by and large, diplomatic fiction, and did not relate to the contemporary situation or the actual intentions of either ruler. It is probable that the treaty was not a direct copy of the 1101 agreement, but of one made between Henry's accession in 1154 and Thierry's departure with Sybil to the Holy Land in 1157, which in turn, I suggest, went back to the one of 1101.[38] Such a treaty would have coincided with Pipe Roll payments made to Thierry at a time Countess Sybil was still actively involved in governing Flanders.[39] The significance of the 1163 treaty, then, did not lie in its actual written contents or its lengthy legal clauses. During the same meeting a second document concerning the military obligations of Flemish barons granted private money fiefs by Henry II was produced.[40] It is over this document, the expression of the two rulers' will to control the cross-Channel community, that any negotiations would have been conducted, with the treaty proper standing merely as a gesture of alliance between the two realms. In a departure from the previous documents, the 1163 treaty was explicitly made binding to the heirs of the two rulers. It sought not only to connect the contemporary relations between England and Flanders with the past, but to project them into the future. Thierry's son Count Philip (1168–91) concluded treaties with Henry in 1175, 1180 and 1182, all of which involved some combination of Flemish military service and a money fief.[41] But it seems that by 1163 the function of the traditional Anglo-Flemish treaty itself had achieved a status that superseded its original intent of recruiting mercenaries to England and to Normandy.

Records of Anglo-Flemish treaties tend to appear soon after a succession in either realm: this was explicitly so in 1101 (Henry I), *c.* 1119

(Charles the Good), 1128 (Thierry of Alsace) and 1154–6 (Henry II).
All these successions were disputed, and I suggest that concluding the
treaty was a part of the process of consolidating the position of the
new ruler. In addition to its military function, the treaty was a dip-
lomatic acknowledgement that created continuity with the previous
generations. Many social, political and economic ties already connected
England and Flanders, and an important part of the cross-Channel
community was made up of migrant soldiers. As a fundamental diplo-
matic tradition between the Flemish and English dynasties, the series
of Anglo-Flemish treaties also reflected the increasing importance of
mercenaries on the theatre of war.

The pattern of payments made to the counts of Flanders, as seen in
Henry II's Pipe Rolls, closely mirrors the changes in the contemporary
political climate.[42] Throughout the twelfth century the money fief was
undoubtedly considered a central component of the Anglo-Flemish
alliance. The Anglo-Flemish treaty provided the context in which these
payments were made. As time went by, the formula of the original
treaty acquired an elevated symbolic importance. It superseded mere
mercenary service, and became something akin to an oath of fealty
by the count of Flanders to the king of England. Paradoxically, this
increased the counts capacity for diplomatic manoeuvring: the treaties
acted as a political counterweight against the ambitions of the French
monarchy. They did not replace or supersede Flanders' traditional
obligations towards France, but did provide an alternative and a
legal loophole for circumventing them. For the king of England, they
reinforced long-lasting links with a strategic ally and gave access to
a considerable pool of foreign manpower—especially important at a
time when the allegiances of a newly coroneted king's own vassals were
suspect. Over the course of the twelfth century a political relationship
between England and Flanders, hitherto unknown between these two
realms, was consolidated, created by the combination of diplomatic
precedent, sheer repetition, and the important role that mercenaries
played in the political, social and military spheres.

Notes

[2] I have chosen to use the terms 'Flanders' and 'Fleming' loosely, incorporating into them peoples whose origins lay in neighbouring regions associated only loosely with Flanders proper, such as Ardres, Artois and the county of Boulogne. Within the context of this paper this is a necessary decision. English sources are rarely clear about the exact origins of all those whom they lumped together as Flemings, and given the close involvement of these adjoining regions to the Anglo-Flemish relationship it would be counterproductive to separate their contribution from the matters under discussion. See Katherine Keats-Rohan, *Domesday People. A Proposography of Records Occurring in English Documents 1066–1166*, 1 (Woodbridge, 1999), 38–41.

[3] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum Anglorum / The History of the English Kings*, ed. and trans. Roger A. B. Mynors, Rodney Thomson and Michael Winterbottom 2 vols (Oxford, 1998), 1. 728–30; Eadmer, *Historia Novorum in Anglia*, ed. Martin Rule (London, 1884), 39.

[4] Pierre Chaplais, ed., *Diplomatic Documents Preserved in the Public Records Office, 1 1101–1272* (London, 1964), no. 1.1–4; and translation: Elisabeth van Houts, 'The Anglo-Flemish treaty of 1101,' *Anglo-Norman Studies* 21 (1999), 169–174.

[5] Jan Verbruggen, 'Military Service in the County of Flanders,' trans. Kelly DeVries, *The Journal of Military History* 2 (2004), 17–37, esp. 18–23.

[6] Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1984), 52–3.

[7] Herman of Tournai, *Liber de restauratione monasterii S. Martini Tornacensis*' ed. Georg Waitz, MGH SS 14 (Hannover, 1883), 284.

[8] Arnold of Ardres, 'Historia Comitum Ghisnensium,' ed. Johann Heller, MGH SS 24 (Hannover, 1874), 615; Mary Abbott, 'The Gant Family in England 1066–1191' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1973), 19–23; Richard Sherman, 'The continental origins of the Ghent Family of Lincolnshire,' *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 21 (1977), 23–35; Renée Nip, 'The Political Relations between England and Flanders (1066–1128),' *Anglo-Norman Studies* 21 (1998), 152.

[9] David Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (Harlow, 1992), 59–61; Henri Platelle, 'La violence et ses remèdes en Flandre au XIᵉ siècle,' *Sacres Erudiri* 20 (1971), 101–73; Geoffrey Koziol, 'Monks, feuds and the making of peace in eleventh-century Flanders,' *Historical Reflections* 14 (1987), 531–49 provides an examination of some aspects of this violence.

[10] George Duby, 'Au XIIᵉ siècle: les 'Jeunes' dans la société aristocratique,' *Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 19 (1964), 835–46; the discussion on aristocratic inheritance and family formation is updated by David Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility. Constructing Aristocracy in England and France 900–1300* (Harlow, 2005), 105–23.

[11] Nicholas, *Flanders*, 16–20, 80–5; For political studies on the southern principalities, see Lambert of Ardres, *The History of the Counts of Guines and the Lords of Ardres*, trans. with introduction Leah Shopkow (Philadelphia, 2001), 25–33; Heather Tanner, *Families, Friends and Allies: Boulogne and Politics in Northern France and England, c. 879–1160* (Leiden, 2004); Jean-François Nieus, *Un pouvoir comtal entre Flandre et France: Saint-Pol, 1000–1300* (Brussels, 2005).

[12] Johan Verberckmoes, 'Flemish Tenants-in-Chief in Domesday England,' *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 66 (1988), 725–56.

[13] Lambert of Wattrelos, 'Annales Cameracenses,' ed. Georgius Pertz, MGH SS 16 (Hannover, 1859), 511–12.

[14] Keats-Rohan, *Domesday People*, 7.

[15] Ifor Rowlands, 'The Making of the March: Aspects of the Norman Settlement in Dyfed,' *Anglo-Norman Studies* 3 (1980), 147. See also Lauran Toorians, 'Wizo Flandriensis and the Flemish Settlement in Pembrokeshire,' *Cambridge Medieval Celtic Studies* 20 (1990), 99–118.

[16] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum*, 1. 726.

[17] Alfred of Beverley, *Annalium sive Historiae de gestis regum Britanniae*, ed. Thomas Hearne (Oxford, 1716), 10.

[18] See above, n. 8.

[19] Lambert of Ardres, *Historia*, 579, 595.

[20] Lille, Archives départementales du Nord, B 1005/79.

[21] Fernand Vercauteren (ed.), *Actes des comtes de Flandre, 1071–1128* (Brussels, 1938), no. 18, 58–9. In this charter Count Robert II mentions his plans to help the king of England against the Normans. Vercauteren demonstrates that the charter must have been issued between 1094 and 1102, and suggests it dates from 1094/5, the invasion of Normandy by William Rufus. But it is equally possible the charter refers to events in the first years of the 1100s.

[22] Chaplais, *Diplomatic Documents*, no. 2, 5–8.

[23] Galbert of Bruges, *De Multo, Traditione, et Occasione Gloriosi Karoli Comitis Flandriarum*, ed. Jeff Rider, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 131 (Brepols, 1994), 169, trans. James Ross, *The Murder of Charles the Good* (reprint, Toronto, 1998), 312. See also Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum*, 1. 730; *Liber Monasterii de Hyda*, ed. Edward Edwards (London, 1866), 320.

[24] Chaplais, *Diplomatic Documents*, 11.

[25] Ernest Warlop, 'William van Ieper, een Vlaams Condottiere. Vóór 1104–1162,' *De Leiegouw* 7 (1165), 198–201.

[26] Famously bitter denunciations were launched by Gervase of Canterbury, *Gesta Regum*, in William Stubbs (ed.), *The Historican Works of Gervase of Canterbury*, 2 vols (London, 1880), 2. 77; and William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglorum*, ed. Richard Howlett (London, 1884), 1. 101–2.

[27] John of Worcester, *The Chronicle of John of Worcester*, ed. and trans. Patrick McGurk 2 vols (Oxford, 1998), 2. 284–90.

[28] *The Waltham Chronicle*, ed. and trans. Leslie Watkiss and Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford, 1994), 80–2. On Geoffrey of Mandeville's allegiances, see Ralph H.C. Davis, 'Geoffrey de Mandeville reconsidered,' *English Historical Review* 79 (1964), 299–307.

[29] According to William of Malmesbury, *Historia Novella*, ed. Edmund King and trans. Kenneth Potter (Oxford, 1998), 32, 72.

[30] *The Book of the Foundation of the Walden Monastery*, ed. and trans. Diana Greenway and Leslie Watkiss (Oxford, 1998), 44.

[31] Gervase of Canterbury, *Gesta Regum*, 158–9; Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum. The History of the English People*, ed. and trans. Diana Greenway (Oxford, 1996), 774; Robert of Torigny, *The Chronicle of Robert of Torigny*, in Richard Howlett (ed.), *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard* 4 vols (London, 1889),4. 182.

[32] Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines Historiarum*, in William Stubbs (ed.), *The Historical Works of Master Ralph de Diceto* 2 vols (London, 1876), 1. 301.

[33] *The Great Roll of the Pipe*, 2. The publications of the Pipe Rolls Society (London, 1884), year 1155–6 CE: 16, 24, 36–40, 65; 1156–7 CE: pp. 82–3, 89; 1157–8 CE: 125, 136, 149, 152; *Pipe Rolls*, 3 (London, 1884), 1158–9 CE: 34, 51, 64; *Pipe Rolls*, 4 (London, 1884), 1159–60 CE: 1, 8, 43, 45. The Flemish fief in 1156–7 was only 336 pounds, but it is probable that a portion of the payment was simply unrecorded.

[34] Robert of Torigny, *Chronicle*, 196–8, 201–5; Emilie Amt, *The Accession of Henry II in England. Royal Government Restored 1149–1159* (Woodbridge, 1993), 184–5.

[35] Amt, *Accession*, 84–93.

[36] Chaplais, *Diplomatic Documents*, no. 3, 8–12.

[37] Robert of Torigny, *Chronicle*, 193, 205, 220.

[38] It was probably negotiated during their meeting in Rouen in 1156, at which Sibyl was also present: see n. 32.

[39] Karen Nicholas, 'Countesses as Rulers in Flanders,' *Aristocratic Women in Medieval France*, ed. Theodore Evergates (Philadelphia, 1999), 122–3.

[40] Chaplais, *Diplomatic Documents*, no. 4, 12–13.

[41] Specified in 1180 as 500 *milites* against 1000 marks per annum. Benedict of Peterborough, *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis*, ed. William Stubbs 2 vols (London,

1867), 1. 83, 246–7, 285–6; Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, 1. 398–9, 2. 11; Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, ed. William Stubbs 4 vols (London, 1869), 2. 72, 196–7, 267.

[42] I am presently conduction a comprehensive review of Flemish payments in the Pipe Roll material for the reign of Henry II. It will eventually form a part of my PhD thesis.

THE ORIGIN OF MONEY-FIEFS IN THE
LATIN KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM

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On Saturday 17 September 1127, in Bruges, William Clito, the newly appointed count of Flanders, proclaimed the re-imposition of tolls on the town, which he had abolished on his accession only five months previously. The burgesses of Bruges regarded the count's new impositions as unjustified and unreasonable. The tolls had been remitted by William as part of a package of concessions granted in order to gain the support of the city of Bruges during the dispute over the succession to the county which had broken out on the murder of Count Charles 'the Good' by some of his vassals on 2 March of the same year. The reason for William's action in September was that before the remission of the tolls, the revenue accruing from them had been enfeoffed to several of his vassals. These vassals were now evidently in financial difficulties, and claimed that the count had not had the right to remit the toll without their consent, since it constituted a diminution of their fiefs; equally, they argued, the people of Bruges had no right to demand remission from the count.[1] Yet for the burgesses the abolition of tolls had undoubtedly been a major economic benefit, and their re-imposition could be expected to damage the commerce of the town, already threatened by a climate of incipient civil war. William Clito's actions on 17 September and their consequences show the new count of Flanders between a rock and hard place. As a political body, the citizenry of Bruges was the most important institution among the count's supporters, which it might seem foolhardy to alienate. Yet with rival claimants to the county of Flanders challenging his rule, William could even less afford to antagonise the knightly vassals who he relied on to do the bulk of his fighting for him.

Why did William Clito go so far as to tear up the solemn concessions with which he had inaugurated his rule, thereby sowing the seeds of a revolt that flared up throughout northern Flanders over the next few months and eventually deposed him? In view of the political and military importance of both the town of Bruges and his own vassals,

could William not have found the means to compensate one or the other, rather than having to choose between depriving his vassals of their income, and breaking his word to the burgesses? Unlike modern governments, the medieval Flemish comital administration evidently did not have the option of shuffling income and expenditure around to the extent necessary to cover the amounts lost by the remission of the toll. Bruges was clearly the most important city in the county, and the main source of the count's wealth; the importance of the assignation of revenues from the tolls there was that they represented a regular form of income, and one which was probably in the form of cash rather than kind. The revenues derived directly from the urban tolls may thus have been far more attractive to William Clito's vassals than the tenure of perhaps modest country estates.

This episode, from Flanders in the year 1127, shows the workings of an institution generally known in French-language scholarship as the *fief-rente*, and in English either as fief-rent or money-fief. There was a simple distinction between this and what we might clumsily, although usefully, think of as the 'traditional fief'. The latter constituted a source of revenue: this source might consist of land or rights which produced income, which might be in the form of cash (such as rents) or kind (i.e. produce or renders) or a combination of the two. The money-fief, by contrast, was limited to the income itself.[2] Even though money-fiefs, when described in the sources, were normally described in terms of a sum of money expressed as an annual payment, the practicalities of medieval life meant that they were most probably paid out in the form of smaller amounts at shorter intervals. This explains why money-fiefs were hypothecated, that is, they were tied to specific sources of revenue, as in the case of the tolls of Bruges. This element of hypothecation is significant, as it is one feature that distinguished the money-fief from a simple money grant or pension.

In its distribution the money fief was limited to those parts of Western Christendom that had an economy in which trade and industry were more important than agriculture. A recent study of the money-fief in Flanders has argued that it was a military institution, whose 'primary goal was to attract foreigners who would serve the prince on the battlefield'.[3] Clearly, the money fief seemed to form a system of remuneration for military service that was distinct from the traditional feudo-vassalic bonds. Scholarship has always accepted that money-fiefs formed an important element in the recruitment of military forces in

the twelfth-century Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and probably even more so in the territorially diminished kingdom of the thirteenth century, although it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty what proportion of forces that they supported in either period. The whole question of the extent of money-fiefs in the Latin kingdom deserves further study, but is beyond the scope of a paper of this length. The aim of the remainder of this discussion is to examine the circumstances in which this institution was introduced to Frankish Palestine.

The whole question of the number of troops available in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the twelfth century is a problematic one. The most detailed surviving documentary evidence about the Frankish forces from this period is a list of military obligations included in the *Livre des Assises* compiled by the jurist John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa (d. 1266). This text was completed in the mid-1260s, but, according to John's own testimony, the information that he had collected related to the 'services which each of the lords of the aforementioned places owed to the chief lord of the kingdom before the land was lost', a stark phrase that can only refer to the conquest of the greater part of Frankish Palestine by Saladin in the wake of the battle of Hattin in 1187.[4] The total service documented in the *Livre* amounts to around 670 knights and 5,025 sergeants. To this should be added troops provided or hired by the Temple and the Hospital, which as international exempt orders were not subject to the Crown of Jerusalem, but regularly contributed to the defence of the kingdom. Yet, even allowing for these, there still seems to be a large gap between any such estimates and the most recent calculations for the largest forces raised by the Franks. John France estimates that the army of the Latin kingdom that fought at Hattin consisted of some 20,000 effectives, with a core of 1,200–1,300 knights.[5] Various possibilities have been advanced to explain the difference in figures. In twelfth-century Palestine visiting pilgrims had often volunteered for—or been pressed into—service at times of crisis, but it is doubtful whether this source would have provided the quantity or quality required. Another obvious solution is that there was a significant element of hired troops from outside the kingdom, whether or not we want to refer to them by the pejorative term 'mercenaries'. France has conceded that while there may have been some Western mercenaries in the East, he is unconvinced 'by the idea of numbers on this scale hanging around the street corners of Jerusalem, waiting [for] paid employment on the off-chance'. His suggestion, although it is

fairly tentative, is that the Franks employed natives, 'although perhaps not always from their own lands'.[6] Certainly there is evidence for the use of the light cavalry known as Turcopoles, even though the precise identity of this group is still a matter of dispute.[7] The Maronites of the Lebanon and the Armenians of Cilicia are also known to have served the Franks as soldiers. Yet the majority of the native Christian peoples of Syria and Palestine had no traditions of military activity, and one wonders whether native Christians, many of them from outside the kingdom, could have provided numbers comparable to the Franks.

Even allowing for the presence of Templars, Hospitallers, pilgrims, foreign mercenaries and native Christians in the Frankish army at Hattin, it is likely that the figures that can be deduced from the *Livre des Assises* of John of Ibelin represent a serious under-representation of actual Frankish strength.[8] In making this point, France is supported by Peter Edbury, the most recent editor of the text, who argues that the listings of service are concerned only with obligations to the Crown, and that individual lords actually enfeoffed more men than are listed in the *Livre des Assises*.[9] Certainly during the period of encirclement of the Latin principalities by Saladin during the 1170s and 1180s Frankish lords, especially those in frontier areas, had every incentive to increase their military retinues beyond the level that they owed to the Crown. The same incentive, of course, applied to the king himself, who was after all responsible for the overall defence of the country. It is possible that many of the names listed in the *Livre des Assises* of John of Jaffa were recipients of money-fiefs, particularly many of those attached to the royal territories of Acre and Tyre, which are not given any further geographical assignation. Part of the difficulty in assessing the extent and significance of money-fiefs derives from the fact that the language applied to feudo-vassalic relations in the documentary sources is often unclear or inconclusive. However, on occasion we can catch a glimpse of a more precise terminology. One such instance occurs in a charter issued in 1158 by Amalric, then count of Ascalon and later king of Jerusalem, to confirm a sale of property to the chapter of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre by Hugh of Ibelin. The list of witnesses makes a terminological distinction by means of three different rubrics: *de hominibus regis*, *de hominibus meis* and *de stipendiariis meis*.[10] The *homines* were clearly the vassals of the king (Baldwin III) and of Amalric himself. The term *stipendiarii* implies men in receipt of a regular income, and thus unlikely to be holders of landed fiefs, who are in this example most likely categorised under the term *homines*. France asks whether

the *stipendiarii* were mercenaries or the recipients of money-fiefs, but it is quite possible that we are wrong to make a fundamental distinction between these two categories.[11] We should remember that money fiefs were very well-suited to the periodic remuneration of individual mercenaries. They were not necessary heritable and did not require grants of land. They could most readily be funded by the customs receipts from the royal ports, which probably constituted the Crown's major economic resource at that time. Now, there may not have been many mercenaries waiting around to be hired in Palestine in the 1180s, but the prospect of individuals or groups of soldiers coming to the East to hire themselves out is inherently no less probable than a large scale use of native Christians. In the first half of the thirteenth century Latin mercenaries are known to have served in the armies of the Saljūq sultanate of Rūm, the empire of Nicaea, and of the Armenian principalities, and there is no reason to assume they were averse to changes of employment if conditions were favourable.[12] The essential point is that the money-fief constituted an important element in the regular provision of military service in the kingdom of Jerusalem, and also provided a means of support that could easily be extended to the employment of mercenaries.

On 22 July 1099, just over a week after the capture of Jerusalem from its Fātimid garrison, Godfrey of Bouillon, duke of Lower Lotharingia, was elected by the leaders of the First Crusade as ruler of Palestine, with the titles of prince and defender of the Holy Sepulchre.[13] By the end of the summer the majority of the crusaders had returned to their homes. After a reign of only a year, Godfrey died and was succeeded by his younger brother Baldwin, count of Edessa, who insisted on a royal coronation and the title of king of Jerusalem and ruled until his death in 1118. The fighting forces of Frankish Palestine during these first two reigns consisted largely of men who had come to the East with Godfrey of Bouillon or joined his service in the course of the crusade, together with others who had accompanied Baldwin I from Edessa on his accession. They originated predominantly from Flanders, Lotharingia, Normandy and northern France.[14] As we have seen, the money-fief was well known in Flanders at this time, but it was far from common in the other areas. In terms of land tenure, Palestine after the crusader conquest of 1099 was a *tabula rasa*: all of the territory that was in Frankish hands, or that the Franks hoped to conquer, was evidently at the disposal of the ruler, with the single but important exception of the possessions of the Greek Orthodox church. These were regarded as

inviolate, although the church itself was latinised through the imposition of new Frankish hierarchy.

In the summer of 1099 Frankish-controlled Palestine was limited to three blocs of non-contiguous territory: central Judaea around Jerusalem and Bethlehem; the port of Jaffa with the neighbouring towns of Lydda and Ramla; and Samaria around Tiberias and Nablus. Communications between these blocs were risky and liable to attack by robbers, Bedouin or forces from the Muslim towns of the coast, which were either possessions of the Fātimid caliphate or of independent amirs who recognised a variable allegiance to the Fātimids. However, over the next two decades this exiguous territory was slowly extended by the Frankish rulers in conjunction with pilgrims and naval forces from the West. Joshua Prawer paints a picture of Frankish knights 'hesitantly venturing into the still dangerous countryside around Jerusalem where marauding Turks, bedouin or infuriated peasants lay in ambush for the hated Franks'.[15] However, it is doubtful whether this kind of individual free enterprise occurred on any scale outside the immediate environs of the Frankish held strongholds; the countryside was dangerous, especially for small groups of Franks. It is equally questionable whether these activities were undertaken by right of a 'law of conquest' which Prawer claims constituted their justification. Most of the evidence adduced by him for Franks seizing property in this fashion (notably the 'explanation' of the 'law of conquest' by Fulcher of Chartres) relates to the seizure of property in the city of Jerusalem, which was a special case given that at the time of its capture no legal authority had yet been constituted by the crusaders, even though they evidently recognised that a *regnum* existed in Palestine.[16] Godfrey and Baldwin both seem to have striven to regularise any seizures by granting formal recognition or in some cases, reassignment of fiefs.

How then, were the followers of Godfrey of Bouillon and his brother Baldwin I remunerated? Some lands in the countryside were undoubtedly granted out, such as the fiefs to the value of 100 marks near Hebron assigned by Godfrey to Gerard of Avesnes, a knight from Hainaut.[17] The rural economy would, of course, have rendered some produce in kind and possibly rents, but agriculture must have suffered greatly from the disruption of the crusader conquest. The situation in the Frankish-held cities must have been even worse. Jerusalem had lost its native Christian population through expulsion by the Fātimid garrison on the eve of the crusader siege; its Muslims and Jews were largely massacred, enslaved or forced to flee by the capture of 15 July.

Jaffa, too, had suffered from the effects of the fighting. The Frankish conquerors were squatting in the dismal grandeur of cities, many of whose productive elements had been annihilated or dispersed. More significantly, the cities held by the Franks were largely situated in the interior of Palestine, in Judaea and Galilee. The major economic centres whose wealth derived from the profits of trade and industry were situated on the coast, almost all of them still in Muslim hands: Ascalon, Arsur, Caesarea, Sidon, Beirut, and above all, the great ports of Tyre and Acre, both of them with well established mercantile connections to Damascus and the Syrian interior.

Both Godfrey and Baldwin I were often short of the means to reward their followers.[18] In one case, Baldwin's need to pay their arrears led to a major dispute with the patriarch, Daimbert of Pisa, whom the king accused of diverting funds sent from the West for the kingdom's defence.[19] For the first five or six years of its existence, the rather grandiosely named kingdom of Jerusalem was little more than a kind of robber principality which financed itself through periodic but irregular injections of cash obtained on a hand to mouth basis. Although some funds did flow into the kingdom in the form of pious donations such as the one allegedly embezzled by Daimbert of Pisa, the liquid financial resources available to the monarchs originated from three main sources. Firstly, there was booty, which provided money and other valuables as well as *naturalia*. After the capture of the port of Haifa, the Franks and their Venetian allies seized 'countless money, both gold and silver, garments, horses and mules, barley, oil and corn'.[20] The capture of Caesarea (May 1101) likewise brought 'many spoils of gold, silver and precious purple', while Fulcher of Chartres adds that 'many of our men who had been poor became rich'.[21] At the Second Battle of Ramla (1102), fought against an invading Fātimid army, the booty was so great that the king and his soldiers were unable to carry all of it away.[22] A remark by the chronicler Albert of Aachen indicates that the customary division of spoils allocated a third to the monarch, and the remainder to his soldiers.[23] Several victories over large Fātimid forces in sieges and in the field during these years meant that booty was plentiful, but it was not a systematic source of revenue.

A second source of income was ransom payments, especially for the release of high-ranking Muslim captives taken in battle or in raids, such as the Muslim 'priest' captured in Caesarea (possibly the *qadi*) who was ransomed by the city of Acre for 1,000 bezants, that is, gold dinars.[24] Forty-five Damascene prisoners released by Baldwin I brought in over

50,000 golden bezants, an 'unheard-of sum of money', as the chronicler Albert of Aachen quite accurately put it.[25] Again, this was by no means a guaranteed source of income, but captives could be kept in prison as a means of increasing the ransom payments offered, and if necessary they could be released piecemeal in order to spread income more evenly. A third source, more important than booty and ransoms, was the extortion of tribute from Muslim cities and other polities. In the summer of 1099 Tancred launched an expedition against a Muslim amir known to the Franks only as the Fat Peasant (*Grossus Rusticus*), who controlled much of the Terre de Suete, the fertile area east of Lake Tiberias. While this gained much booty in the form of livestock and material goods, its main purpose was to force the Fat Peasant to resume the payment of tribute which he had ceased paying.[26]

However, it was the coastal cities which were to prove the most lucrative targets. Ports were essential to secure communications with the West and provide the infrastructure to receive pilgrims and military assistance. If the new kingdom was to have any hope of survival it was clearly necessary to reduce the ports between Beirut in the north and Ascalon in the south, but this was clearly not going to be a quick undertaking. The ports could easily be supplied and reinforced from Fātimid Egypt, and to mount effective blockades and sieges by sea as well as with their own land forces, Godfrey of Bouillon and Baldwin I were dependent on assistance from fleets provided by Genoa, Venice and Pisa, which remained in the East on a seasonal basis. If, at the end of a campaigning season, the ruler had not succeeding in capturing his goal, it might be another six months before he could count on naval support again. It therefore made sense in the meantime to try at least to force the Muslims into arrangements by which they had to pay tribute in exchange for being left in peace. Thus, in the winter of 1106–7 Baldwin blockaded Sidon with the aid of ships from England, Denmark and Flanders. After the siege made little headway he agreed to call it off in exchange for a payment of 15,000 bezants.[27] An example of more regular payment of tribute occurred at Arsur, where Gerard of Avesnes was installed in the capacity of overseer and receiver of revenues. This was a risky position, since when the Muslims of Arsur decided to renege on the tribute payments, Gerard was imprisoned and later used as a kind of human shield when Godfrey's troops attacked the city.[28] What is significant, though, is that it did not take long for the revenues of Arsur to be hypothecated. After a fresh treaty, Godfrey assigned the revenues from the city directly to another of his knights,

Robert of Anzi, even though it remained outside Frankish-controlled territory.[29]

Frankish military successes soon led to similar arrangements elsewhere. Thus the Muslim authorities in Acre, Caesarea and Ascalon agreed to pay 5,000 bezants every month, as well as quantities of grain, wine and oil. To get an idea of the buying power of these sums, we should bear in mind that the expenses of a knight a century later were estimated at one bezant per day.[30] However, the bezants current in the thirteenth century were Frankish imitations of Muslim coins, which had a lower fineness than the Fātimid dinars current at the beginning of the twelfth century.[31] What does this tell us? Well, it would seem that within one year of the crusader conquest, the regime of Godfrey of Bouillon had secured tribute payments from four major Muslim cities (Acre, Caesarea, Arsuf and Ascalon) which might be estimated as providing sufficient revenue for the expenses of perhaps about 200 knights. I have elsewhere argued that during the first 10 years of the kingdom's existence, the total number of knights fielded by its armies was in the region of 260–500.[32] This would suggest that a very significant proportion of its knight service was resourced by tribute paid to the rulers by Muslim powers.

Of course, these were not permanent arrangements, and, as the example of Arsur shows, tribute could be broken off, just as it could be imposed on new cities. Yet during the short rule of Godfrey of Bouillon and the first five years of the reign of Baldwin I, revenue from tribute probably formed the main source of royal income and certainly the main financial support of the kingdom's military forces. When, after the death of Godfrey, his brother Baldwin came to Jerusalem to take up his inheritance, he made enquiries about the state of Godfrey's treasury and 'the fiefs of each knight and noble', and was given information about each of the fiefs 'as they were appointed to each person from the revenues of the towns'.[33] Now, of course, revenues could have come from Frankish-held towns as much as the tribute payments from the Muslim ones, and we have some quite specific instances of this, such as the case of Gerard the Chamberlain, one of Godfrey's household officers, who in 1107 was awarded income drawn on the revenues of Jaffa.[34] However, the mercantile and industrial importance of the Muslim coastal cities, above all Acre, meant that they were far richer than the towns under Frankish control, most of which were situated in inland Judaea and Samaria. It is likely that by the end of Godfrey's reign arrangements were in place for his vassals to enjoy revenues accruing from Muslim

as well as Frankish towns. This pattern only began to change between 1105 and 1110. As the kingdom expanded its frontiers, cities were captured which were increasingly distant from the capital. It was necessary for permanent garrisons to be stationed in them, and we see such places being granted out as lordships, as in the cases of Haifa, Sidon, Caesarea and Beirut. However, the wealthy port of Acre was retained under direct royal administration, and the same applied to Tyre when it was captured in 1124.

I would suggest that the origin of money-fiefs in the kingdom of Jerusalem is to be found in the fiscal arrangements in operation during the first five or six years of Frankish rule. Revenues were assigned primarily on the tribute payments from Muslim towns, which in turn were financed from their principal source of corporate income, that is, the tolls levied on the ports. When these towns were taken either by conquest or surrendered, these arrangements were frequently maintained as a system that was working well, not least because under Frankish rule, the customs office (*cathena*) continued to be administered by officials who were native Arabic-speaking Christians.[35] Money-fiefs were well adapted to the money economy of twelfth-century Palestine. They were probably the simplest way of deploying customs revenues effectively. They allowed the monarch a very tight control over expenditure, as they could be cut off easily. They were a useful way of countering the negative effects of primogeniture, as they could be assigned to younger sons who had received little or nothing of the parental inheritance. Finally, they made it relatively easy to reward newly arrived warriors, especially if they did not have the prestige to warrant the assignment of lordships or heiresses. We may not know the proportion of troops that they supported compared to what we might think of as 'traditional fiefs', but I would argue that money fiefs were a very flexible and durable institution that was well-suited to a relatively quick integration of outsiders into the military structures of the Frankish kingdom, whether or not we might want to refer to them as mercenaries.

NOTES

[1] Galbertus notarius Brugensis, *De multro, traditione, et occisione gloriosi Karoli comitis Flandriarum*, ed. Jeff Rider (Turnhout, 1994), ch. 88,138–39: 'Decimo quinto kalendas Octobris, sabbato, in die sancti Lamberti, comes iturus versus Ipram, requisivit a burgensibus nostris teloneum. At illis ingratus erat comes ideo quod de reditibus telonei milites sui feodati fuerant a tempore omnium praedecessorum suorum comitum.

Vexabant enim consulem milites sui eo quod Brugensibus condonasset teloneum quo ipsi hactenus feodi exstiterant. Et illud non potuisse confirmabant comitem juste sine suorum militum assensu condonare, nec juste ipsos cives ut eis condonaret consulem expostulasse. Unde invidia concitata est inter cives et inter comitem militesque suos.' For the earlier concession, see ch. 55,104–105. For the context of the Flemish crisis of 1127–28 and Galbert's reporting of it, see David Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London, 1992), 62–66, and Jeff Rider, *God's Scribe: The Historiographical Art of Galbert of Bruges* (Washington, D.C., 2001).

² Dirk Heirbaut, 'The Fief-Rente: A New Evaluation, Based on Flemish Sources (1000–1305)', *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis* 67 (1999), 1–37.

³ Heirbaut, 'The Fief-Rente', 7.

⁴ '*Le Livre des Assises* by John of Jaffa', in Peter W. Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, 1997), 118–54: 'Si vos deviserai après les servises que chascun des seignors des dis leus doivent au chief seignor dou reiaume ains que la terre fust perdue et les autres gens do dit reiaume, et les aides que les yglises et les religions et les gens des cites et des chasteaus dou dit reiaume doivent et faisoient au chief seignior quant il aloient a ost bani contre les henemis de la foi por defendre le dit roiaume.' (117).

⁵ John France, 'Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 15 (2000), 49–66, reprinted in John France (ed.), *Medieval Warfare, 1000–1300* (Aldershot, 2006), 453–70.

⁶ John France, 'The Crusades and Military History', in Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-Froux, Paul Pagès and Dominique Valérian (eds), *Chemins d'outre-mer: Etudes sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*. 2 vols (Paris, 2004), 345–52; France, 'Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century', 58–59.

⁷ Jean Richard, 'Les turcoples au service des royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre: Musulmans convertis ou chrétiens orientaux?', *Revue des études islamiques* 54 (1986), 259–70; Alexios G.C. Savvides, 'Late Byzantine and Western Historiographers on Turkish Mercenaries in Greek and Latin Armies: the Turcopoles/Tourkopouloi', in Roderick Beaton and Charlotte Roueché (eds), *The Making of Byzantine History: Studies dedicated to D. M. Nicol* (Aldershot, 1993), 122–36; Yuval Harari, 'The Military Role of the Frankish Turcopoles', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 12 (1997), 75–116.

⁸ France, 'Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century'.

⁹ Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 131.

¹⁰ Geneviève Bresc-Bautier (ed.), *Le Cartulaire du chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre de Jérusalem*, (Paris, 1984), no. 47, pp. 129–31 (= Reinhold Röhricht, *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani* (Berlin, 1892), no. 332).

¹¹ France, 'Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century', p. 58.

¹² Jean Richard, 'An Account of the Battle of Hittin Referring to the Frankish Mercenaries in Oriental Muslim States', *Speculum* 27 (1952), 168–77. When writing of his experiences during St Louis's crusade to Egypt, John of Joinville, who was quite well informed about Ayyūbid military organisation, mentioned a Saracen 'from the Emperor of Germany's land': Joinville and Villehardouin, *Chronicles of the Crusades* (London, 1963), 243. This individual clearly did not follow the pattern of *mamlūk* recruitment from among Türkmen and Kurds that was prevalent among Ayyūbid armies, and presumably he was by no means unique. For the Ayyūbid armies, see Yaacov Lev, *Saladin in Egypt* (Leiden, 1999), 150–58.

¹³ Alan V. Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic History, 1099–1125* (Oxford, 2000), 63–77.

¹⁴ Alan V. Murray, 'The Origins of the Frankish Nobility of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100–1118', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 4 (1989), 281–300; Murray, 'The Army

of Godfrey of Bouillon, 1096–1099: Structure and Dynamics of a Contingent on the First Crusade', *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 70 (1992), 301–29, reprinted in *Medieval Warfare, 1000–1300*, 423–51; Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 79–81.

[15] Joshua Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London, 1972), 63–64.

[16] Fulcher of Chartres, *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana* (1095–1127), ed. Heinrich Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1913), 1.29, 304; Albert of Aachen, 'Alberti Aquensis Historia Hierosolymitana', in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux*, 5 vols (Paris, 1844–95), 4: 265–713, here 6.23, 479; Raymond of Aguilers, 'Raimundi de Aguilers canonici Podiensis historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem', in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux* 3: 231–309, here 292, 300. On the idea of a *regnum* in Palestine, see Jonathan Riley-Smith, 'The Title of Godfrey of Bouillon', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 52 (1979), 83–86, and Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 65–66.

[17] Albert of Aachen, 7.15, 516.

[18] Albert of Aachen, 7.58–63, 545–48; Guibert of Nogent, 'Guiberti abbas Gesta dei per Francos', in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux* 4: 117–262, here 259.

[19] It is clear that the dispute was engineered by Baldwin I in an attempt to assert his authority over the political claims of the patriarch, but there is no reason to doubt the basic point that his knights' remuneration was in arrears. See Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 81–93.

[20] Albert of Aachen, 7.25, 523: 'Qui, universis occisis in ea repertis, pecuniam innumerabilem tam in auro quam argento, vestibus, equis et mulis, ordeo, oleo et frumento, illic depraedati sunt.'

[21] Albert of Aachen, 7.56, 544; Fulcher of Chartres, 2.9, 400–4.

[22] Albert of Aachen, 7.70, 552–53.

[23] Albert of Aachen, 10.31, 645–46.

[24] Albert of Aachen, 7.53, 542; Fulcher of Chartres, 2.9, 400–4.

[25] Albert of Aachen, 7: 34, 530, 7.53, 542.

[26] Albert of Aachen, 7.16, 517–18.

[27] Albert of Aachen, 10.3–8, 632–34.

[28] Albert of Aachen, 7.1–3, 507–8.

[29] Albert of Aachen, 7.12, 514–15.

[30] Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 73–74.

[31] Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 385–86.

[32] Murray, 'The Origins of the Frankish Nobility', 282–83.

[33] Albert of Aachen, 7.37, 532: '…requisivit de suppellectili fratris sui Godefridi, de armatura et pecunia ejus, de beneficiis cujusque militis ac praepotentis. Qui nichil se de rebus fratris ejus habere attestati sunt, sed eas in elemosinas pauperum et solvendis debitis esse dispersas; beneficia vero, prout cuique statuta erant de reditibus civitatum, protulerunt.'

[34] Albert of Aachen, 10.12, 636–37.

[35] Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 403.

MERCENARIES AND PAID MEN IN GILBERT OF MONS

Laura Napran

This paper examines a specific situation of mercenaries and paid men in a particular late-twelfth-century chronicle, *Chronicon Hanoniense* (*Chronicle of Hainaut*) by Gilbert of Mons.[1] Gilbert of Mons was a cleric who served, among other offices, as chancellor for Count Baldwin V of Hainaut, who governed the county from 1171 to 1195. The county of Hainaut, now part of modern Belgium, is situated east of the county of Flanders and south of the duchy of Brabant. Gilbert wrote his chronicle in the years 1195 to 1196, shortly after the death of his lord and patron Baldwin V. His chronicle has especial significance as a primary source in respect to military history, as Gilbert, in his position as chancellor of Hainaut, was eyewitness to many important events including battles, sieges and treaty negotiations. When not present at such events, Gilbert could access the reports of other witnesses and was privy to court news and gossip. He acted as judge, envoy and negotiator, and made a number of visits to the Imperial court in Germany. Gilbert's position as chancellor was beneficial to the composition of his chronicle, because he created many charters and had access to a great many official documents of the counties and ecclesiastical establishments of Hainaut and Flanders, the majority of which are lost to us today.

Gilbert's situation in Hainaut was unusually fortuitous for a chronicler of this period. Although not a large county, Hainaut was particularly prominent in a number of affairs during this period affecting the kingdom of France, the county of Flanders and the German Empire, partly because of astute matrimonial connections, and partly through its favourable geographical position. Baldwin V of Hainaut married Marguerite, sister of the count of Flanders, thereby gaining control of Flanders through her in 1191. By his mother, Alix of Namur, and the favour of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, he became marquis of Namur in 1190. Baldwin was also the father-in-law of King Philip Augustus of France, who married, as his first wife, Baldwin's daughter Elisabeth. The future heir to the kingdom of France, Louis VIII, was Baldwin's grandson.[2]

Geographically, the county of Hainaut occupied a sort of middle ground in this area of north western Europe—while part of the Empire, Gilbert of Mons boasts that Count Baldwin had not given homage for the county of Hainaut to the Emperor, but only to the bishop of Liège, suggesting a perceived independence. Yet, through Baldwin's marriage to Marguerite of Flanders and his subsequent expectation of inheriting the county of Flanders through her, Hainaut had strong ties westward. The marriage of Baldwin's daughter, Elisabeth of Hainaut, to King Philip Augustus, initiated connections to the kingdom of France which had not previously existed. Moreover, Count Baldwin had accepted a money fief from, and done homage to, King Henry II of England. Thus, the count of Hainaut had interests in all directions—the Empire, Flanders, France and England, while still retaining a perception of his county's independence from the great powers.

Accordingly, an examination of Gilbert of Mons' chronicle in respect to mercenaries and paid men, provides a valuable contemporary viewpoint, both from the immediacy of Gilbert's witness and opinions in his own region, and from his position in a county which was effectively involved in military and political matters with the greater neighbouring powers. Moreover, while there are mercenaries, clearly identified as such, in his chronicle, it seems evident that Gilbert himself had a broader, and most interesting, perception of what constituted a paid man.

To begin with those who are baldly identified as mercenaries, the *stipendiarii*, there are five specific identifications of them in this chronicle. The first two instances occur in the early section of the work, where Gilbert is detailing events from more than a century before. Succinctly described, Robert the Frisian had dispossessed Count Arnoul of Flanders, who was killed at the Battle of Cassel in 1071.[3] Arnoul's mother, Countess Richilde and brother, Baldwin, retired to their holdings in the county of Hainaut and made plans to attempt the recovery of Flanders. Apparently lacking sufficient ready resources, Richilde and her son Baldwin raised funds by yielding their allods in Hainaut to the bishop of Liège for what Gilbert calls 'a very great amount of money'. The bishop, in return, gave the lands back as liege fiefs, while Richilde and her son used the money for the exclusive purpose of hiring mercenaries against the usurper Robert the Frisian.[4]

As we lack sources for this area which would be equivalent to the Pipe Rolls of England for example, in which it is possible to find specific monies paid to individual mercenaries, this incident gives us some idea of the costs incurred in hiring a large band of mercenaries in

this region.[5] Although Gilbert does not specify the extent of this 'very great amount of money', he tells us that the bishop of Liège raised the money by 'gravely afflicting all the conventual churches of the bishopric of Liège regarding their treasures of gold and silver'. The chronicler, Gilles of Orval, who copied this section of Gilbert's chronicle, adds further details about these treasures, thereby giving us an idea of the actual costs of hiring a significant body of mercenaries: the greater church of Liège alone lost 100 pounds of gold, plus a great gold chalice with a paten, a gold crucifix, a gold necklace, a gold crest, two gold bracelets, silver chalices with patens, ewers, candelabra, a silver table, and about 175 marks of other silver.[6] It sounds as if the bishop fairly stripped this church, and this was only one of many—Gilbert refers to conventual churches in the plural, in fact, *all* of the conventual churches of the bishopric, so there were rather more treasures than in the given list. As a means of comparison, it may be useful to examine the costs incurred by King Philip Augustus more than a century later, when he hired Cadoc and his band of mercenaries. In this case, the king paid this 'numerous band of *routiers*' a thousand pounds every day.[7] While it is likely that this high figure for daily payment has been exaggerated to emphasise the value of Cadoc and his men, and to magnify the wealth and generosity of Philip Augustus, it is nonetheless clear that mercenary bands did not come cheaply either for King Philip or for Countess Richilde.

Countess Richilde and her son 'assembled helpers and mercenaries from many regions'.[8] Although Gilbert elsewhere claims that Countess Richilde had the support of 'certain Flemings' of both noble and servile condition who had followed them into Hainaut, it is noteworthy that these Flemings are not specified by name, implying that they were unlikely to be men of considerable power or wealth.[9] Thus, with most of the Flemish nobles siding with Robert the Frisian, it seems that the countess had to rely very heavily on hired men for her counterattack on the usurper. No doubt this situation stemmed from the fact that Robert the Frisian was already perceived as the victor in Flanders, having killed the rightful heir Arnoul and exiled his mother and brother. Gilbert comments that Robert had been 'quite strong before, but became even stronger' after the Battle of Cassel.[10] While Countess Richilde had had the support of the French king, Philip I, in her first attempt to recover Flanders, there is no mention of the king associating himself with her cause during her second assault on Robert the Frisian. There were helpers in the form of six counts and dukes from regions to the north

and east of Hainaut, but apparently their help was ineffectual. More-over, it seems that all the money raised from the gold and silver of the churches of Liège could not pay for a sufficient number of mercenaries, as Richilde's men are referred to as 'few in number', and Robert the Frisian 'thought little of their strength'. He defeated them easily, and Countess Richilde and her son had to be content with holding only the county of Hainaut.[11]

Countess Richilde's great-great-grandson, Count Baldwin V of Hain-aut, would also encounter difficulties concerning the costs of mercenaries more than a century later. He is mentioned as using paid soldiers on a number of occasions in his wars against the dukes of Brabant/Louvain. In 1184, he is said to have 'assembled as many virtuous mercenary knights as he could', and, after that particular conflict, he 'paid the mercenaries honourably'.[12] Later, when the count of Flanders and the archbishop of Cologne had allied with the duke of Brabant against him, Baldwin V made use of 300 mercenaries to supplement some 2000 knights, sergeants and footsoldiers in holding the castle of Binche against hostile forces, but they were only one component of his army. Gilbert tells us that, in this war, the count had a total of '300 mercenary knights and about 3000 mercenary sergeants, both mounted and on foot'.[13] In addition, he paid the expenses of a further 300 knights from France and Lotharingia. The size of this mercenary force suggests that the triple alliance against him was a major threat, and also reflects the fact that he was greatly disadvantaged by his former ally and supporter, the count of Flanders, turning against him.[14] By 1186 the pressure of paying for forces like these was taking its toll. Count Baldwin made an account of his great debts for payments to knights and paid sergeants, and it added up to a staggering 41,000 Valenciennes pounds. This debt was paid within seven months 'by burdening his land heavily with taxes'. This is the only mention Gilbert of Mons makes of heavy taxing on the part of the count of Hainaut, indicating that these costs of war, including so many mercenaries, were an exceptional expense far above what could be provided by normal taxation and revenues. However, Gilbert adds that such heavy taxation made the count 'sad', which was, no doubt, a comfort to all of his subjects who were forced to remit the money.[15]

It is interesting to note that Count Baldwin V of Hainaut was appar-ently unaffected by the 1171 treaty between King Louis VII of France and Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of Germany, in which they tried to limit the use of mercenaries in their territories.[16] Count Baldwin

continued to make use of many mercenaries after the date of this treaty, a circumstance which supports the contemporaneous perception that the counts of Hainaut were able to act relatively independently of both France and the Empire. As mentioned previously, they did not hold their lands directly from the Emperor, but rather held them from the bishop of Liège, who was in turn a direct tenant of the Emperor. As we have seen earlier, the bishop of Liège became the liege lord over the county of Hainaut by virtue of providing money to Countess Richilde for the purpose of purchasing aid from mercenaries. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the bishops of Liège should neglect to enforce the Emperor's treaty concerning mercenaries, as the bishops had benefited directly from the use of mercenaries by the counts (or countess) of Hainaut. This situation also demonstrates, of course, the general limitations of the German Emperor's authority.

Elsewhere in the chronicle, two mercenaries are identified as something other than *stipendiarii*, Gilbert referring to them instead as *solidarii*. While in some primary sources, these are equivalent words,[17] it is notable that Gilbert chooses *solidarii* for the only mercenaries in the chronicle who are identified by name, suggesting that he did not view *stipendiarii* and *solidarii* as quite the same thing. In the year 1169, Count Baldwin IV of Hainaut went to war to defend the interests of the count of Namur with an army consisting of 700 armed knights, all from the land of Hainaut, except for two mercenaries: Walter and Gérard of Sotteghem.[18] We have an idea of the social rank of one of these men—Walter of Sotteghem is elsewhere called a knight, and was married to the daughter of the castellan of Tournai.[19] Although Walter was not a titled man, it is highly likely that he came from a noble family if he had married the daughter of a castellan. Moreover, his wife was related to the comital house of Hainaut, being the grandniece of Count Baldwin IV. While it may be risky to read too much into Gilbert's use of the word *solidarius* instead of *stipendarius*, it is apparent that Gilbert was trying to distinguish these two men from the bands of other mercenaries who are mentioned as large units only. He sets them apart both by the use of a different word to identify them as paid soldiers, and by citing their actual names. Perhaps this is a case of special treatment for men related to the count of Hainaut by marriage, and who are of a noble family, suggesting that most of the mercenaries who were in organised bands were not necessarily of noble lineage. There is a comparable example of a named mercenary from Flanders, who served as part of King Stephen of England's stipendiary force: Fromold I, who was

associated with a castellany (Bailleul).[20] Likewise, Cadoc, who served Philip Augustus of France against Richard I of England, was castellan of Gaillon and held a fief in Tosny.[21] In both these cases, like Walter of Sotteghem, a mercenary associated with a castellany is identified by name, thus distinguishing him from the common mass of paid forces. It is also relevant to refer back to the treaty against mercenaries, made by Frederick Barbarossa and Louis VII, referred to above. In this treaty, a mercenary would not be considered outlawed under the treaty if he had been retained permanently by a lord, and marriage was one means to effect such permanent retention. It is possible that Walter of Sotteghem's marriage to a relative of the count of Hainaut indicates that he had become permanently retained, and thus, Gilbert chose a term for him to distinguish him from temporary mercenaries. If so, this differentiation is a peculiarity of Gilbert's own devising, but it does suggest an explanation as to why these two men of Sotteghem are particularly noted among mercenaries in Hainaut.

In respect to Gilbert's choice of vocabulary concerning mercenaries, it is interesting to compare him with the contemporaneous (or near-contemporaneous) French chroniclers Rigord and William the Breton. Rigord, in his *Gesti Philippi Augusti*, chooses the word *Cotarelli* to describe mercenary bands, and particularly for the mercenary captain Mercadier and his men.[22] This word suggests not merely paid soldiers, but brigands. William the Breton, in his *Philippidos*, uses the words *ruptus* and *rupta* to describe both of the mercenary captains Cadoc and Mercadier, along with their men. While these terms can be translated as '*routier*' or 'band of *routiers*', the derivation of these words from the verb *rumpere* implies a more graphic meaning of breaking, bursting through, and forcing.[23] Both Rigord's and William the Breton's choice of wording emphasises the nature of the mercenary as a member of a band of like men, as well as the violent nature of his profession. Conversely, Gilbert's choice of the words *stipendarius* and *solidarius* suggests that he viewed matters differently than his French neighbours, stressing rather the professional nature of the mercenaries and the contractual nature of their employment.[24]

The second part of this paper deals with Gilbert of Mons' conception of paid men, as opposed to mercenaries. One of the points which is central to Gilbert's praise of his patron, Count Baldwin V of Hainaut, is the count's consistent ability to pay his own expenses in wars. This financial situation applies both to wars made on his own behalf, and to wars made in support of his sometime allies at various

times—Count Philip of Flanders, Count Henry the Blind of Namur, and King Philip Augustus of France. Gilbert omits no opportunity to compare and contrast his patron with Duke Henry I of Brabant/ Louvain, who constantly received all his expense money when fighting on behalf of Count Philip of Flanders. For example, in 1182 Count Philip of Flanders was engaged in his interminable conflicts with King Philip Augustus. In a single short section of the chronicle detailing this conflict, Gilbert harps repeatedly upon the matter of expenses. We are told that, prior to rushing to the aid of the count of Flanders, Count Baldwin had been helping his uncle the count of Namur, with 'the expedition of his uncle at his own expense'. In aiding the count of Flanders, Count Baldwin 'retained 100 chosen knights and as many mounted men-at-arms with him at his own expense'. When the conflict ceased temporarily,

> …the count of Hainaut, who was always in that war at his own expense, returned to his own lands. Henry, son of the duke of Louvain, who had been in the expense of the count of Flanders, obtained favour above others before the count of Flanders. The period of the count of Hainaut going to war, staying there and returning, consisted of the space of five weeks. The expense of the count of Hainaut was 1850 marks of silver of great weight.

However, when war erupted again, the count of Hainaut 'had spent six weeks at his own expense going to war, staying there and returning' and that 'the expense of the count of Hainaut was 1600 marks of silver in great weight. Henry, son of the duke of Louvain, who had as wife Mathilde, daughter of the count of Boulogne, niece of the count of Flanders, came to that army with forty knights and as many mounted sergeants and ten crossbowmen, and was completely at the expense of the count of Flanders.' It is evident that Gilbert is determined that the reader know who is, and is not, paying his own way.[25]

There are two main points about the issue of paid men in this chapter, the first being the costs of the count of Hainaut's army. There is no mention of mercenaries, *stipendiarii*, in spite of quite specific details about the number of men at various stages of the conflict, demonstrating that a tremendous amount of monetary support was needed for his men, even though they were not *stipendiarii* as such. I suggest that these costs indicate that the count of Hainaut's army was composed of more than the usual knights and men-at-arms owed to him by the customary obligations of the nobles of Hainaut. Elsewhere in the chronicle, Gilbert refers to 'auxiliary knights', who were not paid, yet

were at the count of Hainaut's expense, of whom some had come from France, some from Lotharingia. Although not paid men, they did not come for free. This situation suggests a two-tier method of paying for support: mercenaries who were literally paid a stipend, and auxiliaries who, like mercenaries, were over and above the usual pool of men available to the count of Hainaut, but were content with expenses only. Gilbert seems to indicate that the difference between a mercenary and an auxiliary is that the former comes away with a profit, while the latter merely breaks even. This is supported by the argument offered by Michael Mallet, that 'profit' is indeed one of the main characteristics distinguishing mercenaries from ordinary paid soldiers.[26]

The second point in this chapter is Gilbert's marked emphasis on the difference between the count of Hainaut who paid his own way, and Duke Henry of Brabant/Louvain who received all his expenses. It is clear that Gilbert evinces disapproval of a noble of the rank of duke or count receiving expenses, and that he believes Henry of Brabant/ Louvain has been degraded by doing so. This is a case where we see Gilbert's own opinion in the matter, and he is not a little bitter about it. He complains that, in spite of getting his expenses paid, Henry of Brabant still 'received favour above others'.[27] Gilbert's implication is that a true nobleman, like his patron Baldwin V of Hainaut, pays his own way in performing his obligations to his friends and allies, even if it means impoverishment of funds and oppressive taxes. Of the two classes of those receiving money for military services, the auxiliary and the mercenary, it is the auxiliary who breaks even. It is easy to see Gilbert's suggestion, that Henry of Brabant is no better than an auxiliary, not a true nobleman at all. It is also noteworthy that, in the midst of discussing expenses, Gilbert inserts a specific mention of Henry of Brabant's marriage to Count Philip of Flanders' niece, Mathilde (daughter of Countess Marie of Boulogne and Philip's brother Matthew). In consequence of this marriage, Henry had received a substantial dowry payment of 1500 Flemish pounds in cash (or movable goods of equivalent value), and he was also able to cherish the reasonable hope that the county of Boulogne might devolve to his wife Mathilde, in the event of the death of her sister Countess Ida (who was still childless in 1182). Gilbert seems to be implying that Henry is a soldier who has been paid in an indirect manner, that is by this prestigious and lucrative marriage and, at the very least, that he is not working off the obligations imposed by that marriage.[28] In contrast, Baldwin V of Hainaut,

who was married to Count Philip of Flanders' own sister, continually financed his own military obligations to his brother-in-law. As Gilbert knew well that Duke Henry's duchy was a source of some of the best known mercenaries, the Brabançons, it is likely that Gilbert viewed Henry of Brabant himself as something of a mercenary. Gilbert's differentiation between Count Baldwin paying his own way, and Duke Henry's receipt of expenses, reinforces the concept discussed earlier in this paper, that the people of Hainaut viewed themselves as being independent and socially different than their neighbours. While Hainaut was a county which hired mercenaries and paid its own expenses, the duchy of Brabant was a provider of mercenaries and their ruler himself acted like a Brabançon.

Moreover, it is evident that Gilbert of Mons is attempting to equate the count of Hainaut with the more powerful count of Flanders—both of them pay their own troops, whether composed of profit-seeking mercenaries or expense-seeking allies. This parallel between the two rulers was no doubt meant to enforce the claim which Baldwin V of Hainaut would later have over the county of Flanders through his wife Marguerite. The devolution of the county had been promised to him by Count Philip of Flanders, by virtue of the fact that Baldwin of Hainaut had married Philip's sister, and because Philip had no heirs of his own body. The perception that Baldwin of Hainaut was the legitimate successor of the county of Flanders was very important to Gilbert of Mons, as the 1180s was a period of renewed armed conflict between Hainaut and Flanders. It seemed for a while that the count of Hainaut would lose his chance to succeed to Flanders, and that the count of Flanders was planning for the county to devolve upon Duke Henry of Brabant instead. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Gilbert of Mons attempted to show the counts of Flanders and Hainaut in the same light, as rulers powerful and noble enough to pay for their own troops, and thus, both worthy of ruling over the important county of Flanders.

In conclusion, we see that Gilbert of Mons considered mercenaries to be a useful and necessary part of the military life of the county of Hainaut. While using two terms to differentiate bands of mercenaries from named individuals, he nonetheless regarded even the large bands as professional warriors under the control of their employer, rather than as violent routiers. Conversely, he had low regard for the duke of Brabant, who was a 'paid man' in that he received his expenses when he should have financed his own military expeditions. Recent work by

a number of scholars, such as Michael Mallett and Steven Isaac, has noted that the twelfth century was an important transitional period in the development of the use of hired fighters.[29]Accordingly, Gilbert of Mons' evidence of different kinds of paid men, and his contemporaneous viewpoint of them, is a useful addition to our understanding of mercenaries in this time period.

NOTES

[1] The best edition of this chronicle in Latin is Gilbert of Mons, *La chronique de Gislebert de Mons*, ed. Léon Vanderkindere (Brussels, 1904); I have recently published an English translation: Gilbert of Mons, *Chronicle of Hainaut*, trans. and annot. Laura Napran (Woodbridge, 2005). Hereafter this chronicle will be cited as 'Gilbert of Mons', followed by the chapter number in the chronicle, for convenience in consulting either the Latin edition or the translation. All quotations provided in English from this chronicle are taken from my translation.

[2] Genealogies of the comital houses of Hainaut and Flanders have been provided at the end of this paper.

[3] David Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London, 1992), 52, 56; Galbert of Bruges, *De multro, traditione, et occisione gloriosi Karoli comitis Flandriarum*, ed. J. Rider, CCCM 131 (Turnhout, 1994), chs 69–70.

[4] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 8.

[5] Stephen D.B. Brown, 'Military Service and Monetary Reward in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', *History* 74 (1989), 30.

[6] Gilles of Orval, *Gesta episcoporum Leodiensium*, ed. J. Heller, MGH SS 15.80.

[7] William the Breton, *Philippidos*, in H. François Delaborde (ed.), *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*, (Paris, 1882), 2. 192.

[8] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 10.

[9] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 8.

[10] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 5.

[11] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 10.

[12] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 112.

[13] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 114.

[14] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 114.

[15] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 126.

[16] MGH: Diplomata, 10/3. 46–47, no. 575; Brown, 'Military Service', 29.

[17] Brown, 'Military Service', 21.

[18] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 60.

[19] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 31.

[20] Steven Isaac, 'The Problem with Mercenaries', in Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (eds), *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History* (Woodbridge, 1999), 106–07.

[21] William the Breton, 2. 135; Elisabeth M. Hallam and Judith Everard, *Capetian France 987–1328*, 2nd ed. (London, 2001), 208.

[22] Rigord, *Gesta Philippi Augusti*, in H. François Delaborde (ed.), *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton* (Paris, 1882), 1. 36–37, 132, 142.

[23] J.F. Niermeyer and C. van de Kieft, *Mediae latinitatis lexicon minus* (Leiden, 2002), 2. 1206.

[24] William the Breton, 2. 138, 182, 192, 220.

[25] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 99.

[26] Michael Mallett, 'Mercenaries', in Maurice Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History*, (Oxford, 1999), 209.

[27] Gilbert of Mons, ch. 99.

[28] For details of this marriage, see Laura Napran, 'Marriage Contracts in the Southern Low Countries and the North of France in the Twelfth Century', Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge (2001), 103, 106–09, 179–80; and Jean-Louis Kupper, 'Mathilde de Boulogne, duchesse de Brabant († 1210)', in J. Dufournet (ed.), *Femmes. Mariages—Lignages. XIIe–XIVe siècles. Mélanges offerts à Georges Duby* (Brussels, 1992) 234–38.

[29] Isaac, 'The Problem with Mercenaries', 101, 103; Mallett, 'Mercenaries', 210–11, 213.

Appendix I: The Comital House of Hainaut

Richilde countess of Hainaut and Flanders (1051–84)
x
(1) Hermann count of Hainaut   (2) Baldwin VI count of Flanders (and Hainaut)
     (d. *c.*1050 or 1051)   (1067–70)

Arnoul III————————————**Baldwin II x** Ida of Louvain
count of Flanders   count of Hainaut
(count 1070–71, d. 1072)   (1071–98 [declared dead 1102])

Baldwin III———Arnoul---Louis–--Henry---William---Ida————Richilde————Alix
count of Hainaut   **x**   **x**   **x**   **x**
   (1102–20)   Beatrice of Ath   Thomas of Marle   Amaury IV   Nicholas II
x   of Montfort   of Rumigny
Yolende of Gueldre

Baldwin IV---------Gerard-------Gertrude---------Richilde
count of Hainaut   **x**   **x**   **x**
   (1120–71)   ?   Roger of Tosny   1) Thierry of Avesnes
x   2) Évrard II castellan of Tournai
Alix of Namur

Baldwin--Godfrey-----**Baldwin V**---------Henry----Yolende---------Agnes--------Laureta
     x   count of Hainaut   **x**   **x**   **x**   **x**
   Eleanor of   (1171–95)   Jean of   (1) Ivo count   Raoul of   (1) Thierry of Alost
   Vermandois   [as Baldwin VIII   Cysoing   of Soissons   Coucy   (2) Bouchard V of
              count of Flanders]   (2) Hugh IV   Montmorency
              x   count of Saint-Pol
    Marguerite of Flanders

Elisabeth --------**Baldwin VI**------------Philip-------------Henry----------Yolende---------Sibyl
   x   count of Hainaut   marquis of Namur   emperor of   (betrothed to   **x**
  Philip II   (1195–1205)   (betrothed to   Constantinople   Henry II of   Guichard IV
  Augustus   [as Baldwin IX   Mathilde of Nevers)   Champagne)   of Beaujeu
king of France   count of Flanders]   **x**   **x**
  (1180–1223)   **x**   Marie of France   Pierre II Courtenay
            Marie of   daughter of King Philip   count of Nevers
          Champagne   II Augustus   emperor of Constantinople

APPENDIX II: COMITAL HOUSE OF FLANDERS: HOUSE OF ALSACE

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                    Thierry of Alsace
                    count of Flanders
                       (1128–68)
                           x
(1) Suanchilde        (2) Sibylle of Anjou
      |                     |
      |                |--------------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|
      |              Philip        Matthew          Peter          Gertrude      Marguerite    Mathilde
Laureta        count of Flanders  count of Boulogne  (d. 1176)          x              x
   x             (1168–91)         (d. 1173)            x          (1) Humbert   (1) Raoul I count of
(1) Iwan of          x                 x           Mathilde of   III of Savoie      Vermandois
    Alost       Elisabeth of    (1) Marie of Boulogne  Burgundy   (2) Hugh III   (2) Baldwin V count
(2) Henry I of  Vermandois       (2) Eleanor                        of Oisy         of Hainaut
    Limbourg          |              of Vermandois                             [as Baldwin VIII
(3) Raoul I of       |                                                          count of Flanders]
    Vermandois       |                                                                  |
(4) Henry I of     Ida------------------------Mathilde      Elisabeth----------Baldwin VI------------Yolende
    Namur           x                x        (Isabelle)           x        [as Baldwin IX        (betrothed
         (1) Gérard count of Gueldre    Henry I duke        x        count of Flanders]       to Henry
         (2) Berthold IV duke of        of Brabant     Philip II            x              II count of
             Zähringen                                 Augustus        Marie of          Champagne)
         (3) Renaud I of Dammartin                  king of France    Champagne              x
                                                         |                                Pierre II
                                                     Louis VIII                           Courtenay
                                                                                        count of Nevers
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THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY SOLDIER

MORE CHAUCER'S KNIGHT OR MEDIEVAL CAREER?

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> A knyght ther was, and that a worthy man,
>   That fro the tyme that he first began
>   To riden out, he loved chivalrie,
> Trouthe and honour, freedom and curteisie.
>   Ful worthy was he in his lordes were,
> And therto hadde he riden, no man ferre,
>   As wel in cristendom as in hethenesse,
> And evere honoured for his worthynesse.
> At Alisaundre he was whan it was wonne.
> Ful ofte tyme he hadde the bord bigonne
>   Aboven alle nacions in Pruce;
>   In Lettow hadde he reysed and in Ruce,
>   No Cristen man so ofte of his degree.
> In Gernade at the seege eek hadde he be
>   Of Algezir, and riden in Belmarye.
>   At Lyeys was he and at Satayle,
> Whan they were wonne; and in the Grete See
>   At many a noble armee hadde he be.[1]

The portrait of Chaucer's knight from the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales is something that has intrigued me for many years. My initial impressions were formed by Mr Terry Jones whilst still at School (and impressionable) so the idea that Chaucer's Knight was a mercenary seemed to me to be a very convincing argument.[2] This is a passage I have revisited frequently in teaching a module on the Hundred Years War at the University of Reading. For a time I did think that the portrayal had something to do with the crusade of Nicopolis in 1396, and should be considered alongside the symbolism present in the Wilton Dyptych, the ideas of Phillippe de Mezières and possible English participation in this ill-fated crusade.[3] The question I have asked today is fraught with problems, not least the difficulty of separating out 'crusader' from 'mercenary'. Nethertheless, I intend to provide some thoughts about what soldiers would get up to as part of a 'normal' career. In more detail, are the careers of Chaucer's Knight and a 'normal' soldier

mutually exclusive or are there identifiable intersection points suggest-
ing that a 'normal' career would pick up on highlights from Chaucer's
Knight. If these points of comparison do exist, then how prevalent are
they and can we make any assumptions as a result?

A student suggested to me that Chaucer's knight was a real person,
it was just that I (and by implication other historians) had never been
able to find an individual replicating his military career. In this spirit
and with this paper in mind I have tried to find evidence of fourteenth
century soldiers with careers that mirrored that of Chaucer's Knight.
We should remember that Chaucer himself was a soldier, captured
by the French on Edward III's Rheims campaign in 1359. In his own
words, delivered as a deponent at the Court of Chivalry in the case
of Scrope v. Grosvenor in October 1386, 'he was [currently] of the
age of 'forty and upwards' and 'had been armed 27 years'.[4] He was
therefore familiar with the average military career and it is clear that
whatever the reason for the accomplishments of his knight, they are
fully intended. What can we find from the available sources? Did men
purely fight on crusade or as mercenaries? Or did they combine service
for the king in the Hundred Years War with crusade, travel beyond
the 'Grete Sea', pilgrimage and mercenary service? We know that a
small number of 'famous' individuals did have such military careers,
but what about the bulk of the manpower of English expeditionary
forces? Did they also have such a military career, or was this kind of
service exceptional?

My search utilises a dataset compiled from the muster rolls of two
expeditionary armies in 1387 and 1388. Then, using the power of a
computer database, I have analyzed this data to look for continuance
of service in other campaigns or theatre's of warfare, where source
material naming serving soldiers exists. My previous work on this subject
has concentrated on the military community and looked mainly for
comparisons with other royal expeditions.[5] For this article, I will begin
by looking at the well known sources from the Court of Chivalry, and
then extend this search to mercenary actions, for instance with the Free
Companies in France and then Spain, at the battle of Najera (1367)
and in Italy, and, finally, crusading with Henry IV, then earl of Derby,
in Prussia with the Teutonic Knights. I will also draw in one or two
other areas of conflict when possible. This search focuses upon the
contemporary to Chaucer and thus is limited from the beginning, but
I think it is here that we must look if we are to develop the portrayal

of Chaucer's Knight in any sensible way. The comparison is possible because of the survival of muster roll evidence for the two campaigns of 1387 and 1388.[6] This gives a base of 6089 soldiers from which to find comparative data. As 487 of these soldiers took part in both campaigns, our overall total number of individual soldiers is reduced to 5602.[7] It would probably now make sense to discuss the campaigns from which this base material is drawn in order to set the paper into its context.

The story begins with an attack on Richard II's prerogative with the establishment of a 'great and continual council', which was appointed for a year with comprehensive powers of government on 19th November 1386. The government of the realm had been removed from the King and his advisors and favourites, and placed in the hands of the council. The main opponents of Richard's policy of peace with France were, his uncle, Thomas of Woodstock, by now duke of Gloucester, and Richard Fitzalan, earl of Arundel who led the Council. Under their influence, the Council acted as an effective regency and changed domestic and foreign policy to suit their own agenda. The unbridgeable difference between the King and his Council forms the background to the Appellant-led expeditions of 1387 and 1388 and also the brief civil war culminating in the battle of Radcot Bridge in December 1387. The expeditions supplying the material for this paper were led in person by the earl of Arundel, who with the duke of Gloucester, wished to reinvigorate the war with France. Arundel had previously been on campaign, but not very successfully. For instance at St Malo in 1378, where he negligently allowed a mine to be undermined by the French. Froissart describes the episode:

> Richard, earl of Arundel, was on guard one night with his people, but he was very inattentive to obey the orders he had received, of which the garrison were informed by their spies or otherwise. When they imagined the army (trusting to lord Arundel's want of vigilance) would be fast asleep, they sallied from the town very secretly, and advanced to where the miners were at work, who had little more to do to complete the mine. The captain of St Malo and his company, being prepared to accomplish their enterprise, destroyed the mine at their ease; and some of the workmen who were within were never seen afterwards, as the mine fell upon them…Upon this, the earl of Arundel was sent for and sharply reprimanded by the duke of Lancaster and earl of Cambridge for his neglect: he excused himself as well as he was able, but was so greatly ashamed that he had rather have lost several thousand pounds.[8]

To return to our current story, the expedition of 1387 was a naval campaign commanded by the Admiral, Richard Fitzalan, earl of Arundel and consisted of two phases. The first phase saw battle joined with the Flemish fleet with a successful outcome for the earl and his forces. After pursuing the remnants of the Flemish fleet into harbour at Sluys, the English force returned to Orwell for a brief rest and refit. The second phase saw the force sail to Brittany for the relief of Brest. Brest had been acquired from John de Montfort, duke of Brittany in 1378. However, de Montfort was in dispute with the English over their occupation and had been besieging Brest since 1386. This expedition was hugely popular at home due to the large amount of wine captured from the enemy force, Froissart again:

> Having entered the Thames, they landed at London, where they were joyfully received for the fine wines of Poitou and Saintonge they had on board, which were intended to have been drunk in Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, Liege, and other places. They were dispersed throughout England, and the prices so much depressed from the quantity, a gallon was sold for fourpence.[9]

The expedition of 1387 also gives me the opportunity to bring in a Welsh theme.[10] Listed amongst Arundel's esquires in 1387 is none other than the future Welsh rebel, Owain Glyn Dwr.[11] He was also recorded amongst Arundel's esquires in 1388, but in this later campaign his name was crossed out, as he had not fulfilled his intention to serve. In 1387 he was accompanied by his brother Tudor ap Gruffudd and the unfortunate Gronw ap Tudor, who was later captured in Owain's attack on Ruthin in 1400. He was executed and the quarters of his body were sent to four border towns.[12] It would seem that Owain gained much valuable military experience that he would later use against Henry IV and Prince Henry, in the service of the English crown.

The expeditions were divided by the brief civil war culminating in the battle of Radcot Bridge in December 1387. The king had attempted to gain a legal opinion to establish whether the Wonderful Parliament of 1386 and the appointment of the council had deprived him of his prerogative. These 'questions to the judges' of August 1387, produced the answers that the council was illegal and also that the people who had directed the actions should be treated as traitors.[13] As a result, the earls of Gloucester, Arundel and Warwick (the senior Appellants) were joined by the earls of Derby and Nottingham (the junior Appellants), who went on the offensive and named five favourites of the king as

traitors, who would be 'appealed' in parliament. It is from this action that the aforementioned senior peers received their collective description of the Lords Appellant. Robert de Vere, duke of Ireland, managed to gather a force of loyal Cheshire men in defence of the king, numbering around 3,000 in strength. This force was no match for the army of the Lords Appellant and the actual battle was a debacle, with de Vere flee-ing from the skirmish.[14] The Appellants may have used the aftermath of the battle to effect a brief deposition of the king, although they had to restore him when they could not decide on the succession.[15] At the Merciless Parliament of 1388 the accused were formally appealed and executed if they had not already managed to escape the country.[16] The two principal, and now victorious Appellants, Gloucester and Arundel, then took a firmer grip on government and foreign policy.

As a result, the expedition of 1388 was planned on a more ambi-tious scale to build on the success of the previous year and was also commanded by the earl of Arundel. It was again a naval campaign, though it was intended to link up with John de Montfort in Brittany and John of Gaunt in Gascony. However, Gaunt did not want to cooperate and due to the late arrival of the force in Brittany, de Montfort had secured his own alliance with the French. Arundel failed to make any impact in France, due to the lack of mobility inland, as the horses for the campaign were very likely to have been provided by England's ally, John de Montfort.[17]

Following the return of the force to England in September 1388, Richard II was able to reassert himself and the Appellants became less influential. The Scottish incursions into the northwest and northeast of England during July 1388, which had culminated in Scottish victory at Otterburn on 5th August 1388 and the capture of Sir Henry 'Hotspur' Percy, had increased the pressure on the Appellant government and Arundel was even made to explain the reasons for the delay for the departure on campaign in 1388. Richard demonstrated that he was politically astute and over the next few months, his friends and favourites who had been banished from court during the Appellant supremacy returned to the king's service. On 3rd May 1389, at a council meeting at Westminster, Richard declared that he was now ready to enjoy his full rights. He dismissed the treasurer and the keeper of the privy seal and Archbishop Arundel, the Chancellor, had to surrender the great seal. Both Gloucester and Richard, earl of Arundel were removed from the council and Arundel was replaced as admiral and captain of Brest.

By the terms of his indenture for service in 1388, Arundel had been confirmed in his post of Admiral for five years.[18] He was therefore removed from office with four years still to run.

This brings us to the wider careers of the soldiers who fought in one or both of these campaigns. Had the men who fought in these expeditions also taken part in mercenary actions or indeed crusade or pilgrimage activity? Perhaps the best information is from the soldiers themselves. The first source which historians use for such evidence is generally the court of chivalry. Detailed depositions were delivered by the supporters of either side of contesting parties, usually to prove a case of heraldry. Witnesses would be called to testify where they had seen the heraldry in use. On many occasions, therefore, this would be on the field of battle, and hence we have first hand evidence of a military career. The problem with this evidence is that we only have the soldier's word for where they have been and in addition, they do not provide fully detailed *Curriculum Vitae*. Instead they simply focus on campaigns and travel where they have seen the heraldry in question.

Although the most famous case, that of Scrope and Grosvenor, contested in 1386, provides us with 40 deponents who also served in 1387–88, it is rather unfortunate that they mainly all testify to rather standard careers, demonstrating careers in royal service.[19] Of soldiers who did not fight in 1387–1388, Scrope v. Grosvenor provides a wealth of evidence: 14 individuals testified to having served overseas from Egypt to Lithuania. They claimed that they had fought in Spain, Africa, the Mediterranean, Middle East and northern Europe. For instance, Sir Richard Waldegrave told the court that had been beyond the great sea to Satalia in Turkey with the King of Cyprus. Nicholas Sabraham stated that he had been on the crusade with the King of Cyprus to Alexandria, he had also served in Prussia, Hungary, Constantinople, Spain, and also beyond the great sea. Therefore both would have definitely served alongside Chaucer's Knight at some stage in their careers.[20]

However, I am rescued for this article by the testimony of Sir Alexander Goldingham, who seems to have 'been armed' in Lombardy and perhaps then passed beyond the Great Sea. Goldingham fought in the retinue of Sir Thomas Ponynges in 1388 and had previously served in Britanny with Thomas, earl of Buckingham in 1380 and with Gaunt in Castile in 1386.[21] Intriguingly, we can trace his Italian service to his participation on a diplomatic mission to Milan with Humprey de Bohan, earl of Hereford, to discuss the marriage of Prince Lionel in July 1366. This is therefore suggestive that he would have come into contact with

Sir John Hawkwood, who as we shall see later, was also involved in the same marriage negotations. The same case in the court of chivalry also provides us with a link to another soldier, Sir Stephen Lescrope, second Lord Scrope of Masham. He probably fought in Arundel's retinue in 1387. I say probably because there are two other possible identifications of Sir Stephen Lescrope, but this identification is strengthened by the presence of his brother, Sir John, fighting in the same retinue.[22] If it is this Sir Stephen, then we have a companion of Chaucer's knight, as they both fought with the King of Cyprus on 'crusade' against Alexandria in 1365. Stephen had previously fought with Edward III in France in 1360 and was later at Najera in 1367.[23]

We are also able to make comparisons with a couple of other contemporary cases, namely Grey v. Hastings from the early years of the reign of Henry IV[24] and Lovel v. Morley in the mid 1380s.[25] These comparisons throw up one interesting career of an archer, Robert Fyshlake, who fights in the retinue of the earl of Nottingham, the earl Marshal in 1388.[26] In the Grey v. Hastings dispute he testifies that he served with John of Gaunt in the naval expedition of 1378, also in the ill fated naval expedition of Sir John Arundel in 1379, in Brittany with the earl of Buckingham in 1380 and on the Scottish expedition in 1385. He also travelled with Hugh Hastings III to Jerusalem and the Eastern Mediterranean.[27] Thus demonstrating that we can even link the careers of archers with the far flung adventures that Chaucer's knight has also undertaken.

If we move away slightly from the court of chivalry we can pick up the stories of a number of more 'well known' soldiers, whose careers include interesting diversions. The Crusade of Bishop Despencer in 1383, throws up a couple of interesting names, Sir Thomas Trivet and Sir William Elmham. Trivet gained notoriety for giving up a town to the French for a bribe, only surviving the wrath of Parliament by throwing himself on the kings mercy.[28] It is also illuminating to note, that both Trivet and Elmham were placed in custody by the Appellants on 1st January 1388, but released again in May.[29] Both had served on the Appellant expeditions. Elmham, captained a retinue in 1387 and served with Sir Thomas Percy in 1388, while Trivet lead the fourth largest retinue in 1387.[30] They may have owed their release in 1388 to their military experience. In the case of Trivet, who had laid ambushes for the Appellants in London, this was rather surprising. He died rather unfortunately later that same year, his horse rather suspiciously falling on him as he galloped across a ploughed field.[31] Trivet is likely to have been involved with the Free Companies, as he accompanied

Robert Knolles on his *chevauchée* in 1370,[32] and was also later involved in Navarre in 1378–79.[33] We will revisit the career of Elmham later in the article, but it is clear that both men served extensively in royal expeditions. One other soldier, William, Lord Hylton, was a retinue captain in 1388 and also served on the Despencer crusade of 1383.[34] The Barbary Crusade of the duke of Bourbon in 1390 was joined by a number of English figures, including the earl of Devon, who led a retinue in both 1387 and 1388.[35] It is also of note that Henry, earl of Derby, was not granted permission to join this crusade, and thus chose to ride with the Teutonic Knights as an alternative pursuit.

A convincing argument for an English participant at the crusade of Nicopolis in 1396 has yet to be made.[36] One possible English name to consider is Sir John Calveley (the nephew and heir of Sir Hugh Calveley). Sir John led a retinue in 1387 and joined the retinue of the earl Marshal in 1388.[37] He left the country in 1396 and returned later in 1397, thus giving him enough time to fight at Nicopolis. However, it is more likely that during this period he was chasing the debts owed to his uncle by the King of Aragon.[38] Sir John died fighting for Henry IV at the battle of Shrewsbury in 1403.[39]

The article will now consider some material that may provide more forceful evidence to show that the activities of Chaucer's Knight might not have been so unusual. Up to this point I have outlined a number of case studies, which point to interesting and varied careers both in and out of royal service, crusade, pilgrimage and mercenary activities, but are these people the norm—or far from the norm?

I will begin by looking for comparisons thrown up by the recent publication by Kenneth Fowler, on the Great Companies.[40] This text provides the names of 82 English soldiers against which to compare my database of soldiers from 1387–1388. The comparison produced a correlation of 8 individual soldiers or just under 10% [TABLE 1].[41] This seems to me to be fairly significant, not perhaps in a statistical sense, but in terms of demonstrating a pattern of continuance of service. I found a similar level of continuance of service (16%) between the two campaigns of 1387 and 1388. From this Table, it is also possible to identify a previously unknown relationship between the esquire, Thomas Fogg and Sir John Sandes, both serving in Free Companies and then together in the retinue of Sandes in 1388.[42]

This kind of mercenary activity can be supplemented by taking into account those who fought at Najera with the Black Prince in 1367.

As we know, many of the English soldiers had already fought to displace Pedro the Cruel as mercenaries, before being ordered to join the Black Prince to put Pedro back on the throne. This included famous soldiers such as Sir Robert Knolles and Sir Hugh Calveley. The *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* even suggests that Chaucer was on a secret mission in Castile in 1367 and would have spent some time in the service of the Black Prince.[43] The comparison of soldiers on this campaign is not so successful, throwing up just five names [TABLE 2].[44] Of these names, we have already come across Sir Stephen Lescrope. It is also of note, that Sir Hugh Courtenay was the brother of the earl of Devon, also mentioned earlier. It is perhaps more significant that we find two soldiers who fought at Najera and are also identified in Table 1 in the free companies, namely Sir John Sandes and Bertrand de la Salle, demonstrating that these two soldiers, who later would also join the expeditions of 1387–88,[45] probably fought both against and for Pedro in Castile.

Another major theatre of warfare to consider is Italy, made famous by Sir John Hawkwood and The White Company. Although Chaucer's knight does not campaign in Italy, Chaucer himself visited on royal business, possibly with Lionel of Clarence in 1368, again in 1372–73, and in 1378 met Hawkwood himself in Milan.[46] If he had been in the wedding party of Lionel of Clarence, he would have come into contact with Edward Despencer, who took command of English forces following the untimely death of the newly married Lionel. Despencer occupied the dowry lands that had been granted to the English Prince and refused to give them up without a fight.[47] For this paper it is interesting that Despencer was the father of Thomas Despencer, future earl of Gloucester, who served alongside Arundel in 1388.[48] I have been able to conduct some analysis for this current paper via the research on mercenaries in Italy by William P. Caferro.[49] From his list of English soldiers in the article on the White Company, I have been able to find two of the 18 individuals in my dataset (11%). From another list of English soldiers serving for the Pope, Florence, Pisa and Venice (from 1360–1390), using comparative analysis, we can find that five of the 35 (14%) also served in 1387–1388. [TABLE 3]. This really is a useful table of identifications, as other than these comparisons, I had only identified when these soldiers served in 1387 and/or 1388 and within which retinue—apart from John Butiller who also served with Arundel in his retinue in 1378.[50] This demonstrates

that the Italian conflict included many of the ordinary soldiers from the regular military community within England and that these types of service patterns are not unusual.

My final set of comparisons of royal service with other theatres concerns Prussia and service with the Teutonic Knights, so again directly comparable to Chaucer's knight. From the 100 or so soldiers named as accompanying the earl of Derby on his two expeditions, on crusade to Prussia and on pilgrimage to the Holy Land, I can identify nine, so just under 10% [TABLE 4].[51] These names are taken from one long expense claim detailing the money spent supporting these trips. Unfortunately for this paper, even though the archers accompanying Henry were given special praise for their prowess on campaign, they are not named in this document.[52] Of the soldiers found in the comparative exercise, it is interesting to see that John Brothir is named as a Trumpeter in 1390–1, and in the muster roll for 1388 is named as a Trumper, suggesting that he was a professional minstrel or signuler of some kind. He seems to have been surplus to requirements in 1388 and his name was crossed out of the muster roll, indicating that he did not campaign.[53] One of our soldiers, Sir John Clifton, appears because he claims back the amount he has spent on a Chess Set for the earl of Derby, perhaps with the intention to wile away the long dark evenings whilst in Prussia.[54] We also come across Sir William Elmham again, this time going to Paris on behalf of the earl on an unsuccessful attempt to gain safe conduct for the Barbary Crusade. This set of comparisons is significant on two fronts. Firstly, it shows that a good number of the regular military community were willing to accompany the earl on crusade and pilgrimage, thus these particular soldiers would have seen this as a worthy undertaking. Secondly, including such activities in the description of the knight, Chaucer is making a direct comparison to the earl of Derby. Would Chaucer be likely to cast aspersions by including this reference to the powerful earl?[55]

So, to conclude, I was surprised to find this volume of evidence indicating participation by regular soldiers, soldiers who campaigned on royal expeditions, in the wider conflict. I certainly did not expect to find so much, and pretty well ignored this possibility when researching my doctoral thesis, other than at the edges with a few case studies. It now seems to me that such participation is far more extensive than previously believed, and this evidence has come from a very limited set of source materials with which to gather the comparisons. This paper has demonstrated, I hope, that the military career would not only

comprise regular involvement in the wars of the king, but also could involve pilgrimage, crusade and mercenary activities.

What about my original question, what does all this evidence tell us about Chaucer's knight and the places he has fought, what did this say to the contemporary audience? Perhaps we shouldn't read too heavily into where Chaucer's knight has campaigned, as it seems that such theatres of warfare were commonplace on the military CVs of a representative group of the English military community (of which Chaucer was a paid up member) and perhaps made up a 'normal' military career. What we should be interested in, is where Chaucer's knight does not campaign. He does not fight in the Hundred Years War, and it is clear from this paper, that for these campaigns to be missing from a knightly career at the end of the fourteenth century was very unusual. Therefore, if we accept that mercenary and crusade activities were regular occurrences in the English military career, and that these soldiers would also fight in the conflict against France, then only one question remains to be answered concerning Chaucer's knight. By omitting any service in the Hundred Years War, was Chaucer attempting to implicitly support the idea's of Phillip de Mezieres: peace in Christendom; an Anglo-French marriage; and a joint crusade against the infidel?[56]

Notes

[1] *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. Larry D. Benson (3rd edn. Oxford, 1992), 24.

[2] Terry Jones, *Chaucer's Knight. The portrait of a medieval mercenary* (London, 1980).

[3] Adrian R. Bell, 'England and the Crusade of Nicopolis', *Medieval Life*, 4 (1996), 18–22. For detail on this crusade see A.S. Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934).

[4] *The Scrope and Grosvenor Controversy*, ed. N. Harris Nicolas, 2 vols (London, 1832), 2. 404.

[5] Adrian R. Bell, *War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2004).

[6] The National Archives (TNA) E 101/40/34, muster roll for 1387 and E101/41/5, muster roll for 1388.

[7] For discussion of continuity of service between campaigns, see Bell, *War and the Soldier*, 96–101, and for detail on the campaigns and what follows *Ibid.*, 34–79 and J.J.N. Palmer, *England, France and Christendom, 1377–99* (London, 1972).

[8] J. Froissart, *Chronicles*, ed. and trans. T. Johnes, 2 vols (London, 1874), 1. 551–552.

[9] Froissart, *Chronicles*, 2. 217.

[10] Pertinent due to the location of the conference at which this paper was delivered, The University of Wales, Swansea, which has a building named after its famous hero.

[11] It is clear that Owain still has a strong public image, recently being voted 23rd greatest Briton of all time (Henry V was 72nd), the 2nd Greatest Welsh hero (behind Aneurin Bevan) and the Welshman of the Millennium.

[12] R.R. Davies, *The revolt of Owain Glyn Dwr* (Oxford, 1997), 103.

[13] S.B. Chrimes, 'Richard II's Questions to the Judges, 1387', *Law Quarterley Review*, 72 (1956), 365–390.

[14] J.N.L. Myres, 'The campaign of Radcot Bridge in December 1387', *English Historical Review*, 42 (1927), 20–33.

[15] M.V. Clarke and V.H. Galbraith, 'The Deposition of Richard II?', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 14 (1930), 125–181.

[16] *The Westminster Chronicle 1381–1394*, ed. and trans. L.C. Hector and B.F. Harvey (Oxford, 1982), 234–35.

[17] Michael Jones, *Ducal Brittany 1364–1399: Relations with England and France during the reign of Duke John IV* (Oxford, 1970), 110 and Appendix A, 212–214.

[18] TNA E 101/41/4.

[19] Bell, *War and the Soldier*, Table 20, 142–143.

[20] *Scrope and Grosvenor*, 2. 374–Waldegrave, 323–Sabraham.

[21] *Ibid.*, 2. 277; 1388–TNA E 101/41/5 m. 6d.

[22] TNA E 101/40/33 m. 1.

[23] *Scrope and Grosvenor*, 2. 130–132.

[24] Maurice Keen, 'English military experience and the Court of Chivalry: the case of Grey v. Hastings', in P. Contamine, C. Giry-Deloison, M. Keen (eds), *Guerre et société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne, XIVᵉ–XVᵉ siècle* (Lille, 1992), 123–42.

[25] Andrew Ayton, 'Knights, Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry', in A. Ayton, and J.L. Price (eds.), *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1995), 81–104.

[26] TNA E 101/41/5 m. 3d.

[27] Keen, 'English Military Experience', 132–133.

[28] *Westminster Chronicle*, 31–49.

[29] *Ibid.*, 229 for arrest and 339 for release. Also *Calendar of Close Rolls, 1385–1389*, 393–395 and 397–398.

[30] Elmham, 1387: TNA E 101/40/33 m. 11; 1388: E 101/40/39 m. 1. Trivet, 1387: /40/33 m. 7.

[31] *Westminster Chronicle*, 369.

[32] J.W. Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and the English Expeditions to France, 1369–1380', *English Historical Review*, 79 (1964), 718–46, reprinted in his *War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England*, ed. A. Tuck (London, 1994), 1–28.

[33] P.E. Russell, *English Intervention in Spain and Portugal* (Oxford, 1955).

[34] 1383: *The Complete Peerage*, ed. G.E. Cokayne (13 vols, London, 1910–57), 7. 26; 1388: TNA E 101/41/5 m. 5d.

[35] *Westminster Chronicle*, 433, 451. 1387: TNA E 101/40/33 m. 3. 1388: E 101/41/5 m. 5.

[36] The suggestion of Sir Ralph Percy has been disputed by Charles L. Tipton, 'The English at Nicopolis', *Speculum*, 37 (1962), 528–40, and promoted by Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, Appendix (o), 239–240. Other historians have stated that John Beaufort was present at Nicopolis, but without supporting evidence: Anthony Goodman, *John of Gaunt. The exercise of princely power in fourteenth-century Europe* (Harlow, 1992), 203 and N. Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford, 1992), 75.

[37] 1387: TNA E 101/40/33 m. 17. 1388: E 101/41/5 m. 3.

[38] Edouard Perroy (ed.), *The Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II* (London, 1933), no. 200, 145, 244–246. My thanks to Professor Anthony Goodman for this reference.

[39] J.S. Roskell, L. Clark, C. Rawcliffe (eds.), *The History of Parliament. The House of Commons 1386–1421*, 4 vols (Stroud, 1992), 2. 469.

[40] Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries, Volume 1: The Great Companies* (Oxford, 2001).

[41] The tables present the results of the comparative exercises. They display the names of soldiers from the source, presented against the evidence from the muster rolls for 1387 and 1388, along with the soldier's rank and retinue captain.

[42] 1388: TNA E 101/41/5 m. 13.

[43] *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (accessed online: www.oxforddnb.com), entry for Chaucer, Geoffrey (c. 1340–1400).

[44] This comparison was aided by the article by L.J. Andrew Villalon, 'Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Najera', in L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (eds.), *The Hundred Years War: a wider focus* (Brill, 2004), 3–74, and see Appendices which list the participants drawn from the Chronicles.

[45] Salle, de la, 1387: TNA E 101/40/33 m. 9; 1388: E 101/41/5 m. 18. Sandes 1388: E 101/41/5 m. 15.

[46] A.C. Cook, 'The Last Months of Chaucer's Earliest Patron', *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 21 (1916), 1–144 and *ODNB*.

[47] Cook, 'The Last Months', 104–107.

[48] 1388: TNA E 101/41/5 m. 1. Lord Despencer, then 15 years old, was listed second on Arundel's muster roll: Bell, *War and the Soldier*, 88–89.

[49] The comparative exercise was conducted against two sources, firstly, William P. Caferro, ' "The Fox and the Lion": The White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy', in *The Hundred Years War: a wider Focus*, 179–210, and secondly a list compiled by Caferro for analysis against my databases and those of Professor Anne Curry.

[50] Butiller, 1378: TNA E 101/36/32; 1387: E 101/40/33 m. 9. William P. Caferro, John Hawkwood. An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 2006) was only published after the conference.

[51] *Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land made by Henry, Earl of Derby, in the years 1390–1 and 1392–3*, ed. L.T. Smith, Camden New Series, 52 (London, 1894).

[52] *Ibid.*, p. xxx.

[53] 1388: TNA E 101/41/5 m. 3d., listed as 'Johan Browder, Trumper—Munstvaly'. Derby: *Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land*, 97.

[54] 1387: TNA E 101/40/33 m. 4; 1388: E 101/41/5 m. 3. Derby: *Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land*, xliii, 113.

[55] Indeed Chaucer was married to Philippa, sister of Katherine Swynford, mistress and later wife (in 1397) of Henry's father, John of Gaunt: *Riverside Chaucer*, xiv.

[56] Support for this idea is given by the fact that half of the envoys used by Richard II in his marriage negotiations in 1396, had also promised to become members of de Mezieres' Order of the Passion: Bell, *War and the Soldier*, 30–31.

APPENDIX—TABLES

Table 1: Free Companies—Comparison with Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*.

Fowler	Name	1387		Name	1388	
		Rank	Captain		Rank	Captain
William Botiller				William Buteler	esquire	Robert Bland and John Creghton
John Chiselden	John Chiselden	esquire	Richard, earl of Arundel			
Bernard de la Salle	Baskin de la Sale	esquire	Sir Hugh le Despencer	Baskyn de la Sole	esquire	Sir Hugh le Despencer
John Sandes				Sir John Sandes	captain	
William Shelton				William Shelton	esquire	Richard, earl of Arundel
Geoffrey Worsley	Geffray Woluley	esquire	Richard, earl of Arundel			
Jannekin Nowell				John Nowell	esquire	Sir Robert Massey
Thomas Fogg	Thomas Fogg			Thomas Fogg	esquire	Sir John Sandes

Table 2: Najera, 1367.

Najera	Name	1387		Name	1388	
		Rank	Captain		Rank	Captain
Thomas Banaster				Thomas Banastre	esquire	Sir John Clanyng
Sir John Sandes				Sir John Sandes	captain	
Sir Stephen Scrope	Sir Stephen LeScrope	knight	Richard, earl of Arundel			
Sir Hugh Courtenay	Sir Hugh Courtenay	knight	earl of Devon	Sir Hugh Courteney	knight	earl of Devon
Bertrand de la Salle	Baskin de la Sale	esquire	Sir Hugh le Despencer	Baskyn de la Sole	esquire	Sir Hugh le Despencer

Table 3: Italy—Comparison with Caferro.

	Name	1387 Rank	1387 Captain	Name	1388 Rank	1388 Captain
White Company (1361)						
William Thornton	William Thorneton	esquire	John Wormington	William Thornton	esquire	Robert Geffard and William Cavven
William Kirkeby	William Kyrkeby	esquire	Sir Thomas Mortimer	William de Kyrkeby	esquire	Sir William, Lord Hylton
Others						
John Gifford 1375, Pope	John Gifford	esquire	Sir Thomas Mortimer			
Johnny Butler 1390, Florence	John Butiller	esquire	Sir Hugh le Despencer			
John Barry 1384, Florence	John Barre	esquire	Sir Gilbert Talbot			
John Coleman, 1360s–70s				John Colman	archer	earl of Derby
John Lye 1388–1389	John Lye	esquire	Sir Thomas Trivet			

Table 4: Prussia—Comparison with *Expeditions of Earl of Derby 1390–1 & 1392–3.*

Prussia	Name	1387 Rank	1387 Captain	Name	1388 Rank	1388 Captain
John Brothir, Trumpeter 1390–1				John Browder, Trumper	minstrel	earl Marshal
Robert Chalons 1390–1	Robert Chalons	esquire	earl of Devon			
Sir John Clifton 1390–1	Sir John Cliston	knight	Lord Beaumont	Sir John Clyfton	knight	earl Marshal
Sir John Dalyngrugg 1390–1	John Dalyngrugg	esquire	Richard, earl of Arundel	John Dalingrugg	esquire	Sir William Heron
Sir William Elmham, Paris 1390–1 & 1392–3	Sir William Elmham	captain		Sir William Elmham	knight	Sir Thomas Percy
Thomas Gloucestre, marshal 1390–1 & 1392–3				Thomas Gloucestre	esquire	Richard, earl of Arundel
Sir John Malet, 1390–1				John Malet	esquire	Sir William Brienne
John Payn, clerk of the buttery 1390–1 & 1392–3				John Payn	esquire	Richard, earl of Arundel
Sir William de Wylloughby or Wyluby 1390–1 & 1392–3				Sir William Wylby	knight	Richard, earl of Arundel

WHAT DOES A MERCENARY LEAVE BEHIND?

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE ESTATES OF OWAIN LAWGOCH

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The medieval mercenary and his impact on the society in which he lived and died is usually discussed in terms of his exploits on the battlefield, his collection of the spoils of war (either hostages or something of more immediate financial worth) and then the subsequent relation of stories about his life in chronicles of the period or fictional tales created later using facets from several different characters and events. Equally important, however, for the study of the personality of the medieval mercenary is the question of what does a mercenary leave behind when he is employed to fight abroad; what archaeological evidence can be recovered relating to his estates and property, and what can they tell us about why he would choose the life of a mercenary.

In July 2003 a memorial was unveiled in the French town of Mortagne-sur-Gironde to commemorate one of the most important mercenary captains fighting for France during the Hundred Years War. His name was Owain ap Thomas, better known as Owain Lawgoch (Owain of the Red Hand) or Yvain de Galles (Owain of Wales). What makes this particular mercenary all the more fascinating is that he was the last direct descendant of the House of Gwynedd, a Prince of Wales by birthright, and a man well aware of his status in society. A miniature of his assassination at the siege of the castle of Mortagne-sur-Gironde is to be found in Jean de Wavrin's Chronique d'Angleterre which is now preserved in the British Library.[1] How Owain ap Thomas came to be known as Owain Lawgoch, his career, and how he was assassinated under the orders of the English Crown at the siege of Mortagne-sur-Gironde in 1378 have already been discussed by A.D. Carr in a book based in part on research carried out by Edward Owen for an article published in 1900.[2]

As well the historical dimension to the study of the mercenaries such as Owain Lawgoch and the world in which he and his contemporaries

lived and died in there is also the archaeological dimension to be considered. This archaeological dimension can take many forms; from studies of the location of battlefields and their preservation as sites of historic and archaeological interest through studies of skeletal remains from battlefields and the study of arms and armour of the medieval period and their efficiency.[3]

An archaeological dimension can also mean the property and related landscapes of a medieval mercenary. An example of this is Bodiam Castle in Sussex where it appears that Sir Edward Dallyngrigge spent some of his profits from the Hundred Years War on building a castle and setting it in a designed landscape although whether or not Dallyngrigge could be considered or perceived as a mercenary is a moot point.[4] Studies of the archaeology of the high-status medieval landscape are beginning to reveal a previously unknown degree of sophistication as regards the planning and layout of designed landscapes around medieval castles and high-status houses during the medieval period.[5]

Given the status of Owain Lawgoch, his father Thomas ap Rhodri and grandfather Rhodri ap Gruffudd, what kind of property and estates did Owain leave behind when he travelled to serve in France and what information is already known about these estates? The estates were originally identified by Edward Owen and the chronology of their acquisition was refined by A.D. Carr. This study was developed in an attempt to identify the remains of the estates surviving today. The four estates are Bidfield, Gloucestershire; Althurst, Cheshire; Tatsfield, Surrey and Plas yn Dinas, Montgomeryshire. The four estates were acquired by Owain's grandfather and father between 1270 and 1322. Each of the estates seems to have been acquired through a different method and this has some significance when the interpretation of the historical and archaeological evidence is considered. Bidfield seems to have been provided by King Edward I for Rhodri ap Gruffudd in order that he was close to the Queen Mother, Eleanor of Provence in her residence at Gloucester Castle. Rhodri had spent much of his early life as a political hostage of the English Crown and later seems to have been part of the household of the Queen Mother, a time which included a visit to France in January 1275.[6] Althurst was purchased between 1301 and 1305 by Rhodri and his second wife Katherine; Tatsfield is recorded as being in Rhodri's possession in 1309 when he presents to the Rectory and Plas yn Dinas was inherited by Thomas ap Rhodri on the death of his brother in law in 1332.[7] These then are the estates

which Owain forfeited in the late 1360's when he went to France to fight as a captain of a free Welsh company.

Archaeological and historical research into the four estates has been rather uneven. Although the estates were recognised by Edward Owen in his *Cymmrodorion* article little use seems to have been made of the available information even after the publication of A.D. Carr's book. The director of an excavation carried out on the site of the medieval manor in Bidfield in 1966 in advance of a road-widening scheme was not aware of the significance of the ownership of the site, and although there was considerable local press interest in the excavation, the results of the excavation were not written up until much later.[8] An archaeological watching brief in 2002 close to the site of the 1966 excavation also did not place the interpretation of the evidence into a wider context.[9] What is considered to be the location of the medieval manor house at Althurst was recognised in 1976, but the information was not passed on to the county sites and monuments record. In 1996 timbers were recovered from a palaeo-channel below Plas yn Dinas and appeared to relate to the late medieval occupation of the site.[10]

Between 1980 and 1995 the fields farmed by Church Farm Tatsfield were metal detected by members of the West Kent Detecting Club, and a record of finds made including a fourteenth century horse harness pendant which appears to one produced for either Rhodri ap Gruffudd or Thomas ap Rhodri as it shows a lion rampant in yellow and red enamel.[11] In 1992 excavation for an M25 service station at Clackett Lane south of Tatsfield produced evidence for a pottery kiln which was in production during the fourteenth century within the manor of Tatsfield and in 1999 a desk based assessment for a new parish hut close to the church at Tatsfield did not mention the medieval period in any great detail although it was noted that the medieval manor house could lie in the vicinity of any proposed works.[12]

In September 2004 the author directed an archaeological excavation and associated topographical survey in Tatsfield in an attempt to locate the medieval manor house. These works were funded through the medium of a television documentary series 'Tywysogion' (*Princes*). This series was produced by Ffilmiau'r Bont, Caernarfon on the history and archaeology of the Native Welsh Princes c. 900–c. 1420 for broadcast on Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C, the Welsh Fourth Channel). The desk based assessment carried out by the author in 2003–4 identified from aerial photographs what appeared to be the remains of a building platform

and associated crop marks and on Ordnance Survey maps of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there is visible the disappearance of a pond which appeared to lie close to the building platform. A field visit was carried out in 2004 in order to examine the site prior to any decision being made about whether an excavation would be possible and noted at that time was a street sign 'Maesmaur Road'. Maesmaur is constructed of two Welsh words '*Maes*' Field and '*Mawr*' Big.[13] The excavation was primarily to locate the position, size and orientation of the manor house and also to examine the relationship of the manor house to the medieval parish church 75m to the south-east.

The excavation strategy adopted was that of targeted test-pits which were extended when they found significant archaeology. Seven test pits were excavated, with three of these extended as needed and one excavated in an archaeologically sterile area of the site in order to provide a method of establishing the make-up of undisturbed material. One of the extended trenches (Trench Three) recovered the remains of a heavily robbed out foundation, although some flint (walling material) was still *in situ*. Also recovered was roof tile or flint work from all the test pits/ trenches (with the exception of Test Pit Seven—the archaeologically sterile test pit). The interpretation of the excavated archaeology is not at first sight particularly complex. A building, which appears to be a medieval manor house, has later been removed and the site abandoned. However, it is the context of Owain Lawgoch and his declaration as a traitor, combined with the additional historical research, which provides the interpretation for the sequence of events which happened on this site during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

During the excavation it was noted that although there was very little in the way of building material (flint and tile) it was all concentrated in a very small area, and the excavation of Trench Five, the trench positioned to examine the make up of the medieval access road into the manor house site, revealed no flint work at all, but a quantity of roof tile. The fact that the flint work was concentrated in this small area, and the fact that the excavations revealed no ceramic evidence for anything other than fourteenth century occupation of the site (some late twentieth century pottery and other rubbish of similar date was recovered—the land owner confirming that this material was on the site from his father's attempts to level the platform during the 1990's) it appears that the earlier manor houses lay elsewhere in the vicinity of Church Farm.

It was also noted during the excavation that there was no sign that the building had fallen into disrepair over a long period of time, and there was a lack of finds such a medieval nails and dressed stone quoins which should have accompanied the dereliction of such a building. There was also no evidence for a post-medieval demolition of the building, an event which would have left evidence such as clay pipes in reasonable quantities (one very small fragment of bowl and one short piece of stem were recovered). An antiquarian report, that a building, assumed to be the medieval manor house, had been demolished in 1801, could now be discounted and applied to the medieval and post-medieval court house which was situated 170 metres north of the manor house at Tatsfield Court.[14]

The only other possibility which offered itself was that the building had been systematically dismantled during the fourteenth century and that the majority of walling material (flint) and unbroken roofing material (tile) along with the wood, metal and stone components of the building were taken away on carts, with some of the roof tile falling off the carts and ending up either in or on the road surface. Such a radical suggestion, that is, that a building would be removed so completely from the landscape demands some explanation. However once the location of the manor is taken into consideration, and the owner's status and aspirations are considered, this interpretation becomes a plausible one and the reasons for the removal of the building will be discussed below.

In order to understand the background to Owain Lawgoch and his 'defection', it is worth examining the situation in Gwynedd at the end of the thirteenth century. Edward I, after the death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (Rhodri's brother and great-great-uncle to Owain Lawgoch) in December 1282 and the capture and execution of another brother Dafydd ap Gruffudd in 1283, set about constructing castles at Caernarfon, Conwy and Harlech (The castles of Flint and Rhuddlan having been begun in 1277 and Beaumaris was not begun until 1295). These castles, in effect, constructed on new sites were the administrative replacements for the native Welsh royal residences or *llysoedd* at Dolbadarn, Trefriw and Ystumgwern.[15]

As part of the works at these castles the timber halls were removed from the *llysoedd* and re-erected within the castles under construction. As an example the hall from Ystumgwern was re-erected inside Harlech castle in 1307 and is still known as Ystumgwern Hall. The removal of

these halls to within the Edwardian castles demonstrated that Edward I was now sovereign of Wales and his appropriation of these symbols of the Prince's power were useful tools of propaganda. Without the halls, which were where the Prince's judicial and political affairs were conducted, these sites became meaningless as administrative and judicial centres and the creation of new shires and lordships meant that there were new centres of power run by the English overlords.

During the period of the First (1277–78) and Second (1282–83) Welsh wars Rhodri ap Gruffudd had served in Edward I's army and had already renounced his claim to the title Prince of Wales in 1272.[16] Following this, he appears not to have been considered a threat in any shape or form by his brother Llywelyn; however Rhodri seems to have had an agenda of his own which shows that he may have been more aware of events around him and more in control of his own destiny than has previously been thought.

Tatsfield had previously been the property of Robert de Crevequer. Robert had passed on this land to Robert de Campania in 1276 and he is subsequently to be found in North Wales as right hand man of the Justice of Chester, Reginald de Grey (Professor J.B. Smith refers to him as an 'agent of ruthless justice') and holding the lordship of Prestatyn and land in Dyffryn Clwyd.[17] This is of some significance, because when Llywelyn and Owain ap Gruffudd agreed to the Treaty of Woodstock in 1247 they gave up the right to land to the east of the river Conwy which included Prestatyn. This land in theory would have, had it been retained, become part of the inheritance of Dafydd and Rhodri (in fact Dafydd was later given lordships in Hope and Dyffryn Clwyd by Edward I.[18] It is all the more interesting therefore the Rhodri ap Gruffudd should come into the possession of land which had recently belonged to Robert de Crevequer, and who now occupied land which in theory at least rightfully belonged to him. Evidence of the work which Rhodri carried out when he arrived in Tatsfield is visible in the church, where windows are dateable to c. 1300.[19] Although these could be ascribed to the previous occupant of the manor Robert de Campania, it is interesting to note that the rector in 1310 was William de Dutton (Dutton being a Cheshire surname) and the record of Rhodri presenting to the Rectory may mean the windows are part of the refurbishment of the church which he had acquired prior to 1309.[20]

Rhodri's son Thomas inherited the three manors of Althurst, Bidfield and Tatsfield on his father's death c. 1315. Thomas appears to

have spent little time on his estates in Cheshire and Gloucestershire, or rather, seems to have been little involved in the daily round of claim, counterclaim and acquisition of land in these areas. Rather, he seems to have spent his time in Surrey, so much so he known in some sources as Thomas de Tatsfield.[21] Thomas appears from the archaeological and historical evidence available to have constructed a new manor house for himself (perhaps his father had planned to do so before his death). This appears to be significant for several reasons and may explain Owain's actions in the 1360's. At a time when the native Welsh *llysoedd* are either being abandoned or key buildings are being removed from certain *llys* sites, we find at Tatsfield that a new 'Prince's hall' with what could now conceivably be termed a *llys* is being constructed. Thomas had also been knighted by this time (his father was knighted before his death c. 1315) and this work may also be seen as important because of his increased social standing in the local community as a status symbol. The construction of this new building was not the only work which Thomas is responsible for within the manor. As has been noted above, the place name *Maes Mawr* (Big Field) still survives within the manor of Tatsfield, and suggests that Thomas was re-organising the way in which the manor was administered and farmed.

There was also a programme of building works on the church. Thomas appears to have spent a considerable amount of money re-modelling parts of the building. His principle expenditure seems to have been on extending the chancel (but he retained and reused the east window which his father had installed). A possible reason for the extension of the chancel will be considered below.

This expenditure on the manor house, landscape and church also appears to have been done for aesthetic reasons. The desk based assessment identified a body of water close to the site of the medieval manor house, which, it is known, was filled in by the farmer at some point during the twentieth century. This dated back until at least the latter part of the nineteenth century, and it is possible that it in part represents a water feature which in turn was part of the designed landscape around the *llys*. Also to be noted is that it was surrounded by trees, as depicted on the Ordnance Survey map of 1884, although these are not recorded on the Ordnance Survey map of 1912. It may be that these trees were the last survival of the formal layout of the landscape around the medieval house. When the position of the pond is considered in relation to the location of the hall it is possible to see that the pond lies to the east of the excavated access road (Trench Five)

and the south of the manor house (Trench Three). This pond would form part of the approach to the house, and as such would be in a similar position to other water features close to other manor houses and *llys* sites.

Having a sister married to an *Uchelwr* in the Welsh Marches would mean that Thomas would aware of the works happening at castles such as Whittington, Shropshire, Shotwick, Cheshire and Sycharth, Denbighshire.[22] His landscape therefore must have borne some relation to the works happening in this part of the world. Recent work has revealed that the designed landscapes of medieval England and Wales are much more sophisticated than previously thought and given that Tatsfield has connections to both England and Wales, and appears to have some elements of landscape design incorporated into it, it hopefully represents an opportunity to explore the wider landscape of this complex.[23]

The career and aspirations of Thomas ap Rhodri seem to be far more concerned with providing a stable environment in which to bring up his son and provide for his wife and being an astute businessman than being involved as a captain in the Scottish wars as some of his contemporaries were, an example being Gruffudd ap Madog who was steward of Maelor Saesneg in 1331, keeper of the manor of Ellesmere for his brother-in-law in 1332 and a captain with a contingent of Welsh troops in Scotland during the 1330's.[24] Whilst there is information from the archaeological and historical record about how Thomas was running his estates and spending his profits, there is precious little information about the birth and early life of his son Owain. It has been suggested he was born c. 1330 and that he spent at least some of his youth in France.[25] Our principal references to Owain are found on the death of his father in 1363 and from the Inquisitions Post Mortems which declare him a traitor towards to end of the 1360's. The manor of Tatsfield had been granted by Owain to Roger de Stanyngden, Allen Lombard and the parson, Stephen Bradpul.[26] It is possible that here we have the names of three of Owain's closest confidents and that the granting to the parson is particularly significant. From the evidence available it would appear that Owain was abroad when his father died in 1363 (his mother Cecilia had died in 1361) and the parson had been responsible for the burial of his father with his mother. Perhaps in leaving of the manor to these three men including the parson we see Owain thanking Stephen personally for taking care of these important affairs in his absence.

In 1963 a new vestry was added to Tatsfield the church, which allowed the west end of the church to be used as an entrance porch.[27] At this time the floor levels of the chancel were lowered as part of the improvements being made and during the works the original east wall of the chancel was found along with three skeletons interred in the chancel. These were examined by Dr J.D.W. Tomlinson and Professor R.J. Harrison and a report produced.[28] Two of the skeletons (skeletons I and II) were buried east-west on the centre-line of the chancel whilst the third (skeleton III) was found buried with its head to the north and feet to the south directly underneath the altar. This burial was a post-medieval burial and will not be discussed here.[29] Skeletons I and II were of a man and a woman. Tomlinson and Harrison were of the opinion that the man was over seventy years of age and the woman over sixty. Little of the archaeological context of the burials was outlined in the report, but given the depth at which they were recorded, the absence of other burial and the history of the manor, it would appear these two individuals represent high status burials of the medieval period.

When Edward I built his castle and town of Conwy he displaced the monks of Aberconwy Abbey (which lay at the centre of his new town and later became the town parish church) to a new abbey at Maenan, some 11.5 km up the Conwy estuary. Also removed at this time from the Abbey were the bodies of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and his sons Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and Dafydd ap Llywelyn. At the dissolution, the coffin of Llywelyn an Iorwerth appears to have been disinterred from Maenan Abbey and is now preserved in the parish church of Llanrwst, although the coffin slab is missing and coffin itself is empty. Perhaps one reason for the extension and beautification of the chancel of the church at Tatsfield was in essence to provide a fitting burial for at least one of the Princes of Wales, given that three of them had recently been disinterred by the English from their preferred resting place at Aberconwy Abbey. Of Gruffudd's four sons, Llywelyn and his brother Dafydd had been decapitated (and in the case of Dafydd, hung, drawn and quartered) and their heads displayed in London, and certainly not treated in a manner befitting royalty of the period (although there is a legend that Llywelyn ap Gruffudd's body was buried in Cwm Hir Abbey in mid Wales) and Owain simply vanishes from the historical record at some point before or during 1281–1283. The fourth brother, Rhodri ap Gruffudd, the man who had given up the claim to the patrimony in 1272, appears to have been buried in Cheshire, most probably in the parish church

of Marbury which appears to have been founded on land belonging to his estate of Althurst at some point in the late thirteenth century.

Given the archaeological and historical evidence outlined above and the location of the burials of skeletons I and II, it would appear that these two individuals could well be Thomas and Cecilia. Without re-excavation of these two individuals it is impossible to take these assumptions any further.

As has been noted above, the manor of Tatsfield was granted by Owain ap Thomas to Roger de Stanyngden, Allen Lombard and the parson Stephen Bradpul.[30] However, the English Crown took possession of the manor from them and it has been demonstrated by the archaeological evidence that at least the main building of the manor or *llys* complex was systematically dismantled and the most likely person to be tasked with this work would be the sheriff of Surrey.[31] The sheriff of Surrey in 1369 was Ralph de Thurbarn and it is interesting to note that although we have no direct evidence to link the sheriff to this work, he was certainly receiving lands during the latter part of the fourteenth century which may well be for carrying out such a task. Also of note is that Ralph de Thurbarn serves as sheriff for three years from 1368–1371, having previously served 1363–1364. The usual term in Surrey appears to have been one year and exceptionally two years. One of the reasons for this could be to ensure that a reliable and trusted man was in charge in Surrey when there was a threat of invasion from France, being led in part by a local man, Owain ap Thomas (or by now, Owain Lawgoch), and also to ensure that any 'works' needed to be carried out at Tatsfield were the responsibility of one man.

The removal of the building seems to mirror the removal of similar buildings in Wales at the beginning of the fourteenth century. What makes Tatsfield such a potent site in the eyes of the English Crown is that it is only some fifteen miles south of London and the very fact that the family had been living there for three generations and (to the Crown at least) planning Owain's defection from this site, meant that it would be removed in exactly the same way as those halls discussed earlier which belonged to the Princes of Gwynedd and where the resistance to English rule was discussed and planned. What is even more interesting is that the same pattern appears to have been followed at other three manors as well of Althurst, Bidfield and Plas yn Dinas.

The archaeological and historical evidence available for the estates in Cheshire, Gloucestershire and Powys suggests that a similar systematic

dismantling of buildings and distribution of property was carried out by the English Crown. Excavations at Bidfield in advance of road-widening found buildings which appeared to have been abandoned during the latter part of the fourteenth century and the 1381 taxation records Bidfield was uninhabited although the manor was in the possession of Mary, wife of William Hervey.[32] The manor of Althurst appears to have suffered a similar fate, passing to Roger atte Gate in 1380 and the buildings discovered in 1976 on balance represent the remains of the medieval manor house.[33] Plas yn Dinas reverted to the possession of the Charlton family in 1370 and their principle residence remained Powis Castle, close to the town of Welshpool with the administrative records for the manor of Plas yn Dinas surviving only from 1769 onwards.

Owain Lawgoch left behind his parents, his friends and his estates. As the last surviving member of the House of Gwynedd he may have felt duty bound to find any way possible to fight the English and if that involved the pay of the King of France then so be it. His estates in England and Wales were possessed by the English Crown and handed out as gifts to court favourites after the destruction of the properties which symbolised the success of the family. However not all traces were removed. Ralph de Thurbarn's men, although thorough, did not manage to remove all the building materials of the house at Tatsfield, Welsh field names survived their partial mutation into English and Owain's parents remained safe in the sanctity of the Chancel which they had paid for from the profits of running an estate which could perhaps during the fourteenth century be called 'Little Wales beyond England'.

Notes

[1] British Library Royal 14 e iv.

[2] A.D. Carr, *Owen of Wales: The End of the House of Gwynedd* (Cardiff, 1991); E. Owen, 'Owain Lawgoch—Yeuain de Galles: Some Facts and Suggestions,' *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion*, 61 (1900), 6–105.

[3] V. Fiorato, A. Boylston, and C. Knüsel (eds.), *Blood Red Roses: The Archaeology of a Mass Grave from the Battle of Towton AD 1461* (Oxford, 2000) address all these aspects in a single report.

[4] M. Johnson, *Behind the Castle Gate: From Medieval to Renaissance* (London, 2002), 19–23 discusses this material.

[5] D. Austin, 'The Castle and the Landscape,' Landscape History, 6 (1984), 69–81; O. Creighton, Castles and Landscapes (London, 2002); C. Coulson, C. Castles in Medieval Society: Fortresses in England, France and Ireland in the Central Middle

Ages (Oxford, 2003); P. Everson, 'Medieval Gardens and Designed Landscapes' in R. Wilson-North (ed.), The Lie of the Land: Aspects of the Archaeology and History of the Designed Landscape in the South West of England (Exeter, 2003), 24–33; R. Liddiard, Castles in Context: Power, Symbolism and Landscape, 1066 to 1500 (Macclesfield, 2005).

⁶ H. Pryce and C. Insley (eds), The Acts of Welsh Rulers 1120–1283 (Cardiff, 2005), 452–4; Carr, Owen of Wales, 5.

⁷ Carr, Owen of Wales, 6, 10.

⁸ Anon, 1963, Plan showing positions of re-internment following the lowering of the floor levels, Surrey History Centre, 2983/4/64; N. Spry, 'The Bidfield Excavation of 1966,' Glevensis, 2000 33, 44–46.

⁹ Whatley, S., 2002 Bidfield Farm, Bisley, Gloucestershire, Border Archaeology 2002/07/29 [unpublished report].

¹⁰ Personal communication from M. Perry in 2005; (http://ads.ahds.ac.uk/catalogue/search/fr.cfm?rcn=CPATSMR_26990).

¹¹ Personal communication from G. Burr in 2004; for the development of Welsh Heraldry see M.P. Siddons, The Development of Welsh Heraldry (Aberystwyth, 1991).

¹² G. Hayman, The excavation of two medieval pottery kiln sites and two sections through the London Lewes Roman road at Clackett Lane, near Titsey, 1992, Surrey Archaeological Collections, 84 (1997) 1–87; R. Poulton, 1999, An Archaeological Assessment of Proposals for a New Hut at Tatsfield Church, Woking: Surrey County Archaeological Unit [unpublished report].

¹³ S. Smith, 2004 Report on Desk-Based Assessment and Historical Survey at Church Farm, Tatsfield, Surrey for 'Tywysogion' TRP/2004/001, Caernarfon: Tywysogion [Limited Circulation Report].

¹⁴ O. Manning, O. and W. Bray, History and Antiquities of the County of Surrey 3 vols (London, 1809) 2. 408.

¹⁵ A.J. Taylor, The Welsh Castles of Edward I (London, 1986).

¹⁶ Carr, Owen of Wales, 5; Pryce and C. Insley (eds), The Acts of Welsh Rulers, 657–8.

¹⁷ J.B. Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Prince of Wales (Cardiff, 1998).

¹⁸ Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 58–59, 425–6 and 434–6.

¹⁹ I. Nairn, and N. Pevsner, Surrey: The Buildings of England (Harmondsworth, 1962), 402.

²⁰ Anon, Saint Mary's Tatsfield Guide and History (1996).

²¹ J.F. Willard (ed.), Surrey taxation returns fifteenths and tenths, Part B, List Calendar and Specimens of Documents subsequent to the 1332 assessment (Woking, 1922), 420.

²² P. Brown and P. King, 2004, Whittington Castle: The Marcher fortress of the Fitzwarine family [unpublished report]: Tuck, C. and Jecock, H.M. 1996 Shotwick Castle, Cheshire (RCHME Archaeological Survey Report, in the National Monuments Record); Smith, S. 2004 Report on Desk-Based Assessment and Historical Survey at Church Farm, Tatsfield, Surrey for Tywysogion TRP/2004/001, Caernarfon: Tywysogion [Limited Circulation Report].

²³ C. Taylor, C., 'Medieval Ornamental Landscapes,' Landscapes, 1(2000), 38–55 is example of research carried out in this field.

²⁴ R.R. Davies, The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr (Oxford, 1997), 136; J.E. Lloyd, Owen Glendower (Lampeter, 1992), 16.

²⁵ B. Davies, personal communication in 2004.

²⁶ Carr, Owen of Wales, 15.

²⁷ M. Horwood, 'The Church in Tatsfield' in E. Pearce (ed.), Tatsfield: The First 2000 Years (Tatsfield, 1999), 65.

²⁸ J.D.W. Tomlinson, and R.J. Harrison,, 1964, Notes on discoveries of human remains at East end when floor levels were reduced, including forensic evidence, 2983/4/65 [unpublished report held in Surrey History Centre, Woking].

[29] Anon, 1963 Plan showing positions of re-internment following the lowering of the floor levels, Surrey History Centre, 2983/4/64.

[30] Carr, *Owen of Wales*, 15.

[31] Personal communication from J. Alban in 2005.

[32] Spry, 'Bidfield Excavation'; Carr, *Owen of Wales*, 18.

[33] Carr, *Owen of Wales*, 12; personal communication from M. Perry in 2005.

THE ROLE OF MERCENARY TROOPS IN SPAIN IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY: THE CIVIL WAR

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The civil war that the legitimate monarch, Pedro I of Castile (1350–69), faced against his half-brother, Count Enrique of Trastamara, was a military event of extraordinary importance in the history of medieval Spain. The Iberian Peninsula was turned into a battlefield by a conflict between urban interests and the interests of the nobility but, also, by a new theatre combat derived from the Hundred Years War. As Sun Tzu wrote many centuries before and Enrique of Trastamara surely thought, a quick victory is the principal aim of war, but neither Enrique of Trastamara nor Pedro I could get such a result, so they turned to international alliances and thus mercenary troops entered into this Spanish Civil War. On the one side, the English mercenary troops of the Black Prince supported Pedro I and, on the other hand, Bertrand du Guesclin's French mercenary troops supported Enrique of Trastamara in a series of clashes that ended with Enrique's victory and the ascent to the Castilian throne of the Trastamara dynasty.

The Fourteenth Century Spanish Civil War[1]

The Fourteenth Century Spanish Civil War can be analysed from three different perspectives: from a Castilian point of view, from an Iberian point of view and from an international point of view. On the one hand it was a civil war between Pedro I of Castile and Enrique of Trastamara and their allies but on the other hand it was another episode of the Hundred Years' War, a new stage involving the Iberian Peninsula. The Hundred Years' War was a conflict which had an important impact in Western Europe during the Later Middle Ages.[2] It involved the kingdoms of France and England along with their respective allies. It was a succession of interrelated conflicts and this struggle ended by dragging in other western kingdoms. Therefore, it can be considered

the first great conflagration in Western Europe. The outcome of this clash also involved the Iberian Peninsula and, therefore, a brief outline of the most significant events will be relevant to provide a framework to our research.

The kingdoms of Castile and Aragon initiated the race for hegemony in the Iberian Peninsula in the middle of the fourteenth century. This struggle escalated with the war between Pedro I of Castile and Pedro IV of Aragon (1336–87) from 1356 to 1365. Aragon had a smaller population and less military resources than Castile. Pedro IV tried to weaken the Castilian kingdom by supporting the insurrection of the Castilian nobility led by the *infante* Fernando of Aragon from 1354 and, later, the revolt which was led by count Enrique of Trastamara. Pedro I of Castile got the upper hand and Enrique of Trastamara was forced to take refuge in France though he went on plotting to overthrow his rival. The Castilian kingdom had a friendly relationship with France. These good relations were established by Sancho IV (1284–95) at the end of the thirteenth century and were important for nobility and clergy of Castile. Nevertheless, the emerging Castilian bourgeoisie favoured a new alliance with England because its naval power could guarantee the commercial routes to Flanders. Alfonso XI (1312–50) had an active policy of neutrality which favoured France, provoking English retaliation at Winchelsea in 1350.

In 1353, Pedro I of Castile established a definitive alliance with England as a result of pressures from Basque and Cantabrian sailors and traders. Pedro IV of Aragon wanted to challenge the Castilian hegemony and the Trastamara party within Castile needed the French Companies of Bertrand du Guesclin to overthrow the Castilian king. France wanted to neutralise the dangerous English and Castilian alliance to obtain the naval support of Castile and to expel the mercenaries from the kingdom. This was useful as a way of ridding France of the mercenaries who had no official cause for which to fight. As the chronicler tells us:

> King Charles [V] of France despatched my lord Bertrand [du Guesclin], together with certain members of his council, to see the Holy Father; whereupon the Holy Father commanded that the Companies should be sent out France. At that moment the Bastard of Spain sent to said Holy Father to seek his help against his brother, king Peter, who, he intimated, was not a good Christian. The Holy Father, who knew of the evil ways of that bad catholic, King Peter, offered to those sent by Henry, the Bastard of Spain, the option of leading the Companies against his brother. There

and then the said envoys made an agreement with my lord Bertrand, the Holy Father contributing the value of a tenth towards the payment of the soldiers. Then my lord Bertrand went back to France to consult with Sir Hugh Calveley and the other English captains, and with such success that they contracted to go with him. So the French king, Charles, made out large payments to my lord Bertrand and to those captains of the Companies so that they should leave the country. And Henry the Bastard, count of Trastamara, on his part went to great lengths and took great pains to attract the soldiers to his service. So much effort was put into this, in fact, both by the Holy Father and by the king (each with the financial contribution [which he made]) that the said companies, English, French, Norman, Picard, Breton, Gascon, Navarrese and others, [all comprising] men who lived off war, left the kingdom of France.[3]

Pedro IV of Aragon and the nobility who was supporting Enrique of Trastamara suggested a complex solution to Charles V of France. They proposed the substitution of Pedro I by Enrique of Trastamara, who was a loyal ally of France. In late 1365 the Castilian revolt was internationalised and Enrique of Trastamara started the invasion of the kingdom of Castile with the support of the mercenaries of Bertrand du Guesclin.

The White Companies

Pedro IV authorised the progress of the White Companies through Aragonese territory. They entered by Catalonia and crossed the Ebro valley looking for a good place to initiate their assault. They decided that Calahorra was a good place because this city had no defences. It was there that Enrique proclaimed himself king of Castile on 16 March 1366 with the approval of his captains.[4] From Calahorra they went to Burgos which they entered at the end of March and there Enrique was crowned king of Castile on 5 April 1366. The chronicler Pedro López de Ayala describes us the arrival of these mercenary troops in Iberian territory:

Estando el rrey don Pedro en la çibdat de Burgos, sopo commo el conde don Enrrique era ya pasado de Çaragoça para venir a Castilla e que todos los capitanes que venian para entrar en Castilla eran ya con el. E eran estos los capitanes de Françia mosen Beltran de Claquin, que era vn caballero muy bueno natural de Bretaña, que fue despues conde estable de Françia, e por que era omne vsado de guerras e auia buenas venturas en las armas, todos le tomaron por capitan en esta cabalgada maguer que

> venian otros señores de mayor linaje, ca venia ý el conde de las Marchas,
> que es de la flor de lis del linage del rrey de França, e el señor de Beaju,
> que es vn grant señor de França, e el mariscal d'Aude[nan] que era buen
> caballero de armas, mariscal de França, natural de Picardia, e muchos
> otros caballeros e escuderos e omnes de armas de França. Otrossi venia
> ý de Yngla terra, mossen Hugo de Carualoy e mossen Eustaçio e mossen
> Mayeu de Gornay e mossen Guillen Alemant e mossen Iohan de Ebreus
> e otros muchos grandes caballeros e escuderos e omnes de armas de
> Ingla terra. Otrossi venian de Guyana e Gascueña muchos caballeros e
> escuderos e omnes de armas.[5]

Enrique of Trastamara initiated the conquest of Toledo from Burgos
with the invaluable help of the White Companies, while King Pedro I
of Castile sought refuge in Seville. The authorities in Toledo negotiated
its surrender and Enrique of Trastamara stayed there until mid-May
1366 and then initiated a campaign to conquer several important cities
in Andalucía, such as Cordoba and Seville, whereas Pedro I escaped to
Portugal. These quick victories gave Enrique of Trastamara the con-
viction of his victory and he decided to dismiss part of his mercenary
troops in late July, as Pedro López de Ayala wrote:

> Por quanto eran ý con el rrey don Enrrique muchas gentes de las conpa-
> ñias que con el eran venidas assi françeses commo yngleses commo
> bretones e otros, e fazian grand daño en el rregno e grand costa, que de
> cada dia se contaua el sueldo que leuauan del rrey, e por tanto acordo de
> los enbiar los mas dellos e fizo en Seuilla su cuenta con ellos del tienpo
> que le auian seruido, e pagoles e enbiolos para sus tierras, e fueron todos
> muy contentos e muy pagados del.[6]

Pedro I of Castile could not obtain the support of the king of Portu-
gal, so he withdrew to Galicia where he decided that he should travel
to Bordeaux to ask the Black Prince for help. Enrique of Trastamara
followed him, reaching Galicia in the autumn of the year 1366 to
try to wipe out all pockets of resistance. He finally managed to make
count Fernando de Castro surrender the walled city of Lugo under
certain conditions. The situation of Enrique of Trastamara worsened
in late 1366 and during the year 1367. Firstly, Pedro I of Castile was
negotiating with the Black Prince for military help and with Charles II
of Navarre to get permission for the English and mercenary troops to
pass through his kingdom; secondly, Pedro IV of Aragon was claiming
the territories which Enrique of Trastamara had previously promised
him, and finally, internal resistance increased in the kingdom of Castile
against the new king. The agreements of Libourne were signed by king
Pedro I and the Black Prince on 23 September 1366. The Prince of

Wales demanded five hundred and fifty thousand florins in exchange for his military help and advice, as well as the possession of *Biscay* (Basque Country) and Castro Urdiales (Cantabria) and an authorisation for English merchants to get more opportunities in the northern ports of Castile.[7] The king of Navarre also was going to have his share; Charles of Navarre would receive two hundred thousands florins as payment for the right of way through his kingdom and the dominions of Guipúzcoa, Álava, Treviño, Logroño, Calahorra, Nájera, Haro and Alfaro, all of them in the Castilian frontier with the Navarrese kingdom.

Enrique of Trastamara renewed his agreement with king Pedro IV of Aragon, who promised to block the way to the Black Prince's troops. The king of Aragon gave to Enrique the castles of Laguardia, San Vicente and Burandón to secure the performance of the agreement.[8] Enrique of Trastamara felt safe and allowed Bertrand du Guesclin and more than a thousand mercenaries to leave the kingdom of Castile on 12 January 1367. Only a little later he ordered them to return when the Black Prince entered in the Castilian territory. While the English troops stayed in their camps, the White Companies developed a kind of guerrilla warfare destined to demoralise the enemy. The stage was being set for the battle of Nájera.

On 2 April 1367, on the eve of the battle of Nájera the two sides confronted one another as follows. The troops of Pedro I of Castile were positioned on the battlefield in the following way. The troops commanded by the Duke of Lancaster and by Chandos were in the forefront. The main body was formed by the Black Prince's soldiers and by Castilian, Navarrese and Majorcan troops. On the left wing were the Gascon troops of Jean of Grailly and the soldiers of the count of Foix. And on the right wing were the soldiers of the count of Armagnac and of d'Albert. The opposing army of Enrique of Trastamara consisted of the following. In the forefront, the knights of the Order of the Band[9] and the White Companies under the control of Bertrand du Guesclin, of the Marshall d'Audrehem and of Pierre de Villaines. On the left wing were the Andalusian troops and on the right wing were the Aragonese troops commanded by the count of Denia and the cavalry of the Order of Calatrava.[10] Battle was joined on 3 April 1367 and the result is well known. Enrique of Trastamara was defeated and he had to take shelter in Aragon and in Avignon whereas Bertrand du Guesclin was captured.

Pedro I of Castile was victorious in the battle of Nájera, but thereafter he began to have problems with the inactive English troops and

his commanders. He was unable to pay the three million gold florins that he owed to the Black Prince; the authorities of *Biscay* would not accept the Black Prince as their lord, and Chandos was not allowed entry into the city of Soria. The Black Prince claimed for himself the possession of twenty castles, but Pedro I could not accept this because they were part of his kingdom and a symbol of his sovereignty. Before departing, the Prince of Wales could only obtain a solemn oath from the Castilian king to fulfil their agreement in the future.

Enrique of Trastamara was not completely defeated and he signed the agreement of Aigues-Mortes with Charles V of France on 13 August 1367. Enrique obtained French financial assistance to re-hire a large group of French mercenaries, commanded by Bernal de Bearn, Arnoul de Solier and Pierre de Villaines. King Pedro IV of Aragon banned Enrique of Trastamara from entry into the territory of Aragon but he arrived at Calahorra on 28 September 1367. He later journeyed to Burgos and, finally, arrived in Toledo on 30 April 1368. The war went to a stalemate but it reared up again with the agreement of Toledo on 20 November 1368. Enrique of Trastamara offered the Castilian navy to France and, in return, France offered him the troops that he needed to win. Charles V of France sent new White Companies to Castilian territory. They are mentioned in the chronicles of the siege of Toledo in February 1369. The great final battle at Montiel was approaching. Pedro I of Castile left his Andalusian lands with an army provided by the Moslem king of Granada. Enrique of Trastamara, who had been informed about the movements of his adversary, attacked and defeated Pedro I at Montiel on 14 April 1369. Finally Pedro I was murdered by his half brother with the help of Bertrand du Guesclin and the civil war in Castile was over.

THE WHITE COMPANIES: PIERRE DE VILLAINES AND THE COUNTY OF RIBADEO[11]

We can now turn to the White Companies and to Pierre de Villaines or Pierre the 'Bègue de Villaines', who was a member of the White Companies and who fought in the Spanish Civil War in behalf of Enrique of Trastamara. The feudal army was based on personal military service, but this system turned out to be ineffective for conflicts of long duration; companies of hired warriors were conceived as a solution to this problem. They were groups made up of mercenaries and adventurers

placed under the command of leaders of varying social standing, who were not limited by the tradition of chivalry. There are some examples of these companies in the fourteenth century. One of the first, known as the Great Company, was formed by heavily armed cavalry and infantry; these men were led first by a German knight, Werner von Urslingen, and then by Montreal d'Albarno, a French knight. However, the most important mercenary grouping, known as the White Companies, was formed in France during the Hundred Years' War and based on the model of John Hawkwood's Company. John Hawkwood was an English mercenary who attained great wealth and renown as a condottiere in fourteenth century Italy. In the beginning of the 1360s Hawkwood was the commander of the White Company and, as Temple-Leader and Marcotti wrote many years ago, this company 'like other bands of free-booters, consisted of both horse and foot soldiers' and 'generally fought on the foot, their horses served more to expedite and facilitate their marches.'[12] The Companies became an important problem for the French monarchy after the peace of Brétigny-Calais in 1360. Peace had been restored but they refuse to disband and survived by the extortion of villages and cities. The Companies listened to no authority beyond their immediate commanders, so the only way to dissolve them was to destroy them in battle or buy them off and hope they went elsewhere.[13] The French monarchs did not have the economic and military resources to expel them nor to impose their dissolution; as Froissart wrote:

> Although the truces which had been arranged the kings of France and England were properly observed between the persons of the kings themselves, and between people, too, where their power, authority and writ were recognised, none the less many adventurers, who were really brigands and thieves, became active, especially in the far corners of France where the local knights were not up to fighting, or were not ready to take up arms against them. There they captured their towns and castles, and gathered around themselves a considerable number of similar sorts of people, bearing arms, men of the German nation and others who, under the guise of war, perpetrated their wicked deeds and enterprises; none opposed them and it was said by some that they were openly tolerated and endured by the royal officers, knights and esquires in the areas in which they were active, and that these shared the loot and the booty with them.[14]

An obvious solution was to send them to fight elsewhere with the promise of substantial earnings. In collaboration with the Pope, Charles V tried to send them to Hungary to fight against the Turks but the mercenaries refused to go to the eastern borders of Europe. The French

king found a new destination for them: the kingdom of Castile. Count Enrique of Trastamara gathered a large number of mercenaries, the White Companies, with the help of Charles V of France, Pope Urban V and Pedro IV of Aragon. To Bertrand du Guesclin, the Pope gave one hundred thousand gold florins and the king of Aragon gave one hundred thousand gold florins and the title of count of Borja as well as the castles and villages of Borja and Magallón near the frontier between the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile. Bertrand du Guesclin left the possession of those castles to his relative Olivier de Mauney.[15] The Aragonese king and the count of Trastamara promised to give Bertrand du Guesclin the Moslem kingdom of Granada if he could conquer it. However, this didn't include the cities and strongholds around the Strait of Gibraltar controlled or claimed by the Moslem dynasty of the Banu-Marin.[16]

The White Companies penetrated into the Iberian Peninsula supervised by Bertrand du Guesclin and Sir Hugh Calveley.[17] These Companies were formed by two main groups, the Big Companies and the French Companies, but they operated jointly. They contributed to Enrique of Trastamara's victory and the commanders of the White Companies received considerable amounts of money and other kind of payment; for example, Bertrand du Guesclin finally received the duchy of Molina and the county of Trastamara.[18] Pierre de Villaines, one of the mid-level commanders of the White Companies, is especially interesting for Galician medieval history. Contamine describes him as a *banneret* but, what did it mean to be a *banneret* in France in the fourteenth century?[19] The author offers us this answer: they were not knights of noble lineage but had an important social and economic position and were in the mid-level military hierarchy. This term appeared in France in the first half of the thirteenth century. King Philip August granted to this type of knights the right to carry their coat of arms, the *bannière*, during their military service.[20] We know that Pierre de Villaines was born in the French region of Beance but not his social origins. It's possible that his background was as humble as Bertrand du Guesclin's. The 'Bègue de Villaines' was an important *banneret* and appears in the White Companies with Bertrand du Guesclin and Sir Hugh Calveley before the first Castilian campaign.[21] Coryn wrote the following about the 'Bègue de Villaines': 'He came to Castile because he liked a good battle but he preferred a profitable battle'.[22] We know that Pierre de Villaines fought in the battle of Nájera on 3 April 1367. Bertrand du Guesclin left the battle temporarily to help Enrique of Trastamara but

returned with the help of the Marshall d'Andrehem, of the 'Bègue de Villaines' and of other good knights who carried the *bannière* with honour. Bertrand du Guesclin and Pierre de Villaines were captured.[23] Pierre de Villaines paid a ransom and remained with the Marshall d'Andrehem in Aragon while Bertrand du Guesclin was sent back to Brittany under the condition that he would return if the Black Prince came back to the Iberian Peninsula.[24]

Returning to the struggle again on the side of Enrique of Trastamara, Bertrand du Guesclin entered the Iberian Peninsula in early 1369 with an army made up of five hundred knights. The 'Bègue de Villaines' was also in this Company, participating in the battle of Montiel, where he commanded a Company of three hundred men.[25] According to the tradition, Pierre de Villaines detained king Pedro I of Castile near the walls of the castle of Montiel and delivered him to his assassins. Enrique of Trastamara, now Enrique II had promised Bertrand du Guesclin and his mercenaries more money than he had, and so he was unable to meet the payments. In compensation, King Enrique II granted Pierre de Villaines the county and village of Ribadeo on 20 December 1369.[26] Ribadeo is an important town placed in north-eastern area Galician and it was founded in the second half of the twelfth century with the support of Fernando II (1157–88) and Alfonso IX (1188–1230) of León. During the Middle Ages it was a rich town with a very important port specializing in fishery and the trade of products as wine, wood and salt. Ferreira Priegue has documented how merchant ships were sent from Ribadeo to Bordeaux 'a hacer la carrera de los vinos' between the years 1303 and 1309.[27] Undoubtedly Ribadeo was an excellent reward for Pierre de Villaines. We don't know how long Pierre de Villaines stayed in Ribadeo; however, he was mentioned by the Navarrese royal treasurer, Jean Le Flament, because he took part in a military campaign with Charles the Bad, king of Navarre, in 1378.[28] We know, also, that he participated in the war between Juan I of Castile and Fernando of Portugal in 1381:

> Vous avez bien oÿ que, quant le roy Henry de Castille fu trespassez de ce siècle, et son aisné filz damp Jehan couronné à roy, la guerre se resmut entre le roy Ferrant de Portingal et le roy de Castille, pour le fait des deux filles du roy dam Pière, Constance et Ysabel, mariées en Engleterre la première au duc de Lencastre, et la seconde au conte de Cambruge. Et disoit le roy de Portingal que à tort on avoit deshèritè ses deux cousines de Castille. Et pour ce deffia le roy Jehan de Castille et lui fist guerre, et le roy Jehan se défendy bien contre lui, car il avoit bonne chevalerie de France avec lui, le Bègue de Vilaines et messire Pierre son filz.[29]

Pierre de Villaines bought the Norman principality of Yvetot in 1391 and he also appears on a list of magnates, using the title of count of Ribadeo, in the company of Guillaume, Viscount of Melun; Olivier du Guesclin, count of Longueville; Louis de Chalon, count of Tonnerre; Philippe d'Artois, count d'Eu; Jean de Bourbon, count of La Marche; Jean, count of Harcourt and Chat, count of Dammartin, in 1392.[30] The last reports about the 'Bègue de Villaines' refer to a donation that he gave to the collegiate church of Saint-Cosme de Luzarches in 1403.[31] Lanza Álvarez thinks that count Pierre de Villaines lived for sometime in Ribadeo and that he constructed a fortress there. The reasons that Lanza Álvarez presents are the following. Firstly, when king Enrique II gave Pierre de Villaines the county of Ribadeo on 20 December 1369 no mention was made of the existence of a stronghold in the town, but the existence of a castle there is mentioned when king Juan II of Castile (1406–54) gave its county to Rodrigo de Villandrando in December 1431.[32] Secondly, Lanza Álvarez[33] indicates that there was a coat of arms in the tower of Ribadeo fortress which could have belonged to Pierre de Villaines because it bears the arms of France (three lilies) and those of Castile and Léon that he was awarded by royal privilege granted by Enrique II. The stronghold of Ribadeo was near the collegiate church of Santa María of Ribadeo.[34] It consisted of two square towers joined by a seventeen-meter high wall with a thickness of three and a half meters. There was a rectangular parade ground inside and the two towers were at its north and east angles. The inner area was surrounded by another wall that was lower and less thick than the first one, and there was a ditch between both walls. The fortress was, approximately, thirty six meters long by twenty-six meters wide. The main entrance was located in the interior wall and there was a door named '*Puerta del Campo*' in the exterior wall which was accessible by a small ramp. The smaller tower, where the keeper of the stronghold lived, was twenty-three meters high and the bigger tower was twenty-five meters high.

We have tried to present a brief summary of the actions of these mercenaries in Spanish territory during the fourteenth century Spanish Civil War, paying attention to the events which had a special impact in the history of Galicia. This anticipates a large scale systematic study of the role played by the armies and the fortifications in war in medieval Spain and, more specifically, in the north-western area of the Iberian Peninsula.[35] This territory was the scene of two entwined struggles in the second half of the fourteenth century: the struggle between Pedro

I and Enrique II for the Castilian throne and the struggle between the kingdoms of France and England for supremacy in Western Europe.

The fourteenth century Spanish Civil War cannot be understood without the analysis of the role that the English (and Welsh) or French mercenaries troops played in this armed confrontation. Those mercenary troops, supporting both Pedro I of Castile and his stepbrother Enrique of Trastamara, introduced into the Iberian Peninsula a new way of waging war, which was rather different from the old standards of the chivalry. The importance of the presence of mercenary troops in the Iberian Peninsula didn't end with the death of Pedro I. Enrique de Trastamara, enthroned with the name of Enrique II (1369–79), had to face the aspirations of Fernando I of Portugal (1367–83) to the Castilian throne. The Portuguese monarch looked for the English support and an English army disembarked in the Iberian territory led by Edmund, count of Cambridge, between 1380 and 1381 but this is another part of the Spanish history.[36]

Notes

[1] Françoise Autrand, *Charles V: le Sage* (Paris, 1994); Luis Vicente Díaz Martín, *Pedro I (1350–1369)* (Palencia, 1995), 275–339; Kenneth Fowler, 'L'emploi des mercenaries par les pouvoirs iberiques et l'intervention militaire anglaise en Espagne (vers 1361–vers 1379),' in Adeline Rucquoi (ed.), *Realidad e imágenes del poder: España a fines de la Edad Media* (Valladolid, 1988), 23–55; Salvador de Moxó, 'De la nobleza vieja a la nobleza nueva: la transformación nobiliaria castellana en la Baja Edad Media,' *Cuadernos de Historia* 3 (1969), 1–210; Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Cornell, 1975), 407–27; Eduardo Pardo de Guevara y Valdés, *Los señores de Galicia: tenentes y condes de Lemos en la Edad Media*, 1 (A Coruña, 2000), 162–84; Peter E. Russell, *The English intervention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Richard II* (Oxford, 1955); Julio Valdeón Baruque, *Enrique II de Castilla: la guerra civil y la consolidación del régimen (1366–1371)* (Valladolid, 1966), 85–200; Julio Valdeón Baruque, 'Pedro I, el Cruel: la guerra civil castellana, intervenciones extranjeras en el marco de la guerra de los Cien Años,' *Historia 16* 143 (1988), 57–63; Julio Valdeón Baruque, *Enrique II (1369–1379)* (Palencia, 1996), 35–93.

[2] Christopher Allmand (ed.), *Society at War: the experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War* (Woodbridge, 1998); Christopher Allmand, *La Guerra de los Cien Años: Inglaterra y Francia en guerra: c. 1300–c. 1450* (Barcelona, 1989); Philippe Contamine, *La Guerre de Cents Ans* (Paris, 1968); Philippe Contamine, *Guerre, État et Société à la Fin du Moyen Âge: Études sur les armées des rois de France (1337–1494)* (Paris, 1972), 12–131; Eugène Déprez, *Les Préliminaires de la Guerre de Cent Ans* (Geneva, 1975). Kenneth Fowler, *The Hundred Years War* (London, 1971). Maurice Keen, *England in the Later Middle Ages* (New York, 1990), 122–42; Julio Valdeón Baruque, *Pedro I el Cruel y Enrique de Trastámara: ¿la primera guerra civil española?* (Madrid, 2003).

[3] *Chronique des Quarter Premiers Valois (1327–1393)* cited by Allmand, *Society at War*, 174.

[4] 'Anno Domini MCCCLXVI in die lune XVI Mensis Martii Dominus Meus Dominus Rex Henrricus fuir assumptus in civitate Calagurritana in regem Castelle et Legionis' cited by Valdeón, *Enrique II (1369–1379)*, 36.

[5] Pedro López de Ayala, *Crónica del rey don Pedro y del rey don Enrique, su hermano, hijos del rey don Alfonso Onceno*, Germán Orduña (ed.), 2 vols (Buenos Aires, 1997), 2. 119.

[6] Pedro López de Ayala, *Crónica del rey don Pedro y del rey don Enrique* 2. 143.

[7] There were two hundred and fifty thousand florins for him and three hundred thousand florins for the mercenary Gascon troops.

[8] A castle placed in the highest zone of the village of Laguardia, in Alava (Basque Country). Probably the castle that overlooks the village of San Vicente of Sonsierra (La Rioja). Most likely the castle of Buradón or the nearby walled village of Buradón, in Alava (Basque Country).

[9] This was a Spanish Military Order. It was founded by the king Alfonso XI of Castile in 1332.

[10] Pedro López de Ayala, *Crónica del rey don Pedro y del rey don Enrique* 2. 161–164.

[11] Autrand, *Charles V*, 491–518; Philippe Contamine, 'Bertrand du Guesclin, la gloire usurpée?,' *L'Historie* 20 (1980), 44–53, 'Les Compagues d'Aventure en France,' in *La France au XIVe et XVe siècles: hommes, mentalités, guerre et paix* (London, 1981), 365–96, *La guerra en la Edad Media* (Barcelona, 1984), 189–206, *La noblesse au royaume de France: de Philippe le Bel a Louis XII* (Paris, 1998), 65–66, 169–70, 182, 223, 281–83, and 289; Marjorie S. Coryn, *Bertrand du Guesclin (1320–1380)* (Paris, 1934), 200–52; Kenneth Fowler, 'Deux entrepreneurs militaires au XIVe siècle: Bertrand du Guesclin et Sir Hugh Calveley,' in Société des Historiens Medievistes de L'Enseignement Superieur Public (ed.), *Le Combattant au Moyen Age* (Nantes, 1991), 243–56; Pedro García Martín, *Los Condotieros* (Madrid, 1985); Norman Housley, 'The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy and the Crusades, 1356–1378,' *Traditio* 38 (1982), 273–77.

[12] John Temple-Leader and Giuseppe Marcotti, *Sir John Hawkwood: story of a condottiere*, trans. Leader Scout (London, 1889), 39–40. William Caferro, *John Hawkwood. An English mercenary in fourteenth-century Italy* (Baltimore, 2006).

[13] The White Companies were under the command of several important English and French captains, like Sir Hugh Calveley, Sir Matthew Gournay, Arnaut de Cervole, nicknamed 'The Archpriest'; Bertucat d'Albret; Seguin de Badefol; Petit Mechin, Pierre de Villaines or Bertrand du Guesclin. These captains controlled extensive territories from the Perigord to the Dauphine across Auvergne, Velay, Forez and Lyonnais.

[14] Jean Froissart's words cited by Allmand, *Society at War*, 88.

[15] The castle of Borja/La Zuda is on a hill that overlooks the village of Borja, in Zaragoza (Aragon). Magallón's castle it's on a hill that overlooks the village of Magallón, in Zaragoza (Aragon). It's one of the castles of the valley of the Huecha. Fowler, 'Deux', doc. V. 256.

[16] 'Et si, par la grace de Dieu, ils purroient conquerre Granade, ycelle realme demoura au dit moss'Bertran sanz nulle partisione tant come est au pouer dou roy qui mantenant est, par ensit que les viles et fortelerses que le reoy de Belmarin tient per deca la mere'. Fowler, 'Deux', doc. I, 254–255.

[17] The White Companies carried a white cross as a symbol of the purity of their intentions.

[18] Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, 'Molina en la Corona de Aragón,' *Teruel* 6 (1951), 75–128. There were some important strongholds in the strategic duchy of Molina: Torre de Aragon, Castilnuevo, Campiño de Dueñas, La Yunta, Embid, Establés, Villel de Mesa, Corduente, Arbeteta, Cubillejo de la Sierra and Tierzo.

[19] Contamine, *Guerre, État et Société*, 153.

[20] Ibid., 14.

[21] Captain of Meaux in 1360, seneschal of Carcassonne in 1361, chamberlain of the duke of Normandie in 1362 and chamberlain of the king Charles VI of France from 1380 to 1382.

[22] Coryn, *Bertrand du Guesclin*, 207.

[23] 'A vos Mose Perres de Villanes, cauallero de Louege, Señor de Villanes, camarero del Rey de Francia, nuestro yrmano que al tiempo que Nos entramos la primera vez en

los nuestros regnos de Castiella e de Leon, vos el dicho Mosee Perres lo Vege veniestes con nuesco a nos acompañar e ayudar a cobrar los nuestros regnos e troxestes a nuestro seruicio las mas vuestras gentes darmas que vos pudiestes; e otrosí porque en la pelea que nos oviemos con el Príncipe de Gales vos el dicho Mose lo Vege fuestes preso en la dicha batalla por nuestro servicio'. Francisco Lanza Álvarez, *Ribadeo Antiguo: noticias y documentos*, 3rd ed. (Sada, 2001), 43.

²⁴ Coryn, *Bertrand du Guesclin*, 228.

²⁵ 'E vos qustó muy grandes quantías de […] de lo vuestro por vuestra redención, e por salir de la dicha prisión; e otrosí porque en la pelea que Nos ouimos con el tirano malo que se llamaba Rey, nuestro enemigo, e con los moros que con él venían por destruyr los nuestros regnos e toda la cristiandad, vos el dicho Mose Perres lo Vege vos acaestes con nusco en la dicha batalla e los vencemos e desbaratamos a él e a todos los que a él venían'. Lanza, *Ribadeo*, 43.

²⁶ 'La nuestra Villa de Ribadeu e la pobla de Navia, con todos sus alfoces e con todas sus aldeas e términos que les pertenescen e pertenecer deuen, que lo ayades a título de Condado vos e vuestros erederos que de vos son descendidos o decenderán de vuestra línea derecha, que vos podades llamar Conde e Señor de Ribadeu e traigades por armas en el vuestro escudo e en el vuestro pendón en el primer quarterón las nuestras armas dichas reales e en derredor dellas vuestras que vos traedes de vuestro linage'. Lanza, *Ribadeo*, 43.

²⁷ Elisa Ferreira Priegue, *Galicia en el comercio marítimo medieval* (A Coruña, 1988), 82.

²⁸ Contamine, *Guerre, État et Société*, 153.

²⁹ Jean Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Peter F. Ainsworth, 2 vols (France, 2001), 2. 815.

³⁰ Contamine, *Guerre, État et Société*, 14.

³¹ 'Sur ce que Messire Pierre de Villaines a donné à notre église pour faire un lampier et y mettre ses armes pour estre devant les corps saints, un hanap d'argent, du vieux poinson pesant environ neuf onces, le dit hanapt a été porté à Paris avec un vieux lampier aux armes de Flandres pour faire le dit lampier et y mettre les armes du dit Mʳᵉ Pierre et pour la façon d'iceluy, ledit Mʳᵉ Pierre a promis de donner un escu et aussy ont étez portées deux ceintures dorées à fame du legs de Madame de Mouy, l'autre de Marie de Bernfroy damoiselle pour les vendre'. Eugène Müller, *Inventaire de la Collégiale Saint-Cosme de Luzarches aux XIVᵉ et XVᵉ siècles* (Paris, 1893) in *Citadelle. Un autre regard sur le Moyen Age*, http://www.citadelle.org/scriptorium.cfm/scID/5/texte/ Inventaire%20de%20la%20Collégiale%20Saint-Cosme%20de%20Luzarches%20aux %20XIVe%20et%20XVe%20siècles. [On line]. Consulted on 7 March 2006.

³² 'La mi villa de Ribadeo, con su castillo e fortaleza e tierra e distrito e término e territorio e aldeas e lugares e vasallos e justicia e jurisdicción civil e criminal, alta, e baxa, e mero e mixto imperio, e rentas e pechos e derechos e penas e caloñas pertenecientes al Señorío de la dicha villa'. Lanza, *Ribadeo*, 50.

³³ Ibid., 135.

³⁴ Ibid., 135–136.

³⁵ This research is taking place in the Institute of Galician Studies *Padre Sarmiento* based on the Spanish city of Santiago de Compostela and it is funded by the Spanish Council of Scientific Researches (CSIC).

³⁶ César Olivera Serrano, *Beatriz de Portugal: la pugna dinástica Avís-Trastámara* (Santiago de Compostela, 2005).

THE TEUTONIC ORDER'S MERCENARIES DURING THE 'GREAT WAR' WITH POLAND-LITHUANIA (1409–11)

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Introduction

During the Baltic crusades against the heathen Prussians and Lithuanians, the Prussian branch of the Teutonic Order was not dependent on mercenaries, because this was a religious war supported not only by the Church, but also by the warlike European aristocracy including kings and emperors.[1] The famous *Reisen*, the military expeditions to Prussia and from there into Lithuania, were for more than 150 years an important part of chivalric life in Latin Europe.[2] One can find mercenaries who were not hired by the Order, but by pious persons in the Latin West who—for different reasons—could not travel in person to Prussia, but nevertheless wanted to participate in papal blessings and obtain absolution of sins. The situation changed and became complicated for the Order when war broke out with Christian Poland in 1327. As their new adversaries were not heathen, the knight-brothers could not count upon help from crusader armies and lost the battle at Płowce (Poland) in September 1331. Polish military technique and equipment (heavy cavalry etc.) was on a similar high level to that of the Teutonic knights.[3] Now, for the first time, it was necessary for the Order to recruit mercenaries. Chronicles tell us the names of two of the mercenary commanders: Otto von Bergau from Bohemia and Poppo von Köckritz from Meissen.[4] After a state of war for many years peace was finally concluded with King Kasimir the Great of Poland (1333–70) at Kalisz in 1343.[5] In the meantime military enterprises against heathen Lithuania were carried on with the participation of crusaders.

When the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had been united with the Kingdom of Poland in a personal union under King Władysław Jagiełło (1386) and Lithuania, independently of the Teutonic Order, had been peacefully Christianised (1387) a new and much more dangerous situation arose because the mission of the Knights, i.e. the war against the heathen, could no longer be carried out *de jure*.[6] The legal existence

of the Order was from now on seriously questioned by its opponents, who proposed that the Knights should be removed from Prussia and used on other frontiers as a shield of Christianity against Tartars and Turks. According to Thomas Aquinas, heathens could be enslaved, but not Christians, and therefore the Knights were no longer permitted to enslave their many prisoners from the campaigns in Lithuania. These prisoners could be used in different ways, notably as settlers, in which capacity they contributed substantially to strengthening Prussia in a time of demographic crisis and economic recession in Europe, and to ensuring the advance of colonisation up to the year 1410. For these and other reasons, the Teutonic Order denied that the Lithuanians' conversion was genuine and ignored the prohibitions on further military expeditions by the German and Bohemian King Wenceslas in 1394 and Pope Boniface IX in 1403. However, from now on, many crusaders stayed away from Prussia, and when conflicts with Poland increased towards the end of the 14th century, the Order had to look for an adequate substitute for the crusader armies. Money had to support religious arguments, and therefore it was necessary to hire mercenaries.

For many years this was no substantial problem for the Teutonic knights, because their Order was wealthy. As long as the conflict with Poland was essentially diplomatic, as it was in the years after 1386, the Knights could rely on long-term agreements of up to 10 or 15 years with the Pomeranian dukes of Wolgast, Stettin and Stolp, who got much money under the obligation to serve the Order in case of war.[7] The details of their service were fixed in contracts: the number of men and horses, the equipment, the payment etc. Similar agreements were also made with some Pomeranian nobles. As a matter of fact we have to regard these documents as a special kind of mercenary agreement. The dukes were eager to get the money, but later often neglected their duties.

As diplomatic negotiations between the Teutonic Order and Poland in June and July 1409 ended without any positive result, Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen decided to declare war and undertake a surprise attack on Poland.[8] On 6 August he signed a declaration of war, and ten days later three armies of the Order marched into northern Poland, the biggest of them into the province of Dobrzyń (German: Dobrin). The Knights' troops, including many mercenaries, were victorious on all the fronts. Only one minor field battle had to be fought and was won, many castles, cities and villages were conquered, destroyed and

burned and many people killed. The Poles were not yet prepared for war, but after some weeks an army gathered together, which marched against the invaders. After hard negotiations near the border a truce was concluded on 8 October to be kept until St John's Day in 1410.

From now on, both sides prepared to continue the war after the end of the truce, which was later prolonged by ten days. This time the initiative was taken over by the Poles and Lithuanians under King Jagiełło and his cousin Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania. A big joint army crossed the border in southern Prussia with the intension of marching against Marienburg (now Malbork, Poland), the main castle of the Teutonic knights, but it was confronted by the Order's army on the fields of the three villages of Tannenberg, Grünfelde and Ludwigsdorf, the Polish names of which are Stębark, Grunwald and Łodwigowo. Here the famous battle of Tannenberg was fought on 15 July 1410.[9] A successful feigned flight of a part of the Lithuanian army was followed up by an attack by heavy Polish cavalry forces into the Order's ranks, resulting in a disastrous defeat of the Teutonic knights. Grand Master, Ulrich von Jungingen, was killed in action.[10] With the exception of a few strong castles which could withstand the following sieges, among them Marienburg, Prussia was occupied for some weeks until the Lithuanians and Poles withdrew voluntarily or were expelled by combined forces from Prussia, Livonia and the Reich, including many mercenaries. Peace was made on 1 February 1411 in Thorn. The battle of Tannenberg had changed the political constellation in east central Europe, considerably diminished the might of Prussia and opened the way for Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to play a central role in this part of Europe until the end of the 18th century.

The Mercenary Service

During the war both sides engaged mercenaries. Those of the Poles came mostly from Bohemia and played an important role in the Tannenberg battle, as they, according to a reliable Polish source, had fought 'victoriously and kingly' (*victoriose et regaliter*).[11] However, in what follows we will take a closer look only at those mercenaries who were recruited by the Teutonic knights. The war service of the Pomeranian dukes will be left aside.

THE SOURCES

Prussian chronicles and the famous *Banderia Prutenorum*[12] and *Annales*[13] by the Polish chronicler Jan Długosz (1415–80) give much useful information about the Order's mercenaries. The most important sources however are preserved in the Archives of the Teutonic Order, which, until 1944, were kept in Königsberg.[14] In the autumn of that year they were taken to a salt mine near Helmstedt in Lower Saxony, and after the end of the Second World War for a couple of years to the old imperial palace (*Kaiserpfalz*) in Goslar, until in 1953 they found a better depot for the next 25 years in the *Staatliches Archivlager* in the renowned university city of Göttingen. Since 1978/79 they have been accessible for research in the Prussian State Archives (*Geheimes Staatsarchiv*) in Berlin. They include different sorts of documents, correspondence and accounts. Two of these account books have to be mentioned here, because they are especially useful for research on mercenaries at the beginning of the 15th century: the significant Treasurer's book (*Tresslerbuch*),[15] which among many other things informs us about the mercenaries of the year 1409,[16] and the Payment book (*Soldbuch*),[17] in which the payments to the Order's mercenaries from the middle of June 1410 till February 1411 are noted.

In the *Soldbuch* we find the names of both important and lesser mercenary leaders and can see how many men they had taken to Prussia. The length of their service is carefully noted as well as their payment, mostly in Prussian marks or Hungarian florins, but sometimes also in Bohemian *Groschen*, English nobles, Florentine and French florins and other currencies. The Payment book is thus extremely important for the history of the war between the Teutonic Order and Poland-Lithuania at the time of the battle of Tannenberg. It also gives much information about the financial and administrative system of the Order, and is in addition a useful source for genealogic and numismatic research. The Payment book itself was edited in 1988; now part two of the edition is being worked on. It will deal with the identification of the approximately 800 mercenaries mentioned in the *Soldbuch* and in some other sources, which are added as an appendix in the edition, among them two lists of mercenaries, who had been made prisoners of war by the Poles and during their captivity were supported with money from Heinrich von Plauen, the new Grand Master of the Order.[18]

A thorough analysis of the Payment book in 1968 brought interesting results concerning the number of the Order's mercenaries who

were present at Tannenberg.[19] There were about 5700 mercenaries in Prussia at that time, but only 3700 of them could be brought into action at Tannenberg, because 2000 men arrived too late to join the main army when it marched against the intruders. This is surely one important reason, why the Order lost the battle. The question why the 2000 mercenaries came so late will be answered in a forthcoming publication by the author; it had to do with the diplomatic skill of the king of Poland.

Tactical Formations, Armour, Weapons and Horses

The smallest tactical cavalry unit was the 'spear' (German *Spieß, spys* or *spies*: Latin *lancea*), which in this part of Europe in its original form consisted of three persons and four horses. Such a formation was intended for close combat as well as for distant fighting. The leader ('Spießführer') was heavily armed 'from head to foot' and had a spear or a lance and a sword. He was accompanied by a crossbowman ('Schütze', *schotcze*) with mail armour, kettle-hat and coif and also by a young page (*junge*). One of the horses was used as a saddle- or packhorse. In other parts of Europe there were more than three men in a 'spear'.[20] Instead of 'spear' this small cavalry unit was often called 'glave' (*'Gleve', glefenye*, from Latin *gladius*, sword), depending on which region the mercenaries came from. It was just another name and had nothing to do with the infantry staff-weapon known as the 'glave' with its solid knife at the end of the shaft. Mercenaries were almost always counted in such 'spears' or 'glaves' but in reality their composition often differed from the 'ideal' formation mentioned here.[21] So, for instance, the number of crossbowmen often exceeded that of the heavy armed knights. According to a mustering list of 1431 a unit of 154 mercenaries with 159 horses consisted of 40 *Spießführer* and 3 other heavily armed men, 85 crossbowmen and 26 pages (*Jungen*).[22]

The Order had to solve the problem of how to count and pay the bigger tactic formations with the 'extra' crossbowmen (compared with the 'ideal' tactic formation mentioned above) and did it in a practical way, as three crossbowmen were valued, counted and paid as one 'spear'. One can see that in the Payment book and other accounts, where no more than two *Schotzen* (crossbowmen) are mentioned. Older research did not observe this fact and thus exaggerated the number of heavily armed knights with spears and swords at the cost of the crossbowmen.[23]

As a matter of fact, it is almost impossible to determine how many of the mercenaries in the account books were heavily armed, and how many served with a crossbow. Crossbowmen were recruited in cities or served the landlords in the countryside and did not have the social status and the money of noblemen. The salary for the two different sorts of 'spears' was the same. The *Spiessführer* fought on horseback, whereas the crossbowman in most cases fought on foot and used his horse only as a means of transport. It was seen as exceptional when crossbowmen were able to use their weapons sitting in the saddle. Consequently the quality of the horses differed greatly; the price of the heavy warhorse of the *Spiessführer* was usually about twice that of the *Schotze*, around 12–18 marks, sometimes much higher. The small indigenous horses, which were used as saddle-, pack- and draughthorses were much cheaper, costing around 3–6 marks.[24] These small mercenary units often formed *Haufen* or *Gesellschaften*, which on their part could form bigger 'companies' (*Rotten*) under the command of a *Rottmaster*; who was a renowned nobleman.[25] 'Ship-children' (*Schiffskinder*) were a special kinds of mercenary, recruited in Hanseatic cities along the Baltic Sea, like Lübeck, Rostock and Danzig, and were mostly used as garrisons in cities and castles. Their typical weapon was the crossbow, but they could also handle pole-axes. They were counted individually and not in 'spears'.[26]

Recruitment and March to Prussia

There were different ways of recruiting people for military service in Prussia. First of all, it was important that the sovereign of the country gave his permission—a case for the diplomacy of the Teutonic knights. Confidants of the Order in the country were able to organise recruitment, but it was also possible to send out suitable agents from Prussia. As the Teutonic Knights still saw themselves as crusaders against the 'heathen' (the Lithuanians) and the 'schismatics' (the Russians or Ruthenians), as well as the 'helpers' of the former (namely the Poles), they stressed the menace for the Christians and primarily asked those noblemen visited to go to Prussia and fight at their own costs for the sake of God and Christendom. However, times had changed, and money was now the better argument. A good example of this are the instructions given to Nammyr, a servant of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, who was sent out from Marienburg on 12 June 1409

to recruit mercenaries in Stettin, Meissen, Thuringia, Brunswick and Lüneburg for the planned war against Poland. He was accompanied by Kunze, a servant of the Order's Commander of Elbing.[27] The mission had to be kept secret lest the Poles be alerted. Nammyr had to inform sovereigns and lords, knights and squires about the causes of the conflict and ask them to march to Prussia to fight at their own expense against the unbelievers in honour of God and the Holy Virgin and as support for Christianity. Well aware that it would be easier to recruit mercenaries, the Grand Master then added that Nammyr should take 200 'spears' to Prussia—about 600 men—, and laid down the conditions. The mercenaries were to be good knights and squires and have good arms and warhorses. Each 'spear' would get 24 Hungarian florins a month. The Grand Master and the Order promised to pay these mercenaries salary for half a year, if they requested it, independent of peace or war. Nammyr had to note their names and ascertain that they were honorable men, fit for war, and that they had good horses. He was ordered to keep the instructions secret and also tell the knights and squires to do the same, until he had brought them to Prussia.[28] Another small group of persons was at the same time sent out from Marienburg to Silesia, which was the main area for recruiting mercenaries for the Order. No instructions for them have been preserved, but the tenor was surely similar. The leader was a nobleman Martin Krop from the province of Culm in southern Prussia. He was not a Teutonic knight.[29] Among the Order's mercenaries those from Silesia exceeded numerically by far those from Saxonia, Lausitia, Thuringia, Bohemia, Moravia and other parts of the *Reich*.

Recruitment often included a payment of a part of the future salary in advance to enable the less wealthy mercenaries to purchase horses, weapons and other equipment and to cover the costs during the march to Prussia. In the documents of the Order that advance payment is called *offraschunge*, which in modern German means '*auf Rechnung*', that is 'in advance'. It was later deducted from the salary.[30] The march to Prussia (mostly from or through Silesia) took about two or three weeks, depending on the distance. The analysis of the Payment book and other sources has shown that the military service of mercenaries from Silesia began when they passed the river Oder at the town of Crossen, that is two weeks before they arrived at the castle of Schlochau in Pomerellia, the Order's land to the west of the river Weichsel. That castle was one of the most important in the commandery (*Komturei*) of Schlochau. This knowledge has made it possible to prove that 2000 mercenaries

arrived too late to join the main army of the Teutonic Order before the battle at Tannenberg.[31]

MUSTERING AND WAR SERVICE

When the mercenary leader and his men had arrived in Prussia, they were mustered in order to make sure that they and their horses and equipment met the requirements for service. Mostly the mustering took place in Schlochau, but it could also be done elsewhere. Two very interesting lists from 1413 and 1431 have been preserved and edited.[32] In one of them even the colour of the horses has been noted.[33] It was also very important for both the Order and the men they had recruited that the names of the mercenary leaders, the number of men as well as the date of their first day of service, were registered. Every day of service had to be paid for. As we have seen in the instructions for Nammyr (1409), each 'spear' he recruited would get 24 Hungarian florins a month. At the time of the battle of Tannenberg the salary was 11 marks or 22 Hungarian florins a month. After a heavy defeat of the Teutonic Order at the battle of Koronowo (German: Polnisch-Krone) on 10 October 1410 the Teutonic Order had to raise it to 12 marks to be more attractive on the mercenary market.[34] The mercenaries were often used as garrison in castles and cities, but also served in the Order's field army, as at Tannenberg.

The problem of how to handle questions concerning loss of horses and weapons was one of the most important and difficult in the relationship between the Order and its mercenaries. There were, in principle, two options: either to give much payment for the service, but no compensation for losses, or to give none or just a little payment and instead compensate for loss of horses and weapons. One may assume that the first option was not as good for the 'fighting spirit' of the mercenaries as the second one. Anyway, during later years they often preferred the second option, which allowed them to loot and take prisoners without the risk of heavy financial losses. This has recently been described in an investigation by the author.[35] The choice of option was always that of the Order. Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen had chosen the first one, but after Tannenberg the Knights also gave 'gifts' and 'honours' in form of money to compensate their mercenaries for losses, at least to some degree. The amount of that sum differed very much, depending not only on the different losses, but also on the social status of the mercenary commanders and their relations with the Order.[36]

Other very important questions were how the Order should act when its mercenaries were made prisoners and also who had the right to ransom prisoners taken from the army of the enemy. Noblemen and other people of high social status had to be delivered to the Knights, but peasants and sometimes also burghers could be kept and ransomed by those who had captured them. The knight-brothers preferred to use their prisoners to exchange for troops captured by the enemy, because it was cheaper and less complicated, but sometimes they had to pay money instead. In that case the prisoner had to be rated according to his social status (and not to his possessions or fortune), which required an impartial decision. All these matters were of a complicated judicial character.

These and similar problems had to be discussed and solved, before military service began. As looting was a very attractive temptation for those men who decided to serve as mercenaries, the agreements mostly included rules, e. g. how to handle the booty, for instance horses and animals with 'divided feet' (*gespaldenem fusse*), which meant cattle, sheep, goats and pigs.

The contracts between the Order and its mercenaries differed considerably, depending on the opinion of the grand masters: Ulrich von Jungingen (1407–10), Heinrich von Plauen (1410–13), Michael Küchmeister (1414–22), Paul von Rusdorf (1422–41) etc. Paul von Rusdorf drafted detailed 'uniform' contracts which had to be agreed in written form by the mercenaries, but he himself could not always follow his own regulations, because warfare required flexibility. We have thus seen that mercenary service was not simply 'military service for payment', but included a lot of more or less intricate problems. However, those interesting matters will not be treated in this paper.[37]

The Order's Mercenaries during the 'Great War'

The Year 1409

Mercenary troops participated in most of the military expeditions in 1409.[38] The total number may have been somewhat more than 800 'spears', that is about 2500 men. They had been mustered and registered in Schlochau and sent from there to other castles in Pomerellia: Konitz, Tuchel, Dirschau and Schwetz. This had not only to do with strategy, but also with the problem of provisions. The burden of supplying all these men and their horses with food, hay and oats made it necessary

to house them in different places. As soon as the border of Poland had
been passed, that problem was solved to a considerable extent, because
then the troops could provide for themselves at the costs of the enemy.
For such reasons, all campaigns during the 'Great War' 1409–11 took
place in summer or autumn, when grass and grain were available in
the fields or barns. The only exception to this typical 'western' warfare
tradition were the famous former winter expeditions of the Teutonic
Order into Lithuania, when rivers, lakes and bogs were frozen over,
thus enabling them to march through the wild countryside.[39]

Except for the usual devastation and burning down of settlements,
villages, cities and castles, the mercenaries during the war in 1409
sometimes used the latter as garrisons in conquered castles, of which
the most important was Bydgoszcz (German: Bromberg) in northern
Poland. On 28 August the town and the castle of Bydgoszcz were cap-
tured. When the Order's army some days later returned to Prussia to
plan a new expedition, some 40 mercenaries from the Silesian duchy
of Oels under the command of the knight Heinz von Borsnitz were left
behind to defend the castle in case of a future Polish siege. About one
month later the Poles indeed recaptured Bydgoszcz. The mercenaries
surrendered the castle voluntarily after heavy fighting, which cost the
Poles over 200 dead, and they were allowed to go back to Prussia with
all their weapons and other belongings. This was surely a psychologically
clever decision of the Polish king, who was eager to win the sympathy
of the Silesians. According to the Treasurer's book, the expenses of
the Teutonic Order for the mercenaries in 1409 were 46 000 marks.[40]
This sum corresponded to the price of 3000 good war-horses.[41] The
money for payment was transported in heavy chests from the treasury in
Marienburg or the mint in Thorn to the different castles in Pomerellia,
in which the mercenaries dwelled before they left Prussia.

The Years 1410 and 1411

The expenses for the mercenary troops in Prussia in 1410–11 were
at least four times higher than the year before. Jürgen Sarnowsky has
estimated that the mercenaries during the whole period of the 'Great
War' 1409–11 cost the knights more then 226000 marks.[42] This was an
enormous sum, which, together with the many other expenses, broke
the financial backbone of the Teutonic Order in Prussia. Its wealth had
disappeared forever. The battle of Tannenberg and its consequenses
had caused an 'unhealable wound' for the Order from which it could

never again recover.[43] Without the military service of the mercenaries in 1410–11 the Prussian branch of the Teutonic Order would probably have been totally crushed, but it was an extremely expensive life insurance, also for the following years.

Many mercenaries were made prisoners by the Poles at Tannenberg, but after their names had been registered, they were released under the obligation to appear in Cracow at a certain date. There, their value as prisoners would be ascertained. Chivalric honour made such an arrangement possible. The mercenaries could thus leave the Polish camp at the battlefield of Tannenberg without problems and hurry to Marienburg to receive their salary before they left Prussia or continued war service. Some of them were sent by the deputy Grand Master, Heinrich von Plauen, to Danzig to help defend the city and castle. This, however, caused conflicts with the citizens, who were not always on friendly terms with the Order.[44] An important mercenary commander, Nickel von Kottwitz, lost 5 horses, 300 florins and all his equipment during those riots in Danzig in August 1410. Later, in Cracow, the Poles rated him at 200 *Schock* (i.e. 12000) Bohemian *Groschen*, 2 mail hauberks of steel, and 4 crossbows.[45] It may be assumed that the Knights made up for all this.

On the day before the peace treaty of Thorn (1 February 1411), the Teutonic Order agreed to pay a large sum of money, 100000 *Schock*, that is 6000000 Bohemian *Groschen*, corresponding to 150000 Prussian marks or the price of 10000 good warhorses, for the ransom of the many prisoners of war from their captivity in Poland or Lithuania, among them two young dukes from Oels in Silesia and from Stettin in Pomerania, and for the return of some castles. This was the precondition for peace. The Polish king desperately needed money to pay his own very numerous mercenaries, most of whom came from Bohemia. His original plan to conquer Marienburg, thus acquiring the famous treasury of the Order, and to use that money for payment, had failed, because of the successful defence of that castle by Heinrich von Plauen.[46] Consequently cash was now of greater importance to the king than the acquisition of land. However, the Teutonic knights could not and surely also did not wish or intend to pay all that money within the stipulated time of one year. Only a part of the sum was delivered in 1411. For that reason the Poles kept many prisoners of war long after the peace treaty of Thorn. The Poles accused the Order of not paying the money, and the Knights accused the Poles of not releasing the prisoners. Real peace could not be achieved under these circumstances,

and the state of war prevailed for many years afterwards. According
to an old Polish tradition, the votive church *Triumphus Mariae* at the
Birgittine cloister in Lublin (after 1412), was built by prisoners of war
from the battle of Tannenberg. Saint Birgitta (or Bridget) of Sweden
(1303–1373) had predicted a disastrous defeat of the *cruciferi* in one of
her revelations, which induced the grateful king of Poland to build a
Birgittine cloister. He first intended to do this on the battlefield, but it
soon proved impossible, because his army had to leave Prussia. Instead,
he erected the cloister in the old Polish town of Lublin, to the northeast
of Cracow.[47] The Teutonic knights, however, in 1411 built a chapel on
the battlefield for the blessed Virgin Mary, who was the patroness of
the Order.[48]

It was a very complicated task for the responsible knight-brothers and
their secretaries to pay the salaries during the troubled months after the
battle at Tannenberg, but they were very skilful and performed their
duty in a most admirable way.[49] The mercenaries often went over from
one commander to another, turned from one *Haufen* or *Rotte* (company)
to another, and all these changes were exactly registed on slips of
paper and in registers which had to be evaluated. Also the payments
in advance had to be considered. The final result of that difficult work
was the Payment book. This most valuable source thus deserves our
respect, even if there are some deficiencies. When deceitful mercenar-
ies later tried to get more money from the Order, the Grand Master
could refer to his registers and refuse their requests.

One important question still has to be debated in future research:
it is not exactly known how the mercenaries were integrated in the
Order's army (at Tannenberg and elsewhere) and how they were put
in formation for battle. However, war service after Tannenberg mostly
consisted in defending or besieging and conquering castles, but there
were also other defeats of the Order's troops in field battles, in which
mercenaries were engaged. Some of the mercenaries were thus made
prisoners of war by the Poles for a second time. Heinrich von Plauen
successfully defended the Marienburg castle thanks to the help of about
4000 men. Most of them belonged to those mercenary units which had
arrived in Prussia too late to join the field army of the Knights when
it marched against the intruders while others came directly from the
battlefield.[50] Also seamen, 'ship-children' (*Schiffskinder*), were extensively
used for different tasks and proved to be very courageous. 400 of them
helped to defend Marienburg and were praised in the Order's chronicles
for bravery during the siege.[51] One reference shows that they stood high

in the knight-brothers favour: in a letter to Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen in November 1410 the mercenary commander Heinz von Ohlau complained that he and his men had been driven out of the refectory of the castle of Tuchel by the Order's commander, who instead let the 'ship-children' come in and eat. Something like that had never happened to Heinz von Ohlau before, he said. He announced that he for that reason would leave the castle together with his men.[52]

Mercenary Identity

There was a strong regional identity among the mercenaries, because persons who came from the same district or were subject to the same sovereign, who spoke the same dialect and perhaps even knew each other, quite naturally felt related to one another. There are many examples of this. In a letter of July 1409 the Order's commander in Schlochau informed the Grand Master that the mercenaries who had been recruited by Martin Krop had been divided into two groups in the castle of Konitz, because they did not come from the same province (*wente sy nicht eyns landes seyn*). One group stayed in Konitz, whereas the other marched to the castle of Tuchel.[53] Obviously they did not get on well with each other. A conflict between Silesian mercenaries from the duchy of Oels under Heinz von Borsnitz and the Order's commander of the castle of Tuchel in 1409 proves the effort of the mercenaries to keep an independent position within the army of the Teutonic Order. According to the Order's commander, they did not want to 'stay under his banner'. The reason was obviously the following: when the castle of Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) was conquered by the army of the Order on 28 August 1409 a big stock of salt was found in it. It originated from two ships from Thorn, which the Poles had confiscated as a countermeasure for the confiscation of some ships with corn for Lithuania by the Teutonic Order. Now the mercenaries wanted to have a share of this salt, but the commander of Tuchel refused this with the argument that the Polish garrison had surrendered to the Order and not to the mercenaries. The dispute was handed over to the grand master to be decided by him. Unfortunately we do not know about his decision.[54] Another conflict arose between the same self-confident mercenaries in Bydgoszcz and the Order's commander of the castle of Schwetz, Heinrich von Plauen, who was later elected a Grand Master. Of interest is the mercenaries' argument that they were not under an obligation

to the Order, but to the commander to whom they had given their oath, namely the commander of Schlochau. This recalls the similar argument of the commander of Tuchel concerning the salt. The mercenaries thus refused to hand over and leave the castle of Bydgoszcz when Heinrich von Plauen came there with a levy and with workers and craftsmen in order to repair and garrison it. They would only obey the commander of Schlochau, they said, and even refused to accept the presence of knights and servants of the Order in the castle until finally an agreement was made.[55] Of course, the circumstances in Bydgoszcz were very particular and we do not know if this perhaps was only an exceptional case, originally caused by the dispute about the stock of precious salt in the castle.

Conclusion

One of the most famous episodes during the battle of Tannenberg was the attack by Luppold von Köckritz, a knight from Meissen, against the Polish king, in which he lost his life. Köckritz was not a mercenary, but a friend of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen and an ardent admirer of the Teutonic Order. He had joined the Knights' army at his own cost. Some weeks before the battle he described the ideological and psychological problems of his aristocratic compatriots in a letter to the Grand Master. There he made a distinction between war against Lithuania and war against Poland: in case of war only against Grand Duke Vytautas, many knights and squires would serve the Order 'for chivalry', that is at their own costs. The implication of this is that they would only serve against the Poles as mercenaries.[56]

The same problem is alluded to two decades later, when Grand Master Paul von Rusdorf prepared for a new war against Poland and told the Order's commanders in the bailiwicks in the *Reich* to send armed men and horses to Prussia at their own costs. The answer he got (in 1429) gave the following characteristic description of the situation: 'In former times sovereigns, masters, knights and squires rode to Prussia for God and chivalry, but that was to fight against the heathens, and they don't any longer regard it as that'.[57] This is striking evidence that the Teutonic Order had now definitely lost its ideological basis and could only survive thanks to expensive mercenary recruitment and war service which was a constant dilemma for the knight-brothers until the Prussian branch of the Order was dissolved in 1525.[58]

NOTES

[1] Sven Ekdahl, 'Crusades and Colonization in the Baltic,' in Helen J. Nicholson (ed.), *Palgrave Advances in the Crusades*, (Basingstoke and New York, 2005), 172–203. A longer version, 'Crusades and Colonisation in the Baltic: A Historiographic Analysis' is published in English in Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski (ed.), *XIX Rocznik Instytutu Polsko-Skandynawskiego 2003/2004* (Copenhagen, 2004), 1–42.

[2] Werner Paravicini, *Die Preußenreisen des europäischen Adels*, 2 vols to date (Sigmaringen, 1989, 1995).

[3] Sven Ekdahl, 'Horses and Crossbows: Two Important Warfare Advantages of the Teutonic Order in Prussia,' in Helen Nicholson (ed.), *The Military Orders*, vol. 2: *Welfare and Warfare* (Aldershot, 1998), 119–51.

[4] Wigand von Marburg, *Cronica nova Prutenica*, ed. Theodor Hirsch, Scriptores rerum Prussicarum 2 (Leipzig, 1863; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1963), 483–5. See the description by Ernst Kutowski, 'Zur Geschichte der Söldner in den Heeren des Deutschordensstaates in Preußen bis zum ersten Thorner Frieden (1. Febr. 1411),' *Oberländische Geschichtsblätter* 14 (Königsberg, 1912), 411–20.

[5] Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford, 1992), 345–6.

[6] For the following, see Sven Ekdahl, 'Christianisierung—Siedlung—Litauerreise: Die Christianisierung Litauens als Dilemma des Deutschen Ordens,' in Vydas Dolinskas (ed.), together with Gediminas Mikelaitis, Klaus Berthel, Irma Daugvilaitė, Irena Tumavičiutė, *Die Christianisierung Litauens im mitteleuropäischen Kontext. Materialien zur internationalen wissenschaftlichen Konferenz, gewidmet dem 750. Jubiläumsjahr der Taufe des Mindaugas, König von Litauen. Vilnius, Museum für angewandte Kunst, am 26. und 27. September 2001*, trans. Klaus Berthel, Irma Daugvilaitė, Irena Tumavičiutė (Vilnius, 2005), 189–205. The book title and all contributions are also in Lithuanian.

[7] Kutowski, 'Zur Geschichte der Söldner,' 420–44.

[8] For the following, see Sven Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen des Deutschen Ordens im Krieg gegen Polen 1409,' in Tadeusz Poklewski-Koziełł (ed.), *Le convoi militaire*, Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae 15 (Łódź, 2002), 47–64.

[9] There is an immense literature on that battle. As for the sources, see Sven Ekdahl, *Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410. Quellenkritische Untersuchungen*, I: *Einführung und Quellenlage*, Berliner Historische Studien 8 (Berlin, 1982). Until now there is no second vol.

[10] Sven Ekdahl, 'Ulrich von Jungingen (26. VI. 1407–15. VII. 1410),' in Udo Arnold (ed.), *Die Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens, 1190–1994*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens 40; Veröffentlichungen der Internationalen Historischen Kommission zur Erforschung des Deutschen Ordens 6 (Marburg, 1998), 106–14.

[11] Letter from bishop Albertus of Posen/Poznań of 29 July 1410 to some Poles at the papal curia, ed. Ernst Strehlke, Scriptores rerum Prussicarum 3 (Leipzig, 1866; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1965), 428. Cf. Ekdahl, *Die Schlacht*, 133.

[12] Sven Ekdahl, *Die 'Banderia Prutenorum' des Jan Długosz—eine Quelle zur Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410. Untersuchungen zu Aufbau, Entstehung und Quellenwert der Handschrift. Mit einem Anhang: Farbige Abbildungen der 56 Banner, Transkription und Erläuterungen des Textes*, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 104 (Göttingen, 1976).

[13] Jan Długosz, *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae, Liber decimus et liber undecimus, 1406–1412*, ed. Marian Plezia (Varsaviae, 1997).

[14] The Archives developed in the main castle Marienburg, but during the Thirteen Years' War of 1454–66 they were brought from there to Tapiau, 45 kilometers east of Königsberg. From 1722 till 1944 they were kept in Königsberg.

[15] *Das Marienburger Treßlerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409*, ed. E[rich] Joachim (Königsberg, 1896; repr. Bremerhaven, 1973).

[16] Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen,' 52–6, 60–3.

[17] *Das Soldbuch des Deutschen Ordens 1410/1411. Die Abrechnungen für die Soldtruppen. Mit ergänzenden Quellen*, 1: *Text mit Anhang und Erläuterungen*, ed. Sven Ekdahl, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preußischer Kulturbesitz 23/I (Cologne and Vienna, 1988). Vol. 2 is forthcoming.

[18] *Das Soldbuch*, 178–201.

[19] Sven Ekdahl, 'Kilka uwag o księdze żołdu Zakonu Krzyżackiego z okresu 'Wielkiej wojny' 1410–1411' [Some remarks on the Payment book of the Teutonic Order at the time of the 'Great War' 1410–1411], *Zapiski Historyczne* 33 (1968), 111–30. Also see *Das Soldbuch*, 13 and Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen,' 49–50. The results are used by Marian Biskup, 'Das Problem der Söldner in den Streitkräften des Deutschordensstaates Preußen vom Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts bis 1525,' in Zenon H. Nowak (ed.), *Das Kriegswesen der Ritterorden im Mittelalter*, Ordines militares. Colloquia Torunensia Historica 6 (Thorn, 1991), 53.

[20] W. Schulze, *Die Gleve. Der Ritter und sein Gefolge im späteren Mittelalter*, Münchener Historische Abhandlungen. Zweite Reihe: Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, 13 (Munich, 1940).

[21] Sometimes the number of their horses was given instead.

[22] Sven Ekdahl, 'Zwei Musterungslisten von Deutschordens-Söldnern aus den Jahren 1413 und 1431', in Marian Głosek *et al.* (eds), *Arma et ollae. Studia dedykowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Nadolskiemu. Studies dedicated to Professor Andrzej Nadolski* (Łódź, 1992), 59–61.

[23] See the comments in the *Soldbuch* 19 and 26.

[24] Ekdahl, 'Horses and Crossbows,' 129.

[25] *Das Soldbuch*, 26.

[26] Sven Ekdahl, ''Schiffskinder' im Kriegsdienst des Deutschen Ordens. Ein Überblick über die Werbungen von Seeleuten durch den Deutschen Orden von der Schlacht bei Tannenberg bis zum Brester Frieden (1410–1435)', in Sven Ekdahl (ed.), *Kultur und Politik im Ostseeraum und im Norden 1350–1450*, Acta Visbyensia 4 (Visby, 1973), 239–74.

[27] For the following, see Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen,' 51–2, 64.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., 52–3.

[30] Ekdahl, 'Kilka uwag,' 119; *Das Soldbuch*, 26; Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen,' 49.

[31] Ekdahl, 'Kilka uwag,' 118–23; *Das Soldbuch*, 13, 25; Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen,' 50.

[32] Ekdahl, 'Zwei Musterungslisten.'

[33] Ibid., 52–3, 58–9. It was a small unit of mercenaries from Silesia or Bohemia with 24 horses, which had been hired by Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen for his planned revenge war against Poland in 1413.

[34] *Das Soldbuch*, 19, 25, 98.

[35] Sven Ekdahl, 'Verträge des Deutschen Ordens mit Söldnerführern aus den ersten Jahrzehnten nach Grunwald,' in Jan Szymczak (ed.), *Militaria*, Questiones Medii Aevi Novae 11 (Warsaw: 2006), 51–95.

[36] Many examples for this are given in the Payment book. See, for instance, *Das Soldbuch*, 26 and passim.

[37] A more detailed description will be given in the publication mentioned in note 35.

[38] For the following, see Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen."

[39] Sven Ekdahl, 'Warfare in the Baltic Crusades,' in Alan V. Murray (ed.), *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia* 4 vols (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2006). 1241–49.

[40] Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen,' 63.

[41] A good warhorse cost about 15 marks. The price differed between 12 and 18 marks, but could also be much higher. Ekdahl, 'Horses and Crossbows,' 129.

[42] Jürgen Sarnowsky, *Die Wirtschaftsführung des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen (1382–1454)*, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preußischer Kulturbesitz 34 (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 1993), 406.

[43] Ekdahl, *Die Schlacht*, 7–12. Also see Klaus Militzer, *Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens* (Stuttgart, 2005), 143–52.

[44] Sven Ekdahl, 'Danzig und der Deutsche Orden 1410. Die Ausschreitungen gegen die Ordenssöldner. Mit einem Quellenanhang,' in Bernhart Jähnig and Peter Letkemann (eds), *Danzig in acht Jahrhunderten. Beiträge zur Geschichte eines hansischen und preußischen Mittelpunktes*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Westpreußens 23 (Münster, 1985), 121–50.

[45] Ibid., 126, 136–7. Also see Ekdahl, 'Kilka uwag,' 126–9 (ibid. 128–9, an edition of a letter from Nickel von Kottwitz to the Order. It was written in Cracow after he had been rated by the Poles).

[46] Sven Ekdahl, 'Die Schlacht von Tannenberg und ihre Bedeutung in der Geschichte des Ordensstaates,' in Rūta Čapaitė and Alvydas Nikžentaitis (eds), *Žalgirio laikų Lietuva ir jos kaimynai* [Lithuania and ist neighbours at the time of the Tannenberg battle], Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis 1 (Vilnius, 1993), 44–9. (Also in Lithuanian, 9–33).

[47] Sven Ekdahl, 'Heliga Birgitta, slaget vid Tannenberg och grundandet av klostret *Triumphus Mariae* i Lublin [Saint Birgitta, the battle of Tannenberg and the foundation of the cloister *Triumphus Mariae* in Lublin],' in Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (ed.), *Polsk-Skandinaviska kulturmöten*, Slavica Lundensia 23 (Lund, 2007), 1–24. An English version, 'St Birgitta of Sweden, The Battle of Tannenberg (Grunwald) and The Foundation of the Monastery Triumphus Mariae in Lublin' will be published in a volume dedicated to Professor K.A. Kuczynski (Plock, 2008). Also see Ekdahl, 'Crusades and Colonisation,' 11.

[48] Ekdahl, *Die Schlacht*, passim, for instance 191–2, 320–69, especially 325–6. In the book there are also many photos from the archaeological excavations of the chapel in 1958–60, esp. fig. 40–52, 57–60.

[49] *Das Soldbuch*, 9–16.

[50] *Das Soldbuch*, 13–5.

[51] Ekdahl, 'Schiffskinder,' 247–8.

[52] More about that incident in *Das Soldbuch*, vol. 2 (forthcoming).

[53] Ekdahl, 'Soldtruppen,' 52.

[54] Ibid., 58–9.

[55] Ibid., 59.

[56] Sven Ekdahl, 'Ein Brief des Ritters Luppold von Köckritz an Hochmeister Ulrich von Jungingen vom April 1410,' in Andrzej Radzimiński and Janusz Tandecki (eds), *Prusy—Polska—Europa. Studia z dziejów średniowiecza i czasów wczesnonowożytnych. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Zenonowi Hubertowi Nowakowi* [*Prussia—Pologne—Europe. Studies on the history of the Medieval Ages and the Early Modern Times. Works dedicated to Professor Zenon Hubert Nowak*] (Thorn, 1999), 240 and 243.

[57] Sven Ekdahl, 'Der Krieg zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen-Litauen im Jahre 1422,' *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 13 (1964), 428–9.

[58] Ekdahl, 'Christianisierung,' 195–9, 203–5.

SCOTS MERCENARY FORCES IN
SIXTEENTH CENTURY IRELAND

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'Mercenary' in the Irish sense is very different indeed when compared to the type of 'paid man' that one encounters elsewhere in Europe. Particularly in Ireland, the dynamic between local lords and their 'paid men' played a role in both the military and political life of Medieval Ireland, from the thirteenth through to the sixteenth century, during which time one can observe the evolution of the mercenary from gallowglass to redshank.

Of course, one cannot hope to emulate the late great G.A. Hayes-McCoy and his work on Scots Mercenary forces in Ireland. However, a number of gaps in this particular area of scholarship need to be researched more throughly. In particular, the relationship between the Gaelic elite of the sixteenth century and the Scottish lordships—arising from the mercenary tradition—needs to be examined in greater detail and at a more complex level. The sixteenth century heralds the political hegemony of the Scots mercenary forces in the north of Ireland, building on a relationship established through centuries of military service. One can note Scottish magnates taking a far greater role in Irish affairs right up to the point where they have nominal control over independent Gaelic lordships, in particular the O'Donnell lordship of Tír Conaill which is the focus of this paper.[1]

When looking at the mercenary tradition one must begin by asking why it was necessary to import mercenary forces into Ireland? Irish warfare was not organised along more traditionally recognised lines, as one can observe in the wider Medieval European sense. Pitched-battles were infrequent and unusual with the notion of 'bellum' in contemporary sources more often than not meaning a single altercation, rather than a long protracted war between two or more factions. Rather than meeting a foe in open battle, the Irish adopted guerilla warfare which best suited the territory and climate of the country. The poem, The Bruce, penned by John Barbour, Archdeacon of Aberdeen, c. 1375, best illustrates this. Irish warfare is described as following a pattern where

the aim is 'to pursue and fight, and to fight while retreating, and not to stand in open battle until one side is defeated'.[2]

In addition, the primary occupation of the population of Medieval Ireland was agriculture, and this in itself barred a large proportion of the already inadequate indigenous population from military service for most of the year. It is therefore unsurprising that in a largely agrarian society the main commodity was cattle, and this is where wealth was perceived to lie. In war the most common objective was to capture and carry off the enemy's cattle, deprivation being a means of securing long-term subjugation and victory. In the semi-nomadic, pastoral culture of Gaelic Ireland, cattle were virtually the only movable commodity of value, and a lord's wealth and influence were judged by the size and quality of his herds. Cattle raiding therefore played a central role in strategies to achieve local or regional predominance. The Norman invasion changed the dynamic behind Irish warfare whereby the battle over local power and moveable wealth decreased in importance and all out military engagements were paramount. The Irish style of small parties of armed men harrying and plundering a neighbour's territory was inadequate in the face of a militarily superior force that was intent on conquest rather than transient submissions. The power of a local lord moved away from wealth and short-term victories—in short cattle raiding lost its importance. The Norman invaders saw Gaelic 'moveable wealth' simply as a means by which they could provision their armies.

One can consequently see the importation of Scots mercenary forces as a reaction to the Norman invasion. The move away from the plundering raid towards more intense battle coupled with a dearth of eligible fighting men with necessary military experience forced the Gaelic Irish Lords to turn to Scotland. The population was simply too small to generate a large body of trained fighting men whose sole function was warfare—the Scots filled this requirement. Geographically, the Northern Lords were in the best position to do this. The first known record of a Scottish mercenary in Ireland comes in the late thirteenth century and they are usually described as gallóglaigh or galloglass. The term 'Gallóglaigh', coming from 'gall', meaning foreigner and 'óglach' meaning a young fighting man, can be first found in the *Annals of Loch Cé*, a southern collection, in 1290. Furthermore, the military techniques of the Scots mercenary forces suited the Irish style of warfare. The Scots came from the Highlands and the Islands—geographically similar

to the north of Ireland—and so were aclimatised to the conditions of the Irish landscape.

The Galloglass axe in particular was the weapon charistically associated with Scots mercenaries in Ireland. The axe is commonly thought to have ranged from between two and six feet in length with an edged blade. The size and weight of this weapon, of course, indicated the type of man who wielded it. The most comprehensive account of the attire of the sixteenth century galloglass comes from Richard Stanihurst who commented, 'They are dressed in cloaks and cassocks...their weapons are one foot in length, resembling double-bladed hatchets, almost sharper than razors, fixed on shafts of more than ordinary length, with which when they strike, they inflict a terrible wound.' They were further described as 'great endurers of cold, labour, and all hardness, very active and strong of hand, very swift of foot.' The mercenaries are also reported to have carried spears and two-handed swords, wearing coats of mail with a hanging undergarment and a cowl, and conical helmets. A number of representations of Scots mercenary forces survive. The earliest is a fifteenth century depiction from a tomb in Roscommon. The two figures each wear a coat of mail and a conical helment. The galloglas to the left holds a sword while the other grasps an axe. The next clear illustrations can be found in the late sixteenth century, both within a year of each other. Again, one can observe the axe, the coat of mail and the conical helmet in both. In particular one can note a difference in height between the Irishman and the Scot, something that was often commented upon by contemporaries. The Irish were slighter in build and shorter than their Scottish mercenaries.

Indeed, a number of accounts describe the Scots mercenaries as 'men of great stature, of more than ordinary strength of limb, powerful swordsmen, but at the same time, altogether sanguinary and by no means inclined to give quarter.'[3] Interestingly there appear to be no references in the annals of a galloglass rout—they stood and fought to the point of victory or death. To reiterate again, this was rare in Irish warfare. The most famous account of galloglass bravery in battle is the 1504 battle of Knockdoe which translates as 'Hill of the Axes', and is situated just outside of Galway city. This conflict, between the Great Earl of Kildare, Gerald Fitzgerald, and his son-in-law, Ulick Burke, Earl of Clanrickard, arose from a personal matter. Both sides employed galloglass, in addition to their Irish allies, and it is the Scottish contingents that appear to have taken the greater part in the fighting.

The annalists recount that the battle lasted for several hours, again rare by Irish standards, with nine bands of galloglass who fought so fiercely to the point that only one band survived. A galloglass band or battalion is commonly thought to have comprised about one hundred men and fought in the vanguard when going into battle and in the rear when withdrawing, always situated in the most dangerous position. The reputation they had developed by the sixteenth century was fearsome. John Dymmock, an Englishman who fought against galloglass forces in the 1590's wrote of them: 'they are picked and selected men of mighty bodies, cruel without compassion, the force of the battle doth lie in them choosing to die rather than surrender.'[4]

The use of these Scots mercenary forces was initially more popular in Ulster and Connacht, and slow to permeate out to the rest of the island. It was the mid-fourteenth century before Scots mercenary forces were regularly seen in Munster and Leinster. Therefore, one can tentatively mark the period from the late thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth century as the first main phase of mercenary activity between Scotland and Ireland, one which would not be replicated again until the sixteenth century. It must be noted that this was a military influx which later resulted in settlement. However, it is not altogether possible to conclusively chart the progression from hired mercenaries to settled lords in their own right. Most of the Scots mercenary family groups who served Gaelic Irish Lords remained unrecorded by contemporary annalists. One is left with tantilising snippets of information which continually fail to amount to anything close to conclusive. The MacSweeney family to whom I now turn have a family panygeric, the *Leabhar Chlainne Suibhne* (*The Book of the MacSweeney Family*), which purports to record their transition from mercenaries to holders of land.[5] However, this work contains glaring inconsistencies and is at points fantastical, which casts doubt on its value.

So it is to the medieval Irish annals that one must turn to attempt to trace this family. The Mac Suibhnes appear in the annals from the mid fourteenth century onwards as galloglasses with their origins lying in Kintyre. As hired mercenaries, their allegiance and loyalty could be bought, at least initially. However, by the sixteenth century three branches of the Mac Suibhnes had become settled, an established part of the political framework of Tír Conaill, in actual fact the strongest force after the O'Donnells. Although it is difficult to mark the transition from hired mercenaries to settled lords, it is clear that they received their lands in return for military service. Furthermore, this military

service did not cease as the family themselves became settled in Tír Conaill, retaining the title of O'Donnell Galloglass, distinct from any additional forces brought in to bolster the local muster. Offshoots of this family also settled in Connacht, but politically and military were less important than their northern cousins. Territorially they held more land than the O'Dohertys, O'Boyles and O'Gallaghers put together and these three families represented the traditional *Lucht Tighe*, or household officers of the O'Donnells. By 1511 the MacSweeneys had reached such a powerful position, without arousing the animosity of the O'Donnells, that the incumbent lord of Tír Conaill, Aodh Dubh O'Donnell, entrusted them with the protection of the territory during his absence on a pilgrimmage to Rome.

So, by the sixteenth century the first wave of Scots mercenaries had become settled, and to a degree assimilated into the military and political life of the local population. The second influx of Scots forces into Ireland was of a very different nature. Military service, of course, remained the major function of the imported troops, but a largely political purpose now came to the fore. In particular the manner in which this new breed of mercenaries was recruited had changed.

The sixteenth century Gaelic Lords faced a number of pronounced difficulties. Their position was by no means continually assured, either within their lordship or outside of it. They could be treated in any manner depending on current climates; the transition from loyal subject to rebel of the crown could be surprisingly quick. In this they faced attack from both Gaelic neighbours and from the Crown administration in Dublin. The English government often denied the legitimacy of their titles, and as a result territory could only be held by military might. In addition, there was no definite feudal allegiance from the sub-chieftainships while continuance and succession within a family line was by no means assured. In short, this all added up to a rather tenuous position.

In essence the remnants of the Gaelic system in sixteenth century Ireland were structurally flawed. It was adequate to ensure survival against an enemy of equal stature, but could not survive a prolonged attack from the outside. It could be postulated that many of the Gaelic Lordships survived in a state of splendid isolation—and this is certainly the case in Tír Conaill—therefore making it almost wholly impossible for them to band together as a single cohesive unit in the face of a renewed English onslaught, either militarily or legislatively. So sixteenth-century Ireland was still largely dominated by localized power-bases,

both Gaelic and Anglo-Irish, with the centralized authority in Dublin having little real effect. High-kingship, though often claimed throughout medieval times, was hardly an established part of the Irish political landscape. Total subjugation of all to one central figure or institution was simply unknown. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that any attempt at centralized authority was rapidly shunned.[6] It was dynastic allegiance rather than a pronounced sense of nationalism that motivated rebellion. Preservation of localized positions and concerns overrode loyalty to a distant and detached crown. It was therefore easy for the O'Donnells to seek alliance elsewhere, they felt no connection to the English crown, and its detachment prevented any sense of loyalty.

In relation to the O'Donnells of Tír Conaill, to quote Kenneth Nicholls 'The family [O'Donnell's] in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries consistently showed a hardness and sense of political purpose absent from most Irish rulers.'[7] In particular, this pronounced sense of political purpose led the O'Donnells, from the late fifteenth century through to the sixteenth century, to pursue an active foreign policy which was a massive deviation from the paths of the previous Lords of Tír Conaill. The position of Ireland as a prominent Tudor borderland during this period plays a particularly important role in the evolution of an active foreign policy and the heightened use of Scots mercenary forces. The O'Donnells of Tír Conaill were, perhaps, the best example of a Gaelic splendid isolation in practice. Tucked away in the far northwest, their position was primarily secured by their removal form the hub of activity in Dublin and the surrounding Pale. To enhance this, a policy of 'duplicity' was employed throughout the sixteenth century. O'Donnell 'duplicity' is marked by fraudulent rather than treacherous behaviour. This policy served their purpose and was not actively pursued to the detriment of others—rather as a means to ensure O'Donnell survival. The motivating factor was legitimization and through it continued existence in an increasingly unstable environment where Gaelic or Anglo-Irish ascendancy was no longer assured. In particular, O'Donnell policy was largely influenced by the increasing marginalization of the Gaelic Irish within the Tudor sphere of influence.[8]

The sixteenth century is the era of the "redshank"—a mercenary distinctly different from his predecessors. The redshank was a mercenary in the truest sense of the word—they offered their services to those who would pay the most, providing loyalty of sorts for a required period of time, leaving as soon as their period of service had ended. Settlement was not an immediate priority. In the case of Tír Conaill, an

influx of MacLeans, MacDonalds and Campbells can be seen, all of whom were to cause particular problems for the O'Donnells through the course of the sixteenth century. The military service they provided came at a considerable political cost and brought Scottish involvement in the north-west of Ireland to a point from which its hold could not be broken.

The political role of the Scots mercenaries in sixteenth century Ireland falls into two groupings. The interaction between the Gaelic Lordships and the crown develops into a more personal relationship between Gaelic Lordship and Scottish Lordship. Aodh Dubh O'Donnell, Lord of Tír Conaill from 1505–1537, built on the diplomatic endeavours of his father in Scotland. Aodh Ruadh O'Donnell had visited James IV at Glasgow in 1495 ushering in this new period of Scots mercenary involvement in the north-west of Ireland. The result was an active correspondence between O'Donnell and the Scottish King, with a request for 4000 fully equipped men led by Alexander MacLean and leaders of the Clan Donnell, only giving James a period of three months in which to affect this. He also requested that the king forbid any of these people from turning on O'Donnell and joining his enemies. This is a very interesting inclusion. It emphasises the peril of hiring outsiders whose allegiance is bought and does not hinge on territorial or dynastic links. In the case of desertion or rebellion it was easy to retreat back to the relative safety of Scotland where a disgruntled former master could not realistically hope to follow. This suggests that once in Ireland, the Scots would quite easily switch between the highest bidders, giving another tantalising glimpse of the mercenary relationship. This did not inspire confidence amongst Gaelic magnates if these troops accounted for a sizeable proportion of his army. This attempted relationship with the Scottish Crown was never really able to take hold. The death of large swathes of the Scottish nobility on Flodden Field in 1513 altered the balance of power in Scotland. The O'Donnell relationship with the Scottish Crown more or less died with James IV, forcing them to explore an additional area of mercenary supply with the Campbell Earls of Argyll.

Because of the weakness of the minority government following Flodden, the Campbells of Argyll grew in power and stature through a succession of bonds and treaties. Because of his securely established powerbase, Argyll was an obvious figure to whom the O'Donnells could turn to in search of additional mercenary forces. However, the involvement of a politically independent Lord, as opposed to the crown, was

to generate problems in its own right. Argyll was politically ambitious at home and abroad, and, in particular, it was his personal involvement with the supply of mercenary forces to Gaelic Irish Lords that was to alter irrevocably the centuries-old system to the detriment of political independence in Ireland.

The political situation in Scotland was far from ideal with the minority of Mary, Queen of Scots and the Regency of her mother Mary of Guise, who, had ousted Arran in 1554.[9] The normal weaknesses associated with a minority were not absent from Scotland, and if anything were accentuated by the fact that the heir whose maturity they awaited was a girl. The new Regent had an incredible amount of power over her daughter—Mary sent to her mother blank sheets signed 'Marie' on which to compose documents that required the young queen's signature as a necessity.[10] This gave her a monumental level of unchecked control over Scottish affairs. Furthermore, Guise used her newly gained position to surround herself with Frenchmen, such as her vice-chancellor, de Rubay.[11] All in all, it was astounding that a foreigner had obtained such an elevated position. The distaste of the Scottish nobles was further fuelled by the fact that Mary, Queen of Scots, was betrothed to the French heir.[12] In short, the Regent was infiltrating the government with French and pro-French advisors. It is unsurprising that the indefatigable John Knox was driven to describe Mary of Guise as 'the woman born to dissemble and deceive.'[13]

Despite this, the fourth earl of Argyll was on relatively good terms with the Regent, supporting her efforts to suppress the clans of the west. In particular, Mary of Guise utilised both Argyll and Huntly in an attempt at 'ethnic cleansing' of the lands of the Clan Ranald, the Mac Donalds of Sleat and the MacLeods of Lewis.[14] Huntly failed, and Argyll subdued rather than exterminated. However, his attempts earned Argyll the respect of Mary of Guise, and one can see through his negotiations and alliances with the MacDonalds of Dunyveg a watered-down extension of the regent's policies. Argyll, in his own way, was bringing the remainder of the Highland clans under his authority through bonds and marriage alliances. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that this corresponds with Argyll's first approaches to Calvagh O'Donnell.[15]

In October 1554, a servant of the fourth earl of Argyll left for Ireland.[16] His aim was to meet with Calvagh, the grandson of Aodh Dubh O'Donnell who has already been mentioned. Calvagh was caught up in a struggle for power with his aged and ailing father. It was the

influx of Scots mercenary forces to Tír Conaill under Calvagh that was to be so detrimental, almost resulting in the utter obliteration of the Lordship which had survived against all the odds since the early thirteenth century. Agents of James McDonald, who himself was tied by bond to Argyll, had sought him out offering the military services of their lord.[17] What is particullarly interesting is that Calvagh claimed that this contact was unsolicited. Although one must be sceptical when considering this particular plea of innocence, bearing in mind that it resounded clearly down through generations of Gaelic Irish Lords in their dealings with the English Administration, it would appear that in this instance Calvagh was telling the truth. This in itself gives a more sinister aspect to the events that were to follow. The fourth Earl of Argyll, under the auspices of James MacDonald, was seeking out a means by which to politically involve himself in Ulster. Calvagh O'Donnell first visited Argyll in 1555, securing the force he first used to overthrow his father. Archibald Campbell,[18] the heir to the earldom, as he was in 1555, led the body of Scots engaged by the Treaty of 13 July to Tír Conaill and helped Calvagh seize control from his father. Of particular interest is a Scottish report on the journey of Calvagh to Scotland which records that 'of late Calloughe O'Donell a subject of England, has rebelled, and meaning unnaturally to depose his father O'Donell from his estate, and usurp it, has married the Earl of Argyll's daughter, which earl has sent his own son with many of his men, and money to help him, while James MacDonnell and his brethren with a strong force of men, vessels, and brass ordnance, are in the north of Ireland. These rebels and Scots have not only sieged and taken our castles of Lough Foile, Lyffer, Fynne Doungall, but have burned and spoiled 60 miles compass, and slain many loving subjects, taking besides others the said Calloughe's father, whose unnatural son keeps him prisoner, the Scots keeping the others and the castles.'[19] The new Lord of Tír Conaill was massively indebted to Argyll. Calvagh obtained a territory that was already brought to its knees. The war between Manus and his son had damaged the territory. One very interesting passage in particular states that, 'Tír Conaill, a country both large, profitable, and good, that a ship under sail may come to four of his houses. And by mean of the war which was between him and his father, the country was greatly impoverished and wasted, so as he did banish his father at last and took the rule himself. And now the like was between him and Callough O'Donnell, so as their wars in effect wasted all the whole country.'[20] It was Argyll assistance that enabled Calvagh to capture his

father and subdue Tír Conaill. Strong Scottish backing ensured early control and the annals are quiet about his activities till 1557. However by this stage he was slowly losing the battle against his troublesome and somewhat infamous neighbour, Shane Ó Néill.

All in all, Argyll was playing a curious game of his own, but his offer of assistance in Ulster to William Cecill presented an ideal solution to a difficult situation for the English.[21] Theoretically Argyll would lead a force that would quash Shane Ó Néill, perhaps replacing him with a more acquiescent figure, while his bonds with both Calvagh O'Donnell and the MacDonalds of Antrim would effectively subdue the rest of the province and unequivocally squeeze Shane Ó Néill out. Additionally, it is not impossible that Argyll perceived support for Calvagh to be the best method by which to extend Argyll interests into Ulster. Argyll informed Cecill in August 1560 that regarding an Anglo-Scottish alliance he wished to 'have your honour's [William Cecill] good advice from time to time therein, that I may do for weal of both realms, and content of the Queen's Majesty, to whose highness please commend my humble service.'[22] Elizabeth, in turn, expressed her thanks to Argyll in early September of the same year, informing him that 'we shall not forget the peculiar good will it seemeth that ye beare towards us.'[23] It would appear that Argyll's offer of men and munitions to the English was never utilised. However the administration in Whitehall did not balk at engaging the network of Scottish informants that the Earl was able to draw upon to keep them reliably informed on events in Ulster and the Isles.[24] The timing and the active seeking out of Calvagh leads one to wonder at the extent of Argyll's motives. One could certainly interpret his actions as part of the growing Anglo-Scottish culture coming to the fore in the mid-sixteenth century.[25] Certainly, it was felt that only through the intervention of Argyll, could O'Donnell be convinced to become a faithful subject of the crown.[26] In fact, the employment of his force of redshanks raised no apparent English reaction, and goes far to support the theory that it was an outcome of the negotiations between Argyll and Cecil. Furthermore, one must question the reliability of Argyll in maintaining his part of any agreement with O'Donnell. In this tripartite policy, the protection of Campbell interests, particularly in relation to Argyll's attempts at an Anglo-Scottish alliance, would always remain paramount. It would therefore appear that Calvagh was becoming little more than a pawn in an Anglo-Scottish political power play, a weak and unwitting figure somewhat at the mercy of

his more astute contemporaries. Furthermore, by 1559 Calvagh's position within Tír Conaill had once more become untenable, because he was constantly harried by both Shane O'Neill and his brother Aodh O'Donnell. It would appear that this escalation of tensions once again spurred O'Donnell to turn to Argyll.

The result was the treaty of 1560 between Argyll and O'Donnell, which fits into the category of 'bonds of manrent', an agreement of general obligation.[27] Argyll, in particular, used these bonds to build a system of alliances to forward Campbell interests. Interestingly, the fifth earl, during his lifetime, entered into only one bond of friendship, preferring manrent to bind a number of the Highland chiefs to his allegiance.[28] The 'bond of manrent' set down four particular obligations: it stated the reason for giving the bond, the particular terms of the bond, the reservation of allegiance and ends with the guarantor binding himself, in addition one can note a standard introduction clause, and it is dated and signed.[29] The position that Calvagh found himself raises an interesting point. It emphasises the fact that it is clear that on occasion Gaelic Lords were prepared to sign anything in order to secure these additional forces, knowing the fickle nature of warfare and the fact that they may not hold on to either power or their lives long enough to fulfil the agreement.

Additionally, negotiations surrounding the bond of 1560 also resulted in the marriage of O'Donnell to Catherine McLean.[30] As the widow of the fourth earl, she was a very valuable commodity for Archibald, and clearly Catherine's role as a political stopgap, on the death of her husband, became somewhat obsolete, and she stood at the mercy of her stepson, coming on the market once again as a marriageable interest to be used as a means to further the terms agreed in the aforementioned bond. O'Donnell and Catherine were married on 8th March 1560.[31] In addition, Calvagh agreed to forfeit the dowry lands of MacLean, estimated to be worth £100 sterling, for the supply of a number of redshanks, something that would at a later date gain him much contempt from Tír Conaill.[32] Later in the year, MacLean came to Ireland leading a force of between 1000 and 2000 Scots, a considerable number, to bolster O'Donnell defences.[33] Moreover, it is also noted that Shane O'Neill had employed a force of between 1000 and 1500, although the exact origin of these soldiers is not clear.[34] It appears that a certain amount of posturing was ongoing between these two well-established enemies and a clash was inevitable. The negotiations with Argyll also provided

ordnance for Calvagh's cause, in particular the 'Gonna-Cam'.[35] This piece of equipment was used to destroy the new castle in Inishowen and Castle Eanaigh near Derry.

It therefore is quite startling to grasp the extent to which Calvagh submitted himself to the power of Argyll in return for men and munitions. One must, therefore, again return to the argument that Calvagh was neither astute nor strong enough to replace his father effectively— without Scottish backing he was a relatively weak figure. Shane O'Neill, realizing the potential that lay in Argyll and the possible benefits that could be gained, proposed a formal marriage alliance between the Campbells and O'Neills, his choice falling upon the sister of the Earl of Argyll. Argyll, again still actively courting English support, declined this and unsurprisingly turned to his established ally in Ulster, Calvagh O'Donnell now Lord of Tír Conaill. A force of 1000 redshanks were sent to O'Donnell in an attempt to prevent further O'Neill encroachments on Tír Conaill. Argyll was obviously keen to protect his interests in Tír Conaill, with Calvagh proving less than capable. Calvagh was under immense pressure from O'Neill incursions, yet Tír Connaill had not completely fallen to the domination of Shane. The master-stroke on the part of O'Neill came in May 1561 when he captured O'Donnell and his wife. The position of Catherine McLean prior to May 1561 must be momentarily examined. By all accounts she was unhappy in Tír Conaill, whether it was with Calvagh or simply with the isolation her marriage forced upon her. Thomas Randolphe writes somewhat cryptically to Cecil in December 1560, only five months before the incident at Killydonnell, that Catherine MacLean, 'repentethe the bargayne that she made in Irelande, and as yt is saide, wyll shortly retorne.'[36] Clearly she wished to leave Tír Conaill, although one must note in the same breath that no exact reason is given. In light of this particular revelation, it is necessary to keep to mind the disposition of Catherine when one considers the events and intrigues surrounding the capture of O'Donnell by Shane O'Neill. Calvagh was most embarrassingly captured at Killydonnell Friary, coincidently constructed in 1471 by his namesake, in late May 1561, by Shane O'Neill, along with his wife, Catherine MacLean.[37] This was despite the cumulatively large force, which he appeared to have at his disposal. Indeed, at the time of his capture, Calvagh had little or no protection, displaying a foolhardy level of self-confidence.

The capture of O'Donnell gave to O'Neill, according to the *Annals of the Four Masters*, 'the sovereign command of all Ulster, from Drogheda to

the Erne, so that at this time he might have been called with propriety the provincial King of Ulster, were it not for the opposition of the English to him.'[38] This was not by any means an over-simplification of the Ulster situation. Tír Conaill now lay in the hands of Conn O'Donnell, the son of Calvagh, who quickly proved to be as ineffective as his father. Any opportunity of an attack on Tír Eoghain from the west had dissipated. Moreover, the English administration had failed to ensure MacDonnell military support in any campaign against O'Neill, thus neutralising any attack from the east. The only real opposition remaining to O'Neill in Ulster was the meagre English garrison at Carrickfergus. By removing Calvagh O'Donnell from Tír Conaill, Shane O'Neill caused the alliance against him to collapse inwards, thus securing his position of dominance in Ulster. In his memoir of his service in Ireland, Sidney recounted that following the capture of O'Donnell, O'Neill, 'totally tyrannised, possessing all his castles, which were many and strong, and put under his subjection all the potentates of the same dominion, namely O'Doherty, O'Boyle, O'Gallagher, the three grand captains called MacSweenys of Fanad, Banagh and Ne Do, all which he either held in prision, or let out, detaining their best hostages.' The meagre attempts by the crown to free Calvagh could have been of little comfort to O'Donnell during his captivity. Calvagh was reportedly kept chained on all fours by O'Neill, forced to wear an iron collar around his neck and fastened by a short chain to his ankles, preventing him from either standing or lying, in the bedroom of O'Neill while the latter co-habited with his wife.[39] Although this relationship began brutally, it eventually blossomed. Catherine MacLean bore children with O'Neill and decided to remain with him when Calvagh's release was eventually negotiated. Sir Thomas Cusake wrote to William Cecill that she could stay there until the Scots felt the need to collect her.[40] In the long run all did not bode well for Catherine MacLean. Shane O'Neill had tired of her by 1566, opting instead to form a more lucrative marriage alliance with James McDonnell.[41]

One must now turn to the question as to how Calvagh was so easily captured at least ten miles from the boundaries of his territory. One theory postulated is that Calvagh was yet another victim of family feuding. Cathbharr O'Donnell was at odds with Calvagh and the latter's son Conn at this time. As Calvagh was playing the role of 'sitting duck' at Killydonnell, Conn was attempting to lay siege to the crannog of Loch Betha, once again acting as the location for a hotbed of intrigue and conspiracy. It is not inconceivable that Cathbharr sent word to O'Neill

that Conn was thoroughly tied up almost twenty-five miles from his father, and would have to dash over quite difficult terrain to come to his assistance. It is unclear if O'Neill was the architect of these divisive activities to isolate Calvagh in a weak position, or if he merely took advantage of an extremely propitious situation.

On the other hand William Fitzwilliams informs William Cecill of suspicions that the abduction was actually planned with the assistance of Catherine. He feels that she was certainly astute enough to orchestrate such plot being, 'conted very sober, wyse, and no lesse sotell, being not unlernyd in the Latyn tong, speckyth good French, and as is sayd som lytell Italyone.'[42] This, indeed, would go some way to explain the ease with which O'Neill captured Calvagh and the surprising lack of a personal bodyguard at Killydonnell. The position itself was vulnerable to attack. The monastery was located in a hollow surrounded by a sharp incline on one side and the tidal estuary of the Swilly on the other. Even to the present day, the area maintains a heavy covering of woodland. Escape by boat was impossible for a large part of the day, while an attacker had the advantage of height while approaching via land. All in all, it was a strategically weak position and, given the political temperature of the time, a foolish place to venture without a substantial force and well placed sentries on all approaches. Calvagh appears to have been lacking all of these. What remains is the perhaps unanswerable question, was it all contrived?

Therefore, the role of Catherine MacLean in the whole affair is puzzling. She was disliked in Tír Conaill. Thomas Cusake in particular commented that Calvagh, 'had neither estimation, wealth, obedience or love of his people and kynred but contrarywyse vilipended and hated amongs them, partly for that when he toke to wife the Conties of Argyle, he dyd gyve to therle of Argyle that now is, for his ayde and friendship one hundred pounds, sterling, yearlye by way of tribute, besides the remission of the said Countesses revenuewe in Scotlande.'[43] In Scotland Catherine MacLean was seen as an unwitting victim of the whole affair between O'Donnell and O'Neill, drawn into a centuries old feud between the two families. One can obviously not question the fact that she was a highly educated woman by medieval standards. It is likely that she was well versed in the male dominated political world of the sixteenth century. One must tentatively put forward the theory that she played a part in the capture of Calvagh, although it does prove impossible to deduce the extent of her involvement. What remains is the fact that Catherine MacLean chooses to remain with O'Neill after

O'Donnell had been freed and eventually married and bore the former a number of children. Could Catherine have chosen to deviate from her original role without the knowledge of Argyll and thus remain with O'Neill? This in itself is questionable, as after the deaths of both Calvagh and Shane O'Neill she returned to Scotland to yet another politically motivated marriage, this time to John Stewart of Appin, one of Archibald Campbell's most trusted advisors.[44] If one adopts the attitude that Catherine MacLean was highly trained, groomed for marriage in order to secure valuable alliances, but yet always remained loyal to her first lord and master, we are left with a very difficult situation to interpret. One need only consider the danger of a wife who was inclined to primarily follow the orders of the head of her family. If this assessment is true, then one must consider Catherine MacLean as a 'matrimonial mercenary', and easily one of the most dangerous 'weapons' in the Argyll arsenal during this period.

The release of Calvagh O'Donnell from O'Neill captivity in 1564, after almost three years of confinement, marked the beginning of the end for the twenty-second O'Donnell Lord of Tír Conaill. Physically defeated, Calvagh was now to be mentally broken. Even with the eventual 'capitulation' of O'Neill in the matter of the imprisonment of Calvagh, the former comes out victorious with O'Donnell being ransomed, on terms which included handing over the castle at Lifford and adjoining land.[45] This appears not to have been paid in full, with O'Neill using its redemption as an excuse to raid Tír Conaill in June 1564.[46] By July of the same year the terms had further extended to include Castlefinn.[47] The further imprisonment of Calvaghs son, Conn by O'Neill, served to rub salt in already aggravated wounds. In late 1564, following his release, Calvagh wrote to Elizabeth to outline his grievances. He claimed that over 4500 people under his authority in Tír Conaill had perished at the hands of O'Neill and his followers [since O'Donnell had succeeded]. He also requested financial aid from the queen to allow him to furnish his forces for battle against O'Neill and prevent any further depredations. Elizabeth ordered Sidney that O'Donnell was to be restored to his position in Tír Conaill, but interestingly noted that this could only realistically be achieved through the 'conformity' of O'Neill. Above all this is a telling assessment of the position of O'Donnell within Ulster and indeed within his own territory.

From this point the Scottish hold over Tír Conaill was absolute. Calvagh O'Donnell was succeeded by his brother Hugh who went on

to marry An Inghean Dubh, Finoula MacDonald, the niece of the fifth
Earl of Argyll. She repeatedly and unequivocally removed any oppo-
sition or threat to her son's political future, forging unbreakable links
between Tír Conaill and Scotland. This is a trend that was replicated
right across the north of Ireland. In Tír Eoghain Turlough Luineach
O'Neill married Lady Agnes Campbell, nominally securing most of the
North. In addition, large scale Scottish settlement to the east was vis-
ible, in particular in the Glens of Antrim by the MacDonnells, further
serving to ensure Scottish dominance and constituting a third stage of
settlement by Scots mercenary forces.

The use of Scots mercenaries suited both the Irish condition and the
Irish political climate. Yet, to many, the idea of a mercenary and the
type of service he engaged in seems almost alien and a touch distaste-
full. Yet the mercenary, paid soldier or hired man appears right though
history—he is no random occurance or anomaly. Greek mercenaries
fought for the Persian Empire during the early classical era. The Emper-
ors and generals of the fourth century Roman Empire were forced to
contract whole bands of 'barbarians' either within established legions or
as autonomous *foederati*. Perhaps most famously, the Byzantine Empire
recruited the Varangian Guard. They were entrusted with the protec-
tion of the Emperor and Empire—as they did not have any connection
with the Greeks they were expected to be ready to supress any hint of
rebellion quickly and ferociously. This emphasises the belief that only
an outside force with no territorial or dynastic connections, un-biased
by local politics could form a truly loyal and incorruptable force. In
European warfare mercenaries were an accepted, and in many cases,
an almost essential element of military engagements.

This evolution of the role of the Scots mercenary force in the six-
teenth century caused the development of a semi-politicised mercenary
ideal that ultimately aided the destabilisation of the north of Ireland.
Irish warfare was inconceivable without Scots mercenary involvement.
Given the tumultuous political climate in both Ireland and Scotland
in the sixteenth century it is largely unsurprising that Scots mercenary
involvement in Ireland became so politically motivated.

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

[1] See Attached Map.

[2] John Barbour, *The Bruce* ed. W.M. MacKenzie (London, 1909), 444–5; M.K. Simms, 'Warfare in the Medieval Gaelic Lordships', *The Irish Sword* 12, (1975/6), 98.

[3] R. Stanihurst, *De Rebus in Hibernia gestis Libri IV* 4 vols (Antwerp, 1584), 1. 14.

[4] G. Hill, *Historical Account of the Mac Donnells of Antrim* (Belfast, 1873), 187.

[5] P. Walsh, *Leabhar Chlainne Suibhne*, (Dublin, 1920).

[6] B. Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century* (Oxford, 1979), 16.

[7] K. Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland in the Middle Ages* (Dublin, 2003), 162.

[8] S. Ellis, *Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485–1725* (London, 1995), 59.

[9] 1558 also saw the death of Catholic Queen Mary and the succession of Protestant Elizabeth—the two monarchies could therefore no longer rely on the unifying force of religion.

[10] J. Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots: a Study in Failure* (London, 1991), 81.

[11] Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots*, 83.

[12] The marriage between Mary and Francois, the dauphin, took place on 24 April 1558.

[13] Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots*, 89.

[14] J.L. Roberts, *Feuds, Forays and Rebellions* (Edinburgh, 1999), 57.

[15] Archibald Campbell, 4th Earl of Argyll.

[16] J.B. Paul (ed.), *Accounts of the Lord High Treasurer of Scotland 1551–59* Vol. X (Edinburgh, 1913), Oct. 1554, 239.

[17] State Papers, Ireland, Mary, Vol. I. 1553–1557, No. 7, 'Agents of Lord James M'Donnell [M'Connell] of the Isles of Scotland to the Calough O'Donnell, soliciting an interview and offering aid and assistance to him. The Lord Donald will give him further intelligence as to their object in coming.'

[18] The son of Archibald the 4th earl. This Archibald was to succeed as the fifth earl in 1558.

[19] State Papers, Scotland, Vol. 1., 1547–1563, 410.

[20] J.S. Brewer and William Bullen (eds), Calendar of the Carew manuscripts preserved in the archiepiscopal library at Lambeth, 1515–(1628) (6 vols, London, 1867–1873), 1. (1515–74), 245.

[21] J. Dawson, *The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary, Queen of Scots* (Cambridge, 2002), 106.

[22] State Papers, Scotland, Vol. I. 1547–1562, No. 887.

[23] State Papers, Scotland, Vol. I. 1547–1562, No. 900.

[24] M. MacCraith, 'The Gaelic reaction to the Reformation,' in S.G. Ellis and S. Barber (eds), *Conquest and Union, Fashioning a British State, 1485–1725* (London, 1995), 141.

[25] This process is discussed fully by Jane Dawson in 'Anglo-Scottish protestant culture and integration in sixteenth century Britain', in Barber and Ellis, *Conquest and Union*, 87–114.

[26] State Papers, Scotland, Vol. 1, 1555–6, No. 721.

[27] The Treaty was a renewal of that first made on 13 July 1555. This is particularly interesting as it is the only existing 'bond of manrent', a distinctly Scottish form of agreement, that is used in an agreement with an Irish chief.

[28] Roberts, Feuds, Forays and Rebellions, 61.

[29] J. Wormald, *Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent, 1442–1603* (Edinburgh, 1985), 53.

[30] Catherine MacLean, a daughter of Hector Mór MacLean of Duart, was utilised primarily in Scotland as a political tool. She was the third wife of Archibald Campbell, the fourth earl of Argyll. The two were married on 12 December 1545 as part of an attempt to end the ongoing feud between the MacLeans and the Campbells.

This attempt at reconciliation between the two families was further cemented at the beginning of 1558 with a similar wedding between Janet, the sister of fifth earl of Argyll, and Hector Óg, the son of Hector Mór. Both these women played a political role, providing a sense of unity between the two families.

[31] Dawson, *Politics of Religion*, 105 n. 108.
[32] See page ooo.
[33] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. II. 1560, No. 12.
[34] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. II. 1560, No. 12.
[35] AFM, 1555.
[36] State Papers, Scotland, Vol. I. 1547–1562, No. 934.
[37] AFM, 1471: State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. III, 1561, No. 76; AFM, 1559.
[38] AFM, 1561.
[39] R. Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, 3 vols (London, 1963), 2. 54.
[40] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. X. 1564, No. 51.
[41] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. XVII. 1566, No. 13.
[42] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. III. 1561, No. 84.
[43] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. XI. 1564, No. 3.
[44] Roberts, Feuds, Forays and Rebellions, 61.
[45] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. X. 1564, No. 51.
[46] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. XI. 1564, No. 1.
[47] State Papers, Ireland, Elizabeth, Vol. XI. 1564, No. 26.

The Sub-Chieftainships of Sixteenth Century Tír Conaill

THE IRISH MERCENARY TRADITION IN THE 1600s

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> The more Irish officers in the Austrian service the better; our troops will always be disciplined; an Irish coward is an uncommon character; and what the natives of Ireland even dislike from principle, they generally will perform through a desire for glory.[1]

Whilst this quotation from the papers of the Holy Roman Emperor Francis I (1745–65) postdates the immediate chronological period of this paper somewhat, it can however be taken as indicative of the Irish mercenary experience—and the attitudes towards Irish mercenaries—in Europe during the Early Modern period. It is hoped that what follows will in some small way show that Irish mercenaries were often worthy of such exalted praise.

The Irish mercenary tradition in the seventeenth century can reasonably be described as singularly unique. Whilst other peoples, such as the Scots and the Swiss, were recognised for their mercenary activity, what characterises the Irish experience is the breadth and extent of their involvement: put simply, the Irish were to be found at this period serving in greater numbers, under more varied colours, than any other national group. This paper is intended to explain the background to, and nature of, this mercenary tradition. Due to the considerable size of the subject matter, those examples have been chosen which, it is felt, best demonstrate the nature of the Irish mercenary tradition in the broad sweep of the seventeenth century.

The backdrop to the Irish mercenary tradition during the early seventeenth century is succinctly summarised by Gráinne Henry: 'Migration to European armies from 1586…was…closely linked to a wider pattern of migration from Ireland. It was both a method promoted by the Tudor administration in Ireland to encourage social and political stability and a response by many different people to a political and economic structure which failed to accommodate them.'[2] As suggested in this passage, the first notable movement of Irish troops into foreign mercenary service occurred towards the end of the sixteenth century, specifically in the aftermath of the defeat of the Desmond rebellion

in 1583 and the subsequent poor harvests in the devastated province. In 1586, Sir William Stanley oversaw the levying of more than 1,000 soldiers from Ireland to take part in an English expedition being sent by Queen Elizabeth to aid the rebel northern provinces of the Netherlands which were then at war with Spain. Stanley's regiment was composed of Irish, Scots, and Englishmen, with more than half this number being Irish Catholics with previous service in either the Elizabethan Army in Ireland or the forces of Gaelic chieftains. Having arrived in the Netherlands (Spanish Flanders) by August 1586, Stanley's regiment saw service at Dixmude, Gravelines, and Zutphen, before going into winter quarters at Deventer. However, in January 1587, Stanley—an English Catholic—surrendered the garrison to Spanish forces and changed sides. The regiment thereafter served Spain until 1600, when tensions between the rank-and-file and their predominantly English officers led to a short-lived mutiny after which the Irish continued in Spanish service, albeit in independent companies under the command of Irish captains.

With the end of the Nine Years War in Ireland in 1603, and the subsequent Flight of the Earls and Plantation of Ulster, many Irishmen were sidelined by the new Stuart settlement of the country. The political and social changes ushered in by the new (Stuart) administration served to exclude vast numbers of Gaelic and Old Irish noblemen and professional swordsmen. These men—veterans of years of warfare, and hostile to the New English settlement of the country—posed a potential military threat to social stability.

It is here that the particular nature of the Irish mercenary tradition can be seen—the state (in this instance the Stuart administration) sponsoring the recruitment of Irishmen for foreign service and what might be termed the 'private' or unofficial recruitment of Irishmen for foreign service, most manifest in this period by the Irishmen who followed the Earl of Tyrone into exile, specifically into the Irish regiment of Colonel Henry O'Neill, formed in 1605 from the aforementioned independent Irish companies and additional Irishmen. However, although this bolstering of the Irish presence in the Spanish Army of Flanders took place in the aftermath of the collapse of Gaelic power in Ireland following the Nine Years War, it should be borne in mind that again, as was the case with the raising of Stanley's regiment, the raising of the Irish regiment in 1605 took place with the official co-operation of the Stuart authorities. This can be explained by the fact that negotiations for the raising of troops in the British Isles for service in both Spanish

Flanders and the United Provinces of the Netherlands took place in early 1605, under the terms of the Anglo-Spanish Peace of 1604—it should be noted that the English authorities did recognise that any Irish recruited were unlikely to serve the Protestant Dutch against the Catholic Spanish.[3] However, unlike the earlier recruiting for Stanley's regiment, the levying of troops as negotiated by the Spanish Ambassador to England in April 1605 was to be conducted by Irish contracting officers from the Spanish Army in Flanders. Somewhere in the region of 800–1,000 Irishmen were recruited for the Spanish service, which was actually considerably in excess of the number initially agreed.

The position of the Irish regiment of Henry O'Neill, as it stood from 1605 onwards, is interesting in that it demonstrates something of the hybrid manner in which certain bodies of Irish mercenary troops were established. As stated, official Spanish recruiting was permitted by the Stuart authorities. In addition, the regiment also absorbed those independent Irish companies which had formed in Spanish Flanders following the short-lived mutiny of the Irish Catholic element of Stanley's regiment. In fact, although Henry O'Neill was the son of the Earl of Tyrone, he had sought the approval of King James I to assume his command—according to the English ambassador in Brussels—and expressed a 'great desire to employ myself in his majesties service' in a letter of December 1605 to the Earl of Salisbury.[4] However, it is likely that the eighteen year old Henry was following this course of action at the behest of both his father and the Spanish monarch, as Tyrone had not yet left Ireland, and was therefore still politically hedging his bets, while the Spanish government had no desire to jeopardise the Anglo-Spanish Peace of 1604.

The number of Irish regiments in Spanish service expanded after 1605, with five more being formed between the years 1632 and 1646. Despite the fact that these regiments, following the Flight of the Earls, became increasingly politically radicalised in that their members saw themselves as constituting an Irish nation overseas, and nervous English observers regarded them as real military threat, the decades prior to the outbreak of the wars of the Confederacy and the English Civil War saw the Stuart government continue effectively to 'export' potential troublemakers into foreign-based mercenary service.

The most notable potential troublemaker—Owen Roe O'Neill, the future Confederate commander in Ireland—gained his initial military experience in the Spanish service, specifically in the Irish regiment of his kinsman Henry O'Neill from 1606. Prior to returning to Ireland

after the outbreak of the Ulster Rising of 1641, his most celebrated
achievement was his dogged defence of the town of Arras in 1640—with
some 1,500 soldiers of his regiment—against a besieging French force
numbering some 80,000 men. His years of mercenary service under the
Spanish were to stand him in good stead when he assumed command
of the Royalist-Catholic forces of the Irish Confederacy in the period
1642–1649, during which he somewhat ironically fought against Scots
veterans of Continental mercenary service.

France

The first instance of Irish troops in the French service during the
seventeenth century is encountered in 1614, where some 200 of them
formed a regiment in the private army of Concini, Cardinal Richelieu's
predecessor as prime minister. It is perhaps worth mentioning that there
were Irish troops in similar 'private service' within the French sphere
of influence, namely the private armies of the Prince de Condé and
the Duc de Lorraine. These Irish in the French service during the early
1600s were part of the larger number who had fled to France in the
period 1605–07. The migrants (or more properly refugees) congregated
in Paris, Nantes, Angers, Morlaix, Saint-Malo, Rouen and also in Nor-
mandy and Anjou. However, the several thousand Irish who descended
on France at this time were doing so primarily to seek short term relief
from the devastation back home, and many of them were merely pass-
ing through France on their way to Spanish Flanders; certainly, official
concerns about social unrest were such that that they received every
encouragement to leave French territory.

   However, the principal influx of Irish troops into French service
during the 1600s dates from 1635, when two regiments comprising
ten companies of one hundred men each were formed under colonels
Cullen (Viscount of Coosle) and O'Reilly. Interestingly, the negotiations
concerning the formation of the O'Reilly regiment were conducted
between O'Reilly and the French ambassador to London, the Marquis
de Pougny, in late 1634.[5] These two regiments were followed over the
next five years by those of Sinnott, Crosbie, Bellings, Wall and Fitzwil-
liam. Despite frequent reports of disciplinary problems with the Irish
regiments,—a dubious honour they shared with German mercenary
cavalry—their fighting qualities were recognised and they were permit-
ted to set up a *conseil de guerre* of seven senior Irish officers to try one

of their own who was charged with having authorised extortion and violence carried out by the men under his command.[6] Such was the value that Cardinal Richelieu attached to Irish mercenaries that in 1638 he attempted unsuccessfully to encourage the Irish regiments of Tyrone and Tyrconnell in the Spanish service to desert to France. A French account of 1644 is worth quoting as it gives some indication of how Irish mercenaries were regarded:

> 'The Irish carry a scquine or Turkish dagger, which they dart very adroitly at fifteen paces distance; and have this advantage, that if they remain masters of the field of battle there remains no enemy, and if they are routed they fly in such a manner that it is impossible to catch them. I have seen an Irishman with ease accomplish twenty-five miles a day. They march to battle with the bagpipes instead of fifes, but they have few drums and they use the musket and cannon as we do. They are better soldiers abroad than at home.'[7]

It is estimated that approximately some 10,000 men passed through the ranks of the Irish regiments in the French service during the period 1635–1664. It is noteworthy that the Irish regiments changed with the establishment under French protection of the court-in-exile of Charles II (1660–85), as this saw the formation of some four additional Irish regiments of infantry and cavalry, and the incorporation of some of the previously levied units. It is likely that the young Stuart monarch recalled the exemplary service given to the Royalist cause by the Marquis of Montrose's Irish Brigade in Scotland in 1644–45, during the Civil War.

In keeping with tradition, these Irish regiments of Charles II refused to serve France when she allied with Cromwellian England in 1656, transferring their allegiance to Spain. This was to a certain degree a period of confusion for Irish mercenary troops, with the uncertain position of the exiled House of Stuart and the uncomfortable realities of European power politics. For example, the Spanish-Irish regiment of Colonel Richard Grace defected to the French during its defence of the town of Gerona in Catalonia in 1653; Philip McHugh O'Reilly's regiment in the Spanish service was temporarily disbanded in 1655 when O'Reilly was accused of conspiring with agents of the Cromwellian government, and ultimately disbanded when it mutinied after the disaster of the Battle of the Dunes in 1658, where it fought as part of Charles II's army-in-exile. With the Stuart monarch's restoration, these regiments were soon disbanded—the retention of bodies of Catholic Irish troops being politically unacceptable. Until the Glorious Revolution

of 1688 and subsequent War of the Two Kings, there were no further
Irish regiments in the French service, with the notable exception of that
which Count George Hamilton was permitted to raise in 1671 by the
government, for service under the French during their war against the
Dutch. This regiment was disbanded with the cessation of hostilities
in 1678, having provided a nursery of arms for Patrick Sarsfield—the
future Jacobite commander and Marshal of France who would lead
the famed Wild Geese into European exile.

<center>AUSTRIA</center>

One of the primary attractions for Irishmen in entering the service of
the Holy Roman Empire in this period was the Catholicism of the rul-
ing dynasty and the fact that the Habsburgs were at that time fighting
for their political survival against predominantly Protestant foes dur-
ing the Thirty Years War. A detachment of Irish troops fought for the
Imperials at the earliest engagement of the conflict—the Battle of the
White Mountain at Prague in 1620—and the contemporary account
kept by the Irish Jesuit Henry FitzSimon makes specific mention of
Captain Sorley MacDonnell and Colonel Edward Fitzgerald as being
present.[8] Apart from Catholicism, one of the reasons why the Irish
were popular as mercenaries—and as mercenary commanders—was
their knowledge of Latin, which particularly in the multi-national
Holy Roman Empire was still the primary means of communication.
Major-General Count Oliver Wallis of Carrickmines, County Dublin, is
indicative of the Irish mercenary commanders in the Imperial service,
in that he raised and commanded four regiments of German infantry
between 1644 and 1667. Wallis was typical of the Irish presence in
the Imperial service as it had become untenable to replenish with Irish
recruits those regiments which had become depleted after the initial
engagements of the Thirty Years War.

  The single event for which the Irish in Imperial service are most
remembered is their part in the assassination of the controversial impe-
rial general Albrecht von Wallenstein, on 25th February 1634 at Eger in
Bohemia. Wallenstein, having fallen out of favour with the Emperor, was
assassinated by a group of Irish and Scots officers, the killing blow being
struck by one Walter Devereux, who was rewarded with some 40,000
gulden; the most senior Irish officer involved—Walter Butler—was

promoted to the proprietorship of his regiment and rewarded with an estate valued at some 225,000 gulden, elevation to the rank of Count and appointment as Lord Chamberlain.[9] A kinsman of Walter Butler's who saw service with the Poles and Imperials, Colonel James Butler, had served at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620, and was noted for the prominent part he played in the defence of Frankfurt-an-der-Oder in April 1631, where his regiment of Irishmen inflicted severe losses on the élite Blue and Yellow brigades of the Swedish army, before being annihilated (Butler was taken prisoner). A fitting tribute to these Irishmen was paid by the great Scots mercenary commander Robert Monro when he stated that 'truly, had all the rest stood to it as well as the Irish did, we had returned with great loss, and without victory.'[10] James Butler soon after raised a dragoon regiment for Imperial service, whilst returning to the Polish service in 1632, where he had been naturalised in 1627, having served there since 1619. As can be seen, the Irish mercenary experience in the Imperial service, was, like that of the Spanish service, only more so, characterised by the extent to which family networks and links were apparent, particularly among the commanding officers.

Irish regiments did make a brief reappearance in Imperial service during the late 1600s, when King William III (1689–1702) sought, like previous English governments, to remove potential troublemakers from his realm. Two regiments were formed, the first in 1689 from former Irish troops of King James II's English Army, and the second in 1692 from Irish troops taken prisoner after the surrender of Limerick. Both regiments were intended for service on the Hungarian frontier against the Ottomans, but although some 4,000 men in total were transported, widespread desertion and discontent at serving an enemy of France saw both regiments disbanded in 1690 and 1693 respectively. However, the remaining Irish were divided out amongst various other Imperial infantry regiments, and eventually saw service in Hungary. One of the most notable Irish mercenary commanders to serve the Empire in the late 1600s was Francis Taafe, subsequently fourth Earl of Carlingford, who gained fame for the part he played in the Ottoman campaigns of the 1680s, most notably the 1683 siege and relief of Vienna and the 1686–87 siege of Buda (at both of which other Irishmen participated). He attained significant rank during his career, being ennobled, made a field marshal, a knight of the Golden Fleece, and prime minister of the Duchy of Lorraine.

POLAND & SWEDEN

The recruitment of Irish mercenaries into the Swedish service in the early 1600s was directly linked to the English government's desire to ensure the security of the Plantation of Ulster, by removing those 'idle swordsmen' who were veterans of the Nine Years War. Consequently, of the up to 6,000 men sent into Sweden in the period 1609 to 1613, the majority of those levied came from Ulster. It was not just former veterans of the war who were sent but also any others who it was felt might pose a threat to the New English settlement of the province: prisons in Ulster were emptied of their inmates for transportation to Sweden. So effective was this policy seen to have been, that senior English government administrators felt that Lord Deputy Sir Arthur Chichester had 'left the province of Ulster in more complete peace and obedience than has ever been seen since the Conquest.'[11]

However, as previously demonstrated, Irish Catholic mercenaries had an aversion to serving a Protestant monarch, particularly when that monarch was at war with a Catholic opponent, in this case the King of Poland. In fact, some of the Irish being transported to Sweden actually mutinied in October 1609, under the leadership of one of the O'Neill family, and others bound for Sweden are known to have made their way to the Spanish Army of Flanders. The English government and diplomatic authorities became uncomfortably aware that Irish clergymen and officers from Flanders were conducting a campaign to undermine the recruitment of troops for the Swedish service, and covertly seeking to encourage desertion.[12] This campaign bore fruit when seven companies of Irish troops deserted to the Polish service in 1610—the men of two other companies were executed in reprisal for this act by the enraged Swedes. Ironically, these men were subsequently dismissed by King Sigismond III in 1613. It is here that the complicated nature of shifting allegiances in groups of Irish mercenaries becomes apparent. The exiled Earl of Tyrone petitioned King Philip III of Spain (1598–1621) to allow these troops to be taken onto the strength of the Irish regiment in the Army of Spanish Flanders, now commanded by another of his sons, John.[13] Tyrone was successful in his petition, and it is worth bearing in mind that many of these soldiers, coming as they did from Ulster, would have been kith and kin of the Earl himself. It would also not be blindly speculative to suggest that the route these Irish troops took into the Spanish service—via Sweden and Poland—may have been engineered by Tyrone and his agents on the Continent.

Certainly, it is an unusual coincidence that clergymen and military officers from Spanish Flanders were responsible for the large scale desertion from the Swedish service, and that Tyrone was ready and well placed to petition Philip III when these same troops were later dismissed from the Polish service. It is possible that similar tactics were employed to encourage desertion from Poland, as the Irish regiment in Spanish Flanders became a primary focus for Tyrone's ambitions following his departure from Ireland in 1607. Evidence of behind-the-scenes manoeuvrings can be found in a letter written by the English ambassador at Brussels, to the English ambassador at Madrid: 'Our Irishe, having added some experience to their valour, thinke all the world is not comparable to themselves for the warrs. And to the ende thei may keepe their troopes on foote, to make use of any opportunitie w[hich] our negligence may offer them, thei have, by ye [the] councell and approbation of Spaine, sent one Conor-og-Oreilli to command their troupes in Poland, and to keepe them togeather until they may do us a mischief in Ireland.'[14]

A 1631 German description of Irish soldiers in the Swedish service is worth quoting for a contemporary view: 'The Irrländer are strong enduring people, contented with plain (or little) food; when they have no bread, they can endure hunger for three of four days, feeding instead on water, crests, roots and grass: when necessary they can walk more than twenty miles a day.'[15] This view of the Irish must be taken in the context of how advantageous it would have been for an army of the early to mid-seventeenth century to have had such self-reliant troops who would not be a burden on the rudimentary military supply systems as they then existed. Not only were the Irish effective fighters, but from the viewpoint of their employers, there was further advantage in the fact that they were cheap to feed and maintain in the field.

Such was the reputation that Irishmen in the Swedish service gained for desertion, that in 1631 King Gustavus Adolphus (1611–32) declared that he would no longer accept Irish recruits—however, such desertion can be attributed to their unwillingness to serve a Protestant monarch, particularly one so noted for his opposition to the Catholic Habsburgs. An obvious parallel can be drawn here with the unwillingness of the Irishmen of Stanley's regiment to serve against Catholic Spain in the late 1580s. However, despite this reputation for desertion, individual Irishmen did continue to serve Sweden during the 1600s, most notable among them being the Protestant Hamiltons of County Tyrone, whom we might more properly term Scots-Irish or Ulster Scots. One of this

family—Hugh Hamilton—ended his service as master-general of the
Swedish artillery in 1662, and both of his nephews attained the rank
of general and were ennobled.[16]

   The extent of continuity in the manner in which Irish mercenar-
ies were recruited for foreign service is demonstrated by the fact that
even Oliver Cromwell, following his suppression of the Catholic-Roy-
alist forces of the Irish Confederacy, continued the Crown's previous
policy of exporting Irish mercenaries abroad. Again, this was in order
to ensure the security of the political settlement of the country by
removing potential troublemakers and those regarded as being outside
the confines of the new order. The Parliamentary Surveyor Sir Wil-
liam Petty, in his contemporary 'Down Survey', estimated that some
34,000 Irishmen were exported by the Cromwellian administration into
the Spanish and French services in the period 1651–54. In addition
to this figure, Lieutenant General Edmund Ludlow and the military
commissioners of Parliament claimed that they sent 13,000 men to
Spain in the year 1652 alone.[17] Indeed, despite the fact that the last
Irish garrison, at Cloughoughter Castle in Co. Cavan, stubbornly
held out until April 1653, they were granted notably generous terms
of surrender, whereby they were permitted to enter into the Spanish
Army of Flanders as part of the 5,000 strong levy agreed upon by a
consortium of parliamentarian officers and the Spanish ambassador
to London—this despite the fact that they were commanded by Philip
McHugh O'Reilly, one of the original Ulster rebel leaders of 1641,
and a kinsman of Owen Roe O'Neill.[18]

   An account of an incident involving Irish troops in the Spanish
service and a noted mercenary of this period, the Prince de Condé, is
perhaps worth mentioning. The incident in question occurred in 1654,
when Condé was inspecting the regiment of the aforementioned Colonel
Philip McHugh O'Reilly, then in Spanish Flanders having been the last
Irish force under arms to surrender to the Cromwellians. Coming to
the guard of the regimental colours, Condé was challenged in Irish and
had a pike levelled at his chest. Not understanding, Condé asked an
Irish officer to explain what was meant, to which the sentry replied: 'A
prince that has followed the profession of arms so many years should
know that even friends are not allowed to come up to the regimental
colours until they have asked and obtained permission.'[19]

   It is a fitting tribute to the Irish mercenaries of the seventeenth cen-
tury, and evidence of how the morale of these men does not appear
to have been affected—despite thirteen years of war and military

defeat—that their professional pride and *esprit de corps* had remained intact. Taking into account the thousands of Irishmen who passed through the ranks of the various Irish regiments that served throughout the 1600s, it is not fantastic to suggest that several hundred thousand Irish followed the mercenary profession during this period. The extent and range of Irish mercenary activity during the 1600s needs to be also viewed in the context of the wider Irish community in Europe; namely the Irish centres of ecclesiastical and academic learning (such as the Irish colleges at Salamanca and Paris); the Irish merchant communities in ports and banking centres, and the Irish diplomats who served numerous European princes.

To conclude then, what can be said of the Irish mercenary tradition during the 1600s? That it was a hybrid thing due to the combination of state-sponsored recruiting and private enterprise seems clear. Stemming from this is the inescapable fact that the manner of mercenary recruitment and where these mercenaries served was closely linked to the political considerations of the English government; but also, in parallel to this, is the fact that the makeup and character of Irish mercenary units in Europe was influenced by the political and religious considerations of those who made up their rank and file and more particularly their commanders, whose personal views often sharply contrasted with those English administrators who sought to rid Ireland of 'idle swordsmen'. Finally, perhaps a simple and straightforward consideration regarding the experiences of Irish mercenaries should not be overlooked, and this is that is should be borne in mind that despite the political and economic factors dealt with, and the personal and group considerations which motivated these Irishmen, it might well be argued that—to echo the words of the Emperor Francis I—they were motivated by a "desire for glory". The sheer numbers of Irishmen who served in the wars of the seventeenth century, their noted effectiveness in battle and their willingness to fight, often to the death, would indicate that this factor—what might be termed the love of war—may well have been, more so than anything else, the most important.

Notes

[1] Quoted in McGinn, Brian, 'St. Patrick's Day in Vienna, 1766', *Irish Roots Magazine* 1 (1996), 10–11.

[2] G. Henry, 'Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders: the first generation 1586–1610', *Irish Sword*, 17 (1989), 193.

³ William Nuse to Salisbury, 8 Jan. 1606, *H.M.C. Salisbury MSS*, 18.11; Sir William Browne to Viscount L'Isle, 2 Nov. 1605, *H.M.C. D'Isle and Dudley MSS*, 223. See also 3 Mar. 1606, *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1603–6*, 412–3.

⁴ J.I. Casway, 'Henry O'Neill and the formation of the Irish regiment in the Netherlands 1605', *Irish Historical Studies* 18 (1972–3), 486–7.

⁵ P. Gouhier, 'Mercenaires Irlandais au service de la France (1635–1664)', *Irish Sword*, 7 (1965–6), 58.

⁶ See D. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, 2001), 307–8.

⁷ De la Boullaye le Gouz, quoted by M.G. McLaughlin, *The Wild Geese: The Irish Brigades of France and Spain* (London, 1980), 4.

⁸ H. FitzSimon, 'Diary of the Bohemian War,' in E.I. Hogan (ed.), *Words of Comfort to Persecuted Catholics*, (Dublin 1881), 272.

⁹ It is interesting to note that Count Claus von Stauffenberg (1907–44), the officer at the centre of the unsuccessful July 1944 Bomb Plot against Hitler, was descended from Walter Butler, through his great-grandmother, Eleonore, Countess Butler von Clonebough (1807–61).

¹⁰ R. Monro, *His Expedition with the worthy Scots Regiment (called Mac-Keyes Regiment) levied in August 1626* (London, 1637), 34.

¹¹ Davies to Salisbury, 30 Sep. 1609, *Cal. S.P. Ire.*, 1608–10, p. 292.

¹² Ibid., 19 Oct. 1609, *Cal. S. P. Ire.*, 1608–10, p. 300; Richard Moore to Salisbury, end 1611, *Cal. S.P. Ire., 1611–14*, pp. 184–5.

¹³ O'Neill to Philip III, 16 May 1613, M. Walsh, 'Last Years' *Irish Sword*, 8 (1967–8), 234; M. MacCurtain, 'Fondo Santa Sede', *Archivum Hibernicum*, 26 (1963), 42.

¹⁴ Trumbull to Digbye, 20 Aug. 1611, *Cal. S.P. Ire.*, 1611–14.

¹⁵ Quoted in Henry, *Wild Geese*, 23.

¹⁶ H. Murtagh, 'Irish Soldiers Abroad, 160–1800,' in T. Bartlett and K. Jreffery *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996), 304.

¹⁷ Parliamentary Commissioners to the council of state, 15 Jan. 1652, in R. Dunlop (ed.), *Ireland under the Commonwealth* 2 vols (Manchester, 1913), 2. 310.

¹⁸ Ibid., 2.336.

¹⁹ 'De Haeresis Anglicae Intrusione et Progressu et de bello Catholico 1641 coepto & c.', quoted in H.F. McClintock, *Old Irish and Highland Dress* (Dundalk, 1943), 92–3.

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